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The field of ethnic conflict studies is dominated by top-down approaches and elite-centric 
analyses that emphasise the social construction of group grievances, fears and hatreds, and 
that highlight the central role played by political entrepreneurs in the manipulation of 
ethnicity and the organisation of violence. Whilst offering valuable explanations of the 
macro-context of conflict, existing theories obscure local level agency and oversimplify the 
nature and dynamics of violence on the ground. The aerial perspective creates the illusion of 
homogenous ethnic groups waging battle along a clearly defined and stable cleavage line, and 
it fails to account for localised manipulations of, and individualised resistance to, the macro-
ethnic divide.  
 
This thesis offers a view of violence from below, complexifying, problematising, and 
nuancing existing theories through a close-grained, thick descriptive analysis of a particular 
case. A detailed ethnographic exploration of the localised dimensions of the 2007-2008 post-
election crisis in Kenya reveals socio-spatial variations in violence dynamics, as well as 
localised and individualised contradictions in involvement and participation, that are not 
easily explained by the dominant perspective. It argues that territories with a clear ethnic 
majority experienced more intense violence than ethnically mixed spaces, which remained 
relatively calm and demonstrated greater levels of inter-ethnic cooperation. It further 
highlights the ambiguities of individual involvement, arguing that local level actors can 
transcend the meta-narrative of ethnic animosity for a variety of reasons and in a variety of 
ways.  
 
The thesis concludes that cases of ethnic conflict are not marked by singularity and 
uniformity, but rather by multi-vocality and complexity. They are not coherent and singular 
conflicts but rather are constituted by multiple locally-ethnicised clashes. Thus, the thesis 
contributes to the broader project of generating more comprehensive and representative 
understandings of ethnic violence by exploring the localised processes of identity production 
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 At 3.30am on Thursday, 27 December 2007, OT,
1
 a Luo youth from Mathare in 
Nairobi, awoke. Leaving his home and stepping out into the darkness of the slum, he went to 
join the already-lengthy queues at a nearby primary school to cast his vote in Kenya's fourth 
General Elections since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992. The atmosphere was 
one of optimism and expectation. Just three days later, however, the mood had changed 
completely. After an election-day that had been riddled with irregularities, a visible bungling 
of the counting process and a significant delay to the announcement of the presidential 
results, and amidst pervasive rumours of rigging and malpractice, OT's hopes for the assured 
victory of his preferred candidate, fellow Luo Raila Odinga, the leader of the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM), were fading fast. Just before 6pm on Sunday, 30 December, 
he and his friends watched the TV in horror as Mwai Kibaki, the Kikuyu candidate for the 
Party of National Unity (PNU), was announced as the winner of the presidential election, and 
soon after was sworn into office in a private ceremony at State House. OT exclaimed, ‘Those 
Kikuyu have stolen from us!’ and grabbing their machetes, rungus,
2
 and other crude weapons 
the group went outside ‘to find where those Kikuyu are.’ OT recalls that within a few 
minutes, ‘we found a Kikuyu // and we cut him to death, slashing him with our machetes.’ In 
the weeks that followed, he and his friends, along with other residents of the 4B 
neighbourhood, looted the properties of Kikuyu living in area, chased them away from the 
vicinity, destroyed their homes and engaged in fierce battles with groups from neighbouring 
villages. The fighting continued until a power-sharing agreement was brokered between the 
                                                 
1
 To protect the anonymity of my interviewees, throughout this thesis I refer to them using codes based upon 
their initials, nicknames or – where interviewees were reluctant to tell me their names – upon some other 
distinguishing feature. Any names which do appear have been altered.    
2
 A wooden club. 
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two principals under the mediation of Kofi Annan on 28 February 2008 (OT, Interview, 4B, 
Mathare, 9 May 2010). 
 Further upcountry, in Kenya Service, a small peri-urban centre situated on the 
outskirts of Eldoret town, C, a Borana youth, tells a very different story. He explains that on 
29 December, the day before the announcement, Kenyans had awoken to find Kibaki, who 
had previously been trailing Raila by a significant margin in the count, unexpectedly in the 
lead.
3
 Later that day, C heard noise coming from the surrounding hills. He and other residents 
of the village came out of their homes and looked up to the neighbouring areas to see smoke 
rising in the distance and houses being burned, ‘so we youths from our centre, we decided to 
join together to unite to protect the community from dangers.’ C explains that members of the 
Luo, Luhya, Kikuyu, Kamba, Kisii, Kalenjin, and other communities living in the area – 
communities who were perceived to be on opposing sides of the political divide
4
 – joined 
together to help protect each other from external attack. Members of ODM-affiliated 
communities reassured their Kikuyu neighbours, ‘we told them not to be afraid, but to join 
hands with us.’ He recalls that one day during the violence they noticed a group of Kikuyu 
from a neighbouring village, Munyaka, launching an attack on the nearby farm of a Kalenjin 
friend. In response, they called for the support of Kalenjin warriors, and they went to ‘rescue’ 
the farm, chasing the Kikuyu away. Despite the ferocity of the fighting in neighbouring 
villages and across the country, Kenya Service itself remained relatively calm throughout the 
crisis, and members of supposedly ‘rival’ communities united together across the political 
                                                 
3
 A detailed account of the sequence of events surrounding the elections and the counting process is provided in 
Chapter Six. However, it should be noted here that Raila Odinga had initially enjoyed a commanding lead over 
Kibaki. As votes from PNU strongholds came in, the gap quickly closed. While C is mistaken in his recollection 
that Kibaki was already in the lead by Saturday morning, it is fair to say that Raila no longer held a convincing 
lead by this point, and tensions were beginning to rise.  
4
 There were three major parties in the 2007 elections: the PNU party, led by Kibaki, ODM, led by Raila, and 
ODM-Kenya led by Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba. As shall be discussed in Chapter Five, voting in Kenya is 
often assumed to operate along ethnic lines, and as such, groups are expected to be affiliated with the party in 
which their leading politician resides. Consequently, the Kikuyu, and sometimes the Kisii were largely 
understood to be PNU supporters, the Kalenjin, Luo and, to a lesser degree, the Luhya were recognised as ODM 
fans, and the Kamba were perceived as favouring ODM-Kenya.  
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and ethnic divide in order to protect their homes and properties (C, Interview, Kenya Service, 
12 February 2010). 
 These two different stories of the Kenyan post-election violence raise a series of 
questions and puzzles that warrant further attention. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, is 
the question of what drives ordinary people like OT and his friends to kill. What makes them 
turn on their neighbours in such a brutal fashion? How do we explain mass participation in 
such intimate violence? This is a problem which has perplexed scholars for a long time; it has 
attracted a wealth of attention, and yet still remains a 'major puzzle' in the story of ethnic 
violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 846). This thesis joins the mass of explorations of this 
problem. However, it also seeks to move beyond the question of why people kill in order to 
address other perplexities such as who they kill, where and when. Why did OT chase some 
Kikuyu away and kill others? Did he behave differently towards friends and people he knew 
well than he did towards strangers and people against whom he had a grudge? Why did the 
Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Kisii and Kamba youths of C's village unite together when elsewhere 
members of their respective communities were engaged in bitter fighting? Why did some 
neighbourhoods remain relatively calm and peaceful while others descended into spirals of 
hatred and revenge? Furthermore, C's story of the battle over the Kalenjin farm suggests that 
what appears to be violence between ethnically homogeneous groups, might in actual fact be 
far more complex. In that particular incident Kikuyu were fighting against Kikuyu, having 
united with their ‘enemy’, the Kalenjin. How do we explain this, and what implications does 
it have for our understanding of ‘ethnic conflict’? All of this leads to one overarching 
question: what does ethnic violence really look like at the local level and how can we explain 
it? This question is of fundamental importance. Ill-conceived, misleading, or overly 
simplified understandings of the nature of ethnic violence and the way in which ethnicity 




Research Questions and Objectives 
 With these puzzles and problems in mind, the central research question driving this 
thesis is: What were the local level dynamics of violence during the 2007-2008 post-election 
crisis in Kenya, and how can they be understood? The thesis is concerned with identifying 
the processes, patterns and acts of ethnic mobilisation and violence on the ground – that is the 
who, how, when, where, what and why of conflict – and with understanding their logic and 
rationale. The chapters are framed around a series of sub-questions: What is the social and 
political context of ethnicity and violence? How are everyday social and political events 
understood and interpreted by local level actors? How did the violence start? What did the 
violence look like on the ground? Who was involved and in what ways? How is the violence 
understood and framed by those who witnessed and participated in it?  
 The thesis, then, aims to generate a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), to situate a 
particular episode of ethnic violence within its social, economic, cultural and political 
context; primarily, its aim is to create a logic of understanding, a ‘catharsis of 
comprehension’ (Plummer, 2001, 247) regarding participation in the Kenyan post-election 
violence at the local level. As such the thesis makes an original contribution to the literature 
emerging in the wake of the Kenyan crisis. 
 However, the project has broader objectives than this, and is intended to speak to 
theories of ethnic violence beyond the Kenyan context.  That is to say, Kenya is used as a 
critical case study for evaluating, problematising and developing existing explanations of 
ethnic conflict. As shall be highlighted in Chapter One, the field of ethnic conflict studies is 
dominated by macro-level perspectives and top-down analyses. These approaches have much 
to offer to an understanding of ethnic violence and this thesis serves, in part, as an evaluation 
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of their applicability to the Kenyan case. However, a close-grained analysis of events and 
processes at the micro-level reveals a more nuanced, complex and ambiguous picture, 
highlighting the limitations of dominant theorising and challenging some of the existing 
assumptions about ethnic identification processes and the nature of ethnic violence.  
 
Research Design and Methods 
 Firmly situated within an interpretivist paradigm, with the objectives of generating a 
thick descriptive account of the Kenyan crisis and of constructing a view of ethnic violence 
from below, I have employed qualitative techniques and adopted an ethnographic 
methodology for this research. The arguments presented are based upon fieldwork carried out 
in Kenya between October 2009 and August 2010, during which time 533 interviews were 
conducted with residents of urban slums and peri-urban centres surrounding the larger towns 
of Nairobi, Eldoret and Nakuru. These broad field sites were chosen not only because they 
were ‘hot-spots’ of the violence, but also because they displayed some diversity and variation 
both in violence dynamics and in ethnic composition. Within each of these locations, smaller 
sub-locations were selected in order to focus the research, and all interviewees were residents 
of these areas. My interviewees included a wide range of people, from unemployed youths 
and university students, to village elders and local councillors, the only criteria for their 
selection being that they were resident in the field site during the events of 2007 and early 
2008, and thus had personal experience of the campaigns, the elections and the violence in 
the area. Interviews were narrative in style and respondents were asked to tell their personal 
stories, describing their experiences of and involvement in the campaigns, the elections and 
the aftermath. Questions related to each individual narrative were then combined with more 
general ones designed to elicit views on the nature of ethnicity, politics, violence and society 
6 
 
in Kenya. Interview material is supplemented by newspaper sources, governmental reports, 
human rights documents and participant observation. The methodological issues, strengths, 
weaknesses and limitations, as well as the ethical challenges of this fieldwork, are extensively 
discussed in Chapter Two.  
 
Scope and Limitations 
 As Fujii (2009a: 21) has pointed out, ‘no study can hope to explain all the 
complexities of a single phenomenon’ and I certainly do not make any such grand claim here. 
This thesis neither provides a complete picture of the intricacies of the Kenyan situation, nor 
does it seek to offer an alternative, comprehensive theory of ethnic violence. Each field site 
exhibited its own peculiar dynamics of violence, and there are significant variations in the 
timing of onset, the actors involved, the intensity, the levels of organisation and direction, as 
well as the mix of objectives and rationales underscoring participation. The ethnicised land 
conflicts of Mt Elgon, for example, are undoubtedly markedly different from the 
landlord/tenant undertones of violence in Nairobi. Similarly, the dynamics of the pre-election 
violence that rocked Molo and Kuresoi cannot speak to the specifics of the post-election 
violence in Mombasa or Kisumu. Moreover, at an even greater level of disaggregation, this 
thesis cannot explain why some individuals seemingly take pleasure in chaos, while others 
avoid it at all costs. However, the thesis does aim to highlight the limitations of existing 
assumptions about the phenomenon of ethnic conflict, to identify the variations in violence 
dynamics in a particular case, and to understand the logic behind some of these patterns. In 
doing so, the thesis illustrates the important insights that a close-grained, micro-level 
perspective can offer, pointing to localised processes of ethnic identification and 
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mobilisation, and to the complexities and ambiguities of ‘ethnic violence’ that might speak to 
other contexts.  
 
Key Terms and Definitions 
 There are two key terms which are used throughout the thesis that warrant some 
explication at this stage. The first is the slippery concept of ‘ethnicity.’ Despite the attention 
it has received, ‘ethnicity’ has eluded an authoritative definition, prompting some scholars to 
doubt that one is even possible (Vaughan 1996: 358). The understanding of ethnicity that 
underpins this thesis is situated within the broader cognitive turn in the literature (Brubaker, 
Loveman and Stamatov 2004: 64); ethnicity is recognised ‘as a perspective on the world, not 
a thing in the world.’ (Brubaker et al. 2006: 169). That is to say, it is a lens through which 
people interpret everyday events, and categorise and define their relationships with others. It 
is a socialised disposition which is shaped by, and in turn shaping of, everyday practices and 
behaviours. Chapter Three delves into a more comprehensive discussion of the complex 
workings of ethnicity in Kenya on the ground, and I employ Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of 
habitus as a loose framework for this conceptualisation of ethnicity. Such a perspective 
allows for a certain stability to ethnic identity – that is for the perception of a bounded ethnic 
group with clear, if not consistent, rules of membership – whilst acknowledging its potential 
for change, contestation and transformation. As Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov (2004: 64-
65) state, this understanding of ethnicity provides ‘resources for avoiding analytical 
“groupism” – the tendency to treat ethnic groups as substantial entities to which interests and 




The second term which requires some qualification is ‘local level actors.’ This phrase 
is used frequently throughout the thesis to refer to ‘ordinary’ Kenyan citizens. That is to say, 
those who are not members of the political elite. Undoubtedly, this is an artificial distinction. 
Local councillors, for example, usually straddle the lines between 'political elite' and 'local 
level actor.' However, I use the term to refer to anyone resident in the areas in which violence 
took place and, as such, who is intimately involved in the everyday production of identity and 
in the local processes of violence. 
 
Organisation 
The thesis begins by exploring the role of ethnicity and conflict in everyday life in 
Kenyan society, moving towards a detailed examination of the 2007 elections and their 
violent aftermath in subsequent chapters.  
Chapter One offers a review of the key theories of ethnic violence, arguing that  
macro-level perspectives, top-down approaches and elite-centric analyses have come to 
dominate the field. While these existing theories offer valuable insights into the phenomenon, 
they are limited by their aerial perspective, masking the ambiguities of local level 
identification processes and the complexities of participation in ethnic violence on the 
ground.   
 Chapter Two explores the methodological and ethical challenges of ethnographic 
research in a post-conflict divided society. Through an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of my own fieldwork, this chapter contributes to the important and growing 
literature that both engages with the practicalities of conducting research on the empirical 




Chapter Three examines the processes of identity construction in contemporary 
Kenyan society and explores the ways in which ethnicity operates in everyday life. It argues 
that far from being a latent or dormant identity, ethnicity is rather continually produced, 
reinforced and transformed by local level actors in their day to day lives. Moreover, ethnicity 
colours everyday interactions and operates as a prominent lens through which to understand 
the social world.  
 Chapter Four examines the ethnicised prejudices, tensions and conflicts which 
underscore everyday consciousness and relationships in Kenyan society, and it locates the 
post-election crisis in a context of diffused and normalised violence. It argues that large-scale 
incidents of violence should be understood as part of a continuum of conflictual behaviours, 
in which the patterns and logics are visible in periods of relative peace.  
 Chapter Five analyses the micro-dynamics of political behaviour in Kenya, exploring 
the extent to which ethnicity defines the relationship between elites and local level actors, and 
examining how violence is employed in political campaigns to secure support. It argues that 
localised socio-spatial dynamics can either play a significant role in enabling vibrant political 
debate across ethnic lines, or can significantly constrain individual agency through the 
punishment of non-conformity to ethnic expectations. 
 Chapter Six traces the transitions from the ‘banality’ of everyday ethnicity and the 
low level conflicts of ‘peacetime’ to the polarisation of the 2007 campaigns, and it highlights 
the ways in which the elections acted as a trigger for widespread violence. It argues that 
bottom-up processes interacted with, and operated independently from, top-down 
manipulation in the construction of ethnic animosity, and that they are intimately related to 
the practices of ethnicity and conflict in everyday life.  
 Chapter Seven closely examines the local level dynamics of violence, and analyses 
the logic underscoring the complex, ambiguous and seemingly contradictory role of ethnicity 
10 
 
in motivations for, and participation in, acts of violence. It argues that socio-spatial dynamics 
influence and shape the behaviour of local level actors in violence and illustrates the multi-
vocality of the ‘ethnic group’ on the ground. 
 The Conclusion summarises the main lines of argument and draws out the broader 
lessons from the specifics of the Kenyan case.  It points to the socio-spatial variations of the 
post-election violence, arguing that they can be understood in relation to everyday processes 
of identity production and negotiation by local level actors, as well as to the profusion of 
ethnic frictions, tensions and prejudices in day to day life. It draws attention to the multi-
vocality of the crisis and argues that these findings have implications beyond the Kenyan 
context. The dominant understanding of ethnic conflict as being fought along clearly defined 
cleavage lines is misleading, and the top-down perspective masks the fluidity and flexibility 





Macro-level Stories of Ethnic Violence:  




The large, diffuse and labyrinthine literature that explores the problem of ethnic 
violence spans a wide array of disciplines. It is both confused and confusing and is marked by 
an inconsistent characterisation of the different strands of thought, forcing ‘new entrants... 
each time to reinvent the wheel’ (Chandra 2001: 11). Traditionally, scholars of both ethnicity 
and ethnic violence have divided the field into three broad schools of thought: primordialism, 
instrumentalism and constructivism.
1
 Primordialist accounts are generally said to assume 
natural, given, fixed and essential identities based upon ineffable emotional ties, and, 
consequently, to explain ethnic violence as the result of inevitable and enduring animosities 
and hatreds inherent within cultural difference;
2
 instrumentalists are characterised as equating 
ethnic identities with political and economic interest groups,
3
 and explaining violence as the 
result of the rational pursuit of power, wealth and privilege on the part of political elites; and 
constructivists are seen to explore the historical and social construction of flexible, fluid and 
malleable identities, and to explain violence as the product of reconstructed destructive 
identity boundaries, often at the hands of political entrepreneurs. However, this reading of the 
                                                 
1
 Some scholars see a clear distinction between instrumentalism and constructivism (for example, Varshney 
2002) – asserting that the former focuses more upon individual choice and rational action, and the latter upon 
social, economic and political processes – whilst others conflate the two under the ‘circumstantialist’ umbrella 
(for example, Gil-White 2001). This is just one minor example of the theoretical confusion that pervades the 
field. 
2
 This is arguably the most caricatured and misrepresented school of thought. Even the classic primordialist texts 
(Shils 1957; Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975) often acknowledge that identities are constructed at some point in time, 
that ineffability is attributed to affective ties, not given, and that identities are the product of socialisation and 
internalisation. Moreover, they acknowledge that identities are susceptible to change over time. Indeed, Van den 
Berghe (1981) is arguably alone in his suggestion that ethnic nepotism is fundamentally biological.  
3




field is fast losing its value. Not only does it obscure the substantial overlap between these 
schools of thought, but it also masks the diversity within them. Furthermore, it is 
normatively-loaded, and accounts which are subjected to the primordialist label are often 
dismissed out of hand, with insufficient attention given to the richness of some of their ideas 
(Connor 2004: 31). Indeed, while it is certainly not uncommon for scholars of ethnic conflict 
to begin their analyses by setting themselves in explicit opposition to primordialist 
arguments, and by (quite rightly) eschewing the supposedly related ‘ancient hatreds’ theory 
of violence (see for example, Lake and Rothchild 1996: 41; Kaufman 2001: 3-4; Toft 2003: 
7-8; Gagnon 2004: 5-6; Straus 2006: 18-23), they are, in many ways, imagining and battling 
against a virtually non-existent enemy.
4
 Constructivist thought is all but unchallenged in 
contemporary scholarship.
 
Despite this dominance, however, there is an increasing sense of 
dissatisfaction with a tired, ‘complacent’ and ‘clichéd’ constructivism (Brubaker et al. 2006: 
7), rife with its own inconsistencies, contradictions and lacunae.
5
 In this overview I argue that 
there is a profusion of macro-level perspectives, top-down approaches, and elite-centric 
analyses within the literature. This aerial view not only obscures the realities, complexities 
and ambiguities of local level participation in violence and  the processes of ethnic 
identification and mobilisation on the ground, but it also creates the illusion of neatly 
bounded and homogeneous groups waging battle against each other. Further research which 
explores how identities are constructed, produced and reproduced at the grassroots, and how 
these processes influence the contours and dynamics of violence, is much needed.  
 
                                                 
4
 Robert Kaplan (1994) is the most frequently cited proponent of this ‘ancient hatreds’ theory of conflict, but 
Huntington’s (1996) notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’, and Kakar’s (1996) psychoanalytic approach to violence 
between Hindus and Muslims in India, demonstrate similar sentiments of essentialised groups, bound to be in 
inevitable conflict by virtue of their cultural difference. Nevertheless, scholars are hard-pressed to find similar 
explanations of ethnic violence within the academic literature, and the advocates of this caricatured position 
tend to be confined to journalistic and policy making circles, where they do, unfortunately, remain prolific.  
5
 Others have expressed dissatisfaction with the field, most notably, Fearon and Laitin (2000); Gil-White (1999, 
2001); and Kalyvas (2008).  
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The Social Construction of Identity 
That ethnic identities are socially constructed ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 
1983), the product of historical, political, economic and social processes, is largely 
undisputed in contemporary theorising. Fredrik Barth’s (1969) influential essay in his edited 
volume Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, is widely regarded as pioneering this constructivist 
school of thought.  His work shifted attention away from the inward-looking primordialist 
position, with its emphasis on natural, fixed, emotive attachments and ineffable affective ties, 
towards the importance of social interaction in delineating ethnic groups, noting that it is ‘the 
ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses’ (Barth 1969: 15).
6
 
Subsequent analyses in the field of nationalism studies are frequently highlighted as key texts 
in furthering and exploring this branch of thought. Amongst these, Ernest Gellner’s (1983) 
argument that national identity is the unintended product of widespread literacy and social 
mobility associated with modernisation, and economic growth, and Benedict Anderson’s 
(1983) notion of an ‘imagined community’ made possible by the dual emergence of 
capitalism and print technology, are the most prominent. However, a rich body of literature 
identifying the ‘invention of tradition’ and the ‘creation of tribalism’ on the African continent 
was simultaneously emerging, and similarly discrediting, the previously assumed longevity 
and primordiality of ethnic identities. These theories suggested that the ‘complex and ever-
changing social landscape’(Soja 1968: 13) of the pre-colonial period, characterised as it was 
by multiple, fluid, flexible, and amorphous social networks and overlapping, mutable 
loyalties, was fundamentally transformed by colonial rule. It is suggested in this school of 
thought that European administrative policies and practices of divide and rule, in association 
                                                 
6
 While Barth is most frequently credited with changing the trajectory of thought on identity, his work owes 
much to that of his predecessors, notably Edmund Leach (1954) and Michael Moerman (1965) who observed 
that there is little evidence of a covariance between culture and ethnic groups, and that delineation tends to be 
subjective rather than objective. Moerman (1965: 1219), for example, concluded that in Thailand, a Lue is only 
a Lue ‘by virtue of calling himself Lue’ and not by any objective cultural criteria.  
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with the active participation of, and strategic collaboration by, African intellectuals, elites and 
local culture brokers, created rigid ethnic identities with distinct, reified customs and 
traditions (Southall 1970; Lonsdale 1977; Iliffe 1979; Ranger 1983). That is, colonial 
authorities, with limited resources and personnel, came to rely upon tribal leaders with whom 
they could work, and through whom they could rule, often creating entirely new ethnic 
groups in the process. John Iliffe’s (1979: 324) summarisation of this position has become an 
infamous articulation of the position: 
Africans wanted effective units of action just as officials wanted effective units of 
government... Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans built tribes to 
belong to. 
 
The creation of a centralised colonial state thus brought emerging and previously isolated 
groups into competition for the same politico-economic resources,
7
 and since the provincial 
administration became the conduit through which these resources could be accessed, Africans 
were encouraged to ‘invest in their relationships with “ethnic” leaders’ (Lynch 2011: 15). 
Furthermore, the uneven penetration of capitalism and the unequal distribution of resources 
created new systems of stratification (Bates 1974: 462), and notions of ‘advanced’ and 
‘backward’ communities (Horowitz 1985: 147-149), as some groups benefited 
disproportionately while others were left behind. The combination of these factors 
accentuated intergroup rivalry and political competition, and further embedded a 
consciousness of ethnic identity and difference.   
In the wake of these observations, scholars devoted attention to exploring this 
supposed construction of ethnic identities at the hands of colonial administrators, 
                                                 
7
 Conflictual modernization theories argued that as groups were brought into the same politico-economic arena, 
awareness of difference would be heightened and there would be intense competition for the scarce resources of 
modernity, potentially leading to conflict. Scholars putting forward arguments within this broad field of study 
include Melson and Wope (1970), Bonacich (1972), Bates (1974), Young (1976) Olzak and Nagel (1986), 
Olzak (1992), Connor (1994). For a detailed discussion and critique of these theories, see Horowitz (1985: 99-




missionaries and ethnographers, in collaboration with African elites (see for example, Vail 
1989; Peel 1989; Ranger 1989; Lonsdale 1992; Willis 1992; Chimhundu 1992; Rathbone 
1997; van den Bersselaar 2005). Largely as a result of the evidence amassed through these 
studies, the argument has come to be subjected to a number of criticisms and modifications, 
as scholars have recognised the limitations and deficiencies inherent in the language of 
inventionism (Ranger 1993; Lentz and Nugent 2000; Spear 2003). The three major branches 
of attack are: that the term ‘invention’ implies, rather implausibly, that ethnicity was ‘plucked 
from the air or created out of nothingness’ (Atkinson 1999: 30), failing to appreciate any 
continuity between pre-colonial and colonial identities; that it attributes too much power to 
colonial authorities (Vail 1989: 4; cf. Ranger 1983: 81) and African elites (Willis 1992: 192) 
at the expense of local agency; and that it intimates a ‘too once-for-all an event’ which does 
not allow for ‘subsequent development and conflict over its meaning’ (Ranger 1983: 80-81). 
Since this thesis is less concerned with the processes of ethno-genesis, and more so with the 
ways in which ethnicity is produced, negotiated, enacted and invoked at the local level in 
contemporary society, a comprehensive survey of the literature emerging out of the first two 
critiques remains outside the scope of this review.
8
 The third branch of attack, however, is of 
fundamental importance to this thesis and warrants some further attention here.  
                                                 
8
 This, of course, does not mean to suggest that they are unimportant or unrelated areas of study. An 
understanding of the pre-colonial roots of identity is revealing, as contemporary productions, negotiations, 
manifestations and invocations of ethnicity may draw upon mythologies, or be shaped by collective memories, 
rooted in the pre-colonial past; but, it is the ways in which these are utilised and employed in the present which 
is of interest to the student of contemporary ethnic violence. For studies which highlight the importance of the 
pre-colonial roots of contemporary identities, see the contributions by Harries and Papstein in Leroy Vail’s 
(1989) collection of essays, as well as Greene (1996), and Nugent (2008). Furthermore, the observation that the 
inventionist tradition tends to obscure African agency in ethno-genesis processes echoes my own dissatisfaction 
with the marked absence of local level agency in explanations of ethnic violence, but an account of the historical 
micro-processes of identity construction are outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, there have been a 
number of historical analyses which explore this ‘agency in tight corners’ (Lonsdale 2000). Spear and Waller’s 
(1993) exploration of Maasai identity is an excellent study of African agency in identity construction and 
contestation, as is Justin Willis’(1992) analysis of Bondei identities. Indeed, the latter’s observation that local 
level actors were as much the manipulators as the manipulated (1992: 201) is extremely relevant to 
understanding contemporary elite-mass relations (see Chapter Five for a development of this argument). Peter 
Sahlin’s (1989) fascinating study of French and Spanish boundary-making is arguably the key non-Africanist 
text which foregrounds the importance of local agency in the construction of identity. 
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One of the great strengths of the branch of constructivist literature within which 
inventionism is located is its recognition that, once constructed, ethnic boundaries and macro-
cleavages can become remarkably sticky and robust, having become deeply embedded in the 
social structures, institutions and consciousness of society. Lynch (2010: 186; see also 
Berman 1998: 323), for example, notes that the development of identity categories during the 
colonial period has encouraged Africans to think and act ethnically. Comaroff (1987: 318) 
states that ethnicity is ubiquitous and tenacious, and ‘refuses to vanish’, and Nugent (2008: 
924) asserts that, ‘there would be little sense in denying the salience of ethnicity today.’ The 
macro-cleavages which have been constructed by historical processes, (in part) through 
colonial rule, are remarkably stable and remain relevant in contemporary society. This is not 
to say that currently salient ethnic cleavages and boundaries have not been, cannot be, and 
will not be altered as a result of further macro-level changes and shifts, or micro-level 
processes of assimilation and fragmentation, but the degree of change required to deconstruct 
entrenched, taken for granted, and deeply politicised ethnic identities tends to occur only over 
an extended period of time. As Gil-White (2001: 516) has pointed out, ‘one hardly finds 
accounts of ethnic construction that do not refer us to a relatively long, intergenerational and 
emergent process.’ Thus, I concur with the general criticism that inventionism does not 
adequately allow for the possibility of future developments, evolutions and shifts in ethnic 
boundaries, whilst recognising the strengths of the tradition in its acknowledgement of a 
socially constructed, but durable ethnic consciousness and macro-cleavage. 
Furthermore, I am in complete agreement with Ranger’s (1993: 81) self-criticism that 
the term does not take into account the continual conflicts and negotiations over the content 
and meaning of ethnic identity.
9
 Indeed, this thesis is intimately concerned with how macro-
                                                 
9
 Ranger concludes that ‘imagining’ is a far better term than ‘invention’ as it allows for a more dynamic, 
continuous process.  
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cleavages are inflected, reinterpreted and modified by local level dynamics, that is with the 
multi-vocality of the ‘ethnic group.’ Thus, the literature emerging out of this third strand of 
criticism points to a valuable and important area of further study in its acknowledgement that 
ethnic identification is a continual process of imagination, negotiation and contestation – yet 
this research needs to explore the here and now, as much as it does the historical 
manifestations of these dimensions. However, at times, the mutability, flexibility, 
negotiability, fluidity, and contestability of ethnic boundaries can be overstated. I do not 
disagree that small groups and individuals can contest their inclusion within, or exclusion 
from broad, ethnic categories, as Lynch (2006) has so convincingly illustrated in the case of 
the Sengwer,
10
 nor do I deny that different levels of affiliation can be emphasised in 
particular circumstances, to be more or less inclusive. However, these negotiations do not 
often alter or seriously challenge the persistence and awareness of relatively stable and sticky 
macro-ethnic boundaries, or the consciousness of ethnic differentiation along these lines in 
Kenyan society. Suggestions that ‘ethnic boundaries and identities thus created remain 
multiform, ambiguous and mutable’ (Lentz 2000: 130), that people are constantly 
‘“becoming” Maasai [or Kikuyu, or Luo, or Kalenjin etc] in an endless process of 
transformation’ (Waller 1993: 302), and that ethnicities are ‘the ambiguous, constantly 
contested and changing results of cultural politics; the outcome of an endless process... 
perpetually in the process of creation’ (Berman 1998: 312), can create the impression that 
there is nothing stable about ethnic identity and differentiation. While this may not always be 
the intention, the phraseology – that it is ethnic boundaries which are highly porous and 
mutable – is ambiguous and confusing, seeming to imply that macro-ethnic cleavages are 
very easily challenged, contested and subverted, that ‘there can be hardly any discussion of 
clearly defined ethnic blocks’ (Lentz 2000: 130) and that ‘the notion of “an ethnic 
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 See also Kweya’s (2011) study of sub-group contestations over Luhya identity 
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community” is impossible to tie down or clearly define.’ (Lynch 2006: 51). This sits very 
uncomfortably with everyday understandings of identity which operate at the local level in 
Kenyan society. I fully agree with the recognition that ethnic communities are far from 
cohesive and monolithic, and that there is substantial room for negotiation, debate, and 
multiple interpretation over the content of ethnic identities, such as what it means to be a 
Kikuyu. As shall be demonstrated throughout this thesis, conceptualisations over how the 
‘group’ should respond to a given situation, what is acceptable behaviour, who we should or 
should not vote for, who constitutes a brother, an enemy or a friend, are all inflected with, 
shaped by, and moulded to suit, local circumstances. Nevertheless, these interpretations and 
contestations, in Kenya at least, operate within, and are significantly constrained by, a more 
stable macro-level framework in which politically relevant ethnic boundaries are remarkably 
durable, the salience of ethnic consciousness and differentiation is deeply embedded in social 
structures, and ethnic identities inform behaviour and shape perceptions of the social world. 
Indeed, there has been a renewed interest in the importance of boundaries which are 
perceived by everyday actors to be essential and fixed, and I situate myself largely within this 
school.
11
 As Van Evera (2001: 22) states, ‘those who underestimate the strength and 
endurance of ethnic identities are bound to blunder in their dealings with nationalism’ and 
ethnic conflict. Lentz (1995: 319) elsewhere states, ‘behind the essentialist “façade”... there is 
always room for multiple meanings and negotiation’; I agree. This does not mean, however, 
that we should dismiss the ‘façade’ as inconsequential. Thus, it is the content of ethnicity, not 
the boundary, which is mutable, ambiguous, flexible, debated, fragmented and forever in 
production. John Lonsdale’s (1992) concept of ‘moral ethnicity’ offers a fruitful framework 
for this more bottom-up approach to identity, as it seeks ‘to catch this sense of societal 
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renegotiation of what one “ought or ought not, to do or believe” in relation to kin and 
neighbours, patrons and clients’, while still appreciating the fact that ‘our socialization 
necessarily makes ethnic, and other, identities for us all.’ (Lonsdale 2004: 78).   
 Despite the potential richness inherent in this emerging debate, and its capacity to 
push our understanding of the micro-dynamics of ethnic identification, and their relationship 
to ethnic violence, further, the majority of studies remain focused upon the macro-level 
historical construction of identity. In the Africanist context there remains a general consensus 
that ethnic identities became increasingly rigid and singular in the colonial period (Lynch 
2006: 49) and in the broader field of ethnicity and nationalism studies, the focus has remained 
on the macro-structural forces of identity construction, that is on the political, economic, and 
social changes, which have facilitated the emergence of imagined communities. However, 
these macro-historical analyses of identity do not account for the variability in ethnic 
identification processes at the local level in the here and now. As Fox and Miller-Idriss 
(2008b: 575) have pointed out, ‘the historical emergence and development of the nation does 
not in itself explain its everyday invocations in the world today’ and if we are to understand 
the complex and ambiguous role of ethnicity in contemporary episodes of violent conflict, 
then this macro-historical skew must be corrected. Indeed, by failing to appreciate the multi-
vocality of ethnicity in the present, we are unable to account for spatial variations in violence 
dynamics. As Varshney (2002: 35) states:  
By focusing on specific histories in an attempt to explain why some ethnic cleavages 
acquire political and emotional salience and become master cleavages in the process, 
the constructivist arguments have advanced our understanding of the macrocontexts 
of violence and peace. But by failing to deal with variance across time and space, they 
have left unresolved the local issues... something intervenes between the master 
narratives and actual violence, skewing the patterns and making it impossible to read 




Elite Manipulation and the Neo-Patrimonial State 
The potential strengths of this constructivist literature and its critical offshoots are 
seldom adequately carried through in thinking about contemporary ethnic violence in Africa. 
The stickiness of ethnic identity and its persistence as a framer of social life, as well as the 
place of local agency and the capacity for multiplicity and reinterpretation on the ground, are 
often obscured in favour of a more short-term, top-down, instrumentalist approach which 
emphasises the motivations of, and strategic action by, political elites. This preference for 
elite-centric analyses extends far beyond the African context and such accounts have 
arguably become the dominant paradigm in the field of ethnic conflict studies.
12
 This 
overwhelming top-down focus has been well documented. Bax (2000: 28), for example states 
that there is an ‘uncritical acceptance of a central or national leader perspective’ in accounts 
of the Bosnian violence; Mamdani (2001: 8) argues that academic writings on Rwanda ‘have 
highlighted the design from above in a one-sided manner’; Autesserre (2010: 45) asserts that 
‘standard analyses  of war politics focus not on ordinary people but on elites’; and Fearon and 
Laitin (2000: 853) go as far as to suggest that ‘virtually every self-identified constructivist 
who has written on ethnic violence... has tended to blame elite machinations and politicking.’ 
While these explanations have their roots in the hard instrumentalist approaches of the early 
1960s and 1970s – which equated the ethnic community with a political and economic 
interest group, depicting ethnicity as predominantly epiphenomenal and akin to a ‘false 
consciousness’ imposed upon the gullible masses – they became increasingly popular in the 
wake of the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Rallying against the ‘ancient 
hatreds’ explanations which pervaded popular discourse, scholars argued that these conflicts 
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 A select list of the theoretical articulations of these arguments include de Figueiredo and Weingast (1999), 
Snyder (2000), Wilkinson (2004), and Kaufman (2001). For examples of their application to a variety of cases 
see Brass (1997), Denitch (1994); Woodward (1995); Gagnon (1994, 2004); Prunier (1995), Hintjens (1999) and 
Deng (1995).  
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are better understood as the result of deliberate orchestration from above, as ambitious and 
chauvinistic leaders sought to capture positions of power, wealth and privilege, or embattled 
elites tried to maintain hold of them. The argument postulates that elites ‘play the ethnic 
card’, that is that they mobilise supporters along ethnic lines, they construct, manipulate, fuel, 
foster, incite, and inflame ethnic passions, grievances, fears and animosities, and they 
instigate and direct violent ethnic militias in the pursuit of their own political agendas.
13
 De 
Smedt (2009: 584) summarises the key points underscoring these elite theories of ethnic 
violence with regards to Kenya, stating: 
At the risk of over-simplifying, this amounts to pitting one community against the 
other, exploiting latent (ethnic) grievances about scarce resources (often ‘land’), and 
triggering ethnic violence through incitement, as a means of securing political power 
and facilitating elite accumulation of wealth.  
 
While these arguments are applied to a diverse range of cases, they have found 
particularly fertile ground in the context of big-man politics and neo-patrimonial rule widely 
understood to characterise African politics. Scholars have emphasised the particularly 
powerful incentives of electoral victory afforded by the privatised nature of the African state, 
pointing to the considerable opportunities for personal enrichment which are attached to 
holding public office (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 52).
14
 Indeed, Bayart et al. (1999) go as far as 
to suggest that there has been a ‘criminalisation of the state’ which facilitates this personal 
accumulation of wealth. In this context of ‘spoils politics’ (Allen 1995: 301) and weak 
accountability, the incentive to use all means possible to gain or maintain power is 
                                                 
13
 Elite based explanations often point to ‘ethnic outbidding’ in explaining elite motivations for playing the 
ethnic card (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Rothschild 1981; Horowitz 1985). Ethnic outbidding refers to 
situations where members of the same ethnic group compete for power. In such situations, it is argued, there are 
greater incentives for elites to assume more extreme ‘ethnic’ positions than their competitors in order to 
mobilise supporters.   
14
 Bayart’s (1993) ‘politics of the belly’ is arguably the key articulation of the predatory nature of African 
politics and the pursuit of wealth and power which underscore it. The centrality of this notion is evident in 
popular discourses of ‘cutting the national cake’ heard in many countries on the continent, and in Kenya 
specifically the phrase ‘it’s our turn to eat’ (Wamwere 2003; Wrong 2009; Branch, Cheeseman and Gardner 
2010) is commonly heard.  
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heightened; as Mueller (2011: 100) states in relation to Kenya, ‘Politicians are dying to win 
and freed of institutional and legal constraints are able and willing to use violence to achieve 
their ends.’  
Branch and Cheeseman (2009) offer perhaps one of the most comprehensive accounts 
of elite behaviour and motivation in manipulating ethnicity and inciting violence in the 
Kenyan context.
15
 They argue that the stability of the state in the early years of independence 
rested upon the collusion of elites, who, with sufficient incentives to maintain the status quo, 
contained dissent from below. However, under worsening economic conditions in the 1980s, 
these intra-elite patronage networks became unsustainable, and Moi was forced to adopt an 
increasingly exclusionary system of government. As the elite alliance began to fragment, 
clamours for political liberalisation intensified among those excluded. Under intense 
pressure, both externally and from within, Moi was forced to reintroduce multi-party politics 
in the country; in order to hold on to power he exacerbated ethnic tensions to divide the 
opposition, and he mobilised ethnic militias to intimidate their supporters. Branch and 
Cheeseman go on to suggest that the fragmentation of the political elite continued into 2007 
and that this encouraged a similar employment of violent means to achieve and maintain 
power, concluding that ‘when the centre fragments, the “instrumentalization of disorder” may 
come into play’ (2009: 17). Thus, much of their analysis echoes theories which explore the 
logic and rationality of conflict in weak, collapsing and failed states.
16
 These arguments 
suggest that violence is a deliberate and calculated survival strategy, an ‘instrumentalisation 
of disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999), employed by elites in the face of ‘collapsing patronage 
politics’ (Reno 1998: 12), dwindling resources, and the ‘retreat of the state’ (Braathen et al. 
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 Though Throup and Hornsby (1998) offer a very thorough analysis of ethnicity, electoral politics and elite 
motivations for mobilising violence in the context of the 1990s.  
16
 Indeed, they appear to recognise the similarities, affirming that, ‘We do not believe Kenya is a failed state. 
However, it is chastening to think that the situation over the first months of 2008 closely resembled the fluid and 
potentially uncontrollable situation typical of collapsing states’ (Branch and Cheeseman 2009: 16).  
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2000: 19). The basic line of argument underlying this school of thought is as follows:
17
 In the 
early years of independence, functioning neo-patrimonial systems, in which the levels of high 
and low politics were linked through complex networks of patronage – ‘rhizomes’ as Bayart 
(1993) describes them – provided a modicum of stability in many states. Political elites were 
accommodated within the state, and were granted access to resources through horizontal 
patron-client ties in a reciprocal assimilation of elites (Bayart 1993); people on the ground 
were then connected to these elites through ethnically structured patronage networks. In this 
way, rulers ensured loyalty and suppressed political challenge by accommodating the elite 
within the structures of the state and distributing resources through patrimonial networks, 
simultaneously balancing and managing the demands of various ethnic groups (Abrahamsen 
2001: 85). However, this system of patronage was costly and, for the most part, 
unsustainable, particularly following the economic crises of the 1980s and the end of the 
Cold War.
18
 As resources dwindled and patronage networks shrank, more and more elites 
were excluded from power, the struggle for hegemony and access to scarce resources 
intensified, and elites had far greater incentives to mobilise their supporters either to maintain 
their hold on power, or to challenge the status quo. Braathen et. al’s (2000) collection of 
essays apply versions of this argument to a number of specific conflicts, including Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the contributions are both 
convincing and persuasive. In their introduction the editors summarise the basic argument, 
stating: 
The structuring of state violence is above all a reflection of the wish to keep power 
and thereby the possibilities for accumulation. These contests on the arena of the state 
can thus provoke violent confrontation between groups with different locality and/or 
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 It should be noted that there are significant differences  in explanations of the way in which disorder is 
instrumentalised by elite actors, and  in the nature and dynamics of the resulting conflict. However, the 
underlying supposition is that, when faced with political and economic crises which threaten their positions, 
elites will find innovative ways to deflect these threats, including the orchestration of violence. 
18
 Which saw a significant reduction in external aid to many African countries, as well as the imposition of 
conditionalities on remaining financial support. 
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community affiliations. In particular, these situations tend to emerge when the 
neopatrimonial state is forced to retreat owing to lack of resources. (2000: 14).  
 
These top-down approaches to ethnic conflict, both in Africa and more generally, 
offer powerful insights into, and are invaluable for understanding, elite interactions and 
motivations.
19
 However, they are subject to a number of criticisms and they leave much 
unexplained. Firstly, by reducing ethnicity to a political tool employed by elites, many of 
these approaches understate its salience and significance in the everyday lives of local level 
actors, and they afford it little independent effect (Toft 2003: 9). There are two slightly 
different formulations of elite-centric arguments, but both suffer from some common 
problems. In the first, scholars emphasise the fact that ethnicity is but one of a number of 
different identities that individuals have, and they argue that politicians must work very hard 
in order to elevate its prominence in the minds of their supporters (Wilkinson 2004: 4). In the 
second, scholars argue that elites must manipulate the content of ethnic identity, ‘such as 
making Serbs believe that Serbs cannot live with Croats’ (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). 
Neither of these approaches grant sufficient agency to people on the ground in identification 
processes, and both imply a ‘clever elites’-‘dumb masses’ dichotomy
20
 which is highly 
problematic. Paul Brass (1997: 6), for example, writes: 
When examined at the actual originating sites of ethnic and communal violence, it is 
often the case that the precipitating incidents arise out of situations that are either not 
inherently ethnic/communal in nature or are ambiguous in character, that their 
transformation into caste or communal incidents depends upon the attitudes toward 
them taken by local politicians and local representatives of state authority, and that 
their ultimate elevation into grand communal confrontations depends upon their 
further reinterpretation by the press and extralocal politicians and authorities. The 
“official” interpretation that finally becomes universally accepted is often, if not 
usually, very far removed, often unrecognizable, from the precipitating events.  
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 Though at times it is unclear why violence is necessarily the most rational strategy for elites. Kaufman (2006: 
48), in a critique of the application of elite theories to Rwanda and Sudan, states that ‘in neither case was the 
predatory strategy the best option for leaders seeking to maintain power; in fact, in both cases their violent 
strategies resulted, predictably, in the loss of their power.’ 
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 The phrasing employed here is borrowed from Hodgkin (1961: 60). 
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Here Brass very clearly locates agency wholly with political elites, and the ordinary person is 
markedly absent; s/he is simply assumed to accept elite manipulations and interpretations 
without question, even when they are ‘unrecognizable’ to the actual event. The reader is left 
wondering how and why these elite projects succeed. As shall be illustrated throughout this 
thesis, ethnicity is far more deeply embedded in local level consciousness and social life than 
is afforded by these situationalist approaches. Local level actors themselves continuously 
produce and negotiate their identities and construct locally contingent readings of events, 
often reinforcing, but sometimes challenging and contesting, appeals by elite actors. Indeed, 
closer attention to these processes can help to explain why elite appeals often resonate on the 
ground, and also why they sometimes do not. Moreover, contrary to the argument that elites 
are able to demobilise all other identities individuals hold, my own research indicates that 
people do not simply fight along the cleavages laid out for them by politicians. The situation 
on the ground is far more complex than this, as people re-interpret and renegotiate the lines 
between enemy and friend in light of local contexts and individual relationships. Thus, people 
are not simply ‘zombies mechanically responding to orders from above’ (Lemarchand 2009: 
124), but are active agents in the construction of their own identities and the interpretation of 
events, and a closer exploration of the way in which these interact with elite provocations is 
necessary.     
The second, and related, problematic assumption inherent within these approaches is 
also evident in the quotation above. Even if we are to accept the elite manipulation argument 
without the reservations already outlined, the notion that top-down constructions become 
‘universally accepted’, resonating evenly and unwaveringly across time and space, renders 
temporal and spatial variations in violence dynamics inexplicable. Why do some villages, 
neighbourhoods and towns remain peaceful whilst others erupt into intense and deadly 
26 
 
fighting? What accounts for the significant delays in the onset of violence in certain places? 
How can we explain local level peace efforts and challenges to the macro-narrative?   
 Thus, while these approaches are invaluable in identifying the important role played 
by elite actors in episodes of widespread and intense violence, and they are persuasive in their 
explorations of elite motivations for involvement in conflict, they often presuppose rather 
than explain participation in violence at the grassroots (Scacco 2008: 5), and they leave the 
reader consistently asking ‘why the followers follow?’ (Horowitz 1985: 140; Fearon and 
Laitin 2000: 846). More than this, however, scholars are now beginning to question whether 
the masses are following at all (Kalyvas 2003; 2006).
21
 The remainder of this chapter 
explores the major strands of the existing literature which seek to answer these questions. 
While these theories have undoubtedly made significant contributions to the understanding of 
ethnic violence, they still largely remain at a high level of aggregation. By taking groups as 
the unit of analysis they fail to appreciate the complexity of ethnic identification processes 
and participation in violence at the grassroots.  
 
Group Grievance: Horizontal Inequalities and Historical Injustice 
For it is because of profit and honour that men are incited against one another – not... 
in order that they may get them for themselves, but because they see others (some 
justly, some unjustly) getting more. Again, it is because of insolence, fear, superiority, 
contempt and disproportionate growth. Or again, in another way it is because of 
electioneering, belittlement, smallness, or dissimilarity. 
  (Aristotle, Politics, V.2, section 1302a, line 36 – section1302b line 4) 
 
Grievance-based understandings of conflict and violence have a long history, dating 
back to ancient Greek thought, and the significance of inequality, discontent and relative 
deprivation, here identified by Aristotle, remains prominent in contemporary theorising. At 
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 Brubaker et al. (2006: 6) for example, describe the response to ‘fervent ethnonationalist rhetoric’ amongst 
ordinary Clujeni as ‘tepid.’   
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their most basic level, these accounts suggest that when people compare their lot with others 
and perceive a significant disparity, or when they recognize a prolonged or acute gap between 
expectations and the capability to achieve them, the resulting frustrations and discontents can 
be a significant motivation for participation in violent action. There is a voluminous body of 
work which develops and explores these theories of relative deprivation, but Ted Robert 
Gurr’s (1970) influential book Why Men Rebel is arguably the most systematic and detailed 
articulation of the argument. This is not to say, however, that these theories have been 
universally accepted; on the contrary, extensive, predominantly statistical, testing has 
produced contradictory results and the search for a clear relationship between inequality and 
violence remains elusive.
22
 Indeed, proponents of grievance-based explanations have been, 
and remain, locked in a fierce and ongoing debate with scholars who eschew any significant 
correlation between inequality and conflict. Based upon both the empirical findings of large-
N studies and upon the theoretical argument that while grievances and inequalities are 
ubiquitous, violence is not, critics have suggested that economic incentive offers a far better 
understanding of participation in violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004; Keen 1998; Berdal and Malone 2000). Despite the popularity of this burgeoning school 
of thought which elevates ‘greed’ over grievance, explanations based upon the latter have 
recently experienced a resurgence, and employing Frances Stewart’s (2000, 2002) concept of  
‘horizontal inequalities’, advocates of grievance explanations have responded persuasively to 
some of the criticisms directed at them.
23
 They argue that contradictory findings are reflective 
of the choice in units of analysis, and they assert that their opponents tend to measure vertical 
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 For a detailed review of this literature, see Lichbach (1989).  
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 It should be noted, however, that the dichotomy between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ explanations is not always 
clear cut. Stewart (2004: 270), for example, acknowledges that economic incentives can drive participation in 
violence, and Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 581) concede that ‘if a country is characterized by ethnic dominance 
its risk of conflict is nearly doubled.’ Ballentine and Sherman (2003) have furthered the discussion by offering a 
model which identifies a complex interplay of greed and grievance in violence.  
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(individual) inequalities rather than horizontal (group) inequalities (Deiwiks, Cederman and 
Gleditsch 2012: 290). They highlight, however, that:  
Civil wars are group conflicts – not confrontations between individuals randomly 
fighting each other... Hence, the focus should be on polarization, or inequality 
between groups, not between individuals. (Ǿstby 2008a: 144). 
 
 Horizontal inequalities, then, are defined as ‘inequalities in economic, social or 
political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups’ (Stewart 2008: 3). 
That is, horizontal inequalities reflect intergroup differentials in access to economic resources 
such as land and jobs, political rights and inclusion in state institutions, and cultural 
recognition and status.
24
 They can have both material and socio-psychological dimensions; 
while inequalities in the distribution of resources and socio-economic opportunities are 
important, so too are notions of esteem and group worth.
25
 Horizontal inequalities can be the 
product of deliberate discrimination and exclusionary policies and social practices, or the 
unintended result of uneven modernization and development (Gurr 2000: 107).
26
 Conflict, 
then, is seen to arise either out of increasing group frustrations and grievances over 
subordinate status positions, where ‘one feels compelled to act against the unjustly dominant 
groups as a way of changing the imbalance’ (Petersen 2002: 263),  or out of a desire on the 
part of the dominant group to maintain its position of hegemony (Stewart 2002: 3). There 
have been a number of cross national studies which illustrate the robustness of the theory 
(Ǿstby 2008a, 2008b; Ǿstby, Nordas and Rod 2009), and it has also been persuasively 
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 The concept echoes Gurr’s (1993, 2000) more recent works in which he applies his theory of relative 
deprivation to ethnic conflict, and ‘minorities at risk.’   
25
 The two are often interlinked and holding positions of power and influence in society is intimately tied up 
with feelings of group worth. While there has been far more attention paid to objective and material inequalities, 
some scholars have explored the socio-psychological dimensions, emphasising feelings and perceptions of 
group worth,  inferiority, superiority, dominance and subordination. In his analysis of the role of emotions in 
fuelling ethnic violence, for example, Petersen (2002:  40) asserts that ‘human beings are motivated by a desire 
for esteem’ and firmly identifies sentiments of inferiority as a source of resentment. Horowitz (1985: 141-228) 
similarly draws attention to the importance of perceptions of group worth. 
26
 Hechter, (1975), for example, argues that uneven modernisation advantaged some groups at the expense of 
others and engendered an ‘internal colonialism’ and a cultural division of labour. Horowitz (1985: 141-228) 
similarly argues that the uneven distribution of resources and opportunity during colonial rule promoted group 
disparities (both material and socio-psychological) resulting in notions of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ groups.  
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applied to a diversity of case studies including Nepal (Murshed and Gates 2005), Indonesia 
(Diprose 2009; Mancini 2005), Nigeria (Onwuzuruigbo 2011), Côte D’Ivoire (Langer 2005) 
and Kenya (Muhala 2009; Stewart 2010). Furthermore, scholars within this branch of thought 
are developing more nuanced arguments which address the question of where and when 
grievances generate violence and where and when they do not. Cederman, Rod and 
Weidmann (2007) for example, argue that grievances are higher, and therefore more likely to 
lead to conflict, when there is an overlap between ethnicity and geographical region; Gubler 
and Selway (2012) suggest that cross-cutting cleavages can reduce the ability of leaders to 
mobilise ethnic communities, and argue that it is only when ethnicity is reinforced by other 
socially salient cleavages that violent action is likely to occur; Langer (2005) argues that the 
potential for violence is higher where groups are politically excluded as well as socio-
economically disadvantaged; and Stewart et al. (2008: 290) suggest that ‘people are unlikely 
to take to violent conflict if their own group leaders are politically included.’ Indeed, these 
latter two points are particularly powerful in the Kenyan context of zero-sum contest and a 
‘politics of the belly’ mentality, where  socio-economic benefits are expected to trickle down 
from ‘our man’ being in power, and where exclusion from government is equated with almost 
certain marginalisation, discrimination and subordination.  
Many, if not most, analyses of inter-ethnic relations in Kenya, and the emerging 
explanations of the post-election violence more specifically, have drawn attention to the 
importance of horizontal inequalities to some degree, highlighting processes of ethnic 
marginalisation, discrimination, exclusion, and domination. Furthermore, ‘the tone of 
discourses on horizontal inequalities has assumed nearly “historical injustice” [sic] ring to it’ 
(Okello 2006: xii), where scholars equate current grievances with long-standing injustices 
30 
 
and tensions, particularly with regards to the distribution of land.
27
 Indeed, grievances over 
historical land injustices are often regarded as being key drivers of conflict in the country. 
Boone (2011: 1312), for example, claims that ‘all previous accounts recognize that 1991-
1992 violence stemmed from long-standing land conflicts’; Githinji and Holmquist (2008: 
346) state that ‘the exclusion of the autochthones of the Rift Valley and the Coast in land 
resettlement programmes as both beneficiaries and planners is central to understanding the 
intensity of the violence’; and Cheeseman (2008: 167) asserts that ‘salient ethno-regional 
identities reinforced by historical grievances over land ownership, economic inequality, and 
political exclusion are central to an understanding of the Kenya crisis.’ In this thesis I frame 
my discussion of land in terms of contemporary grievances over the appropriation of space by 
‘immigrants’, and I explore sentiments of other historical injustices through the framings of 
my interviewees. I do not offer an account of the historical origins or evolution of land 
injustices, nor do I trace the roots of the multiplicity of past injustices. That is not to say that I 
do not recognise their importance, but rather that, for the student of contemporary violence, it 
is the way in which historical narratives are used to justify existing animosities which are of 
significance. Furthermore, as shall be discussed below, an overemphasis on the historical 
roots of grievance carries with it a potential danger of over-determinism.   
 Thus, whilst these grievance explanations are invaluable for developing an 
understanding of ethnic violence, and this thesis consistently highlights the importance of 
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 A detailed discussion of the unjust and unequal allocation of land remains outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, by way of a brief overview it can be said that the settler economy created during colonial rule 
dispossessed many communities of their land, particularly in the white highlands, and engendered large-scale 
migration of people in search of wage labour on settler farms. As the country moved towards independence the 
Million Acre Scheme was set up to structure the transfer of land from the departing Europeans back to African 
hands. However, the initial intention of returning the land to ‘local’ communities was disrupted by the 
implementation of a willing-buyer-willing-seller policy (Anderson and Lochery 2008: 335) and in the Rift 
Valley, the native Kalenjin found themselves largely excluded from land allocations as Kenyatta facilitated 
Kikuyu acquisitions (Githinji and Holmquist 2008: 346). This is an extremely simplistic and reductive 
articulation of the land question, however. See Oucho (2002: particularly Chapter 7) for a more detailed 
discussion. See Rutten and Owuor (2009) for an analysis of the post-election violence that situates the historical 
evolution of land conflicts at the heart of the crisis.  
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struggles over relative status and access to, and distribution of, resources, they are subject to a 
number of significant limitations. There are three key interrelated points which should be 
highlighted here. Firstly, grievance-based approaches tend to focus upon the objective 
dimensions of inequalities, using quantitative data to measure and illustrate their existence 
and intensity, while the subjective elements of grievance are often downplayed. This problem 
is also identified by Langer and Mikami (2012) who argue that this objective focus is 
problematic ‘because people act on the basis of their perceptions of the world in which they 
live, and these perceptions may differ substantially from the “objective reality”’ (2012: 3, 
original emphasis).
28
 I suggest that we need to push this point even further; if perceptions of 
inequality are of more importance than statistical inequalities –  of which people may not 
even be aware (Stewart 2010: 14) – then we need to explore what shapes and influences these 
perceptions. In this thesis I argue that they can be distorted by lived experiences and shaped 
through interactions with others in everyday life, and as such are part of the continual 
production and negotiation of ethnic identity at the local level. Perceptions of inequality, and 
discrimination, and feelings of superiority and inferiority, dominance and subordination at the 
macro-level can be reinforced or complicated by micro-level dynamics. 
 This point leads into the second key criticism of the existing literature: that it 
predominantly identifies grievances at the national level. That is, analyses tend to identify 
and explore country-wide dynamics of dominance and subordination and focus upon the 
competition for, and distribution of, resources at the state level. However, as Cunningham 
and Weidmann (2010) have pointed out, ethnic grievances and disputes often operate at the 
level of local political boundaries, and broad national level inequalities can be inflected with 
and problematised by local level experience. Indeed, discourses of superiority and inferiority, 
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 This is of course not to suggest that people are always mistaken about their relative status – Langer and 
Mikami unequivocally demonstrate that this is not the case – only that we cannot simply assume grievances will 
correspond neatly with the statistical reality of inequality.  
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and debates concerning socio-economic and political rights in areas with ‘local majorities’ 
(Cunningham and Weidmann 2010: 1036) operate alongside the macro-narrative, and whilst 
sometimes reinforcing of it, they can also run counter to it. Conceptualisations of hierarchies 
and status positions are far more complex and nuanced than the macro-context allows. While 
the Kikuyu may be perceived to be (and indeed may perceive themselves to be) dominant at 
the national level, in the midst of pervasive regional and micro-level discourses of 
autochthony, other groups can feel that they have, or that they should have, a superior status 
in their own areas; consequently an inferior status can be imposed upon members of other 
communities through social practices within certain spaces.
29
 Discrimination and feelings of 
grievance can operate below the level of the state, and perceptions of inequality and relative 
status are, consequently, not consistent across space. By taking the ethnic group as an 
unproblematic whole, as a cohesive and monolithic unit with clearly defined and uncontested 
grievances, the multi-vocality of ethnicity is obscured and the micro-spatial variations in 
violence dynamics remain difficult to explain. 
  The final limitation related to these approaches relates to the tendency to conflate 
salient grievances with historical injustices. It is certainly the case that past discrimination, 
subordination and exclusion can generate significant inequalities and resentments which 
persist and are deeply felt in the present. Indeed, many of my own interviewees alluded to 
them as a significant factor in fuelling their participation in the violence. However, a 
retrospective reading of historical injustice through the lens of a particular episode of 
violence can over-determine conflict along particular cleavage lines, over-emphasise one 
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 Interestingly, Gurr (2000: 68) alludes to a similar dynamic when he states that ‘groups often feel superior 
because they share a belief that they are the original people of a place.’ While he does not explore this in any 
detail, the point has important implications for the potential complexification of the relationship between macro-
and micro-level perceptions of relative status. These points are intimately related to the burgeoning literature on 
autochthony, which is addressed throughout the thesis.  
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source of resentment, and can mask the flexibility of the friend/enemy, ally/rival 
conceptualisation. Kanyinga (2009: 341), for example, falls into this trap when he states: 
The violence that followed Kenya’s disputed presidential election result in December 
2007 may have caught many commentators on Kenya by surprise. But looking 
through Kenya’s politics of land rights especially in the former white highlands shows 
how predictable this violence was... Giving preference to the Kikuyu in the 
resettlement effort led to antagonism with other communities, the Kalenjin in 
particular.  
 
Such a historical reading implies a certain inevitability to conflict between the Kikuyu and 
other communities, especially the Kalenjin, and suggests that conflict was primarily, if not 
almost entirely, about land. However, the political fault lines in Kenya are far more flexible 
than this and there are multiple, diverse, and cross-cutting sources of resentment fuelling 
existing animosities. Consequently, the salience of some historical injustices can be 
diminished through different political allegiances, while the significance of others can be 
heightened; that is, historical injustices can effectively be put to one side should the potential 
for future inclusion and favour be assured through political alliance. The Kikuyu-Kalenjin 
coalition in the lead-up to the 2013 elections is indicative of this.
30
 Indeed, Kamungi (2009: 
347) draws attention to this flexibility, stating: 
The insider-outsider dichotomy and access to land rights are tempered by political 
positioning of groups: when outsiders and outsiders [sic] share a common political 
affiliation, the land question recedes in significance as the lines of political division 
become blurred.  
 
Thus, antagonisms between communities are not constant and historical injustices can wax 
and wane in significance. Gurr’s (1993: 173) notion of ‘active’ and ‘persisting’ grievances, 
can perhaps offer some assistance in making a differentiation between horizontal inequalities 
and historical injustice. While he does not offer an extensive discussion of the distinction, the 
dual concepts might allude to the fact that while there are enduring grievances with their 
roots in historical processes and policies, they need not necessarily be a significant factor 
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 As is the significant level of Kalenjin support for a Kikuyu presidential candidate in 2002.  
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driving the current conflict. Thus, while I accept the importance of grievances over past 
injustices, it is the way in which they speak to the contemporary socio-political context which 
is of importance and which renders them more or less salient.
31
 Other scholars have similarly 
cautioned against a retrospective reading of history through the lens of violence. Straus 
(2006: 18), for example, laments the vast attention paid to historical processes in 
understanding Rwanda, stating, ‘history now overdetermines the genocide’ and Fujii (2009a: 
73), similarly asserts that ‘reading history backward creates a straight-line trajectory from 
past oppression to genocidal hatreds.’ While I do not believe that most accounts of the 
Kenyan crisis go as far as this,
32
 it is worth noting the dangers of historical determinism given 
the tendency to conflate contemporary grievance with historical injustice.  
 
Group Fears: The Security Dilemma and the Construction of Fear 
 In addition to the wealth of attention paid to group resentments and antagonisms over 
inequalities, a large volume of work has emerged identifying collective fear as the central 
driving force behind ethnic violence. The most common formulation of this argument adopts 
a rational actor approach, and has emerged out of the application of the International 
Relations concept of the security dilemma to situations of intrastate war. The security 
dilemma can be understood in the following way: in an anarchic international system, states 
are concerned about their safety, fearing attack, domination and annihilation by others. In 
order to ensure their security, they mobilise in self-defence. However, these actions render 
others more insecure and, uncertain about the intentions of the mobilising state, they in turn 
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 Lynch (2008; 2010; 2011), for example, has convincingly illustrated how contested histories have been used 
by elites and non-elite actors to justify contemporary demands.  
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 Indeed, most accounts seem to allude to ‘latent’ grievances which are then activated, manipulated, and 
accentuated by elites. While I would push for greater attention to local agency in the ‘activation’ of these 
grievances, I agree with the general point that there is not a linear causal chain between historical injustice and 
contemporary violence.  
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take similar actions to safeguard their survival. Thus, the actions states take to ensure their 
own security causes reactions that actually render them less secure.
33
 There are three 
fundamental elements underscoring the security dilemma. Firstly, it is structural: it is the 
anarchic system which brings it into action. Secondly, uncertainty about the intentions of 
others is central to understanding spiralling fear and hostility. Finally, it is an unintended 
‘tragedy’ (Roe 1999: 183), a ‘heartbreaking plight’ (Herz 1950: 137) – that is, the states 
locked into these spirals of insecurity do not have malign intent, rather it is their mutual fear 
that leads to conflict. Indeed, Tang (2011: 517) argues that if the perception of the threat is in 
fact accurate, and one party does intend harm to another, then it is no longer a security 
dilemma, it is a security threat which spirals.
34
  
 Posen (1993) was the first to apply the concept explicitly to situations of ethnic 
conflict. Examining the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Posen 
argues that the collapse of imperial regimes creates an ‘emerging anarchy’ under which 
different ethnic groups suddenly find themselves responsible for their own protection. 
Windows of opportunity and vulnerability are opened up, and in the ensuing pursuit of the 
key to security – power – groups will begin to threaten others, who will respond in turn 
(1993: 27-28). Posen further emphasises two factors which will increase the intensity of the 
security dilemma, and therefore, the likelihood of violence: the indistinguishability of 
offensive and defensive forces, which intensifies uncertainties about a group’s intents, and 
the effectiveness of offensive strategies which can create incentives for pre-emptive attack. 
Since the publication of this seminal article, the argument has flourished as scholars have 
sought to illustrate the rationality of fear in ethnic conflict through the lens of the security 
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 See Butterfield (1951), Herz (1950, 1966) and Jervis (1976) for the original development of the security 
dilemma theory, and for more nuanced conceptualisations than the simplified description offered here.  
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 It is for this reason that Tang suggests that the less restrictive ‘spiral model’ – the worsening of relationships, 
arms races, insecurity, fear and violence – is better suited to understanding the mechanics of ethnic conflict. 
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However, a direct application of the concept to intrastate conflict has proven 
problematic. Scholars have highlighted the fact that anarchy is rare within states (Kaufman 
1996a: 151), and that often the security dilemma is coincident with the movement towards 
violence, not the cause of it (de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Lake and Rothchild 1996). 
Thus, as Kaufman (1996b: 112) has stated: 
The neorealist concept of a security dilemma cannot be mechanically applied to ethnic 
conflict: anarchy and the possibility of a security threat are not enough to create a 
security dilemma between communities which may have been at peace for decades. 
 
 Consequently, in many accounts, the structural dimensions of the original concept have been 
downplayed in favour of a perceptual security dilemma,
36
 in which perceptions of insecurity 
and threat are exaggerated and are not the direct result of structural conditions. Some scholars 
argue that the security dilemma can be deliberately fostered and manipulated by elites 
(Kaufman 1996a, 1996b; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999
37
), situating these largely within 
the elite manipulation school of thought. Susanne Mueller (2008: 199) alludes to a similar 
line of argument when she states that the negative rhetoric which marked the 2007 election 
campaigns in Kenya ‘ignited fears on both sides about what would happen if their parties did 
not win.’ Others suggest that the security dilemma can be triggered by particular events, 
circumstances or conditions. Horowitz (1985: 179), for example, argues that the anxiety-
laden ‘fear of subordination’ is a characteristic of unranked ethnic systems, and consequently, 
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 See for example, Fearon (1995); Lake and Rothchild (1996); Kaufman (1996a, 1996b, 2001); Melander 
(1999); Roe (1999, 2002, 2005); Rose (2000); Saideman et al. (2002);  Tang (2011). 
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 Snyder (1985) is usually credited with identifying the distinction between structural and perceptual security 
dilemmas.   
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 De Figueiredo and Weingast argue that a security dilemma alone is insufficient as an explanation of violence, 
and suggest that elites deliberately inflame fears about the other. People on the ground are often uncertain about 
the intentions of their leaders. However, while they may not believe the rhetoric propounded by elites, they 
accept extreme actions and follow them because the costs of being wrong are too high. In this way de 
Figueiredo and Weingast argue for the ‘rationality of fear’ and their argument straddles both elite manipulation 
and fear-based explanations of violence. 
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it ‘limits and modifies perceptions, producing extreme reactions to modest threats.’ Saideman 
et al. (2002) extend this line of argument and explore the relationship of the ethnic security 
dilemma to democratisation processes. They suggest that since the government is often the 
greatest threat to security, groups fear its control by others. Thus, in divided societies the 
search for security motivates groups to seek control of the state, and through each group’s 
efforts to capture power, the fears of others are reinforced. Consequently, democratic 
transitions are likely to intensify ethnic group insecurity, and the uncertainty about future 
prospects inherent within them can cause ethnic communities to act pre-emptively. Traces of 
this argument can be seen in Bratton and Kimenyi’s (2008: 276) analysis of the 2007 Kenyan 
elections in which they argue that groups vote along ethnic lines defensively:
38
 
Kenyans do not easily trust co-nationals who hail from ethnic groups other than their 
own... they worry that their co-nationals are prone to organize politically along 
exclusive ethnic lines and to govern in a discriminatory fashion.  
 
Some scholars have located the source of the perceptual security dilemma within 
group norms and ‘myth-symbol complexes.’
39
 They suggest, for example, that feelings of 
insecurity and threat are, at least in part, a product of perceptions of the past; that is, groups 
fear other communities as a result of memories and narratives relating to how they acted 
under similar circumstances in the past. Posen (1993: 30), for instance, argues that newly 
independent groups will assess the offensive tendencies of ethnic others by using history, 
asking ‘how did other groups behave the last time they were unconstrained?’
40
 Thus, 
translating this argument to a situation of democratic transition in Kenya, for example, it 
could be said that fears of the Kikuyu community retaining the presidential seat are 
intensified as a result of prior marginalisation and exclusion under both the Kenyatta and 
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 Their argument relates to voting behaviour and not explicitly to violence, however. 
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 The myth symbol complex has been identified by Anthony Smith (1986). It refers to the shared cultural 
attributes, traits, histories, narratives and values of different groups.   
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 Consequently, while his argument is often identified as one of a structural security dilemma, there are 





 Others focus on the myths, narratives and histories which justify hostilities 
and fears of subordination as facilitators of the emergence of a security dilemma. Kaufman’s 
(1996a, 1996b, 2001) ‘symbolic politics’ argument is the most explicit articulation of this 
point. He notes (2001: 32) that myths of historical domination, and racist ideologies of 
particular groups as inferior, evil and dangerous can engender prevalent fears, which ‘justify 
and motivate a resort to violence in self-defence.’ Thus Kaufman’s theory, and this strand of 
argumentation in general, sit at the intersection between predominantly rational actor 
approaches and what Brubaker and Laitin (2004: 109) term ‘culturalist’ arguments. Scholars 
who adopt the latter tend to focus upon particular cases, illustrating how specific symbols, 
myths, narratives and cultural texts have been constructed and deeply embedded in 
consciousness, engendering fears of, and hostilities towards, the ethnic other.
 42
 Kapferer, for 
example, explores the demonization of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and demonstrates how they 
have come to be regarded as ‘agents of evil’ (Kapferer 1988: 101; see also Spencer 1990). In 
the case of Rwanda both Prunier (1995) and Mamdani (2001) draw attention to the 
prevalence of a racist ideology representing the Tutsi as evil foreigners, who would pose a 
significant threat to the Hutu natives should they maintain power again. Thus, for Prunier, 
fear of the evil Tutsi devils underscored the genocide, and Mamdani (2001: 14) similarly 
claims that the mission was ‘one of cleansing the soil of a threatening alien presence.’
43
 Thus, 
while not explicitly identifying themselves with the security dilemma literature, these 
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 While it might seem that this argument falls into the trap of historical determinism as highlighted above, in 
fact it circumvents it by situating perceptions of group histories in the contemporary context. Thus, it allows for 
greater flexibility in that, if there is no reason to fear a particular group, perhaps by virtue of an existing political 
alliance, then past actions are less threatening.  
42
 These approaches cannot be accused of assuming a top-down macro-level perspective which much of this 
review critiques. However, they remain focused at the wider group level, and assume rather than explain the 
resonance of these culturally constructed fears across the ethnic group as a whole. As Brubaker and Laitin 
(2004: 110) state, ‘it is difficult to know whether, when, where, to what extent, and in what manner the posited 
beliefs and fears were actually held.’ 
43
 For other culturalist accounts of ethnic or religious violence see Zulaika (1988) in the case of the Basques; 
and in reference to Muslim-Hindu relations in India see (Pandey 1992) and Hansen (1996). 
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culturalist accounts remain similarly concerned with uncovering the logic of inter-ethnic fear 
and hatred which makes violence understandable and comprehensible.  
Thus, there is a rich and diverse literature which explores how fears of other groups 
can lead to spirals of insecurity and violence and many of these arguments have value in 
understanding the macro-contexts of ethnic conflict. However, they are subject to many of 
the same criticisms identified above in relation to grievance-based explanations. By taking 
the ethnic group as a cohesive unitary actor, these theories assume that fears are consistently 
felt, experienced and acted upon across space, and they fail to appreciate that they are rather 
produced, negotiated and transformed in local contexts by ordinary people in the course of 
their everyday lives. Thus, neither an emerging anarchy, nor the deliberate social, or 
unintended cultural, construction of fear, will produce coherent and uniform perceptions of 
the ethnic other at the local level. Macro-narratives are always inflected with localised 
dynamics and it is only through an examination of these variations that the spatial and 
temporal contours of violence can be explained. Relatedly, the notion that the objects of fear 
are the same across time and space is problematic; that is to say, these theories tend to 
understand a clear inter-ethnic cleavage along which fear is coherently constructed and 
defined. Thus, they assume that the animosity between the Luo and the Kikuyu communities, 
for example, is both temporally and spatially constant. However, understandings of ‘the 
enemy’ shift according to localised and political contexts, and fears can be either intensified, 
diffused, or negotiated by people and by circumstances on the ground. Local rumours during 
violence, for example, can reinforce fears along the macro-cleavage, but they can also subvert 
them, and cross-cutting associations and personal relationships can problematise the macro-
narrative of inter-group fear and hatred.  During the Kenyan violence not all members of 
‘rival’ groups were regarded with equal levels of fear and suspicion and it was not 
uncommon for neighbours, friends and relatives to help, protect and unite with supposed 
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‘enemies.’ Similarly, while in one setting members of the Luo community are unequivocal 
enemies, to be feared and defended against, in another they are potential allies in the defence 
against a more dangerous, common threat. Thus, the dichotomy between friend and enemy is 
not quite so clear cut at the local level, and we must delve further into the micro-dynamics of 
the construction of fear to understand the complex and ambiguous role of ethnicity in 
situations of violence. 
 
Economic Incentive, Greed, and the ‘Banality of Ethnic War’  
 The final branch of the literature moves away from explanations of violence as seen 
primarily through the lens of the ‘ethnic group.’ Troubled by the collective action problems 
associated with grievance-based approaches to ethnic conflict,
44
 these arguments focus rather 
upon more individualistic behaviours and motivations, emphasising economic opportunity, 
the pursuit of individual benefits, greed, thuggery, criminality, political opportunism, and 
vigilantism as central features driving conflict. Underscoring the diverse formulations of 
these ‘greed’ theories, then, is the notion that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by 
economic opportunities than by grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004, 2005; Collier 
1999, 2000; Keen 1998; Reno 1995, 1998; de Soysa 2000, 2002; Berdal and Malone 2000; 
Klare 2001; Azam and Hoeffler, 2002).
45
 These arguments have found most resonance in the 
context of ‘resource wars’, where lootable primary commodities are recognised as providing 
sufficient incentive to those ‘doing well out of war’ to perpetuate it. However, they have 
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 The collective action problem refers to the notion that any public benefit is subject to the free-rider effect. 
That is, rational actors would choose not to participate in action in the pursuit of collective benefits, allowing 
others to bear the costs, yet still reaping the rewards. Olson (1965) is widely considered to be the classic text 
here. He states, ‘Large or “latent” groups have no incentive to act to obtain a collective good, because however 
valuable the collective good may be to the group as a whole, it does not offer the individual any incentive... to 
bear in any other way the costs of the necessary collective action’ (1965: 50-51).    
45
 There are significant differences and nuances to the various arguments which constitute this school of 
thought. A comprehensive review of these unfortunately remains outside the scope of this review.  
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become prolific in explaining mass participation in violence in other contexts and, in some 
cases, have engendered a reading of local level participation in ethnic violence as ‘banal’ and 
almost entirely criminalistic in nature. Autesserre (2010: 72), for example, asserts that efforts 
to explain the ‘local’ in violence tend to conflate it with ‘criminal.’ That is, that any attention 
paid to the micro-level, has largely been to assert its criminality. While these stark versions of 
greed theories remain popular, they have become far more nuanced in recent literature as 
scholars have explored how economic incentives and political grievances interact in conflict 
(for example, Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Berdal 2005; Korf 2005, 2006; Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin 2009; Keen 2012).
46
 There are two dimensions of this broad school of thought 
with particular relevance to the Kenyan situation: the first highlights the ethnically-structured 
redistributive nature of the state in Africa; the second emphasises the predominance of 
politically-sponsored vigilantes and ethnic militias, and stresses the opportunities for 
immediate gain inherent in violence and disorder.  
The first strand of thought straddles the groupist/individualist focus within the 
literature and, again, relates to the understanding that capturing the state and putting ‘our 
man’ in the presidential seat, is the ‘only way to eat’ (Cowen and Kanyinga 2002: 170) and 
the key means of securing the ‘ethnic slice at the expense of the total national pie’ (Englebert 
200: 65). However, rather than framing this politics of the belly mentality primarily in 
groupist terms, as grievance and fear based arguments tend to, this body of literature 
emphasises the expectations of individual gain and benefit from a co-ethnic’s position of 
power. That is, benefits and resources are expected to trickle down to individuals at the 
grassroots from the highest echelons of the state and ‘politicians are seen primarily as 
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 Though, as has already been noted, even those works more commonly situated firmly on the greed side of the 
divide tend to afford some role to grievances. Collier (Collier et al. 2009), the key proponent of the greed 
school, has shifted his attention in more recent work, focusing on the feasibility of conflict rather than the stark 
greed-grievance dichotomy, for example. 
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personal distributors of private rather than public goods’ (Mueller 2008: 200).
47
 Thus, Azam 
(2001) argues that credible signs of a functioning redistributive system, such as the institution 
of members of various ethnic groups in high level public sector positions, which will 
facilitate the ethnic trickle-down effect, are an effective means of maintaining peace. 
However, if these signs are absent, then the ethnically-directed redistribution of state 
resources breeds ‘destructive competition and conflict’ (Tarimo 2010: 303). Local level 
actors are understood to follow their leaders unquestioningly in an effort to secure their 
individual material interests. Thus, the collective action problem is over-ridden by the notion 
that while the group still controls access to benefits, individuals participate in violence in the 
expectation of private gain through patronage networks.
48
 This formulation of economic 
incentives and rational actor arguments most commonly enters analyses as a precipitating 
condition rather than as a direct cause of violence – as central to explaining the ease with 
which people can be mobilised by politicians, and as rationalising ‘the lengths to which 
leaders and followers are willing to go to get their leader in power and the means they are 
willing to use to achieve their end’ (Mueller 2008: 200; Kagwanja and Southall 2009: 272). 
Once again, while this argument does a good job of capturing and explaining the macro-
context of high stakes political competition, and renders the potential for a devolution into 
violence more explicable, it obscures the complexities and nuances of political support and 
grassroots action, and presents an overly materialist understanding of local level motivation. 
As shall be highlighted in Chapter Five, there is a strong recognition amongst many local 
level actors of ‘how little trickles down to the worse off through the patronage network’ 
(Williams 1987: 639), and their support for politicians is more complicated than a simplistic 
expectation of individualised material benefit. Moreover, ethnicised political support can be 
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 This neo-patrimonial literature is explored in more depth in Chapter Five.  
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problematised and disrupted as local level actors debate, contest and negotiate the most 
effective means of securing their futures. Thus, participation in violence cannot simply be 
assumed from the macro-context of an ethnicised, high stakes, zero-sum political arena.  
 The second dimension of this body of literature departs from the notion that elites 
whip up mass inter-ethnic tensions and hatreds, mobilising and inciting large numbers of 
ordinary people to participate in violence, and argues that ethnic wars are in fact more 
commonly carried out by ‘small – sometimes very small – bands of opportunistic marauders 
recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance.’ (Mueller 2000: 42). 
That is, politicians recruit ethnic militias and vigilante groups to carry out violence for 
political ends.
49
 Scholars often argue, then, that individuals recruited into these militias are 
‘indistinguishable from bandits or pirates’ (Grossman 1999: 269), and participation in 
conflict is essentially equated with rent-seeking and criminality (Neary 1997). Militias are 
portrayed as being made up of unemployed youths who see an opportunity for a regular 
salary, for access to food and drink, and for immediate material gain through looting and 
other criminal behaviour (Mueller 2000: 20; Prunier 1995: 232; Servant 2007: 523). 
Africanist scholars have additionally situated this reward system within the broader rubric of 
patronage; Boone (2011: 1327-1328), for example, states that in the Kenyan state-sponsored 
clashes of 1990s, ‘the process of expelling landholders and expropriating their farms 
generated selective incentives for participants in the process of ethnic cleansing’ as land 
seized from settlers was redistributed. De Smedt (2008: 595) similarly asserts that ‘rewards 
can also be indirect, more substantial, or long-term’ and he points to the pervasive, albeit 
unsubstantiated, rumours that Raila Odinga pays rent for many of his supporters in Kibera. 
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 Some scholars who are more closely associated with collective-fear explanations of violence similarly 
highlight the role of vigilantes, militias and thugs in helping to construct this fear. For example, Tang suggests 
that elites mobilise a small fraction of the population, such as vigilante groups, who unleash violence which then 
generates spirals of hatred and fear (Tang 2011: 536). Posen (1993: 33) similarly argues that violent actions by 
small bands of fanatics can magnify initial fears within the wider populace by confirming them. 
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This instrumentalisation of disorder through the direction of ethnic militias has been well-
documented in the Kenyan context (for example, Klopp 2001; Kagwanja 2001, 2003, 2006; 
Anderson 2002; Katumanga 2005; Laakso 2007; Servant 2007; Mueller 2008) and is most 
commonly traced back to Moi’s attempts to secure his position following the reintroduction 
of multiparty politics in 1992. It is argued that these groups are, and have been, widely used 
to disrupt opposition rallies, intimidate politicians and their supporters, and to carry out 
ethnic cleansing operations in order to displace opposition supporters and prevent them from 
voting. As the violence progresses, it is argued, ordinary people not affiliated with these 
militias join the opportunistic melee and acts of looting and plundering become increasingly 
common (Keen 1998: 36). This literature has become far more nuanced in the some of the 
recent Kenyanist works emerging in the wake of the post-election violence. Scholars have 
pointed to the uncontrollable proliferation and diffusion of extra-state violence in the country 
(Mueller 2008: 187), and to the ways in which Kenyans have been socialised into violence 
(Ndung’u 2010: 111), arguing that this environment not only facilitated the top-down 
mobilisation of gangs and vigilante groups by politicians, but also led to the emergence of 
more bottom-up spontaneous and retaliatory violence (Kagwanja and Southall 2009: 271). 
These are important observations which situate the violence within its social context and 
which have the potential to shift the focus from the level of the elite alone. However, the 
concentration upon organised gangs, vigilante groups, ethnic or tribal militias, political goon 
squads, personal armies, ‘elite stormtroopers’ (Kagwanja 2009: 370), and ‘hired thugs’ 
(Brown 2003: 69) still has a tendency of focusing upon mobilisation from above; it simplifies 
the nature of political campaign groups, it overstates the criminality and banality of the 
conflict, and it has the effect of exculpating the ‘ordinary’ man and woman. Kagwanja (2009: 
378), for example, suggests that: 
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Violence in Nairobi slums was more or less a throwback to earlier wars by gangs such 
as Mungiki, Taliban, Bagdad Boys and Kamjesh... In the ensuing chaos, criminal 
thugs overwhelmed and usurped the role of the police and took over specific areas in 
slums and rural areas as new frontiers of robbery and killing. 
  
Thus, these accounts, while undoubtedly capturing an element of violence at the local 
level, are subject to a number of important criticisms. Firstly, there is a tendency to focus 
primarily upon highly organised, ethnically-based, and politically-directed gangs, militias and 
vigilantes in political campaigning and violence, at the expense of the more amorphous and 
inclusive elements of violent ethnic politics evident in 2007-2008. The types of militias used 
to intimidate and displace opposition supporters in incidents of pre-election violence in the 
1990s do not always translate neatly into the 2007-2008 context. My own research suggests 
that the youth groups attached to politicians during the 2007 campaigns were often less 
centralised and cohesive than the various jeshi
50
 of earlier years, with a more casual, fluid, 
and often ethnically heterogeneous membership (see Chapter Five for a further discussion).
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Secondly, this instrumentalist interpretation of ethnic violence as the ‘joint product of 
political manipulation and organized thuggery’ (Brubaker and Laitin 2004: 98) is simplistic 
to the point of being distorting.  Ethnicity is largely absent from these accounts, save from 
being a source of patronage; indeed, the conceptualisation of participants in violence as 
primarily ‘homo economicus’ (Cramer 2002) fails to explain the peculiar intensity of ethnic 
violence, and risks reducing ‘naked evil to ultimate banality’ (Green 1999: 35). As Horowitz 
(1985: 140) asserts, ‘a bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory.’ 
Finally, despite their focus upon individual motivation and participation, these accounts 
remain very much a top-down affair, in which violence is understood as orchestrated and 
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 The militias attached to politicians in Kenya are often referred to as jeshi, meaning ‘army’ and many of these 
groups incorporate this within their names, for example jeshi la Mzee (army of the elders), jeshi la Embakasi 
(army of Embakasi) and so on.  
51
 This is of course not to suggest that more organised groups played no role in the 2007 elections or in the 
violent aftermath, only to point out that an exclusive focus upon these militias obscures other important players 
and can mischaracterise the gangs of youths which surround politicians during their campaigns. 
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directed from above by political elites, rebel leaders, or centralised gangs, and the ordinary 
man or woman is either absent from the analysis or is presented as simply following out of 
economic need or greed. Yet, as has already been stated, local level actors participate in 
ethnic violence in far more nuanced, complex and ambiguous ways than is afforded by these 
reductive explanations.  
 
Conclusion: The Limitations of Existing Explanations 
The key theories identified and discussed above are, for the most part, compatible 
with each other, and their synthesis has often produced well-founded and valuable 
explanations of ethnic violence. Indeed, throughout this thesis I draw upon and interweave 
these theories in my own analysis of the Kenyan post-election crisis, and my conclusions are 
seldom entirely in opposition to existing explanations. However, invaluable as these theories 
are, they suffer from the same problem of perspective, and as a result their fusion can only 
take us so far in developing a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of ethnic violence. 
The predominantly top-down, macro-level perspective obscures the ambiguous, complex, and 
often contradictory processes of identity construction, and the empirical dynamics of violence 
on the ground, and as such oversimplifies the nature of ethnic conflict. The criticisms of each 
branch of the literature identified and highlighted throughout this review can be drawn 
together into two overarching problems within the field: the absence of local level agency and 
the obscuration of multi-vocality. With regards to the former, the overwhelmingly historical 
approach to identity construction fails to explore the ways in which ordinary people produce, 
invoke, enact and experience ethnicity in the present, and the tendency towards elite-centric 
explanations of conflict affords insufficient agency to people at the local level in their 
participation in, and navigation of, violent contexts. People do not simply respond 
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unthinkingly and unquestioningly to macro-contexts and elite rhetoric, but are active agents 
in negotiating their own circumstances. As such, we cannot assume participation in violence 
along particular cleavage lines simply from an elucidation of the macro-context of inter-
group tension and conflict. Secondly, and relatedly, by taking the ethnic group as a cohesive 
and coherent unit of analysis in times of conflict, with clearly defined grievances, fears, and 
hostilities, existing explanations fail to appreciate the multi-vocality of ethnic identity. 
Rather, they create notions of a singularly understood and commonly perceived ‘other’ 
(Tronvoll 2005: 236), which is a drastic oversimplification of local processes and inter-ethnic 
relations. As Bayart (2005: 109) has argued in his extensive examination of ‘cultural’ 
identity, the notion of ethnic totalities and coherences is an illusion, and ‘what we need to do 
is to express indeterminism, incompletion, multiplicity and polyvalence.’ Thus, the aerial 
view is a distorting lens through which to explore ethnic violence, and a model of conflict 
which examines the relationship between micro-dynamics and macro-contexts can offer a 






Negotiating the Field: 





Dejected and frustrated following a particularly difficult day in the field, I was sitting 
in a small Somali hoteli in Eldoret town, sharing a plate of pilau with my research assistant, 
Nusrah. Noting my demeanour, he leant over the table and very quietly said, ‘The research 
you’re doing, you know, it’s not easy. This kind of thing, it needs much more intelligence.’ In 
the many conversations and discussions between the two of us, in which we planned, 
organised, problematised, reflected upon and rearranged our negotiation of the field, this 
sentiment was expressed frequently. The challenges of conducting sensitive research in 
difficult situations are many and varied, and while they are beginning to be explicitly 
explored by a number of scholars working in diverse contexts (see for example, Sluka 1990; 
Lee 1995; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Smyth and Robinson 2001; Porter et al. 2005; 
Sriram et al. 2009), there remains a ‘dearth of academic literature’ (Thomson 2010: 19) 
surrounding the practicalities of conducting such research. A key aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate the value of more local level empirical research in the study of ethnic violence, 
arguing that such analyses can both broaden and deepen our understanding of the 
phenomenon. Consequently, further honest engagement with the practical realities of 
fieldwork is needed to refine the strategies used to negotiate these difficult field settings. This 
chapter reflects upon my own fieldwork experience, examining its successes and its failures, 
its strengths and its limitations. Through an analysis of issues relating to access, security, 
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veracity, and researcher subjectivity, I suggest that a collaborative partnership between 
outside researchers and inside assistants can facilitate a more successful navigation of the 
ethical and methodological challenges encountered when conducting sensitive research in a 
post-conflict, divided society.  By accepting the necessity of surrendering some control over 
the research, and by working with local assistants, outside researchers are better able to 
understand and to manoeuvre in difficult research settings.  
 
The Problem of Sensitive Research 
 It is often claimed that sensitive research presents unique methodological and ethical 
challenges, yet the diversity of disciplines and topics that have been encompassed within the 
rubric of sensitive research raises questions as to its very nature. What makes research 
sensitive and for whom is it so? Is sensitivity absolute or relative? Fixed or contingent? Such 
questions are important as they speak directly to the problems encountered and the ways in 
which they can be managed. Renzetti and Lee (1993: 5) offer the following definition of 
sensitivity: 
A sensitive topic is one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, 
the emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/or researched the 
collection, holding and/or dissemination of research data. 
 
The problems associated with sensitivity are multifarious. They are related not only to the 
physical dangers, but also to the emotional consequences of the research; they can affect both 
the researcher as well as the researched; they can be real or perceived; and they can affect the 
research at all stages, from design through implementation to dissemination (Brewer 1993: 
128). In the case of my own research, some of the potential risks were, to an extent, 
identifiable in the early planning stages, and could be minimised before arriving in the field. 
The focus on individual experiences of, and involvement in, recent violence, for example, 
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undoubtedly presents a potential risk to the emotional well-being of participants. 
Remembering the horrific acts witnessed, recalling the loss of loved ones, and, moreover, 
recollecting one’s own personal involvement in violence, can be emotionally stressful. The 
narrative-style interview served to minimize this risk as participants were in control of the 
interview, and they were able to select the experiences they felt comfortable sharing with the 
researcher. Similarly, the interest in individuals’ active involvement in violence could 
generate fears of being ‘identified, stigmatized or incriminated in some way’ (Renzetti and 
Lee 1993: 6) and, as such, required very careful, discreet handling and dissemination of data. 
In light of this, the decision not to tape interviews or to record the names of interviewees, was 
taken and strategies of holding data securely were adopted.
1
 
However, while there are often elements of research projects which are inherently 
sensitive, these are limited, and outside researchers can easily misunderstand the nature, or 
the degree of risk posed by their research. The sensitivity of a topic is highly subjective and 
so the challenge is to assess ‘risk factors from the perspective of the persons who will be 
affected, remembering that not everyone perceives things as the researcher would’ (Sieber 
1993: 19). What one person sees as risky, may be considered harmless by someone else, and 
an issue which is deemed to be unthreatening at one moment, may become highly charged in 
another; sensitivity is not fixed or static, but rather it varies across time and space according 
to social and political context. As such, constant attention must be paid to sensitivities 
throughout the duration of the fieldwork and the research design must be sufficiently flexible 
to accommodate and adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats. I suggest throughout this 
chapter that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an outside researcher alone to be 
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 It should be noted, however, that the nature of the threat was misunderstood at this stage. It was initially 
thought that the research data would need to be protected from police and other state officials who would find it 
of interest, and that participants would be concerned with government authorities discovering their actions 
during the violence. However, interviewees were more afraid of reprisals from other community members and 
from International Criminal Court prosecutors. These fears generated some additional challenges to those 
anticipated in the early stages of research design which are explored throughout the chapter.  
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able to identify, understand and negotiate the potential threats of the research in the absence 
of a collaborative relationship with inside assistants. Not only are insiders better equipped to 
identify and manage the risks of the research at the data gathering stage, but they are also 
better able to monitor how the research is being perceived by members of the researched 
community, and to identify any emerging and unanticipated threats. Specific events which 
occur in the field, for example, can drastically alter the way in which the research is 
perceived, and therefore, how, and indeed whether, it can be continued. Belousov et al. (2007: 
164) indicate that following the murder of a key gatekeeper during the course of their 
fieldwork, relations with respondents ‘underwent a noticeable change’ from active interest to 
bare tolerance. In my own fieldwork, the suspension of the leading Kalenjin MP William 
Ruto
2
 and the resulting reaction in Eldoret town and the surrounding villages, led to several 
of my local contacts warning me to ‘lay low for the next few days’; in effect, the topic of my 
research was seen to be more sensitive due to the highly charged political context at that 
moment. Such events and the subsequent reactions of the researched community cannot be 
foreseen, but they have a significant impact upon the sensitivity of the research. In some 
cases the researcher may be able to negotiate the new uncertainties and fears, in other cases 
they may not, and the field site may need to be abandoned. Stanko and Lee (2003: 3) draw 
attention to this problem of identifying threats and dangers: 
The kind of threat posed by a particular piece of research inheres less in the specific 
topic and more in the relationship between that topic and the social context – defined 
both broadly and narrowly, within which the research is conducted. It is not unusual 
for the sensitive nature of an apparently innocuous topic to become apparent once 
research is underway, or for a researcher to approach a topic with caution only to find 
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 On 14 February 2010, Luo Prime Minister Raila Odinga suspended the leading Kalenjin politician, William 
Ruto, on suspicion of his involvement in a corruption scandal. Following the announcement, tensions increased 
in Eldoret town centre as Kalenjin youth gathered in the streets. Roadblocks were reportedly set up in the 
Eldoret North District and members of the Luo community were arriving in town claiming that they had been 
chased away by their Kalenjin neighbours. The General Service Unit (GSU) was deployed and tensions were 
further cooled when President Mwai Kibaki reinstated Ruto later that same day on the basis that the Prime 
Minister did not have the authority to suspend members of the cabinet. I was in Eldoret town on this day and 
observed the increasing tensions.  
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that initial fears about its ‘sensitivity’ have been misplaced. It may well be that a study 
seen as threatening by one group will be thought innocuous by another. 
 
Thus, it is important to emphasise here that sensitivity is neither absolute nor objective; 
rather, it is highly subjective and situational, and its nuances and the degrees to which it is felt 
cannot be wholly grasped by an outside researcher. Insider knowledge is fundamental to the 
safety and success of potentially sensitive research. The remainder of the chapter will 
highlight the complexities of my own research, demonstrating that constant attention to the 
ways in which the research was being perceived through frequent discussions with inside 
assistants and other local contacts, enabled some of the methodological and ethical 
difficulties to be managed and negotiated according to the context. 
 
Researchers, Collaborators and Assistants   
While a great deal of attention has been paid to debates concerning the relative virtues 
and drawbacks of insider- versus outsider-researchers, the crucial role played by local 
fieldwork assistants is seldom afforded a thorough and detailed analysis within the literature.
3
 
As Sanjek (1993: 13) states: 
While professional ethnographers – usually white, mostly male – have normally 
assumed full authorship for their ethnographic products, the remarkable contribution 
of these assistants – mainly persons of colour – is not widely enough appreciated or 
understood.   
 
Indeed, ‘the anthropologist’s assistant is a figure who seems suspiciously absent from 
ethnographic accounts. The conventional myth seeks to depict the battle-scarred 
anthropologist as a lone figure wandering into a village, settling in and “picking up the 
language” in a couple of months’ (Barley 1983: 44). The lack of attention to these local level 
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 The excellent elaboration of Whyte’s relationship with his ‘collaborator’ (1955 [1943]: 301), Doc, in his 
seminal work Street Corner Society  is a notable exception; as are the more recent contributions by Scott et al. 
(2006), Yeh (2006), Maloney and Hammett (2007), and Turner (2010). 
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assistants is further reflected in our difficulties in labelling the relationship, as these 
individuals seem to shift somewhere in the spaces between key informant, research assistant, 
collaborator, guide and friend (cf. Crick 1992: 177). Nevertheless, despite this problem of 
conceptualisation, these individuals can be of fundamental importance to the success or 
failure of the research.  
 In my own fieldwork, this multifarious role was adopted by Nusrah, a young, popular 
and charismatic Nubian man who lived in Makina village, Kibera. He was initially introduced 
to me by his sister, Hawa, a local NGO-worker with whom I had made contact prior to 
arriving in Kenya. Having discussed my research aims and objectives with her, Hawa 
indicated that such a topic of study required a youth
4
 to help navigate the area safely and to 
mobilise the different types of participants the research necessitated; the next day she 
introduced me to Nusrah. Initially, he acted as a guide and key informant, showing me around 
Kibera and talking freely about ethnicity and politics in Kenya. Gradually, his role became 
more and more complex; not only was he a collaborator, becoming increasingly involved in 
the design of the research and advising in issues related to access and security, much like Doc 
in Whyte’s Street Corner Society, but he also took on the role of assistant/interpreter, acting 
as translator during interviews, asking questions, as well as reflecting upon the plausibility 
and veracity of some of the material. We had frequent discussions about the progress of the 
research, talking about what was working and what was not, and we each suggested 
alterations to its design and implementation in response to changing contexts. Indeed, the 
data collected is as much a product of his interactions with, and presence in, the field as it is 
mine.   
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 The term ‘youth’ tends to be used in a gendered fashion in Kenya, usually denoting a male anywhere between 
the age of 18 to 35, and a similar usage is employed throughout this thesis. Nusrah was 28 at the time of the 
fieldwork.   
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 Additionally, local youths were employed in order to navigate the different field sites 
and micro-territories, and their role was equally complex. To an extent, they similarly 
contributed to the design and implementation of the research within their area. They were 
also key informants, discussing the local dynamics of the election campaigns and violent 
aftermath with us, and they were assistants in that they had specific duties, ‘payment for 
services and an almost contractual arrangement’ (Crick 1992: 177). Additionally, on occasion, 
it was necessary for these field assistants to act as translators for interviewees who were not 
proficient in Kiswahili or English, and who preferred to speak in their vernacular language. 
While it is difficult to pinpoint a singular or precise role, the involvement of these local 
assistants was invaluable.  
 
Access  
 Debates regarding insider/outsider researchers have frequently highlighted the relative 
advantages enjoyed by insiders in terms of accessing the field. Their pre-existing social 
networks, proficiency in the language, and familiarity with the local social and political 
context can facilitate quick and easy entry into the community, and can enable them to 
‘collect information and monitor issues such as safety’ more easily (Smyth 2005: 17; cf. 
Hermann 2001; Sherif 2001; Chavez 2008). On the other hand, the difficulties encountered 
by outside researchers, whilst not limited to sensitive research, are certainly amplified by it. 
Questions are frequently raised concerning the researcher’s identity and intent, and the 
suspicion with which they are often confronted can create serious problems. This section 
explores how these were managed during my own fieldwork, suggesting that ‘the success of 
field researchers is determined in large part by their ability to develop trust with local 
counterparts’ (Mertus 2009: 3).  
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Many, if not most, scholars conducting research on sensitive topics have highlighted 
the importance of trust in mobilising participants. While some level of trust is essential in all 
disciplines, its importance is further accentuated by potentially sensitive research. Studies of 
deviant behaviour, from domestic violence to organised crime, institutional corruption to 
large-scale conflict, are often regarded with unease and suspicion by researched communities, 
presenting a significant challenge in accessing field sites and mobilising participants. Indeed, 
one of the key challenges encountered by outside researchers is the management of the oft-
heard accusation that they are spies. Such allegations are common – indeed Sluka (2007: 264) 
suggests that ‘it is difficult to find an anthropologist who has done fieldwork who has not 
encountered this suspicion’ – but they can have serious implications for the willingness of 
individuals to participate in the research. I myself encountered this suspicion, and the 
somewhat unfortunate timing of my fieldwork only served to fuel these rumours and this 
wariness. Throughout the duration of my time in the field, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, was conducting investigations in Kenya and 
building a case against key figures suspected of organising and funding the post-election 
violence. During this period, key steps towards the consolidation of a prosecution case were 
taken, Ocampo himself made two official visits to the country, and media attention remained 
high. In short, the investigations of the ICC were continuing in a decidedly visible manner 
and they were the topic of much conversation and debate among people at the local level. As 
such, an outside researcher, asking questions about the details of events of violence on the 
ground, was bound to raise some gossip and chatter among researched communities. 
Rumours that I was an ICC investigator, a government spy, or more perplexingly, a CIA 
agent, made some individuals and communities uneasy about assisting with, or participating 
in, the research. The source of their fears varied.  Some believed that the ICC was looking to 
build cases against ordinary people; some feared reprisals from neighbours who had been 
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heavily involved in the violence; and some were concerned that members of their ethnic 
group would accuse them of betraying the ethnic community by assisting the ICC in 
developing a case against ‘their man.’
5
  Thus, fears concerning the identity and intentions of 




 It is frequently assumed that ethnographic studies, particularly those sensitive in 
nature, are consequently very time-consuming as high levels of trust must be developed and 
established between the researcher and the researched community. It is this time-investment 
and ‘sustained trust period’ (Norman 2009: 86) that is often understood as the most important 
factor in determining the success of fieldwork on sensitive topics. Brewer (1993: 130-131) 
states: 
Ethnographic research has special qualities suited to dealing with controversial topics 
in sensitive locations. It entails a gradual and progressive contact with respondents, 
which is sustained over a long period, allowing rapport to be established slowly with 
respondents over time.... To be successful... ethnographic research demands 
considerable time commitment. This is true especially with sensitive topics where the 
researcher’s penetration into the field takes longer and, once successful, continually 
needs to be reinforced by intensive contact. 
 
Such techniques seem to require a near-exclusive engagement with a localised, bounded 
geographical space in order to allow sufficient time for trust to develop. However, such a 
geographically constrained focus was problematic for my interest in understanding the 
variations in violence dynamics across the country: My research questions demanded a multi-
sited ethnographic approach. The limited amount of time afforded to researchers of multiple 
                                                 
5
 Methodological challenges and difficulties are often revealing and attention should be paid to them. In this 
case, the strong emotive attachments felt towards the ethnic leader, and the fear of intra-ethnic reprisal for 
‘betraying’ the community, speaks to the entrenchment of ethnic politics, and the importance of intra-ethnic 
policing in disciplining behaviour at the local level. These issues are further explored in later chapters.  
6
 A further ethical issue was raised as a result of the perception of my affiliation with the ICC. While in some 
cases this perception generated difficulties in accessing communities, in others it actually facilitated it. Whilst I 
was very careful to be clear about my status as a student researcher with no affiliation to the ICC, it was clear 
that there were some interviewees who continued to believe that this was simply a cover story. Thus, the 
researcher  is not in complete control of how the research is perceived and in light of this, it raises the question 
as to the ethics of interviewing someone who is believed to hold misconceived ideas about the research, even 
after a thorough explanation has been given. 
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field sites can raise questions over whether sufficient levels of trust can be established. 
However, I suggest that in such research, a different form of trust relationship can be fostered 
that does not depend upon the researcher’s direct relationship with members of the researched 
community, but rather upon that between local assistants and their community. That is, the 
researcher must establish and utilise networks of trust through partnerships with insider-
assistants. Polsky’s (1967: 129) notion of ‘snowballing’ is very similar in its suggestion that it 
is the researcher must get an introduction with one informant, ‘who will vouch for you with 
others, who in turn will vouch for you with still others.’ 
 Many researchers make mention of the importance of having an insider to ‘vouch for 
who you are and what you’re doing’ (Jacobs 2006: 159), but the implications of this are 
seldom explored in detail. Sixmith et al. (2003: 584), for example, suggest that introductions 
from fellow community members can foster the perception of the researcher as ‘a friend of a 
friend.’ Strocka (2008: 262), similarly, declares that his own attempts at accessing youth 
gangs in Peru were largely unsuccessful until he was introduced to Daniel, a former gang 
leader who became ‘my first research assistant and a key intermediary in the process of 
establishing rapport with the local manchas.’ Indeed, gaining the trust of an insider, with an 
already established ‘trustworthy and legitimate social network’ (Chavez 2008: 482) appears, 
in many cases, to lead to an extension of that trust to the researcher. Certainly, sensitive 
research benefits from intensive and extensive interactions, but I suggest that this need not 
necessarily be directly between the researcher and the researched; the former can rather 
concentrate on building and sustaining trust with research assistants. By fostering 
relationships with a small number of insider-assistants, the researcher can establish ‘trust by 
association’ (Norman 2009: 79) in a shorter space of time, consequently enabling him or her 
to work in multiple field sites. 
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 Access to field sites in my own fieldwork was highly dependent upon the trust which 
had been built over intensive, and inevitably, as time went by, extensive, interaction with 
Nusrah. I spent long days in Kibera in the first few months, socialising with him and his 
friends after interviews, consolidating our friendship. During this time he frequently 
questioned me about what the research was, why I was doing it and what had sparked my 
interest in Kenya in particular. It was essential that I was entirely open and honest in my 
responses to allay any of Nusrah’s initial suspicions. It is through this relationship that trust 
was subsequently extended to other assistants in each field site and, consequently, to the 
members of these communities. In Kawangware and Mathare, the local partners with whom 
we worked were good friends of Nusrah and as such their trust in him was extended to me 
almost immediately, whilst in Nakuru and Eldoret more time had to be spent establishing 
friendships with local residents. In the case of the former, the loose connections between our 
host, Abdul, and Nusrah,
7
 facilitated a trusting relationship and our intensive interactions with 
him through living in his home and socialising with him and his friends after work 
consolidated our relationship very quickly. It is through his personal networks that we were 
introduced to our local partners in each area of Nakuru. Eldoret was perhaps the most 
challenging area in which to establish connections. The home in which we were staying was 
located outside of any identified field site and the family consisted of two children, their 
mother - who was in full-time employment - and the housemaid. As such, they did not have 
any useful contacts in our desired field sites. In this situation Nusrah’s charismatic, outgoing 
and likeable personality was of fundamental importance in establishing friendships with local 
people. In the first week, he spent time meeting people in Eldoret town, establishing rapport 
with some local market vendors and their customers. He would sit and chew miraa with two 
                                                 
7
 Abdul’s family lived in the same village as Nusrah in Kibera, he was introduced as a ‘fellow Nubian’, his wife 
schooled with Nusrah’s wife, and members of his extended family were loosely connected to Nusrah’s family. 
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individuals in particular, spending long hours of the day talking with them. After several days 
I was introduced to them and we spent the remainder of the first week sitting and talking at 
their stalls. Indeed, simply ‘hanging out’ with these individuals, engaging them in honest, 
open and free conversation enabled us to develop friendships relatively quickly. As a result, 
we were able to use their social networks to access the various field sites around Eldoret.
8
  
Thus, through an establishment of trust with a small handful of individuals, the 
challenges often associated with access in such research were largely overcome. Before 
leaving for the field, I had envisaged access and mobilisation of participants as a potential 
problem. When Nusrah first suggested that we could enter multiple field sites with ease, I 
thought it was a somewhat naive expectation. However, by placing my own trust in Nusrah’s 
knowledge of social relations and context in Kenya, I was able to access a large number of 
interviewees with far greater ease than I had anticipated. Indeed, my experience is 
reminiscent of Whyte’s (1955[1943): 292-3) first meeting with Doc when he expressed his 
anxiety about making a good impression with the residents of his field site:  
[Whyte] ‘Now I’m going to try to fit in all right, but, if at any time you see I’m getting 
off on the wrong foot, I want you to tell me about it.’ 
[Doc] ‘Now we’re being too dramatic. You won’t have any trouble. You come in as 
my friend. When you come in like that, at first everybody will treat you with respect.’ 
... At the time I found it hard to believe that I could move in as easily as Doc had said 
with his sponsorship. But that indeed was the way it turned out. 
 
 Thus, networks of trust rely on the researcher’s relationship with key local collaborators, 
informants or assistants. It is through the gradual development and sustained trust relations 
with these individuals that access to researched communities can be eased.   
However, if access to field sites is so heavily reliant upon these individuals, then their 
position and popularity within the researched community is also of fundamental importance. 
                                                 
8
 Additionally, these contacts had an influence on the choice of field sites, highlighting areas which were hot 




Local impressions and perceptions of researchers are largely derived from the people with 
whom they associate and as such, the characteristics and identity of assistants must be 
carefully considered (Berreman 2007: 149). In an ethnically divided society such as Kenya, 
and particularly one which has experienced recent violence, the ethnic identity of assistants 
can be important. It was extremely advantageous that Nusrah was Nubian as he was largely 
seen to be relatively impartial by all participants,
9
 and therefore was an acceptable presence 
in interview situations. However, the ethnic identity of other local assistants, whose key role 
was the mobilisation of local interviewees, was of some consequence and had to be 
considered carefully. In ethnic enclaves local assistants were always members of the 
dominant community, whilst in ethnically mixed areas the identity of the assistant appeared to 
be largely unimportant.
10
 The popularity of the assistant, on the other hand, was critical in 
both types of field site. It was essential that the assistant could mobilise a diverse range of 
people, including men and women, youths and elders from the various ethnic communities 
residing in the area, in order to gather different perspectives and stories.
11
 Moreover, the 
popularity of the assistant is intricately tied to the issues of trust already addressed.  
Thus, it is important that research assistants are ‘well thought of by the other 
participants in the system’ (Walker and Lidz 1977: 115), and mistakes in the choice of 
assistant can be devastating, both methodologically and ethically. In my own research I made 
several errors in this respect, which limited the amount and quality of data collected and, in 
one case, actually played a significant role in rendering the site unworkable. In this latter 
                                                 
9
 Largely due to the fact that the Nubian community does not have significant representation at the highest 
levels of political competition.  
10
 This in itself is interesting and speaks to the importance of socio-spatial dynamics in shaping the nature of 
ethnic interaction in Kenya. This is further elaborated upon in Chapter Three, and its significance in informing 
political behaviour and involvement in violence is highlighted throughout the thesis.  
11
 In all field sites – with the exception of Huruma in Eldoret – our assistants were young men. This was 
deliberate. Men were better able to mobilise the local youth who were actively involved in the violence, but they 
were also able to recruit women and elders with relative ease. However, had female assistants been employed 
there would have been a much clearer gender bias as their ability to mobilise male interviewees was diminished. 
Indeed, even in Huruma our assistant enlisted the aid of some youths to enable her to mobilise the boys in the 
area who had been actively involved in the violence.  
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case, a local contact in Nairobi had recommended his in-laws who lived in Maili Nne, Eldoret 
as potential assistants in the village. Upon meeting them, they insisted upon arranging an 
appointment with the Chief, who, in turn, assigned the village elder to accompany us around 
the village. The fact that our local partners were elders created a methodological problem in 
that they were less able to mobilise younger interviewees. However, further ethical problems 
were raised by our association with these individuals. The mother-in-law and the village elder 
were clearly intimidating presences in the community, and the latter’s refusal to leave the 
room during interviews created problems of privacy and confidentiality. Moreover, it became 
increasingly obvious that residents felt obliged to participate in the research. Fortunately, the 
narrative-style interview enabled them to give a short and generalised statement, which I 
insisted met the requirements of my research; however, the ethical problems remained and it 
is for these reasons, as well as others which are elaborated upon in the next section, that Maili 
Nne was abandoned after two days and the data already collected was discarded. Thus, errors 
in judgement such as these demonstrate the limitations of relying upon local counterparts for 
establishing trust and mobilising participants.    
 It is important to investigate the spatial variations in the dynamics of violence and it is 
only through a multi-sited approach that this can be achieved. Thus, researchers must develop 
alternative techniques to a prolonged stay in one field site in order to overcome the 
challenges of access. Whilst relying on local assistants is not wholly unproblematic, their pre-
existing networks of trust can be utilised by outside researchers to enable quicker access. 
Thus, in a similar approach to that of Jacobs (2006: 163), ‘I infiltrate by proxy, riding the 




 The physical risks and dangers involved in sensitive research, particularly when it is 
conducted in difficult and violent situations, can place significant constraints upon the 
researcher’s control of ethical decisions, and can have a substantial influence upon the 
methodological choices undertaken in the field. Furthermore, sensitive research often 
highlights the limitations of existing ethical positions (Renzetti and Lee 1993: 8). The rising 
interest in understanding cultures of violence, coupled with the increasing number of scholars 
conducting fieldwork in difficult situations, makes attention to the methods of minimizing 
risks all the more important and urgent (Kovats-Bernat 2002: 2). However, while there is an 
emerging body of literature which calls for more attention to be paid to the strategies of 
negotiating dangerous fields, it remains ‘quite limited in extent’ (Belousav et al. 2007: 156). 
This section explores how potential risks were identified, monitored and minimised in my 
own fieldwork, arguing that the safe negotiation of the field was highly dependent upon the 
knowledge and skill of insider-assistants, and a willingness on my part not only to be flexible 
in my research design, but also to accept the necessity of relinquishing some of my control 
over the research.  
The AAA ‘Code of Ethics’ and ‘Principles of Professional Responsibility’ maintain 
that researchers have a responsibility to ensure the safety and security of both themselves and 
those with whom they associate. However, this is highly problematic; not only does it assume 
that the researcher is aware of and, indeed, fully capable of anticipating all the potential risks 
of the research, but it also implies that he or she has absolute control over the research 
environment. I argue here that these assumptions are deeply misleading and generate serious 
dilemmas for researchers, as their negotiation of the field comes into tension with some of the 
presuppositions of existing guidelines. Following my own experience, I am in full agreement 
with Nordstrom (1997: xvii) when she states that, ‘our discipline would be well advised to 
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provide its researchers with a more realistic and critical methodology than I first took with 
me to the field.’ 
The importance of insider-knowledge in navigating dangerous fields cannot be 
overstated. Outside researchers face considerable problems identifying and anticipating the 
potential dangers of their fieldwork due to their ‘relative lack of knowledge of the context 
and relative inability to interpret cues’ (Smyth 2005: 17). Consequently they must engage in a 
collaborative partnership with insider-assistants who can facilitate their safe navigation of the 
field. Several researchers point to the value of insiders in their own fieldwork, suggesting that 
their advice, and indeed, presence, was essential to manoeuvring around the field safely and 
successfully. Pamela Nilan, for example, in her research on drug subcultures in nightclubs, 
was advised by a barman to employ a local guide to act as her bodyguard and informant: 
The place was dangerous and I might get robbed or worse. He knew more than I did 
in his acknowledgement of the dangers to personal safety which arise for 
researchers... it was remarkable that as soon as I paired up with Wayan... I felt much 
less conspicuous and much more in control of the data collection possibilities (Nilan 
2002: 377). 
 
Similarly, Nordstrom (1997: xvii) admits that she was largely ignorant of the potential 
dangers she faced in her study of the Mozambique conflict, and states that ‘the foresight of 
those around me protected me from physical violence I had not anticipated.’ In the same way, 
Toros (2008: 287) declares that her safety was largely out of her control and lay, instead, in 
the hands of her interviewees; she claims that ‘they know the territory, the risks and the best 
way to carry out my research without getting anyone else hurt’, and Wood (2006: 380) 
additionally confesses that she was ‘too inexperienced and too naive’, and had much to learn 
from her assistants. My own experience was very similar. While I had anticipated some of the 
general risks associated with working in urban slums, such as robbery, and had envisaged that 
the sensitivity of the topic could present a risk to my interviewees and to myself, I 
misunderstood the nature of those risks, and was ignorant of the best strategies to circumvent 
64 
 
or minimise them. It was only through insiders, both assistants and interviewees alike, that I 
could gain some understanding of these issues.  
 The danger of being a target of robbery and attack, whilst being ever present, was 
relatively easily negotiated. Indeed, while I was a more likely target by virtue of being white 
and female, the threat of mugging is one faced by residents of these areas on a daily basis and 
their strategies of minimising this risk became intuitive and virtually second-nature. As time 
went by, after observing the situation and through my many conversations with local 
assistants, I grew increasingly aware of where and when I could walk in relative safety, and 
where and when I could not. For the most part, my security was safeguarded by my 
familiarity within a particular territory, and by virtue of the people with whom I associated.
12
  
However, to my mind, robbery was far less threatening than the potential risks posed 
by the research itself.
13
 In this respect, I very quickly realised that my presuppositions about 
this threat were ill-conceived. I had imagined that the data I was gathering would be of 
interest to local authorities and, as such, that it was crucial to develop strategies to protect the 
anonymity and confidentiality of my interviewees and to prepare for the possibility of being 
asked to surrender my data to authorities. However, despite all my preparations for these 
risks, I had not anticipated much hostility from members of the researched communities 
themselves, perhaps with the exception of individual members of organised gangs such as 
Mungiki. In hindsight, this was extraordinarily naive and, as it turned out, this hostility 
                                                 
12
 Indeed, the points made here are revealing for three reasons. Firstly, the physical dangers of living in an urban 
slum are ever-present and are indicative of the everyday violence which underscores these settings. This is 
further discussed in Chapter Four. Secondly, my own feelings of comfort and discomfort in particular 
neighbourhoods, highlights the deeply territorialised nature of these spaces. The issue of territoriality is of 
central importance to the thesis as a whole and is interwoven throughout the following chapters. Finally, the 
issues of familiarity, popularity, friendship and deep social ties was a key factor in shaping the ways in which 
people participated in the post-election violence. This issue is explored in Chapter Seven.   
13
 I rarely carried anything of any real value whilst in the field; my greatest concern was that my data would be 
stolen and that this could place my interviewees in danger. It is for this reason that names were not recorded 
anywhere. I also instructed my assistants that should we be mugged, they should allow the thieves to take 
whatever we had and not retaliate. My assistants, and Nusrah in particular, seemed to feel a strong sense of 
responsibility for my protection and I was concerned that should we be attacked, they would react and risk being 
hurt themselves.  
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presented the greatest physical threat, both to me and to my interviewees. Moreover, these 
dangers were not fixed, but rather varied across time and space, making it very difficult for 
me to develop a clear understanding of when and where the risks were greatest.  
Furthermore, the norm of informed consent, in its demands that participants 
understand the potential risks they run in participating in the research, erroneously assumes 
that the researcher is fully aware of all the potential risks. Yet more often than not, it is the 
interviewees themselves who are better able to assess the dangers of participation. Some of 
my interviewees, particularly self-confessed members of Mungiki, stated that they ran a great 
risk in talking to me, but were willing to participate in the research on the condition that the 
interview was conducted in a private place. Conversely, other interviewees were very 
comfortable being interviewed on the side of a street, or in a very public setting, despite my 
own reticence. Equally, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter, sensitivity is not fixed 
and new dangers can emerge at any given time; people can become less willing to participate 
as they become aware of a new threat, and the researcher can find him- or herself at a greater 
risk of harm quite suddenly. Thus, while the researcher is certainly responsible for ensuring 
the anonymity and confidentiality of research participants in the holding and dissemination of 
data,
14
 sometimes it is the participants themselves who are better equipped to identify the 
dangers of participation. Indeed, Kovats-Bernat’s (2002: 7) suggestion of a ‘reconfiguration 
of how we perceive our relationship with our informants’ to one of ‘mutual responsibility’, 
seems more appropriate to my own experience than the ‘colonial assumption’ that I was ‘fully 
equipped... to foresee the deadly consequences of participation in my study.’ Moreover, I 
found it somewhat patronising and a little absurd that I should tell a member of a gang that I 
                                                 
14
 In my own fieldwork, I did not record the names of interviewees and I did not tape interviews. All interviews 
were written by hand, word for word and later the same day were transcribed and stored on a password 
protected computer.   
66 
 
was not comfortable interviewing him or her because I felt that there was a risk to their 
security which they had not anticipated! 
With regards to my own safety the risks associated with the research similarly waxed 
and waned according to context. There was a greater risk, for example, in communities which 
were particularly loyal to a specific politician, in ‘hotspots’ of the violence, and in areas 
controlled by an organised gang or vigilante group. Additionally, political events and tensions 
increased dangers in particular areas at certain times. As an outsider, then, it was difficult for 
me to recognise or anticipate where and when the research was likely to be met with 
increased hostility, and what the nature of that hostility might be. I relied very heavily on the 
knowledge of local assistants in this matter. When field sites were being selected, they 
offered advice on the possibility of working in particular areas, warned me of emerging 
threats resulting from events which occurred either at the national or local level, and 
suggested strategies that could help to minimise the dangers.  
It is important to recognise, however, that there is a significant weakness in relying on 
the advice of insiders. While I firmly believe that erring on the side of caution is the best 
strategy, the prejudices and biases of insiders can play a significant role in their assessment of 
the level of danger, particularly in an ethnically divided society still recovering from conflict. 
For example, my attempts to access Kalenjin-dominated areas in the Rift Valley region were 
largely thwarted, as the majority of my local contacts warned me that discussing these issues 
with ‘that community’ in the heart of their homeland, would be exceptionally dangerous. I 
cannot say whether their perceptions of the risks were accurate or not, but disregarding their 
advice ‘seemed both dangerous and arrogant’ (Toros 2008: 287). As a result, however, my 
research is skewed by my failure to access Kalenjin-dominated villages in the area 
surrounding Eldoret.  
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 Finally, it is important to note that incorporating members of the local community into 
the research team can further assist the researcher in monitoring emerging threats, and in 
evaluating how the researcher, and the research itself, is being perceived (Sixsmith et al. 
586). Perhaps the greatest difficulty I encountered during my fieldwork was the management 
of rumours which emerged in each field site. Mostly, these revolved around the ‘inherently 
dangerous’ (Sluka 2007: 264) suspicion that I was a spy: 
Every field-worker runs across a good deal of gossip, hearsay, slander, rumor and 
even character assassination, but they acquire inordinate importance in violent 
situations in which access to such information can make the difference between life 
and death, safety and injury (Robben and Nordstrom 1995: 15) 
 
In my own experience, accessing this information was almost entirely dependent upon my 
local assistants. However, while it is important for researchers to pay attention to managing 
the impressions people have of them, the way in which the research is perceived is largely out 
of the researcher’s control. All that can be done is to explain any behaviours that have been 
deemed to be suspect, and monitor and evaluate the potential consequences of the rumours. 
Thus, the researcher must also accept that on occasion it may not be possible to manage 
perceptions, and in these circumstances the prudent course of action is to abandon the field 
site. In my own fieldwork this was the unfortunate result of our attempts to work in Maili 
Nne, Eldoret. While there were a number of reasons why we abandoned working here, the 
rumours circulating about our relationship with the ICC, in addition to Nusrah’s increasing 
suspicion that a particular group of youths were planning to attack us, as well as our mutual 
distrust in the partners with whom we were working, were the most significant.
15
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 On the second day of working in this village, one of our assistants tried to elicit 10,000 shillings from us, 
stating, ‘You know, I know those boys down there in the interior area. They won’t like what we are doing here.’ 
Nusrah interpreted this as a thinly-veiled threat that should we not hand over the money, he would mobilise a 
group of Kalenjin from the neighbouring areas to come and attack us. Given the rumours of our association with 
the ICC, we felt that this was more than an empty threat. Thus, while the researcher must certainly engender the 
trust of research assistants and participants, in potentially dangerous field settings, where assistants largely 
ensure the safety of the researcher, issues of trust surely must extend both ways.  
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 Thus, issues of security are particularly difficult for outside researchers to address 
alone. Insider-assistants and participants themselves can not only help to identify and 
anticipate potential threats and risks, but also to monitor and evaluate the situation on the 
ground. Additionally, their familiarity with the territory, and the people within it, enables 
them to develop more effective strategies for minimising risks. The researcher is undoubtedly 
responsible for protecting the anonymity and confidentiality of participants, but the safety of 
all those involved in the research must surely be a collaborative, incorporative project in 
which there is a mutual responsibility to ensure security.   
 
Authenticity and Veracity in Sensitive Research 
 The question of veracity, credibility, authenticity, and ‘truth’ is frequently 
encountered in sensitive research, and oral sources and narrative-style methods have elicited 
much criticism in the past for being vulnerable to falsehoods, lies and distortions. However, 
the value of narrative accounts ‘does not lie solely in the truthfulness of their content’ (Fujii 
2010: 232), nor indeed, in the factual accuracy of their substance; rather, the facts and fictions 
that constitute personal truth (Atkinson 1998: 20), the very distortions, exaggerations and 
inconsistencies, are important data in themselves.  
The credibility of oral sources is a different credibility... the importance of oral 
testimony may often lie not in its adherence to facts, but rather in its diversion from 
them... Therefore, there are no ‘false’ oral sources... ‘untrue’ statements are still 




Indeed, this thesis is intimately concerned with understanding the social constructions of 
reality and truth in its assumption that beliefs and perceptions can be catalysts for violent 
action or inaction (cf. Bwenge 2005: 95).  
                                                 
16
 For further discussion of the credibility and ‘truth’ of oral sources see the symbolic interactionist writings of 
Shaw (1966); Bertaux (1981); Prus (1996); Atkinson (1998); Plummer (2001). 
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 However, what is perhaps more problematic and worthy of further attention here, is 
the difficulties in establishing authenticity in sensitive research, that is establishing whether 
the narrative is ‘genuine to the interlocutor’s own sense of truth and reality’ (Robben 1995: 
97). While surely not all interviewees are liars, some are, and the distortions, exaggerations 
and half-truths which constitute their narratives must be identified and reflected upon. Much 
of the methodological literature implies that through building rapport with interviewees over 
time and through repeat interviewing which engenders ‘relaxed interactions’ (Thomson 2010: 
31), deceptions and fabrications can be minimised and the data is more authentic.   
The researcher who uses such methods relies on sustained or intensive interactions 
with those studied as a way of establishing trustful relations between researcher and 
researched, in these circumstances, it is assumed, barriers to the researcher’s presence 
are eventually removed to reveal the hidden, the deviant or the tabooed. (Renzetti and 
Lee 1993: 101). 
 
This chapter has already argued that such time investment is not essential to the establishment 
of sufficient trust and rapport to facilitate access. In the same way, I suggest here, that it does 
not necessarily engender more ‘honest’ and ‘authentic’ data. Indeed, my own experience 
supports Jacobs’ (2006: 164) argument that, in fact, ‘social distance between researcher and 
respondent empowers the latter to speak freely.’ Several interviewees, following the 
interview, indicated that the experience had been a cathartic one, as they had not felt able to 
share their story of the violence completely before, largely because they were concerned that 
there might be some reprisals if friends, neighbours, or co-ethnics discovered the nature of 
some of their actions during the violence. Indeed, the value of social distance was explicitly 
articulated by Nusrah on a number of occasions. He would tell me many stories about his 
own life and background and he would frequently claim that he had not shared the 
information with anyone else before. One day I asked him why he told me these stories, but 
would not share them with his family and friends. He replied, ‘You are not from here. There 
can be no harm in telling you such things because you are not from here, you can do nothing 
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to me.’ In the same way, he would ensure that our local assistants were not present during 
interviews, explaining to them that people might be less honest if someone else from their 
neighbourhood could listen to their narrative. I recall a conversation he had with Charles, our 
assistant in 4B, Mathare, who was particularly eager to listen to some of the interviews. He 
explained that ‘maybe he [the interviewee] did some things in that time that you won’t like. 
Maybe he stole from you. He can’t tell us that if you are here, because if something happens 
in the future, he knows he will be the first target.’
17
 Such interactions certainly corroborate 
the idea that ‘with anonymity comes comfort and with comfort comes candor’ (Jacobs, 2006: 
164).  
 Nevertheless, while it is possible that the researcher’s status as an outsider can 
encourage more open narratives, they are still susceptible to some lies, inaccuracies, evasions 
and half-truths. The researcher must nonetheless develop strategies which can help them to 
identify, and consequently to critically reflect upon, deception, seduction (Robben 1995), 
distortion and deviation in narratives. Three different means of reflecting upon the veracity of 
the material evolved in the course of my fieldwork. The first involved comparing narrative 
accounts with official human rights documents and media reports. This not only enabled me 
to identify factual inaccuracies, such as the timing of the onset of violence in the area, but 
also to compare them with statements made at the time of the violence. In addition, 
interviewees themselves served to corroborate or refute each other’s narratives. A key 
advantage in gathering detailed interviews from large numbers of interviewees in a small 
area, is that it enables the researcher to cross-check accounts for inconsistencies. Moreover, 
the use of personal networks and snowballing recruitment strategies meant that many 
interviewees were familiar with each other and would refer to each other’s actions during the 
                                                 
17
 This alludes to the prevalence of personal score-settling during the post-election violence, situating the 




violence. As such, while one interviewee might be more evasive about their involvement in a 
particular incident, others might specifically identify him as being the leader. Perhaps the 
most productive strategy, however, involved engaging local assistants in conversation about 
events in the area, and discussing specific interviews with Nusrah. Indeed, it was very 
common following an interview for Nusrah to express his thoughts on the plausibility and 
veracity of the narrative. These dialogic reflections upon the material were of crucial 
importance in assessing the authenticity of the interviews.  
 In addition to reflecting upon issues of authenticity, there has been a wealth of 
literature which draws attention to the researcher as a ‘variable in the interview process’ 
(Edwards 1993: 185), suggesting that his or her particular characteristics will elicit particular 
narratives. Undoubtedly, my status as a young, white, female researcher had an effect on the 
interview process.
18
 However, in a post-conflict divided society such as Kenya, the identity of 
insider assistants can equally influence the narratives of interviewees. While it has already 
been stated that Nusrah’s Nubian identity was advantageous, the matter is a little more 
complex. In a society characterised by an embedded ethnic logic, where ethnic identification 
is a typical mode of thought, it would be naive to assume that interviewees were not engaging 
in what Burton (1978) has termed the process of ‘telling.’
19
 It became evident that Nusrah 
was often erroneously assumed to be a Luo; his friends frequently told me that he ‘simply 
looks like a Luo,’ and this situation was further complicated by the fact that he used a 
nickname in an effort to conceal his identity when meeting new people.
20
 Occasionally, 
Nusrah was explicitly asked his ethnic identification, and in one particular interview he was 
asked to produce his identification card to ‘prove he was not a Luo.’ Such incidents raise 
                                                 
18
 Though the nature of this effect is impossible to determine, and reflections upon it would be largely 
speculative.  
19
 Burton’s comment refers to the pattern of social cues and markers which are used to determine religion in 
interactions between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. There is a similar process at work in ethnic 
relations in Kenya. This is explored in detail in Chapter Three. 
20
 Nusrah was particularly concerned with hiding his Muslim identity, for reasons which never became clear. 
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questions as to the number of interviewees who mistakenly assumed Nusrah to be a Luo, and 
the ways in which this might have affected their narratives. However while the impact cannot 
be fully appreciated, it is interesting to note that it does not seem to have prevented 
respondents from speaking negatively about the Luo community. While a full examination of 
the productive nature of the interviewee-assistant-researcher interaction remains outside the 
scope of this thesis, it is important to recognise that the material gathered is, to an extent, 
shaped by the interview process itself. 
 Thus, narrative interviews, and particularly those with a sensitive subject matter, are 
characterised by distortions, inaccuracies and even deliberate misdirection. I suggest that the 
partnership between local assistants and outside researchers can not only assist in the 
identification of distortions and exaggerations, but can also foster more authentic narratives. 
Indeed, as Jacobs (1998: 163) writes with reference to validity within criminological 
research: 
 A balance can be achieved with the right strategy and it is upon this balance that the 
validity of one’s data may well hinge. In the mediated approach, balance hinges on 
help from an indigenous ‘paraprofessional’, a person entrenched in the criminal 
subculture who enjoys a solid reputation for street integrity and trustworthiness and 
can vouch for the researcher’s legitimacy... The benefits of immersion coupled with 
the neutrality of distance make for a powerful combination. 
 
The collaborative reflection upon interview material was of fundamental importance in 
relation to issues of credibility and veracity. However, it is of equal importance that the 
researcher continually reflects upon his or her own analysis. As Fujii (2009b: 161) suggests, 
the researcher’s ‘immersion into local cultures and perspectives... slowly shifts and 
transforms the researcher’s own sense of what is normal and credible.’ Therefore, attention 
must be paid to this. Such reflections are incorporated into my analysis throughout the thesis 
and the concluding section of this chapter draws attention to the importance of the 




Researcher Subjectivity  
The depiction of the outside researcher as an objective observer of social phenomenon 
has been both extensively and successfully challenged by the movement towards ‘embracing 
the subjective foundations of knowledge’ (Lerum 2001: 467),  incorporating reflexive 
approaches towards fieldwork and acknowledging the researcher’s impact upon the data 
gathered. However, despite the attention afforded to the subjective position of the researcher 
and the cultural ‘baggage’ they bring to the field, there remains a tendency to avoid 
articulating feelings and writing emotions into analyses (Widdowfield 2000: 200). Yet, 
emotive responses and reactions to situations not only affect the strategies used to navigate 
the field, but they are also important elements of data in themselves. The researcher is not 
simply an observer existing outside of the research environment, but rather is ‘a participant 
who experiences the field while studying it’ (Toros 2008: 289). Indeed, despite the common 
idea that critical analysis is necessarily objective, emotions, both positive and negative, 
pervade fieldwork and ‘not accounting for all of one’s attitudes in and towards the field… is 
to some extent cheating both the audience and oneself’ (Lecocq 2002: 275). The 
characterisation of outside researchers as impartial and objective is misleading, particularly in 
the study of violence and conflict which can elicit strong feelings ‘likely to influence the 
researcher’s judgement and the type of information gathered’ (Smyth 2001: 8). This section 
offers a brief illustration of the value of incorporating feelings in and towards the field into 
our analyses and serves as a precursor to the colours of self-reflexivity which scatter this 
thesis.  
Any fieldwork conducted in a potentially dangerous or violent setting is sure to 
engender some feelings of fear in the researcher. These feelings should be documented and 
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reflected upon for two reasons. First, they can have a significant effect upon the 
methodological and ethical choices the researcher makes in the field, and second, they are a 
distorted reflection of the culture of fear which pervades the research setting. Thus, as 
Kovats-Bernat (2002: 10) argues, ‘the researcher’s reactions to, fears of, and anxieties toward 
in-field violence have a place in ethnography.’ My fear of the potential repercussions of 
inadvertently giving the wrong impression about my research to the wrong person led me to 
be cautious, perhaps overly so, in my interactions with particular individuals and groups in 
certain field sites. Indeed, just as some interviewees had various misgivings about 
participating in the research for fear that I might be a spy, on occasion, I myself had 
reservations about interviewing them. I was concerned that asking the ‘wrong’ question to the 
‘wrong’ person could have significant and, perhaps, violent consequences. In Eldoret, for 
example, fuelled by the prejudices of local contacts and interviewees, I was cautious in my 
interactions with members of the Kalenjin community. I had been warned that my research 
could engender hostility and violence amongst the Kalenjin if they believed me to be an ICC 
spy gathering information that could be damaging to William Ruto. As such, I was nervous 
conducting interviews in Kalenjin areas such as Maili Nne, and my feelings of insecurity 
walking around the village, as well as those of Nusrah, were a large part of the reason why 
we abandoned the site. An extract from a report I sent to my supervisors in February 2010 
reads: 
The main issue at the moment is difficulty accessing members of the Kalenjin 
community here. We have to be very careful here with this community because they 
are incredibly suspicious and fearful that we are working with Ocampo. As they were 
the main instigators in this area and their fellow tribesman, Ruto, is one of those most 
likely to be pursued by the ICC, we have to be careful. 
 
Looking back on this report, the language itself reflects my alarmingly prejudiced, suspicious 
and homogenising views of the Kalenjin community, and the threat ‘they’ posed. Indeed, in 
light of this mindset, it is perhaps more understandable that I approached a potential field site, 
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Nandi Hills, with deep caution.
21
 My perception that the youth there were noticeably uneasy 
and suspicious of both my research and of me, engendered a fear that further attempts at 
carrying out the research in this town could provoke a hostile reaction and led me to decide 
not to persevere in the site. In a similar way, I approached interviewees who I knew to be 
members of organised gangs such as Mungiki and Siafu with more caution, altering and 
reframing particular questions, or even omitting them altogether. While I can only speculate 
as to the influence my anxiety had upon my interactions with such interviewees, I am certain 
that it was of significance.  Thus, my fear affected not only the way in which the research was 
carried out, but also whether it was carried out at all in particular field sites (cf. Widdowfield 
2000: 201).  
In addition to the methodological implications, however, emotions such as fear and 
suspicion are indicative of the social and cultural context in which the research is taking 
place. As I became increasingly immersed in local culture my responses to violence and 
ethnic prejudice shifted substantially. By February, only four months into my fieldwork, my 
prejudices regarding the Kalenjin community were becoming entrenched,
22
 and are somewhat 
reflective of the divisive and ethnicised nature of Kenyan society and culture. Perhaps the 
clearest, and in retrospect, the most alarming example of my position as a ‘functioning agent 
in the local culture of violence’ (Kovats-Bernat 2002: 217), however, is evident in my 
increasing indifference to mob justice and everyday violence in the areas in which I worked. 
                                                 
21
 Nusrah was reluctant to assist in pursuing the research in this area. I decided to visit the town alone to see if I 
could find a local youth who was willing to act as my assistant for the research, and travelled there with a fellow 
researcher who had some contacts in the area. However, I felt anxious when broaching the subject matter of my 
research with residents, and I perceived them to be uncomfortable with the topic and reluctant to get involved. 
In hindsight, this perception may well have been largely, if not entirely, distorted. I am also led to speculate 
whether approaching the field site with a Kenyan may have been more profitable, and helped to allay any 
concerns as to my intentions.  
22
 They would later become challenged by my friendship with a Kalenjin youth in Nakuru, and through my 
interviews with Kalenjin in this town. My perception that the Kalenjin in Nakuru were somehow less 
threatening than those who resided in ‘interior’ rural Kalenjin areas surrounding Eldoret and my different 
approaches to, and interactions with, members of this community reflects the shifting relationships between 
groups across space which has important implications for the local dynamics of violence. This is explored in 
Chapter Seven.  
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What follows is an extract from one of the few reports which explicitly focused on my 
personal reactions to an occurrence in the field. The following excerpt is taken from an email 
I sent to my supervisors following an incident that took place within the first month of my 
arrival in Kenya, when I was interviewing some youths in Gatuikera, Kibera.  
I was told that a thief had been caught and burnt alive not twenty minutes ago just 
around the corner. They [the boys I was interviewing] insisted on taking me to the 
place to see the body. As we walked down the railway track I was getting increasingly 
anxious. I thought I was going to be sick. I saw ahead that there was a large group of 
people (men, women and children), all gathered in a semi-circle around the body of 
the man. His hands had been tied behind his back, petrol poured over his head and he 
had been burned alive as people stood around and watched. I have heard that some 
were also throwing stones at him as he burned. The most disturbing thing about the 
scene, however, was not the body itself, but the reaction of the people. It was nothing 
to them. People stood and looked, made jokes about it and then carried on with their 
lives. As we walked away, my guide asked me if I was alright. I told him that I 
couldn’t believe that people were so blasé about the life of another human being. His 
only response was, ‘This is the slum. We see it all the time. It’s normal. Someone will 
be lying dead on your doorstep and you just step over him and close the door. It is 
nothing.’ Later on I spoke to my guide again about it. I reminded him of his own 
words not two days earlier when he described such a death as ‘dying in the line of 
duty’ – by that he meant that people who have perhaps not eaten for three days, or at 
the end of the month when rent is due, can become desperate and do things they do 
not want to do. I said to him that if people in Kibera lived this way, they surely 
understood the situation that the boy must have been in to even contemplate stealing 
in Gatuikera,
23
 how could they not show some mercy? He merely shrugged and said 
that that was the price of being caught. The next day I thought I would speak to some 
women about the incident to see what their reaction was. It was exactly the same. 
They laughed at my discomfort, made some jokes, and told me that it was normal 
here. The thing I can’t stop thinking about is how frightened that man must have been 
as they were tying his hands, and throwing petrol over him. And I just can’t 
understand how people can stand and watch it like it’s entertainment. It made me feel 
sick and just very, very sad. 
 
Four months later, however, I had a very different reaction to a similar incident. One day, as 
we were coming into our final weeks in Eldoret, Nusrah received a call at 3am. It was his 
neighbour, reporting that Nusrah’s house had just been broken into and robbed by three men. 
The neighbour had chased the thieves; he had caught one and slashed him to death with a 
                                                 
23
 There is a local vigilante group called Siafu which operates in the area and is well-known for leading such 
punishment of thieves in the area. As such I was confused as to why someone would attempt to steal in their 
stronghold, rather than in another area of the slum.  
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machete, injured another, while the last escaped unscathed. My immediate reaction was to 
ask how much had been stolen. I was largely indifferent to the fact that a young boy had been 
killed, or indeed that I knew and liked the man who had killed him. However, when I related 
this story to a friend back in the UK, her shock that the thief had been killed, and by a friend 
of mine, and moreover the casual way in which I was telling her about it, forced me to reflect 
upon my indifference. I came to recognise it as important data in itself. As uncomfortable as 
it was to recognise in myself, it was indicative of the ease with which violence and mob 
justice can become normalised in a culture of violence. This issue is explored in further detail 
in Chapter Four, but the significant point here is that the researcher’s emotive reaction (or in 
this case lack thereof) to the field  should be recorded diligently.  
Thus, I make every effort throughout this thesis to colour my analysis with such 
reflexivity, based upon the assumption that ‘the best objective knowledge is rooted in 
subjective experiences, publicly acknowledged, and reflected upon by authors’ (Lerum 2001: 
480). The researcher is not simply a third-person narrator but also a first-person participant, 
and his or her reactions to the field should be part of the data set. I am in full agreement with 
Blee’s (1998: 396) recommendation that ‘maintaining an emotional log of one’s feelings and 
the emotional negotiations of fieldwork relationships over time is one way to ensure that 
emotional issues will be available for subsequent analysis’, and I see my failure to do this 




Sensitive, micro-level research in post-conflict, divided societies poses unique and 
significant challenges to the researcher at all stages of the research process. The difficulties 
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encountered are not only methodological, but also ethical, and new researchers in particular 
can be left feeling isolated and uncertain of their footing in light of the scholarly silence 
which has surrounded these issues. We must be more transparent in our presentation of how 
we collect our data; the need for such disaggregated and locally-grounded empirical research 
in studies of conflict is great and, as such, better mechanisms and strategies for negotiating 
the difficult setting must be explored and developed. This chapter has drawn upon my own 
experiences and has suggested that the collaboration of outside researchers and inside 
assistants can be an effective, valuable, and rewarding means of negotiating the field. The 
crucial role of research assistants is often obscured in scholarly writing, yet, in reality, he or 
she is often the hero of the research (Jacobs 1998: 163). Nusrah, Charles, Abdul, and the 
numerous other local assistants and collaborators who assisted with my research, as well as 
many of the interviewees themselves, helped me in identifying field sites, facilitating access, 
ensuring safety and security and reflecting upon the authenticity of the material, and the 
thesis is as much the result of their hard work as it is mine. This strategy undoubtedly comes 
with its own challenges and problems which must be acknowledged. Their presence can 
generate ethical problems, and errors in the choice of assistant can be both devastating to the 
research, and potentially dangerous. Moreover, it is all too easy to accept and internalise their 
prejudices and biases towards particular field sites, people and settings, significantly affecting 
the contours of the research and the researcher’s approach to the field. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that the ‘hidden colonialism’ (Sanjek 1993) of much fieldwork, which assumes the 
researcher’s absolute control over the research environment, is not only misleading, but it 
does a serious injustice to the vital role played by local research assistants.  Finally 
researchers should both record and incorporate their emotional reactions to the field within 
their analyses, not only because they are often important sources of data themselves and they 
point to potential skews and biases in the material, but also because they might assist and 
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reassure other researchers in their own field experiences. This chapter, at least in part, is a 
plea for greater transparency in our reflections upon the field, one which highlights the 
mistakes made and the opportunities missed. It is only through an honest engagement with 
our cumulative field experiences that better methodological and ethical guidelines can be 






Everyday Ethnicity:  
Social Space, Everyday Life and the Construction of Identity 
 
Introduction 
 As has already been highlighted, the literature exploring ethnicity is replete with 
analyses which examine the macro-historical construction of ethnic boundaries over time, and 
analyses of ethnic violence have a tendency to emphasise the capacity of elite actors to 
manipulate and mould ethnicity to suit their own agendas. The former, while often 
appreciating the stickiness of ethnic identity, does not explore the ways in which ethnicity is 
produced, reinforced, negotiated and challenged from below in the here and now. The latter, 
with its focus on moments of political salience and elite rhetoric, often downplays the extent 
to which ethnicity permeates everyday life and shapes behaviour and interaction – Ajulu 
(2002: 252), for example, states that, ‘in “normal” conditions ethnic identity does not really 
play an important role in the interactions between different groups.’ Both bodies of literature 
assume that ethnicity resonates evenly and consistently on the ground. This chapter 
problematises some of these suppositions, arguing that ethnicity is neither an ‘intermittent 
mood’ (Billig 1995: 6), nor is it evenly produced, enacted and experienced at the local level. 
Rather, it is differentially embedded in daily practices, habits, routines, institutions, social 
structures, interactions, and modes of thought, and is significantly influenced by socio-spatial 
dynamics. This chapter, then, explores these dynamics and examines how ‘social, spatial and 




 A deep-rooted consciousness of ethnic identity and differentiation pervades 
contemporary Kenyan society, colouring everyday interactions and experiences. Ethnicity in 
Kenya is not simply one form of identification which sits latent and dormant in a toolbox of 
multiple, unstable identities, waiting to be brought to life by ambitious elites; it is not 
something to be ‘donned and shed according to a short-term and largely instrumentalist logic’ 
as is sometimes assumed in theories of ethnic violence (Nugent 2008: 922);
1
 it is more than 
this, it is a pervasive and habitual way of thinking, of interpreting and of making sense of the 
world (Karner 2007: 4; cf. Billig 1995: 10). Recognising and examining these patterns of 
thought, and the ways in which they operate in everyday life is important, as they speak to 
how groups of people construct their reality and how they might interpret a series of events 
(Burton 1978: 7).
2
 Indeed, if local level actors tend to categorise each other along ethnic 
lines, understanding a relatively stable boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and if they are 
inclined to understand events through an ethnic lens, then not only does this help to explain 
the resonance of elite appeals to ethnicity, but it allows for its capacity to operate 
independently of elite machination. This section seeks to demonstrate how this ethnic 
consciousness operates in everyday life in Kenya through a discussion of the process of 
‘telling’ (Burton 1978: 4), an examination of the sensitivity to, and awareness of, ethnicity in 




                                                 
1
 Nugent is actually referring to the profusion of this assumption within the inventionist literature of historical 
identity construction, but the eloquent phrasing is equally pertinent for a substantial element of contemporary 
ethnic violence theorising.  
2
 Thus, ethnicity is not only a product of identity construction, but, once it is deeply embedded in social 
structures, everyday life and consciousness, it can become a constructor in itself, a framework through which 
people perceive and interpret their social reality.  
3
 This, of course, is not to suggest that there is no room for alternative readings of a situation, only that 
ethnically framed interpretations are extremely common, and tend to predominate. As is argued throughout the 
thesis, however, ethnicised perspectives can be reinforced, policed or disrupted by socio-spatial dynamics.  
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There are numerous accounts, across a wide range of disciplines, which recognise the 
anthropological tendency of people to use certain cues, signs and markers to place strangers 
into categories such as race, religion, class and ethnicity.
4
 In Kenya, it is the latter which 
dominates this process and the ‘first question after encountering anyone for the first time 
always seems to be “what is he?”’ (Harris 1986 [1972]: 148). One Kenyan writer, in an 
opinion piece for The Sunday Standard, laments the ‘fascination with our tribes’ and the 
extent to which ethnicity is ‘stamp[ed]... in our psyche’, stating: 
Tribalism is entrenched in our very fibre. In fact, you have not introduced yourself 
properly until you have answered the question: “Where are you from?” This 
seemingly innocent question... is for the purposes of establishing your origin. (Baiya 
2008). 
 
Furthermore, the claim to be able to ‘tell’ the ethnicity of a stranger is not uncommon and 
while it is certainly not undisputed – indeed, I recall one youth exclaiming, ‘you cannot tell 
just by looking!’ in response to his friend’s insistence that he was particularly skilled at 
identifying the ethnic category of others – it is, nevertheless, widespread. Notions that an 
individual can ‘simply look like a Kikuyu’ were a common feature of many of my 
interviewees’ narratives. This process of ethnic categorisation, however, is evident not only 
in times of violent conflict, when it can mean the difference between life and death, but also 
in the more mundane sphere of everyday interaction. Ethnic differentiation is, in fact, a 
‘typical mode of thought’ (Burton 1978: 37) in Kenyan society. While the reliability of the 
cues used in categorisation processes is certainly questionable and contested, the practice of 
ascribing ethnic identity upon others, and the use of such ascriptions to ‘think with and act 
upon’ (Burton 1978: 38) is a prominent feature of everyday life. Moreover, ‘the cognitive 
mechanisms of ethnic categorisation’ work to ‘give ethnicity a salience that typically remains 
unexamined in the literature’ (Levine 1999: 173).  
                                                 
4
 See for example Suttles (1968: 15); Sebring (1969); Burton (1978); Harris (1986 [1972]: 148); Anderson 
(1990); Horowitz (2001:124ff); Brubaker et al., (2006: 217ff.).  
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 The cues to ethnic categorisation in Kenya are many and varied and, moreover, are 
often disputed. While they appear to be relatively stable, they are subject to renegotiation and 
transformation over time and space, as particular behaviours, practices and attitudes 
associated with a community alter according to context. Thus, the physical, phonetic and 
behavioural markers of categorisation identified here are specific not only to the Kenyan 
context, but to the Kenyan context at a particular moment in time. I offer only a brief 
exposition of the cues upon which identification is based, as it is not the markers themselves 
which are of interest, but rather the process of differentiation and the implications it has for 
understanding the significance and salience of ethnic identity in Kenya.  
A wide variety of different cues, which broadly fit into three main categories – 
physical markers, phonetic signals and behavioural mannerisms – were identified through 
interviews, conversations, and general observations, and it is the combination of these 
different indicators through which ethnic ascription is reached.
 
Visual cues, for example, 
include dress,
5
 hairstyle, and culturally-specific bodily modifications such as circumcision, 
body piercings and tattoos. Physical stature, facial structure and skin tone are the most oft-
cited ways in which people ascribe ethnic identity, and the stereotypes of the Kikuyu as light-
skinned, and the Luo and Kalenjin as much darker, are pervasive. Additionally, phonetic 
markers are a prominent means of differentiation. The use of vernacular language is often a 
good indicator of ethnic category, but accent and conversational style are of equal 
significance; not only are Kiswahili and Sheng
6
 frequently spoken, but it is also not 
uncommon for individuals to learn other vernacular languages, particularly if they live in an 
area in which another community constitutes the majority. As one interviewee states: 
                                                 
5
 While a distinctive dress can be directly associated with an ethnic group, such as the Maasai garments, 
religious robes are also occasionally considered to be indicative of ethnic identity. The white turbans worn by 
Akorino followers, for example, are regarded as a marker of Kikuyu identity. This relationship between religion 
and ethnicity in Kenya is discussed later in the chapter.  
6
 A slang language that has evolved amongst urban youth, the corpus of which is an amalgamation of English, 
Kiswahili and other vernacular elements.  
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The Kikuyu accent is very distinctive. Even the Kisii, it is almost a blend with Meru. 
Kambas are distinctive… they talk and you know this one is a Kamba. They know 
how a Luo speaks. So just by speaking you could tell the tribes. (SIL, Interview, 
Woodley, Nairobi, 22 November 2010). 
 
Similarly, names are an important cue to ethnicity and the act of calling someone by their 
name, such as Mwangi, Otieno, Kipsang, and Mutunga serves to confirm their identity to 
others. As one interviewee states, ‘my name is purely Kikuyu, if you hear it you just know 
that I am a Kikuyu’ (BTS, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 14 April 2010). Finally, subtle 
behavioural characteristics, such as a person’s gestures, his way of looking, his way of 
talking and moving, his place of residence, his companions, the pubs and social spaces he 
frequents, what newspaper he reads, where he buys it from, which matatu
7
 he takes, what 
position he adopts on a particular political issue and other such subtle indicators, are 
important elements in the process of ethnic categorisation. Suttles (1968: 15) has identified 
similar identification processes in the Addams area of Chicago and concludes that ‘in 
combination these become the signs on which residents rely to define a person and to 
determine their course of action.’ 
 While there is an acute awareness that markers are not fool-proof, misidentifications 
are rarely a source of friction in everyday life and, often, are met with light-hearted joking, 
‘the humour lying as usual, precisely in the gaffe’ (Burton 1978: 64). As has already been 
noted in Chapter Two, Nusrah was often misidentified as a Luo, apparently by virtue of his 
dark skin tone. One interviewee, an elderly Kikuyu man from Kiambaa, convinced of 
Nusrah’s Luo affiliation, insisted upon seeing his identity card before proceeding with the 
interview. Once it had been established that Nusrah was indeed a Nubian, the two men 
laughed raucously at his similarity to ‘those stupid Luos.’
8
 This incident is illustrative of the 
                                                 
7
 Small minibuses which are a popular mode of public transport in Kenya.  
8
 The use of the derogatory epithet ‘stupid’ when referring to the Luo community is extremely common. Similar 
ingrained elements of negative ethnicity are further explored in Chapter Four.  
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deeper role telling plays in everyday life: it governs people’s actions and behaviours, it 
informs them of who someone is, what it is appropriate to say to them and in front of them, 
and how to behave towards them. This preoccupation with ethnicity is perhaps not surprising 
considering its socio-economic, political and cultural significance in society, and the intense 
concern with knowing the ethnic identity of others is largely a result of its importance in 
negotiating everyday life. Where access to jobs, loans, housing, school bursaries and other 
such resources are dependent upon ethnic identity, or at the very least perceived to be so,
9
 it 
is unsurprising that ethnic identification processes are of importance in everyday life. 
Moreover, people are acutely aware of the fact that this cognitive process of telling is a factor 
in daily interactions and that it must be navigated whenever possible. A particularly revealing 
example of this occurred during the early stages of my fieldwork as I was looking for 
accommodation close to Kibera. Nusrah had spent several weeks helping me find a suitable 
room and he usually insisted upon going to look at the place without me first, believing that 
landlords would raise the rent significantly if they realised that a mzungu
10
 was interested in 
renting the room. However, on one occasion, he received a phone-call from a friend of his, 
Ed, who knew of a house in Jamhuri. Ed told Nusrah to bring me to view the house, 
explaining that the landlady was a Meru and would not rent the room to him if she mistook 
him for a Luo.
11
 Nusrah related the story to some of his friends during an informal group 
interview, saying: 
                                                 
9
 This issue is discussed further in Chapters Four and Five, but it should be noted here that while I do not deny 
that ethnic nepotism and corruption are features of Kenyan society, the perception of their extent and influence 
is often overstated by local level actors. The exaggeration of this favouritism is, for example, highlighted by a 
Kikuyu resident of Kawangware who states, ‘like for Equity Bank, there’s a saying that if a Kikuyu goes there 
he gets free money, but we’re using our ATM cards, it’s not free money. It’s a myth.’ (BM, Interview, Satellite, 
Kawangware, 15 March 2010).  
10
 The Kiswahili word typically used to refer to a white person. 
11
 The reluctance to rent properties to members of the Luo community has emerged largely in the wake of the 
2007 elections, when many Luo tenants, particularly in the urban slums around Nairobi, refused to pay rent to 
their Kikuyu landlords. The stereotype that ‘Luos want free things’ and that ‘Luos won’t pay rent’ has become 
pervasive and persists in contemporary Kenya.  
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If there is an empty room here, they’ll have to ask… like when I looked for Sarah a 
house in Jamhuri. Ed said that the mother is a Meru and she doesn’t want a Luo in this 
house, “You must come with the lady, because you look like a Luo.” When we got 
there, the woman asked me, “Are you a Luo?” She asked what my name is, I told 
her
12
 // she asked, ‘Are you a Luo?’ I tell her, “No, I’m a Nubian Muslim”… but if I 
said that “I’ll be here and I am a Luo,” do you think I can get the house? No. (MUS, 
Group Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 2 January 2010) 
 
This account demonstrates both Ed’s and Nusrah’s awareness of the cognitive process of 
telling which would underscore initial interactions with the landlady, as well as their 
understanding of its potential consequences. Thus, people negotiate everyday interactions in 
the knowledge that this process is a constant factor, and it informs their behaviour and 
predicates action. Moreover, it is not unusual for individuals to make use of particular cues to 
misinform and misdirect in an attempt to hide their ethnic identity. This practice was 
prominent during the post-election violence as targeted individuals would dress like the 
members of other groups, speak in other languages, and adopt behaviours associated with the 
‘right’ political party (and so the ‘right’ ethnic group)
13
 in an effort to escape from dangerous 
areas. However, miscuing is also practiced in times of relative peace and normality. 
Nicknames amongst urban youth, for example, particularly in ethnically mixed social groups, 
often serve to mask ethnicity. This use of cues to misdirect and misinform thus further 
highlights the collective awareness, salience and prevalence of this mode of thought in 
Kenyan society.  
The second point of discussion in this section, closely related to this process of telling, 
is the acute attentiveness to, and awareness of, individuals’ ethnic affiliation, both in the 
public arena of wider society, as well as within local neighbourhoods. The ethnic identities of 
politicians, chiefs, the local police OCS (Officer Commanding Station), sports stars and other 
                                                 
12
 Nusrah’s name has been altered to protect his identity, but it must be noted here that his surname began with 
an O. There is a belief that only members of the Luo community have names which begin with an O, and it is 
this relation of his full name which prompted the landlady to repeat her question.  
13
 Such as wearing a campaign t-shirt or colour associated with the acceptable party in the area, or shouting 
“ODM” or “PNU” as appropriate. See Chapter Five for an exploration of the association between ethnic identity 
and political parties. 
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prominent social and political figures are well known. Moreover, certain businesses are 
recognised as belonging to particular communities, such as the Kikuyu-owned Equity Bank, 
Mololine matatus, and CitiHoppa buses. However, this ethnic awareness is even more 
prominent at the micro-level; residents know the ethnic identity of their neighbours, of the 
landlords and tenants of each house in the area, and the ethnic affiliation of local business 
owners and their employees. One interviewee, echoing the words of many others, states, ‘in 
my plot it was mixed, we are three Luo, and two Luhya, one Kamba, one Kalenjin and the 
rest are Kikuyu, so mostly they are Kikuyu in that plot’ (JG, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 3 
June 2010). There is nothing necessarily conflictual about this identification,
14
 but it is 
illustrative of a pervasive, entrenched, and relatively stable ethnic consciousness, which not 
only facilitated the targeting of individuals, houses and businesses during the violence, but 
which perpetuates and renders more durable the relevance of ethnicity in everyday life.  
 The final point which is indicative of the predominance of ethnic consciousness in 
Kenyan society is the frequency with which events, both local and national, small scale and 
large, personal and collective, are interpreted in ethnic terms. Conflicts between individual 
politicians are often understood as evidence of an attempt by one community to target, 
dominate, or finish off ‘our’ group, rather than as personal wrangling between politicians and 
parties, or as disputes over policies and ideologies. Indeed, an article appearing in the Daily 
Nation following the suspension of the then-Minister of Agriculture, William Ruto, on 
suspicion of his involvement in a corruption scandal, draws attention to this ethnic framing of 
the political arena: 
In Kenya, whenever the man in the dock is from your ethnic community, that 
community is “the target.” So any Kenyan could have predicted the hullabaloo that 
                                                 
14
 Although at times the perceived dominance of businesses and economic activities by a particular group within 
an area is a significant source of resentment. This is explored further in Chapter Four.  
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followed President Kibaki’s suspension of William Ruto from the Cabinet: “Our tribe 




Such interpretations and framings of political events can have very real consequences at the 
grassroots. That morning of 14 February 2010, immediately following the announcement of 
Ruto’s suspension, tensions were significantly heightened in Eldoret town and the 
surrounding areas. Members of the Kalenjin community began to congregate on Malaba 
Road in the centre of Eldoret, vehemently discussing and protesting their man’s suspension, 
demonstrations reportedly took place in Nandi Hills, and several members of the Luo 
community were arriving in town claiming that the Kalenjin were chasing them away from 
their homes. The General Service Unit (GSU) was deployed to manage the situation, and 
tensions in the town only died down after Ruto was reinstated by President Kibaki later that 
day. Similarly, fierce debates over Bethuel Kiplagat’s suitability for chairing the Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) following the post-election violence,
16
 
assumed a distinctly ethnic dimension: 
Threats by the Kalenjin that they will not participate in the TJRC if Kiplagat was 
removed and claims that the chair is targeted because he is a Kalenjin threaten to 
completely derail the process (Kenya National Accord Monitoring Project, 2010). 
 
Other large scale events, which are not necessarily or inherently of a political nature, provoke 
similarly ethnicised readings. For example, following the seizure of a cache of weapons in 
Narok in December 2009, ethnicised interpretations permeated public discourse again, as 
people voiced their suspicions that an ethnic community was arming itself. A middle-aged 
                                                 
15
 It is interesting to note that the author of this article, Philip Ochieng, a Luo, presents President Kibaki as the 
‘protagonist’ of the incident, when in reality it was the Luo Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, who called for the 
suspension. In fact, Kibaki reinstated Ruto later that same day on the basis that the Prime Minister did not have 
the authority to suspend ministers. Although Ochieng admits that Raila took the blame, he insists that Kibaki 
was behind it. This could be understood as an example of ethnicised perspectives and biases permeating 
editorial pieces, as the author appears to distort the facts of the situation in order to place ‘his man’ in a more 
favourable light.  
16
 There was mounting public pressure for Kiplagat to resign his chair of the TJRC due to the fact that he was in 
government during the time in which many of the atrocities being investigated occurred.  
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Kikuyu man from Bombolulu in Kibera, vocalises this predominant discourse in an interview, 
when he states,  
Like in the newspaper, there are guns in the Maasai area, and no one knows why those 
people are having guns. The people who know are only the area MPs, maybe in the 
future, maybe they are going to start their army. (FR, Interview, Bombolulu, Kibera, 
16 December 2009). 
 
While I would certainly agree with Wa-Mungai (2007: 339) that events of a political nature 
‘seem to be more open to ethnically coded readings’, this tendency is far from being the 
exclusive domain of the political sphere and, in fact, extends to local and personal situations. 
People often rationalise a job rejection or a failed loan application by virtue of being from the 
‘wrong’ community; being refused credit at local shops and kiosks is similarly interpreted in 
these ethnic terms; landlords are often accused of charging higher rental rates for members of 
other communities and evictions resulting from a failure to pay the rent are not uncommonly 
interpreted as being ethnically-motivated, rather than understood as an issue of business and 
livelihood.   
While the tendency to interpret events in ethnic terms is common, particularly in the 
political arena, socio-spatial dynamics play a significant role in either constructing, 
reinforcing or challenging this ethnic component of the habitus. Where social networks are 
largely intra-ethnic, for example, then these attitudes and perceptions are shaped and further 
affirmed through local public discourse and conversations with friends and neighbours. 
However, in ethnically mixed settings it tends to provoke heated debates, in which ethnicised 
perspectives are challenged, rather than being confirmed and reinforced. 
 
Everyday Life and the Segregation of Space 
This ethnic consciousness, and the predominance of ethnicity as the defining cleavage 
within Kenyan society, is shaped, maintained, and reinforced by and through its continual 
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reproduction in the everyday habitual practices of life; that is, ‘ethnic components of the 
habitus’ (Bourgois and Schonberg 2007: 28) are maintained through daily routines, practices 
and social structures. I hesitate to use the term ‘ethnic habitus’ as some scholars in other 
fields have suggested, given its implicit connotations that each respective ethnic group has 
distinctive cultural dispositions and habits. Rather, I employ Bourgois and Schonberg’s 
phrasing, indicating that there are ethnic dimensions within the habitus, which predispose 
people to understand the social world in ethnic terms, which help to generate and maintain 
ethnic differentiation as the defining cleavage of Kenyan society, and which influence the 
ways in which people act and react to emerging social circumstances. This section, drawing 
upon ‘the idea that practice underlies consciousness’ (Bentley 1987: 27-28), examines the 
‘continual “flagging”’ (Billig 1995: 8) of ethnicity in day to day life in Kenya, through both 
its banal, and its more dramatic and performative expressions. 
While macro-historical approaches to ethnic identity construction dominate the 
literature, there has been more recent interest in the role of the everyday, as scholars are 
beginning to emphasise the significance of the small, mundane and generally unnoticed ways 
in which identities are reproduced at the micro-level (for example, Billig 1995; Edensor 
2006; Brubaker et al. 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a, 2008b). What has been far less 
explored, however, is the relationship of these everyday practices to social space. This is 
somewhat surprising given the fact that space can have a significant influence on shaping 
everyday life experiences, and it is through these lived experiences that the habitus can be 
reinforced or modified: 
Being the product of history, it [habitus] is an open system of dispositions that is 
constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a 





It is this notion which underscores one of the key arguments of this chapter: that ethnic 
components of the habitus are either produced and reinforced by, or contested and challenged 
through, lived experiences, and these are, to a large extent, shaped by socio-spatial dynamics. 
Thus, I suggest that spaces which are dominated by one ethnic group, and which 
consequently encourage predominantly intra-ethnic interaction, embed ethnicity within the 
everyday lives of ordinary actors through the ethnicisation of social structures and 
institutions, the frequent flagging and performance of identity, and the inter-subjective 
negotiation, construction, and reinforcement of ethnicised narratives and perspectives. On the 
other hand, in ethnically mixed territories, the ethnic components of the habitus are 
challenged on a daily basis as ethnic cleavages are less entrenched in social and institutional 
structures, the everyday expressions and practices of ethnicity are significantly reduced, and 
inter-ethnic interaction consistently challenges ethnic narratives. Appadurai has drawn 
attention to this importance of space stating that ‘locality is always emergent from the 
practices of local subjects in specific neighbourhoods’ (Appadurai 1996: 198). Liisa Malkki 
(1995) has similarly observed how processes of identity construction can be influenced by 
local circumstances in her study of Burundian Hutu refugees in exile in Tanzania. She argues 
that while refugees living together in a camp were ‘continually engaged in an impassioned 
construction and reconstruction of their history as “a people”’, those who were more 
dispersed throughout the town, ‘had not constructed such a categorically distinct, collective 
identity’ (1995: 3). She concludes that this sense of collectivity and historicity are produced 
through everyday practices (1995: 241). It is this influence of socio-spatial dynamics in the 
production and maintenance of ethnic identity which is explored here.  
However, an important qualification must be made at this point. Throughout the 
chapter I suggest that the segregation of ethnic groups in space influences the inculcation and 
reinforcement of ethnic components of the habitus. This argument is potentially vulnerable to 
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the criticism that it takes an overly ‘positional’ view of identity, suggesting that ‘social 
location determines subjective identity’ (Bottero 2010: 4). This is not the argument I wish to 
make. Rather, I suggest that it is through the ‘everyday experience and interactional 
enactment of ethnicity’ (Brubaker et al 2006: 168) that the ethnic components of the habitus 
are either reinforced or challenged. That is to say that ‘an individual agent’s experience of 
isolation from or exposure to actual everyday life spaces of other groups’ (Schnell and Yoav 
2001: 623) is of fundamental importance. I certainly do not wish to overemphasise the power 
of physical space and structures in constraining the agency of individuals. Of course, people 
are not confined to the spaces in which they reside and many people actively cultivate social 
networks outside of their territories; spatial structures do not wholly constrain agency. 
Nevertheless, they do encourage social networks which are reflective of the ethnic makeup of 
the neighbourhood and it is far from unusual for individuals to spend the majority of their day 
within their own neighbourhood. Gotham and Brumley (2002: 269) draw out this idea of 
agency, suggesting that individuals use space by engaging in a range of activities, ‘to create, 
present and sustain a personal identity tied to place’ such as cultivating ‘spatially defined 
informal social networks.’ Thus, in areas dominated by one group, social contacts, while 
rarely exclusively intra-ethnic, are nevertheless dominated by members of the same 
community, whereas in ethnically mixed zones, social networks echo the mixed 
demographic.  
This section is divided into three parts; the first offers a brief examination of the 
segregation of space, and how it influences social structures and the everyday interactional 
experience of ethnicity, the second explores the banal elements of ethnic identity, and the 





Spatial segregation of communities and the ethnicisation of social structures 
 The concentration of ethnic communities within specific regions and provinces of the 
country is the product of a complex interaction of pre-colonial migration and settlement 
patterns and colonial policies of divide and rule, which not only solidified previously fluid 
social networks and constructed a more stable consciousness around ethnic boundaries, but 
also fostered and strengthened a strong sense of attachment to particular territories.
17
 This 
regional ethnic division of space is echoed at the micro-level, largely the result of ethnic 
enclave formation through urban migration patterns; the various slums and urban spaces 
across the country are microcosms of wider Kenyan society. Thus, it can be said that there 
has been a certain ‘ruralization’ of Kenyan cities which ‘gives the various neighbourhoods 
their ethnic coloration’ (Jua 2005: 105). The imaginative dimensions of these territorialised 
identities are central to understanding ethnic relations and politics in Kenya, and as such 
these are explored in detail later in the chapter. However, of concern here are the more 
objective, concrete and material effects of this segregation. While territorial boundaries are 
indistinct and largely imagined, the concentration of ethnic groups within geographical space, 
both at the macro- and at the micro-level, has very real consequences for the entrenchment of 
ethnic cleavages in social structures and the everyday experience and practice of ethnicity. 
The ‘ethnicisation’ of social structures, that is ‘the tendency for institutions, social groups and 
social divisions to take an ethnic form’ (Ngunyi 1995: 124) is, to a large extent, related to the 
spatial distribution of members of the same ethnic community. Schools, for example, both in 
rural areas, and (to a lesser extent) in urban settlements,
18
 tend to be dominated by one ethnic 
                                                 
17
 A comprehensive account of the origins of this ethnic division of space remains outside the scope of this 
thesis. For various analyses see, for example, Soja (1968); Ominde (1968); Spear and Waller (1993); Oucho 
(2002); Wanyonyi (2010).  
18
 I suggest that the ethnicisation of schools in urban areas is highly dependent upon the ethnic homogeneity of 
enclaves as well as their proximity to other villages. For example, the peri-urban centres of Huruma and 
Kiambaa in Eldoret, both predominantly Kikuyu communities, are relatively isolated from other villages and 





 and, as ‘prime sites of identity formation’ (Secor 2004: 360), they can help to foster 
the awareness of ethnicity and ethnic differentiation in early childhood years. 
Similarly, ethnic cleavages are apparent in religious life, as particular churches and 
religious denominations have come to be associated with particular groups.
20
 An Islamic 
preacher from Kibera who teaches comparative religion points out the ethnic segregation of 
Christian denominations within Kenya, stating that ‘7
th
 Day Adventist people, most followers 
are Kisiis, Anglican - most are Kalenjin’ (PAD, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 15 December 
2009), and Deacon (2011: 76) reports that the Kenya Assemblies of God churches are seen as 
being ‘Central Province Churches.’ This religious fractionalisation consequently encourages 
less heterogeneous congregations, which are then further reinforced by the spatially 
segregated dynamics of both the rural and the urban arenas. Thus, people in the churches 
within Kibera, for example, tend to ‘come from the same group as each other’ (Deacon 2011: 
59) due to the segregation of Christian denominations and the concentration of certain groups 
in particular neighbourhoods. 
These brief observations concerning the ethnicisation of educational and religious 
institutions are just two examples of the ways in which ethnicity has become embedded in 
social structures, partly as the result of the concentration of ethnic groups within particular 
spaces. Yet the pattern is further evident in other elements of social life, including sports 
                                                                                                                                                        
2001: 2) leads to a Kikuyu dominance of the student body in these areas. However, in more densely populated 
urban slums, such as Kibera and Kawangware, where ethnic neighbourhoods exist in close proximity, and where 
minority communities are still significant in numbers, schools are often much more ethnically mixed.  
19
 Indeed, ethnic divisions within the education system have been further entrenched by the implementation of 
certain policies ensuring its continuation.  For example, in 1976 the Ministry of Education implemented a policy 
stating that in provincial and district primary schools the language of the school’s catchment area should be the 
language of instruction for the first three years, ensuring that the majority of students are from the local 
community. Additionally, the quota system initiated in 1985 dictates that 85% of provincial secondary school 
admissions places be reserved for students from within the province. The former policy is rendered possible due 
to the concentration of ethnic communities, whilst the latter serves to reinforce and indeed to perpetuate spatial 
segregation.  
20
 The origins of this ethnicisation of religious denominations lie in the trajectory of colonial missionaries. For a 







 businesses, friendship groups and gangs. Indeed, the ethnic cleavage is 
‘manifested in virtually all politically and socially relevant organisations and group 
affiliations’ (Lijphart’s 1975 [1968]: 23) at the macro-level, and the pattern is further 
replicated at the micro-level as institutions and social structures are ethnicised to a greater or 
lesser extent according to the spatial demographics in which they are situated. Thus, as 
Suttles (1968: 41) has suggested with reference to the Addams area of Chicago, ethnic groups 
are not only separated by location: 
They are divided still further by a host of ecological and institutional arrangements. 
Generally, the religious, commercial, recreational and educational institutions help 
sustain these ethnic boundaries…. the overall structure, then, is one in which local 
institutions either mirror the ethnic sections in the neighbourhood or bring out the 
opposition between them. 
 
Banal ethnicity  
 
  
                                                 
21
 The Luo-associated Gor Mahia football club, and the Luhya-based AFC Leopards are good examples. While 
the ethnicisation of the Kenyan football league has been somewhat diminished in recent years as corporate and 
institution-sponsored clubs have emerged and ‘shifted power away from community-based clubs’ there remains 
support for these ethnic teams, particularly among ‘Kenyans living in informal settlements such as Mathare and 
Kibera’ (AfriCOG, 2010).   
22
 Carotenuto suggests that the Luo Union, for example, was reborn as the Luo Council of Elders in the early 
1990s  and draws attention to the ‘rumours of the re-emergence of other ethnic-based associations, such as the 




 Figure 1 depicts a photograph of a small sign nailed to the wooden post of a street 
light, advertising house-girls of ‘all tribes.’ It was situated on Joseph Kangethe Road, on the 
outskirts of Kibera’s Toi Market. The advertisement is illustrative not only of the centrality of 
ethnicity in employment and business opportunities, but it also constitutes an example of 
‘banal’ or everyday ethnicity, that is the mundane indicators of ethnic identity in daily life.
23
 
These banal routines and signs are ‘such a familiar part of the social environment, that they 
operate mindlessly, rather than mindfully’ (Billig 1995: 60). In Kenya, there are two 
important and related aspects of these everyday indicators of identity: the first are the 
mundane flags of ethnic identity itself, that is the reminders and practices of one’s individual 
ethnic association; the second are the indicators of ethnic difference and cleavage in broader 
Kenyan society. The sign in Figure 1 is an example of the latter, serving as a banal reminder 
of the significance of ethnic identity in employment opportunities, and flagging the ethnic 
cleavages which characterise Kenyan society. Similar reminders of ethnic divisions can be 
seen littered throughout the Kenyan press. Wa-Mungai (2007: 339), for example, draws 
attention to the dominance of the ‘ethnic question’ in public discourse by examining 
newspaper headlines in the early months of 2007. While he suggests that the obsession with 
ethnicity may be more prominent than usual, situated as it is in the lead-up to the elections 
(2007: 338), my own research supports his conclusions that news reports, editorials, opinion 
pieces and readers’ letters consistently make reference to ethnicity, tribalism and ethnic 
cleavages outside of election years. This section focuses largely on the visual and audible 
reminders of ethnic identity in day to day life, but it is important to note that this signalling is 
not limited to ethnic identification alone, but extends to reinforcing the logic and 
consciousness of ethnic differentiation and cleavage which pervades society. 
                                                 
23




Some of the visual reminders of ethnicity have been discussed earlier in this chapter 
in relation to the process of telling. Brubaker et al. (2006: 217) suggest that the cues by which 
people arrive at ethnic ascription can also be understood as ‘embodied ethnicity’, thus 
highlighting their function as banal markers of ethnic identity. These cues can be further 
visualised through specific actions, such wearing a nametag in the workplace, but should also 
be understood as examples of banal ethnicity in and of themselves. The visibility of cultural 
dress and adornments, the use of cultural objects such as mats, serving dishes and gourds, and 
the display of traditional weapons such as bows and arrows in the home, while largely 
unnoticed due to their familiarity, are important symbols of ethnic identity.
24
 Similarly, 
notice-boards advertising vernacular church services, matatu signs displaying ethnicised 
destination names (such as Kisumu Ndogo, or Kiamba),
25
 and hotelis promoting the sale of 
ethnic dishes, are frequently seen, but seldom noticed, flags of ethnic identity. 
Audible markers of identity in everyday life similarly underscore this ethnic 
consciousness. Hearing matatu touts shouting their routes, for example, is the audible 
equivalent of the signs which display their destination. Music which is played in homes, 
heard in the streets, or danced to in clubs, frequently reveals ethnic dimensions, either 
through its use of vernacular language or by relating ethnic folk tales and stories. This does 
not mean to say that members of different communities do not listen to and enjoy the music 
of other ethnic groups, but rather I suggest that the awareness of its origins does serve to 
reinforce ethnic consciousness in an imperceptible way. An extended extract from an article 
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 Interestingly, such objects are usually intended for use on special occasions such as at weddings or annual 
rituals, but they often remain on display or are used for other things in everyday life. For example, in the Nubian 
homes in which I stayed in Eldoret and Nakuru, the kuta, a traditional woven plate and cover used to present 
gifts to the bride at a wedding, or to serve food at other special occasions, were used to store everyday items 
such as pins and combs, or to cover food in the kitchen to protect it from insects. Thus, ethnically-symbolic 
objects such as these are also used in banal and mundane ways in everyday life and constitute an unconscious 
flagging of ethnic identity.    
25
 These are names associated with the ancestral homelands of the Luo and the Kikuyu respectively.  
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appearing in The Standard newspaper demonstrates how ethnic consciousness colours 
everyday life, and it also offers a clear illustration of the process of telling in operation: 
Anyhow, here we were, tribesmen of the land, enjoying ourselves, getting nicely deaf 
and drinking our livers away, when the DJ suddenly brought the house down. First, he 
played that age-old Kikuyu gem Wendo Wakwa Mwariro […] His choice was greeted 
with whoops of delight, with every able bodied man and woman rushing to their feet 
in a whirl. I looked around with my practiced village eye and I can affirm with 
certainty the ancestry of the people gyrating on that dance floor was not confined to 
the mountain region. I recall the unforgettable picture of a six-foot-tall man whose 
dark features clearly suggested his umbilical cord is buried on the shores of Lake 
Victoria. He dances with the distinctive pleasure and style of the men of the lake: eyes 
closed, arms raised in reverence and hips swaying seductively like the famed 
romantics these brothers are. And the maiden, to whom the swaying hips were 
intended, had “Mt Kenya” written loudly all over her. But before you could say 
Wachiliia, the cheeky DJ hit the brakes on his turntable and threw a hot Kamba 
number called Osa Ovoo Lucy into the works. There were again whoops of delight 
with dancers gyrating even faster to the trademark tingili-style Akamba guitar. And 
then before the ready excitement generated by that Kamba gala had died down, the 
sneaky DJ played the Ohangla anthem by that man called Nyaduno […] I espied the 
aforementioned Luo romantic sweep his Mt Kenya maiden into his arms, sway her 
gently to the tune of his land, eyes shut with the sheer pleasure of it all (Malanda 
2007). 
 
The article illustrates the fact that music can strongly evoke ethnic associations, subtly 
flagging ethnic identity; at the same time the extract clearly demonstrates the practice of 
telling, and the pervasiveness of ethnic stereotypes which underscore Kenyan society. There 
is nothing inherently conflictual in the banal flagging of identity, but it is a constant and 
consistent aspect of Kenyan society. Indeed, a song entitled Barack Obama ni Jaluo [Barack 
Obama is a Luo] performed by Bafu Chafu at the Sawa Sawa concert in Nairobi in May 
2010, was greeted with some amusement by the crowd, who swayed along to the reggae beat 
and who joined in on the repetitive chorus. In many ways, then, it can be argued that 
‘ethnicity is fun in everyday transactions of a non-conflictual kind. It adds spice to life. 
Ethnicity is the way people do things: it is culture’ (Frederiksen 1995: 54). Nevertheless, this 
is not to say that banal ethnicity is necessarily benign (Billig 1995: 7), indeed, there are 
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particular circumstances in which it can be a significant source of tension and conflict. This is 
explored in Chapter Four.  
So far, this section has argued that banal expressions of ethnic identity and 
differentiation are present in wider society as a whole. However, in some ways this mundane 
flagging of ethnic identity is shaped by socio-spatial dynamics. The practices of ethnic 
identity are understandably more frequent and pervasive in areas that are dominated by 
members of the same ethnic community, and less apparent in ethnically mixed territories. The 
remainder of this section focuses on the use of vernacular language, as arguably the most 
pervasive and common audible reminder of ethnicity in everyday life in Kenya, 
demonstrating how this everyday practice of ethnic identity and marker of difference can be 
influenced by the socio-spatial circumstances of daily life.  
While English and Kiswahili are the two national languages of Kenya, the use of 
vernacular dialects remains prominent. The spatial distribution of ethnic groups, both at the 
macro- and at the micro-level, reflects a marked difference in the choice of language used in 
various day-to-day interactions. Indeed, there is a degree of urban-rural divide in the 
language of the everyday; in rural areas, vernacular languages tend to be utilised to a greater 
extent than either English or Kiswahili, both in conversations between family, friends and 
neighbours, as well as in interactions with strangers. The extensiveness of vernacular 
language use in these areas is apparent in the fact that a significant number of residents, 
particularly of the older generation, display limited knowledge of either Kiswahili or English. 
Ogechi (2003: 279) goes as far as to suggest that: 
Kiswahili itself is as alien to most rural people as is English, and, even among those 
who claim to speak it, only a small proportion are fluent enough to engage in serious 
discussions. The rest of the Kenyan languages are largely used for intra-ethnic 




Thus, language choice in rural areas frequently tends towards the vernacular in the home in 
public settings and in interactions with strangers. Indeed, ethnic minorities residing in these 
areas often learn the language of the native community in order to negotiate everyday life. As 
such, the use of vernacular language not only exists as a daily, generally unnoticed, reminder 
of ethnic identity, but similarly, can accentuate the sense of ‘otherness’ amongst minorities as 
they are conversing in another community’s language.  
 The situation in the urban arena is, however, far more complicated. In some territories 
the language choice echoes that of rural areas, but there is often a more complex, largely 
unconscious process of language selection at work. Again, the socio-spatial dimension is of 
fundamental importance. In ethnically mixed territories, the use of vernacular language is 
very rare and it is not unusual for children who have grown up in these areas to have no 
knowledge of their mother-tongue. While some families use vernacular languages within the 
home, interactions with friends, neighbours and strangers uniformly adopt Kiswahili or 
Sheng; indeed, the use of vernacular language in mixed interactions is rare and is almost 
certainly considered rude. However, this does not completely preclude the use of vernacular 
languages; there are occasions in which ‘private talk in public places’ (Brubaker et al. 2006: 
246), that is conversations between friends or family members in public settings, are 
conducted in the mother-tongue. This is frequently heard in exchanges between matatu 
drivers and their touts, for example, who routinely converse in their mother-tongue, as well as 
in certain pubs and streets, and in some places of work. This use of vernacular language is 
rarely ‘policed’ and while it is certainly a source of friction in specific settings,
26
 on the 
whole it is passed by without comment.  
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 In fact, I witnessed one occasion in which the use of vernacular language did evoke a strong reaction, and led 
to one of the few incidents of policing I witnessed during my fieldwork. I was sitting in a small office in Nyayo 
House, Nairobi, trying (largely in vain) to sort out a waylaid visa application. There were two male employees, 
myself, and a Kenyan woman in the office. As they sifted through piles of paper, searching for my application, 
the two men were talking to each other in Kikuyu. After a few minutes of pointed glares, the woman interjected, 
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 The social rules and expectations governing language choice in ethnic enclaves is 
more complex. So far it has been suggested that the language of communication in social 
settings tends to reflect the ethnic makeup of the area; in ethnic enclaves, however, there is an 
intricate mix of language use and frequent code-switching. There is some evidence to suggest 
that the use of vernacular languages is common within urban ethnic enclaves. In 4B, Mathare, 
for example, two of my interviewees were proficient in neither Kiswahili nor English, 
preferring to conduct the interview in Jaluo; similarly, in Kosovo, one interviewee 
unconsciously slipped back into Kikuyu in the middle of his narrative, suggesting that it is a 
more common vehicle of expression in his everyday life. Nevertheless, while friendship 
groups in these areas tend to be dominated by one community, they frequently include a few 
members of other groups and, consequently, Sheng is the more prominent language of 
interaction amongst the youth.
27
 Sheng is sometimes pointed to as an illustration of 
generational identities emerging, cutting across ethnic divisions and uniting the youth. 
However, it should be noted that it can still include elements of vernacular languages which 
serve as banal flags of ethnic identity: 
There are local variations of the language which betray the presence of ethnically 
predominant groups in the respective localities. The Sheng of the predominantly 
Kikuyu Bahati, therefore would be expected to have a higher proportion of Kikuyu 
linguistic items than say the Sheng spoken in Majengo, though both are situated in 
Nairobi Eastlands’ (Mazrui 1995: 169). 
 
Even through the use of Sheng, then, ethnic flagging is still in operation. The frequency with 
which vernacular languages are heard, and moreover practiced, as individuals negotiate their 
                                                                                                                                                        
berating them for using their vernacular language in a government building and asserting that they should only 
use the official languages of Kenya. This disapproval of the use of vernacular languages by government 
employees is echoed by a number of interviewees, and, I suggest, should be understood in relation to grievances 
over unequal access to the resources of the state, such as employment opportunities. Horizontal inequalities such 
as these, be they perceived or real (or a bit of both), are explored in Chapter Four.  
27
 The fact that a significant number of minorities living within these enclaves report that they have some 
knowledge of the language of the dominant community suggests that it is frequently heard, and often used, in 




daily lives, is an important element of maintaining the salience of ethnic consciousness and 
differentiation.  
The final aspect of banal ethnicity which deserves some attention here is the presence 
of ethnicity in everyday interactions and discourses. While Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008a: 
540) suggest that talking about the nation is infrequent and momentary, in Kenya ethnicity is 
actually quite regularly referred to in everyday conversations. While it certainly is not a 
feature of every interaction, ‘there is a vibrant surface level articulating and even celebrating 
ethnicity through greetings, jokes, in negotiations and in conflicts.’ (Frederiksen 1995: 54). 
The predominance of ethnic stereotypes is extensive and they frequently form the basis for 
jokes and commentaries on individuals, groups, and society as a whole. Wa-Mungai explores 
the variety of ways in which ethnic stereotypes pervade discourses by offering detailed 
anecdotes which illustrate their extensive use. He suggests that ‘the predominance of these 
stereotypes within everyday social discourse seems to make ethnic othering normative’ (Wa-
Mungai 2007: 339). My own observations confirm this suggestion, and one particular 
occasion is especially illustrative of the pervasiveness of ethnicity in social discourse, even 
outside the realm of political debates and discussions.  In July 2010, the African Athletics 
Championships were held at Nyayo stadium in Nairobi and I attended two days of events 
with some Kiberan friends. Upon arrival at the stadium we climbed to the top level, and 
seated ourselves just underneath the large video screen in what my friends called the ‘Kibera 
zone.’ Often international sporting events such as these are pointed to by scholars and policy 
makers alike as vehicles for uniting divided nations.
28
 Indeed, from a distance, it certainly 
would seem that Kenyan nationalism had superseded ethnic identity and difference. The 
crowd enthusiastically chanted “Kenya, one, two, three!” as the Kenyan triumvirate of 
                                                 
28
 One example of such a position in relation to Kenya is put forward by Njoki Ndung’u (2009), an advocate of 
the High Court in, an opinion piece entitled ‘Sport and art can heal rift that damages our nation’, that appeared 
in The Saturday Standard in 2009.  
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Rudisha, Yego and Kivuva dominated the 800 metre race, and people vocally expressed their 
national pride, boisterously singing the national anthem and cheering each time the Kenyan 
flag was raised in victory. However, the conversations heard from within the midst of the 
crowd during the events themselves reveal the continued presence of ethnicity in everyday 
discourses, even in what might appear to be an overt performance of national identity. Ethnic 
stereotypes frequently formed the basis of jokes and commentaries on the athletes’ 
performances. Watching the javelin competition, I heard one youth remark that the Kalenjin 
should be good at that event, ‘since they are good at throwing arrows.’ His friend then 
retorted ‘leave away those Kalenjin; kwani, are there no Luo shot-putters? They are the good 
stone-throwers of Kenya.’ Moreover, while national victories were celebrated, defeats were 
often commented upon with reference to ethnicity. Of particular note was the surprise defeat 
of Janeth Jepkosgei in the women’s 800 metres at the hands of Algeria’s Bourkas Zahra; as 
she fell behind, my friend turned to me and said, ‘ati Sarah, do you see this stupid Kalenjin?’ 
and another joked that she would be running faster if she was chasing a Kikuyu ‘like they did 
in post-election!’ None of these comments appeared to cause offence, and indeed were met 
with good humour and shared laughter. This is not to say that ethnic jokes and stereotypes 
never cause discomfort or conflict, but in such a setting they at least appear to be taken in 
good spirit. However, as Frederiksen (2010: 1076) states, ‘ethnicity is central in joking 
relationships, but can turn sour, as in the use of jocular stereotypes in the build-up to the 2007 
elections.’ The potentially sinister undertones of these jokes and prejudices are further 
explored in Chapter Four.   
A further important element of the conversational and discursive dimensions of 
ethnicity is the fact that they can be affirmed or policed in some spaces, whilst challenged 
and deconstructed in others. Ethnicised perspectives, behaviours and attitudes can be 
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constructed and reinforced, governed and disciplined through moral and political judgements. 
Indeed, as Frederiksen (2010: 1074) suggests:  
Ethnicity thrives… in Kenya’s oral and everyday culture and discourse. Ethnic 
identification keeps together a “moral community” which often, and especially in 
times of crisis, provides support and functions as the sounding board for communal 
values and experience.  
 
Thus, predominantly intra-ethnic interactions provide this ‘sounding board’, which not only 
reinforces, but also to an extent, produces, ethnicised perspectives, shapes perceptions of 
ethnic others, and influences behaviours. In ethnicised spaces, then, people engage in the 
construction of ethnic narratives and attitudes, that is, they imagine, negotiate and shape the 
content of ethnic identity. In ethnically mixed areas and social interactions, however, 
ethnicised perceptions are challenged, modified, and occasionally deconstructed, through 
conversation with ethnic others, helping to give form to ‘a challenging cosmopolitanism’ 
(Malkki 1995: 232). Indeed, not only is there less opportunity to inter-subjectively produce 
and police these attitudes and behaviours, but identities are not so intricately connected to 
space. The influence of interactions and conversations in the construction and reinforcement 
of ethnicised attitudes and behaviours are particularly notable during the 2007 campaigns and 
during the violence itself, and, as such, are further discussed in Chapters Four and Six.  
Thus, the simultaneously visual, audible and conversational practices of banal 
ethnicity maintain the ethnic components of the habitus, producing, reproducing and 


















In addition to these banal indicators of ethnic identity, there are more overt, ritual and 
dramatic practices of ethnicity which occur less regularly, but which equally underscore the 
ethnic components of the habitus. Life-cycle events, including coming-of-age rituals, 
weddings, and funerals, in addition to traditional festivals and other cultural celebrations are 
important aspects of the reinforcement of ethnic identity. Certainly these are less frequent and 
more momentary than the banal expressions discussed above, but their practice remains an 
important element in the continued production and maintenance of ethnic consciousness. It is 
not that these rituals are necessarily performative in the sense that, in themselves, they serve 
to construct identities, but they are performative in the sense that they are visible 
demonstrations and practices of ethnic identity, which are not so banal and mundane as to go 
unnoticed, but not so dramatic as to be extraordinary. Again these are, to an extent, shaped by 
the socio-spatial environment, occurring more frequently and more visibly in ethnically 
homogeneous areas than in mixed territories.  
 The traditions that surround marriage ceremonies and the practices which are 




preparations for, and celebrations of, the wedding, offer a good example of this more overt 
and dramatic demonstration of ethnic identity. The customs surrounding the marriage such as 
the slaughter of a goat, the presentation of a dowry, the preparations of the bride, the 
ceremony itself, and the celebrations afterwards, where cultural dress is often worn, 
traditional food prepared, and ethnic songs are played and danced to, are highly visible, 
conscious enactments of ethnic identity. Figure 2, for example, is a photograph taken on the 
ceremonial day of a Nubian wedding which took place in Karanja, Kibera. The groom, 
having completed the marriage ceremony in the mosque, is being escorted through the streets 
of Kibera by his family, to his wife’s home. The procession is accompanied by enthusiastic 
singing of traditional Nubian songs. Later that day, the celebrations continued in an open 
space near Karanja road, with Nubian music and dancing. Thus, not only is the celebration an 
overt and elaborate performance of ethnicity, as large numbers of family and community 
members adopt traditional dress, assume certain traditional roles, and perform cultural 
practices, reinforcing their own sense of identity and unity, but it is also conducted in a public 
space and in a manner which renders this ritual highly visible to members of other ethnic 
communities living in the area. Thus, the performance highlights differences in cultural 
practices and renders ethnic differentiation highly visible.   
The relatively new phenomenon of cultural nights, in which members of ethnic 
communities gather in a particular place, eat traditional food, and celebrate their culture 
through the performance of traditional songs and dances, offer further opportunities for the 
overt, conscious expression of ethnic identity. The intention behind the creation of these 
nights is to enable migrant workers to have a ‘taste of the life they yearn for’, and the 
originator of the idea noted that ‘above all it creates a sense of belonging’ (Obara 2003, cited 
in Mutonya 2007: 170). At the same time, however, they serve to maintain an awareness of 
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ethnic differentiation within society. One interviewee, a young man from Kangemi in 
Nairobi, highlights this dual impact: 
Yes, tribes have meetings. Then there are things like Luhya Night, Luo Night to 
remind them of the culture // we’ve gone back to our roots and there are these cultural 
nights... Stories from our people and they tell you ancestral things… people are into 
tribes now 
// 
So when did these cultural nights and things start to re-emerge? 
Let’s say about three to four years ago they started coming out with cultural things, 
keeping our heritage. At one point it is good, but it reminds people of who I am and 
who you’re not. Then I’ll be better than you because you are not of my tribe. It brings 
divisions (SIL, Interview, Woodley, Nairobi, 22 November 2009). 
 
Interestingly, these overt performances of ethnicity are often shared by residents hailing from 
other communities who want to experience other traditions and customs. Cultural nights are 
not attended exclusively by members of one community, nor indeed are weddings. In fact, at 
both the Kikuyu and the Nubian weddings I attended in Kibera during the course of my 
fieldwork, passers-by from other ethnic communities not only stopped and observed the 
traditions, but also, on occasion, joined in with some of the celebrations and the dancing. 
Furthermore, people of different ethnic groups contribute to the often overt and visible 
fundraising efforts for funerals of their friends and neighbours. Ethnic difference is not 
always conflictual; nevertheless, it is a defining feature of society which is continuously 
flagged through the observance of different practices and traditions. Moreover, the frequency 
and visibility of this flagging is, to an extent, influenced by the concentration of ethnic 
communities within particular territories.  
 
Ethnicised Space  
 The geographical and spatial concentration of ethnic communities should not be 
understood simply as ‘a residential agglomeration of social groups in neutral and static space’ 
(Schnell and Yoav 2001: 622); rather, in Kenya, spaces have come to be imagined as 
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‘belonging’ to, and indeed ‘owned’ by, particular groups. Consequently, spaces can not only 
play an important role in producing and framing social identities (Schnell and Yoav 2001: 
622), but the subjective and cultural meanings attached to them can help govern and shape 
behaviour within them.
29
 This concluding section explores the ‘imagined geographies’ which 
characterise Kenyan society, arguing that space is ‘poetically endowed’ (Said 2003 [1978]: 
54, 55) with discourses of belonging and ownership, and suggesting that the subjective 
meanings attached to it and the everyday practices which underscore the narrative, can help 
to produce and maintain a stable sense of ethnic differentiation. 
Myths of origin and claims of belonging to a particular ancestral homeland are a 
common feature of ethnic categorisation, often identified as one of the fundamental attributes 
of the ethnic group, particularly in the African context. Cobbah (1988: 73) goes as far as to 
suggest that ‘geo-ethnicity’ is a more appropriate term for the phenomenon, concluding that 
‘in Africa, ethnic identity is above all things a territorial identity.’ As has already been 
suggested, pre-colonial migrations and settlement patterns, in combination with the creation 
of rigid administrative boundaries, the regulation and monitoring of Native Reserves, and the 
reliance on provincial administrators in the colonial period, constructed a sense of ‘ethnic 
territoriality’ (Lynch 2011: 17) which still persists in contemporary Kenyan society, where 
provinces and regions are recognised as being the domain of particular groups. The Kikuyu, 
for example, are understood as belonging to, and indeed owning, Central Province, the Luo, 
Nyanza, the Luhya, Western, the Kalenjin, Rift Valley, the Mijikenda, Coastal province, and 
so on. This powerful attachment of communities with their ancestral homelands has 
facilitated the emergence of a native-immigrant dichotomy, where those residing outside of 
                                                 
29
 This is, of course, not to suggest that space and structure determines behaviour. Individuals can and do 
‘contest and transcend situational frames of meaning and resist oppressive structures and subordination’ 
(Gotham and Brumley 2002: 282), and as shall be argued here, the geo-spatial imaginaries attached to territories 
are often challenged, contested, and occasionally modified.  
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their ancestral homes and in the homelands of other ethnic groups, are regarded as 
‘foreigners’ and ‘immigrants.’ Visible practices such as regular returns to the rural home for 
festivals and celebrations, the custom of burial in the homeland and the production of ‘homes 
away from homes’ through ethnic enclave formation and labelling
30
 reinforce this 
conceptualisation, as many migrants maintain strong ties with their rural homes.
31
 Yet, the 
narrative is so deeply entrenched that even families who have lived in an area for generations, 
who display no apparent ties with their ancestral land, and whose younger members have 
perhaps never even set foot in the homeland, are still subject to this immigrant status. As one 
interviewee, in his reflections on Kikuyu migrants, revealingly exclaims, ‘How can you say 
Rift Valley is your home? Your home is Central’ (B, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 19 
March 2010). These claims to autochthony – meaning ‘sons of the soil’ – have been 
identified across the African continent and there is a burgeoning body of literature which is 
exploring its apparent resurgence in the context of democratisation (see for example, 
Geschiere and Gugler 1998; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2002; Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005; 
Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Jackson 2006; Socpa 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Konings 
2008; Bøås 2009; Dunn 2009; Geschiere 2009; Médard 2009). However, these analyses tend 
to focus on the regional level, and less attention has been paid to the ways in which these 
narratives are reproduced in the urban arena.
32
 As urban neighbourhoods come to be 
dominated by a particular community, discourses of territorial ownership emerge and an 
‘intra-urban orientalism’ (Jua 2005: 116) becomes apparent, designating in the minds of 
residents the boundaries between ‘our’ space and ‘theirs.’ The borders are subjectively and 
                                                 
30
 Just as enclaves the world over acquire names which evoke the home of the dominant community, such as 
Chinatown, Little Italy, and Little Korea, ethnic enclaves in Kenya often invoke similar attachments to the 
ancestral home. For example, in the slums of Korogocho, and Kibera in Nairobi, and Langas in Eldoret, there 
are villages by the name ‘Kisumu Ndogo’, meaning ‘little Kisumu’, linking these Luo-dominated enclaves with 
the Luo homeland of Nyanza, of which Kisumu is the capital.  
31
 See Jenkins (2012: 3-8) for a fuller discussion of these practices.  
32
 Notable exceptions include Anthony (2002) and Fourchard (2009). 
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inter-subjectively constructed by local residents.  While in some spaces a sharp and distinct 
borderline is understood – often marked by some geographical feature such as the dirt road 
which runs through the centre of Pondamali separating the Luo-dominated Ronda, from the 
Kikuyu area of Mwariki, the river which constitutes the border between the Kalenjin 
‘hillside’ and the Kikuyu village of Huruma in Eldoret, or the football field marking the 
boundary between Kosovo and 4B in Mathare –  in other instances, there is a more gradual 
transition through ethnically mixed frontier zones
33
 and territories. There is a clear boundary 
consciousness amongst residents of urban settlements, and people are acutely aware of which 
neighbourhood belongs to which community. Thus, the ‘absolutist conception’ of ethnic 
others as ‘immigrants’ (Marshall-Fratani 2006: 17), both at the macro- and at the micro-
levels, is a further means by which ethnic boundaries are continually reproduced and 
stabilised in contemporary society. Rogers (1998: 210) has stated that, ‘if racial meanings are 
thought of as contested and relatively unfixed, then spatial demarcation is a powerful strategy 
of naturalising and fixing such difference’, and while I do not believe that identity boundaries 
are forever-fixed, impervious to transformation over extended periods of time, autochthonous 
discourses certainly embed them further into consciousness and render then remarkably 
durable. 
However, if the immigrant metaphor is remarkably durable and persistent, the 
subjective meanings attached to space are not.  That is to say that the ethnicisation of space, 
the understandings of to whom that space belongs, is highly susceptible to contestation, 
renegotiation and transformation. John Lonsdale (2008) has identified this potential for 
change, highlighting the three idioms of understanding, controlling and working land when 
conceptualizing how claims to land entitlement and land are expressed in Kenya. To this I 
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would add dominance, and, in Kenya – a setting where few communities can claim true 
autochthon status, and where most are migrants who have displaced others (Lonsdale 2008: 
306) – this might be the most difficult claim to contest (Jenkins 2012: 18). The formation of 
ethnic enclaves, for example, can challenge native claims to the land, and can be seen as a 
‘symbolic appropriation of territory and space’ (Achieng 2003: 165), and related shifts in 
numerical superiority in urban areas can similarly alter perceptions of who owns the territory. 
Two clear examples of this potential for change in contemporary Kenya are Nakuru and 
Kibera. Situated in the Rift Valley, and widely understood to be part of the Kalenjin 
homeland, Nakuru’s demographics have altered significantly over time and now ‘according 
to the Kikuyu, Nakuru should be a Kikuyu county like Nyeri or Kiambu because the Kikuyu 
are the most populous in the area and have the numbers to win most parliamentary seats and 
also control both the county assembly and government’ (Daily Nation, 8 September 2010). 
Similarly, the numerical dominance of the Luo in Kibera has led to a common understanding 
that ‘Kibera is for the Jaluos’ (CHOC, Interview, Waithaka, Kawangware, 8 March 2010), 
despite the historical claims to the land made by the Nubian community. Indeed, as Anderson 
and O’Dowd (1999: 595) state, border change can refer to ‘changing the symbolic meanings 
and/or the material functions of existing borders’, and in Kenya the two, that is the material 
and the symbolic, appear to be inextricably linked.
34
 However, whilst claims of ownership 
and belonging may morph over time, this only alters the positions of the players, not the 
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 The relationship between numerical superiority and claims to belonging and ownership is closely related to 
ethnic politics and political dominance. This issue is expanded upon in later chapters but it should be 
highlighted here that the perception that economic opportunities are inextricably linked to having a member of 
the ethnic group in power is of fundamental importance to the discourses of ownership and notions of belonging 
in a particular territory. Thus, in Nakuru, as the Kikuyu become increasingly dominant, it is understood that they 
will come to hold the majority of political seats in the town. As a result, it is perceived that members of the 
Kikuyu community will occupy more jobs, own more businesses, command greater access to school bursaries 
and loans, and consequently, the town will be ‘theirs.’ The reality of this economic advantage to power at the 
grassroots is highly questionable, as can be seen in the case of the Luo community in Kibera, who have not 
significantly benefited from Raila Odinga’s position as MP. Nevertheless, the ‘significance of borders derives 
from the importance of territoriality as an organizing principle of political and social life’ (Anderson and 




game itself and the native-immigrant dichotomy remains intact (Jenkins 2012: 19). Thus, 
ethnic boundaries are relatively stable; it is the subjective meanings attached to them which 
are continuously being renegotiated and reformulated.   
   
Conclusion 
 A comprehensive understanding of contemporary episodes of ethnic violence 
necessitates more than a macro-historical examination of the construction of ethnic cleavages, 
or an assertion that political elites invoke ethnic identities to further their own agendas. They 
also require an exploration of how these identities are maintained, reproduced, experienced, 
enacted and made meaningful in everyday life by local level actors. This chapter has argued 
that there is a pervasive ethnic consciousness in Kenyan society which is characterised by the 
cognitive process of telling, and the tendency to perceive of everyday events and interactions 
in ethnic terms. The ethnic components of the habitus are produced and maintained through 
daily routines, social structures, institutions and interactions, and these are, to an extent 
shaped by socio-spatial dynamics. Thus, in territories dominated by one ethnic community I 
argue that social structures and institutions have become ethnicised, encouraging 
predominantly intra-ethnic interaction. Consequently, the practices of ethnic identity are more 
prevalent, the subtle signs and indicators which flag it more pervasive and ethnicity is more 
deeply entrenched in the habitus. It assumes harder structures through its embeddedness in 
social institutions and is more durable in the imaginations of local level actors. However, in 
ethnically mixed spaces, the ethnic components of the habitus are frequently challenged 
through everyday conversation and discourse, the performance and interactional enactment of 
ethnicity is less frequent, ethnicity is not so deeply rooted in social structures, and the space is 
not understood as belonging to any one community. This does not mean that ethnicity 
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disappears in these areas, but that it is less entrenched and frequently challenged. The 
variation in the embeddedness of ethnicity in the everyday lives of ordinary actors has a 











Kenya is experiencing a period of calm, but it is not peace.  
(AB, Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 20 December 2009) 
 
 In the previous chapter I explored the ways in which ethnic consciousness is 
embedded in the structures of society, suggesting that an appreciation of its everyday 
processes and workings is crucial to developing an understanding of its role in, and the 
dynamics of, violent ethnic conflict. This chapter continues with this line of argumentation 
suggesting that violence itself cannot be understood in isolation from the social context 
within which it emerges. While Kenya was once considered to be an oasis of peace in a 
region of instability, in reality, ‘ordinary citizens were constantly plagued by violence in their 
daily lives’ (Mueller 2008: 194). It is in this context of ‘diffused violence’ (Mueller 2008: 
194), in this continuity between the ‘everyday’ and the ‘exceptional’, that the reaction to the 
flawed elections of 2007 must be located. The significance of this ‘ubiquity of violence’ has 
not only been recognised in the Kenyan context (Mueller 2008, 2010; Cheeseman 2008; 
Branch and Cheeseman 2009; Kagwanja 2009; Kagwanja and Southall 2009; Ndung’u 
2010),
1
 but it has also provoked a burgeoning literature, particularly amongst scholars of 
Latin America and post-apartheid South Africa (Scheper-Hughes 1992; Simpson, Mokwena 
and Segal 1992; Hamber 1998, 1999; Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Pécaut 1999; Moser and 
                                                 
1
 While I have cited those identifying the profusion of extra-state violence specifically in relation to the post-
election crisis here, as Murunga (2011: 10-11) notes, studies of vigilantism and petty crime in Kenya more 
generally, also fit into this school. See for example, Anderson (2002), Katumanga (2005) and Kagwanja (2001, 
2003, 2006).  Moreover, Ruteere and Pommerolle’s (2003) study of community policing in Kenya further draws 
attention to the ubiquity of violence and the decentralisation of repression in the country, illustrating as it does, 
the brutal tactics employed by community policing institutions.  
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McIlwaine 2004; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004; Steenkamp 2005). This chapter 
contributes to this body of literature by exploring the everyday conflicts, ‘small wars’, 
‘peace-time crimes’ and ‘routinized violence’ that colour Kenyan society, and builds upon it 
by situating ethnicity within them.  
 The chapter begins by suggesting that while there is nothing inherently conflictual 
about ethnicity, underlying inter-ethnic tensions and prejudices nevertheless scatter everyday 
relations in Kenya, and the resentments and grievances so brutally articulated during intense 
episodes of violence find more banal, but certainly not benign, avenues of expression in 
everyday life. It goes on to examine the structural violence that overarches Kenyan society, 
arguing that while inequalities and relative deprivations define almost all major social 
cleavages, it is the horizontal inequalities and ethnicised grievances that are the most 
significant source of resentment. The third section of the chapter explores the centrality of 
territorialised identity narratives to this culture of violence, arguing that ethnic tensions are 
maintained and exacerbated by autochthonous discourses of belonging and exclusion. The 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the manifestations of direct violence in everyday 
life, pointing to the parallels between these practices and those which marked the post-
election crisis. Thus, running through the chapter is the suggestion that violent ethnic clashes 
should be understood as part of a continuum of conflict
2
 (Richards 2005: 5) in which the 
‘seeds of war are to be seen shooting up in peace’ (Richards 2005: 14).   
 
                                                 
2
 This notion of a continuum of conflict or violence has been effectively utilised in a number of different fields, 
most notably in studies of violence against women. Gardner (1995: 4), for example, in a study of gender and 
public harassment, states that ‘public harassment is on a continuum of possible events, beginning when 
customary civility among strangers is abrogated and ending with the transition to violent crime: assault, rape or 
murder. Women... can currently experience shouted insults, determined trailing, and pinches and grabs by 
strange men and be fairly certain that no one – not the perpetrator and probably no official – will think anything 
of note has happened.’ I adapt this notion of a continuum of violent behaviour to ethnic conflict throughout this 
thesis, suggesting that negative ethnic jokes, stereotypes, and insults constitute largely unnoticed, but still 
significant, forms of ethnic conflict, which are not wholly detached from, or unrelated to, situations of more 




Negative Ethnicity and Speaking Prejudice 
 In the previous chapter I suggested that ethnic identification and differentiation, while 
pervasive, need not necessarily be conflictual, and indeed is seldom overtly so. By this I 
mean that everyday interactions are predominantly friendly and cooperative, and that direct 
and highly visible friction is infrequent.  However, at the same time, small and often barely 
noticed expressions of negative ethnicity, prejudice and resentment permeate everyday life. 
Recognising how these banal forms of ethnic conflict operate at the micro-level can help to 
elucidate the social logic of violence. Ethnically-based negative stereotyping, jokes, insults, 
verbal abuse, prejudiced statements and derogatory comments are forms of ethnic conflict, 
and their widespread acceptance and circulation facilitates their mobilisation and escalation 
into more direct forms of violence, including interpersonal brawling and fighting, 
neighbourhood clashes, and large-scale violence.  
The role of negative ethnic rhetoric, both in the media – particularly vernacular radio 
– and in political speeches has been well-documented in the Kenyan context (KNCHR 2006, 
2007; CIPEV 2008: 295-303; Ismail and Deane 2008; Rambaud 2009; Somerville 2011), as 
well as in other cases of ethnic violence and genocide.
3
 While this macro-level employment 
of negative ethnicity plays an important role in the increasing polarisation of societies at 
particular moments in time, the significance of prejudice in everyday interactions between 
local level actors is seldom sufficiently appreciated. Ethnic prejudices are not solely the 
construction of manipulative elites and media rhetoric, a tool employed for political agendas; 
they are also produced and reproduced by ordinary people in their day to day lives. Indeed, it 
is the very persistence and circulation of these prejudices at the micro-level that facilitates the 
                                                 
3
 The most extensive literature on the topic has emerged out of studies of the Rwandan genocide. See for 
example, Steeves (1998); Des Forges (1999); Schabas (2000); and Thompson (2007).  
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successful reception of negative ethnic rhetoric from above. The ways in which negative 
ethnicity is articulated are wide-ranging, and while in some instances prejudice is overt, 
direct and openly abusive, in others it is much more subtly and humorously employed. While 
this near ethnic-racism which marks Kenyan society rarely produces open violence and, in 
many ways, is either accepted as a normal part of day to day life or simply laughed off, it 
nevertheless helps to embed ethnicised notions of superiority, inferiority and difference, and 
it continually produces and maintains underlying ethnic tensions.  
The acceptability of ethnic prejudice in contemporary Kenyan society is striking, and 
there is a distinct ‘social silence’ (Harris 2003) concerning the use of negative stereotypes 
and ethnically-derogatory language.
4
 Sentiments depicting the Kikuyu as thieves and 
conmen, the Luo as stupid and arrogant, and the Kalenjin as secretive and backwards, are 
commonly heard during in-group communication,
5
 and these expressions of prejudice are 
seldom policed. A clear example of this social silence can be seen in the way a group of 
youths reacted to the inflammatory comments made about the Kikuyu community by one of 
my Luo interviewees in Mathare.
6
  
We call them Kiuks, we call them monkeys, they are just like monkeys, you can give 
them a banana, and say you have three bananas in your hand, you give them one and 
then he’ll want more (MUS, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 29 April 2010).  
 
                                                 
4
 It should be emphasised that not all stereotypes are negative. The Kikuyu, for example, are also said to be 
‘hardworking’ and the Luo ‘well-educated.’ Nevertheless, the frequent and largely unchallenged use of negative 
stereotypes is notable, and the circumstances in which they are articulated are the main focus of interest in this 
chapter.   
5
 While ‘in-group’ is often employed to describe ethnically homogenous settings, I mean something different 
here. ‘In-group’ in my understanding need not necessarily mean wholly intra-ethnic, but rather refers to settings 
in which all ethnic groups represented are perceived to be friends and allies. Who constitutes the ‘in-group’, 
then, is both temporally and spatially contingent, and is open to negotiation and contestation. See Chapter Seven 
for a further discussion of the negotiability of boundaries of belonging in the context of the post-election 
violence.    
6
 This interview was conducted in the presence of other members of MUS’s predominantly Luo social group. 
While the majority of interviews were conducted in private, a small number were carried out in a more public 
setting such as this. These were, in fact, often extremely informative, and the research might have benefited 
from more group interviews of this kind. 
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This comment provoked some mild laughter and general nods of agreement from his 
predominantly Luo friends, but there was little evidence of shock and no attempt at dispute or 
challenge. Similarly, a Kikuyu interviewee showed no discomfort openly stating his feelings 
to me and to Nusrah that ‘those Luos, their origins are from Sudan and Sudanese people are 
illiterate and stupid, so they have that origin of stupidity. So because they are from that, 
they’re stupid’ (DH, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 22 April 2010). This stereotype of Luo 
stupidity is often employed through offhand epithets such as jaluo jinga [stupid Luo], and 
similar terms are regularly heard in everyday conversations about different ethnic 
communities.  This ethnic prejudice is a product of socialisation,
7
 and the act of vocalising it, 
of ‘speaking prejudice’, not only normalises the practice, but further entrenches the 
sentiments within mentalities and consciousness. Indeed, the ease with which prejudice can 
become internalised, normalised and consequently reproduced, is evident from my own 
experience. Returning home from Kawangware one rainy day in March, I had a somewhat 
heated exchange with a matatu conductor over the price of the journey. When I related the 
story to some friends in Kibera, I angrily explained that the makanga
8
 had tried to convince 
me that the fare for the short ride back to Jamhuri – usually somewhere between ten or 
twenty shillings
9
 – was, in fact, two hundred bob! I concluded the story by indignantly 
exclaiming that he was a ‘typical bloody Kikuyu, trying to con me out of money!’ While I 
myself was shocked by my use of such ethnically-biased language, my audience – none of 
whom, it should be noted, were Kikuyu – simply nodded knowingly. The act of speaking 
prejudice has become common and routine in Kenya, and ‘if you go to the villages you find 
                                                 
7
 Consequently they can vary significantly across time and space. Stereotypes and prejudices are not only related 
to macro-level contexts, but are also reflective of localised power relations. For example, in Kibera, a number of 
my interviewees suggested that the Luo community are arrogant and display superior attitudes towards other 
communities in the area, whilst the Kikuyu are ‘humble.’ This issue of locally contextual resentments is 
discussed in the next section.  
8
 The conductor. 
9
 Matatu fares often fluctuate depending upon time of day and weather conditions.  
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them grouping themselves, like a Kikuyu grouping, a Luo grouping, talking in their language, 
talking about the other tribes’ (GLIV, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 21 March 2010). 
Consequently, ethnic prejudices are often reproduced with little conscious reflection.
10
 An 
article appearing in The Sunday Standard, offers a rare recognition of the entrenchment of 
ethnic prejudice in everyday Kenyan discourse:   
We have also left unchallenged our ethnic stereotypes to the point of allowing hate 
speech to thrive in our conversations. We have accused our political leaders (and 
rightly so) of making hate speeches in public gatherings, but we are all engaging daily 
in the same sin. We easily make very mean comments that can perfectly fit into hate 
speech (Mwazemba 2008). 
  
Directly insulting statements and the overt use of negative stereotypes and derogatory 
labels, however, do tend to be limited largely to in-group communication; they are much less 
frequently heard in mixed settings where members of the abused group are present. It is 
difficult to imagine, for example, that I would have made the same comment about the 
makanga had a Kikuyu friend been present. Wa-Mungai’s (2007) analysis of the use of ethnic 
stereotypes in Kenya further demonstrates this key point. He draws attention to the use of 
Luo stereotypes in two different conversational settings, the first a group of four Kisii 
discussing a music competition in a bar, the second a political discussion between three Luos 
and a Kamba man. In the former, overtly derogative labels are used and negative comments 
are made; one member of the group exclaims, ‘Given that the teachers in Tusker Project 
Fame Academy were Jang’os
11
 what did you expect?!’ (Wa-Mungai 2007: 341).
12
 In the 
                                                 
10
 It is interesting to note that it is not uncommon for people to ridicule stereotypes of their own community, 
particularly in interactions between friends. For example, one interviewee began his interview by asserting ‘I’m 
a Kikuyu so I am one of those who they said stole the votes’ prompting shared laughter between himself and his 
Kalenjin friend who was sitting next to him (MK, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 3 June 2010). Such humorous 
enactments of prejudice may well be intended to undermine or ridicule the stereotype and Leveen (1996: 36) 
suggests that they are successful in doing so. However, I argue that these moments of ethnicised self- and 
collective-deprecation simultaneously reproduce and maintain the negative discourse and the more serious 
issues which underscore it.  
11
 Jang’o is an insulting and contemptuous street reference to the Luo (Wa-Mungai 2007: 341). 
12
 The discussion prior to this comment alluded to the perceived bias of the judging in this singing competition, 
and Wa-Mungai (2007: 341) concludes that the group present a distorted version of reality, enabling them to 
employ a ‘predetermined moral economy that pits “scheming” Luo against “unprincipled” Gikuyu.’  
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latter setting, on the other hand, Wa-Mungai argues that ‘the Kamba knows that he is 
outnumbered’ and, consequently, must articulate his disagreement with his Luo friends more 
objectively. Nevertheless, he succeeds in insulting them in a ‘veiled manner’ by alluding to 
their supposed infatuation with Western lifestyles (2007: 343-344).
13
 Thus, overt prejudices 
and negative stereotypes are frequently heard in everyday in-group communication, but they 
are much more subtly or jokingly articulated when members of the out-group are present. A 
particularly revealing comment recently appeared in a short opinion piece in the Kenyan 
paper The Star. The author states that the resentment of Kikuyu hegemony is ‘a subject that is 
talked about in murmurs in public and loudly in our bedrooms and sitting room’ (Mabinda 
2012), alluding to the unacceptability of voicing such remarks too openly where they might 
be heard by members of the Kikuyu community. Indeed, in ethnically mixed settings, if 
someone is perceived to have overstepped the boundaries of acceptability through overly 
subjective, biased and prejudiced statements, s/he is usually challenged. For example, during 
one interview a Kamba interviewee pointed at Nusrah and exclaimed, ‘But you, you have 
tribalism. Yes you do. I’m married to a Nubian and the Nubian women come and make me 
feel bad. They say, “Why can’t you marry someone of your own tribe, why do you have to 
take a Nubian man?” You have tribalism.’ Nusrah smiled and without taking his eyes from 
the woman, gently joked to me, ‘You see now she is abusing my tribe!’ pointedly indicating 
to the speaker that she should redirect her line of conversation. Notably, there was a moment 
of awkward silence and the interviewee did not respond until Nusrah prompted, ‘So talk 
about something else’ (B, Makina, Kibera, 22
 
November 2009). Similarly, during a group 
discussion between two Luo and two Luhya youths, the following exchange took place: 
                                                 
13
 The subtle way in which the Kamba man insults the Luo community – some of whose members are present – 
stands in stark contrast to the very explicit way in which he demeans the absent Kikuyu community: ‘What do 
they [Kikuyu] know other than buying land and cultivating coffee? They don’t even know Kiswahili but the Luo 
know English!’ This juxtaposition of the subtle and the overt draws attention to the ways in which the 
expression of prejudice is tempered in mixed settings.  
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M (Luhya): You know Raila is a bad influence for the Kenyan people. He is the one 
doing the tribal wars. I mean he came in here and said that people should decrease the 
rent. Raila is not a role model to people. Let it be like that.  
T (Luo): Raila is a good person. He is fighting for the poor people. 
M: Ok, but what has he done for the poor people? 
[The conversation descends into lots of shouting in Swahili; it seems the Luhyas are 
on one side while the Luos are on the other about whether Raila has been a good 
leader or not] 
M: We are not about tribalism and Kibaki, he only helps the Kikuyu people. But 
Raila, what people do with the name of Raila… they use his name badly. 
    (GWH, Group Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 20 November 2009) 
 
M’s open criticism of Raila is challenged by one of the Luo, and after some discussion and 
argument, he modifies his position slightly, shifting the responsibility for ethnic violence 
from Raila as the instigator, to ordinary people committing violence in his name. Another 
example can be seen in an interaction between a Luhya youth and a Kikuyu youth: 
S: Was there any hatred between communities before? 
JF (Luhya): There was no hatred. Everything was ok there was a good relationship 
between Kikuyu and Luo. 
W (Kikuyu): There was a hatred. 
JF: Before? 
W: Between landlords and tenants. 
JF: Oh yeah. 
W: They wanted to stay here for free… and the Luhyas. 
JF: [Laughing] He’s saying that because I’m a Luhya. 
W: That grudge started with Moi saying that this is government land and when he left 
the Luhyas and the Luos were celebrating because they were not supposed to pay. So 
that grudge was there for a long time. Raila to be President... we have plots, we have 
land, everything of ours. Us we knew what will happen, we didn’t know what these 
people were planning. 
JF: There was smoke everywhere. 
S: Do you agree with what he has said? 
JF: I agree with some of it. But it was mostly between Kikuyu and Luo.  
  (JF, Interview, Bombolulu, Kibera, 16 November 2009) 
 
Despite JF’s gentle and light-hearted signalling, W does not recognise or heed the reminder 
of social boundaries, and continues to talk negatively of the Luhya group. Consequently, JF 
tries to steer the conversation elsewhere through an abrupt change of subject. However, asked 
directly whether he agrees with W, he asserts that the problem was less with his own 
community than it was with the Luo. It is interesting to note in this interaction that there is a 
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potential for the conversation to become more confrontational, and deflection is the desired 
strategy of negotiation. Nevertheless, on occasion, attitudes or behaviours which are 
perceived to be ethnically biased and which are overtly articulated in inter-ethnic settings can 
cause significant tensions and can easily escalate. For example, in November 2009 The 
Standard reported the following incident: 
Our readers have also frequently pointed out that tribal alliances in student leadership 
and welfare associations are a danger to national harmony. That is why reports last 
week that Nakuru Teachers Training College was closed after a face-off between 
students from two ethnic groups were alarming. The students were watching 7pm 
news when one group cheered the eviction of settlers from Mau Forest, annoying the 
‘rival’ tribe (The Standard, 24 November 2009). 
 
Thus, it can be said that in ethnicised spaces negative ethnicity, in its overt form, is 
discursively enacted more frequently, and the production and circulation of prejudice is more 
acute than in mixed neighbourhoods. When it is articulated in the latter context it is usually in 
the more subtle form of humour, and when an individual is perceived to have overstepped the 
boundary of acceptability, s/he is either gently reminded of social decorum, or challenged 
more directly; either way, the tension is usually, though not always, deflected and diffused.  
However, the use of humour in ethnically mixed settings acts as a thin veil, (barely) 
covering underlying resentments and prejudices. Richard Jenkins (1994: 211) draws attention 
to anthropological studies that argue that where ‘social restraints inhibit the overt expression 
of inter-ethnic hostility’ ethnic joking becomes a vehicle of articulation. In Kenya, then, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that ethnicised jokes are common in inter-ethnic conversational settings. 
While it is acceptable, for example, to articulate resentments of ethnicised power and 
dominance during in-group settings, in mixed company similar grievances and resentments 
are more often articulated in the form of humour. 
123 
 
There is a joke around here that when a cop, like here, when you get arrested, the cop 
will say “unatoka wapi?”
14
 [using an accent], he will use that Kalenjin accent, 
because the police here are associated with the Kalenjin (WIL, Interview, Shabab, 
Nakuru, 2 June 2010). 
 
The potent issue of inequality and ethnic favouritism underscores this joke, just as it does the 
more direct statements of resentment – such as ‘those Kikuyu own everything’ and ‘who do 
those Kikuyu think they are?’ (PAD, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 15 December 2009) – 
frequently heard in in-group settings. However, the more subtle verbalisation of frustration 
over perceived injustice and discrimination is a far more acceptable vehicle of expression in 
inter-ethnic settings. Thus, jokes can be used to articulate underlying grievances, as well as 
feelings of tension and fear. A further example of this can be seen in the following account of 
an interaction between Kikuyu matatu drivers, and their predominantly Luhya passengers in 
the immediate aftermath of the post-election violence: 
At the bus stage in Kakamega, even the conductor and the driver were chatting and 
joking with the passengers saying, “You’re beating us, but we run the buses so if you 
beat us // you’ll endanger yourselves because you won’t travel. You’ll have to buy a 
bus, so watch over the donkeys and sell them after some years so that you can buy a 
bus.” So they were joking and the passengers were joking back (CB, Interview, 
Gatina, Kawangware, 3 April 2010).  
 
While CB describes this as a relatively light-hearted exchange, it is in fact replete with 
articulations of inter-ethnic frictions and sentiments of superiority and inferiority. The 
Kikuyu matatu drivers are expressing their fear that they could be attacked by their 
passengers, and in the guise of a joke, demonstrate an awareness of their vulnerability. 
However, they are also aware of their power in the situation, drawing attention to the fact that 
they control the transport sector. Interestingly, the Kikuyu drivers throw an insult into the 
exchange in the form of humour, playing upon the stereotype that the Luhya are a poorer, less 
developed, ‘backward’ community; they will have to continue rearing their donkeys until 
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they can sell them for enough money to buy a bus – notably a bus that the Kikuyu already 
have. So, while the exchange is not overtly conflictual, notions of unequal relationships and 
difference are maintained and reproduced, and ethnic tensions expressed, through it. 
What might begin as a joke, however, can easily escalate and transform into 
something much more sinister. As one interviewee states, ‘sometimes you must be on your 
toes, jokes are jokes but you don’t know what will happen next. Sometimes they’re serious’ 
(K, Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 5 December 2009). This potential for escalation is particularly 
apparent in times of political tension, and one interviewee recalls that during the campaigns 
jokes often evolved and assumed a far more confrontational undertone: ‘We argued a lot, and 
he said things like “You’re thieves,” it was as jokes, but sometimes it heated up’ (MK, 
Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 3 June 2010). There is a fine line between a joke and an insult, 
and given the right conditions, such interactions can degenerate into argument and violence:
15
 
There is no such thing as just a joke and ethnic jokes are no exception... humour, 
insult and violence shade into each other and are intimately connected... Issues of 
power and control are at the heart of the matter (Jenkins 1994: 211). 
 
The act of ‘speaking prejudice’, whether it be in the form of jokes or in a more overt manner, 
constructs and maintains negative stereotypes, produces and reproduces sentiments of 
grievance and discrimination, and facilitates their transition to more threatening acts at 
particular moments in time. Moreover, at times of political tension the boundaries of 
acceptability gradually shift; overt insults and direct mocking of cultural attributes become 
increasingly apparent in everyday inter-ethnic interactions, and jokes assume more sinister 
undertones. This is illustrated by the dynamics of the circulation of hate speech during the 
                                                 
15
 Indeed, as Leveen (1996: 35) states, ‘the same ethnic joke told different ways – by different tellers, in 
different circumstances and to different listeners – may become increasingly or decreasingly volatile.’ For 
example, on a number of occasions people introduced me to their Kikuyu friends as ‘one of the ones who stole 
our votes.’ This joke told by a friend, in a period of relative calm is usually taken in good spirit and provokes 
mild laughter, not overt tension. However, a similar joke made by Nusrah to a Kikuyu interviewee in Kibera 
immediately provoked discomfort, tension and mistrust.   
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Thus, in periods of relative calm, negative ethnicity is evident in the open 
articulations of prejudice in in-group settings. In mixed settings, while the expression of 
prejudice and resentment is more subtle, it does not pass by wholly unnoticed. Just as Harris 
(2003) suggests, these experiences and practices of negative ethnicity are ‘the “smaller”, 
everyday actions of prejudice that fly beneath the radar’, yet their presence helps to maintain 
oppositional identities. It is part of a continuum of ethnically conflictual behaviours which 
facilitate the gradual transition into more direct forms of inter-ethnic violence. As the 
political situation became increasingly tense in the lead-up to the 2007 elections, ethnic jokes 
became more abusive and insulting, derogatory labels and inflammatory comments were used 
more often in direct inter-ethnic interactions, and ethnic disagreements regularly descended 
into interpersonal fights or brawls.  
  
Structural Violence and Horizontal Inequalities  
 Many, if not most, of the ethnically-based jokes, prejudices and resentments which 
pervade everyday discourse in Kenyan society relate in some way to perceptions of 
dominance and subordination, superiority and inferiority, favouritism and discrimination – in 
essence they relate to perceptions of inequality. Kenya is a society marked by deep 
inequalities, both vertical and horizontal, and the majority of its citizens are, to some degree, 
                                                 
16
However, even in these more tense circumstances, many interviewees did not believe that the jokes and threats 
articulated during the 2007 campaigns were serious, further illustrating their prevalence in everyday life. For 
example, one interviewee recalls: 
D: Before the elections during the campaigns, people were threatening people, saying this tribe, this 
time we will not rule the country // Threats were there. We were taking them as jokes, not seriously // 
S: Why didn’t you take the threats seriously? 
D: They were from the neighbours so we took them as jokes. We thought they will shout for two days 
or three days and that would be it.  
    (D, Interview, Soweto, Kibera, 21 November 2009) 
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subject to what Galtung (1969) has referred to as ‘structural violence’, where unequal life 
chances are built into societal structures, where there are deep inequalities in the distribution 
of power, and where human needs – including those relating to survival, well-being, identity, 
and freedom (Galtung 1990) – are lower than potentially possible. Galtung’s extension of the 
concept of violence to include any and all harm which occurs indirectly, has become widely 
accepted in academic and policy circles, and scholars from a variety of disciplines and in a 
variety of contexts have explored the roots, characteristics, and effects of structural violence. 
Some go as far as to suggest that the conditions and effects of structural violence are the 
‘primary causes of large-scale violence’ (Nathan 2000: 189, original emphasis). While there 
are notable differences in understandings of the origins and development of these violent 
structures across cases, and their relationship to acute violence is debated, their 
manifestations are consistent. Poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunity, lack of access to 
education, healthcare and other social services, poor and dangerous living conditions, high 
infant mortality rates, corruption and deprivation are the hallmarks of structural violence. 
This section presents the manifestations of this form of violence in Kenyan society; while 
many of Kenya’s social and political divides are accentuated by deep inequalities, and while 
there is often an acute awareness of these, the ethno-regional dimensions are most frequently 
emphasised by my interviewees and provoke particularly intense reactions. While these 
violent structures do not cause conflict in and of themselves, they nevertheless maintain 
powerful feelings of frustration which are easily directed against specific communities, they 
contribute to the normalisation of direct violence, and they act as a significant incentive to 
participate in episodes of more widespread and intense violence. I begin by illustrating the 
structural violence and vertical inequalities which many of my interviewees experience in 
their daily lives, before exploring perceptions of ethnic inequalities. The section concludes by 
highlighting how the macro-narrative of ethnic dominance and subordination is not only 
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temporally contingent, but also can be inflected with experiences produced in local 
circumstances and contexts. 
 The majority of the research for this project was carried out with slum residents, those 
living in the informal settlements or peri-urban centres surrounding the larger towns of 
Nairobi, Nakuru and Eldoret. Residents of these areas are among the most excluded in 
Kenyan society and they are subjected to various layers of structural violence, facing severe 
livelihood insecurity, poverty and lack of opportunity.
17
 According to a recent World Bank 
report, 63 percent of slum residents in Kenya fall below the poverty line, unemployment 
levels are high at 26 percent, only a minority have secondary level education (24 percent), 
and only 3 percent of households live in housing with a permanent wall and access to piped 
water and electricity (World Bank 2008: xix). Consequently, many residents of these areas 
struggle to meet the costs of everyday life; they are vulnerable to disease due to poor living 
conditions, malnutrition, and lack of access to healthcare; high unemployment levels and 
school drop-out rates disable them from achieving their potential; they experience difficulties 
gathering funds for life-cycle rituals and cultural celebrations,
18
 consequently constraining 
their identity needs; and they face entrenched corruption within institutions, limiting their 
freedoms and potential opportunities.
19
 In these areas then, ‘violence enacted is but a small 
part of violence lived’ (Nordstrom and Martin 1992: 8), and there is a pervasive sentiment 
that, ‘We are surviving. We are not living, we are surviving’ (WJ, Group Interview with 
ROCP youth group, Makina, Kibera, 17 November 2009). Such structural violence creates a 
                                                 
17
 It should, however, be noted that there is a great deal of diversity within these urban communities. While 
there is a large and highly visible contingent of unemployed youth, for example, there are also many residents 
who are much more economically stable. Similarly, while school drop-out rates are high, many disaffected 
youth have completed their secondary education and are actively seeking the funds for university programmes.   
18
 Many youths highlighted the difficulties they faced in gathering sufficient funds for a dowry, for example, 
explaining that they could not afford to marry. The high costs of funerals are equally problematic. Residents 
frequently rely on community fundraising, or occasionally on powerful patrons, to meet such costs.   
19
 The pervasive requirement of kitu kidogo –  meaning ‘something small’ and often employed as a euphemism 
for a ‘bribe’ – often prevents individuals from obtaining important documents such as birth certificates, school 
certificates, or passports, for example. Indeed, a significant number of interviewees explained that during the 
post-election violence they took great risks to prevent such documents from being destroyed or stolen. 
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culture of insecurity, raises the potential for criminal activity
20
 and maintains underlying 
feelings of ‘frustration, anger, ignorance, despair and cynicism’ (Uvin 1998: 107). While 
these conditions are a form of violence in and of themselves and are, to a degree, intricately 
related to the ubiquity of more direct forms of violence in everyday life, the most noteworthy 
element of structural violence, and what Winton (2004: 167) suggests ‘relates most 
significantly to the emergence of everyday reactionary violence’, is inequality.  
 Relative deprivation and unequal life chances pervade Kenyan society and the ‘top 
dogs’ are able to gain more out of their interactions with social and institutional structures 
than others (Galtung 1990: 293). The gap between rich and poor is wide, and ever-
widening,
21
 with the bottom 10 percent of households currently estimated to control less than 
1 percent of the country’s income, whilst the top 10 ten percent of households control over 40 
percent (Society for International Development 2004: 3). My interviewees are acutely aware 
of this divide, and often mention the corrupt practices of the political elite which serve to 
consolidate their positions of power, wealth and privilege. Many draw attention, for example, 
to the problem of land grabbing amongst the elite,
22
 to the fact that politicians are ‘eating’ the 
money from projects intended for people at the grassroots,
23
 and there is a pervasive 
sentiment that ‘the poor man is the rich man’s keeper’ (D, Group Interview with ROCP youth 
group, Makina, Kibera, 17 November 2009). In addition to this recognised corruption within 
the ruling classes, the lavish lifestyles of the rich in Kenya are highly visible and in some 
cases the proximity of affluent neighbourhoods to urban settlements is a daily reminder of the 
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 This issue is taken up later in the chapter, but it should be emphasised here that I am not drawing a direct 
causal relationship between structural violence and criminal activity, and especially not to violent crime. Such a 
characterisation neglects the agency of local level actors and fails to appreciate the nuances of the ways in which 
people negotiate uncertainty.  
21
 It is generally accepted that inequalities between rich and poor have increased significantly during the post-
colonial period.  
22
 For an account of the proliferation of land grabbing in Kenya see Klopp (2000). 
23
 The Kazi kwa Vijana [Work for Youth] project, for example, was consistently mentioned throughout the ten 
months of my fieldwork, and in virtually all field sites. Interviewees indicated that local elites had siphoned off 
funds intended for youth employment projects to enrich themselves, or at best had distributed them only to a 
limited number of youths from within their own community.   
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deep inequalities inherent within society. Walking through the Congo neighbourhood of 
Kawangware each day, for example, Isaac, my local assistant, repeatedly drew my attention 
to the luxurious apartment complexes of Lavington that are separated from the slum by a 
single concrete wall, the top of which is lined with barbed wire. Almost every day he would 
tell me that it was ‘deeply painful’ for him to look at such houses from his position, standing, 
as we were, on a muddy dirt track, lined with iron-sheet houses, sewage and litter. Residents 
of urban slums are acutely aware of the deep-rooted economic disparities in Kenya, and of 
their disadvantaged position in society. However, despite this clear awareness of the inherent 
class divisions, frustrations relating to inequality and discrimination are just as frequently 
expressed in regionalised, territorialised, and ethnicised terms. Indeed, anger at, and 
resentments over, ‘horizontal inequalities’ (Stewart 2000), both perceived and real, 




 Despite their residency in urban areas, the vast majority of my interviewees 
emphasised the broader regional inequalities in society. They drew attention to the uneven 
development between provinces which, given the geographical distribution of ethnic 
communities, maps relatively neatly onto ethnicity. Both the product of unintended 
modernisation processes and colonial settlement and investment patterns, as well as the result 
of deliberately discriminatory policy choices in the post-colonial era,
25
 these regional 
imbalances have undoubtedly engendered significant differences in the living standards of 
                                                 
24
 In terms of gender, while the disparity in opportunities is shrinking, women remain less likely than men to be 
employed, more likely to drop out of school and consequently more likely to live in poverty (World Bank 2008: 
70).   
25
 While I have suggested elsewhere that the origins and evolution of inequalities are of less importance to the 
student of contemporary ethnic violence than the way in which they define and speak to the present context, it 
should be noted that the favouring of particular regions and communities in the post-colonial era,  particularly 
during the Moi years, but also under Kenyatta and Kibaki,  has contributed significantly to the understanding of 
politics as a zero-sum game, and has exacerbated ethnic tensions and resentments. I thank Nic Cheeseman for 
drawing my attention to this point.  
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different communities. A government analysis of the geographic dimensions of well-being 
indicates that the highest percentage of individuals living below the poverty line are located 
in Nyanza (65 percent), while the lowest are resident in Central (31 percent), and that the Rift 
Valley Province is the highest contributor to national poverty at 22 percent (Republic of 
Kenya 2005). These statistics are further borne out by the fact that infant mortality rates are 
almost three times higher in Nyanza than they are in Central Province (Maoulidi 2011: 14), 
and that the life expectancy of someone living in Meru is almost double that of someone 
living in Mombasa (Society for International Development 2004: 25). The doctor to patient 
ratio in North-Eastern Province is 1: 120,000, in comparison to 1: 20,700 in the country as a 
whole (Society for International Development 2004: v), and people living in this forgotten 
region often refer to trips to Nairobi as ‘going to Kenya.’
26
 Indeed, a newspaper article which 
appeared in 2004 following the release of a report detailing these inequalities asserts, ‘it turns 
out that resources and services are better in Central Province, which leads in nearly every 
type of well-being’ (Daily Nation, 27 October 2004). So, it is unsurprising then that many of 
my interviewees exclaimed that the best schools, universities and hospitals are located in 
Central Province, that the region has better roads and infrastructure, and more widespread 
provision of services such as electricity and water, and that the Kikuyu community as a whole 
have far better opportunities in life than other groups in Kenya. Nevertheless, this framing of 
grievance in terms of material, regional inequalities is interesting coming from urban 
residents, particularly those who have been born and raised in Nairobi, and who, arguably, 
have felt its material effects to a far lesser extent. When this notion was put to some of them 
during the interview, many alluded to an additional socio-psychological underpinning of this 
resentment – to feelings of group worth and pride attached to perceptions of ‘advanced’ and 
                                                 
26
 Again, I thank Nic Cheeseman for drawing my attention to these statistics and to the discourse within North-
Eastern province which serve to illustrate the extent of regional inequalities in Kenya.  
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backward’ communities – which exists in tandem with the more tangible dimensions of 
unequal life chances. For example,  
N: Me, I’m a Waria, I’m a Somali. If there is a President who will run from my tribe, 
I can’t vote for anyone else, it is obvious that I will vote for him // if someone from 
my own tribe stands, then I’ll vote for him so that they put in development. 
S: Ok. But you live in Nairobi. So say for example, a Kikuyu living in Rift Valley, 
what does he care that Central is developed? He won’t see the benefit because he 
doesn’t live there. 
N: But that is not their motherland… They are proud to build in their home.  
     (N, Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 4 March 2010) 
 
Thus, material inequalities are also tied up with feelings of pride, superiority and inferiority. 
It is widely perceived then that the Kikuyu not only have a better standard of living, 
but that they have far greater opportunities for advancement and for procuring wealth and 
economic stability than other communities. Indeed, Rothchild’s analysis of Kenya in the early 
years of independence is remarkably transferable to the contemporary context: 
Imbalances of opportunity between tribal groupings remain a stubborn fact of life in 
Kenya today. Although they may be attributable to a variety of inherited 
circumstances, these inequalities inevitably cause tensions to rise to the surface. The 
success of Central Province (chiefly Kikuyu in composition) in securing support for 
social welfare activities and, in consequence, in building up a pool of trained man-
power and an array of commercial enterprises has not been lost upon the less 
advantaged peoples of the country (Rothchild 1969: 691-692). 
 
The majority of my non-Kikuyu interviewees expressed their belief that the Kikuyu have 
been, and continue to be, favoured in all aspects of life, from land acquisition to employment 
opportunities: 
But it is not just land. It is employment. You can’t find Nubians in government. There 
are just Kikuyus everywhere. Nairobi City Council – they live there. There are no 
Nubians or other tribes like them. Another issue, during this election post you find the 
director is a Kikuyu. All government organisations, Kenya Power, Kenya Central 
Bank: Kikuyu. Everywhere. This is what people are unhappy with. Any job. They’re 
even in the mortuary. They’re there. They are just working there. // The Kikuyu are 
big robbers, the bank, the highway, the wealthy people are them. They are in each and 
every category (TF, Interview, Ayany, Kibera, 18 November 2009). 
 
The economic prosperity and life opportunities of ordinary Kikuyu are often overstated, 
however, and there is a persistent tendency to conflate class and ethnicity. One interviewee, a 
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well-educated, well-travelled employee of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, in a highly 
illustrative example of this exaggeration of Kikuyu wealth, states: 
JK: You know Kenyans have a class walala hoi, walala hai.
27
 
S: Well this is something I don’t understand. Why do people see the Kikuyu as part of 
the higher classes only? Surely they can see that there are some poor Kikuyu living in 
Kibera with them? 
JK: In Kibera there are not. There are no poor Kikuyus. Sindiyo,
28
 F? 
F: You are right. 
    (JK, Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 2 December 2009) 
This distinct refusal to accept that there are any Kikuyu who are living in poverty is both 
extreme and absolutist, but not uncommon. Nevertheless, a softer version of the sentiment is 
perhaps more pervasive; people articulate the notion that ‘The Kikuyu, some of them are not 
rich, you can’t help everyone, but most benefited because of the Kenyatta era’ (O, Interview, 
56, Kawangware, 6 March 2010). Thus, these attitudes are a reflection of the macro-level 
narrative which asserts that ‘it is not equal in eating the cake of Kenya, the Kikuyu have 
taken a big part’ (PAD, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 15 December 2009). It is undoubtedly the 
case that historical processes and policies have given the Kikuyu an advantage in the 
economic sphere, and the widely acknowledged fact that business activity is dominated by 
members of this community is not wholly unjustified. However, despite the resilience of 
Kikuyu socio-economic dominance and the resentments it can cause, I would suggest that this 
is often a persisting rather than an active grievance, one that can be distorted or displaced by 
temporal and spatial dynamics.  
Contemporary perceptions of inequality and discrimination, that is active grievances, 
are heavily influenced by which community holds the presidential seat and so are, to some 
degree, temporally contingent. If the president is perceived to be favouring his own 
community in cabinet positions, ministries, civil service jobs, development projects and other 
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 Meaning the ‘have-nots’ and the ‘haves’, the very poor, and the very rich, respectively. 
28
 Meaning ‘Is that not right?’ 
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dimensions of redistribution, whilst neglecting others, then grievances are directed towards 
that community. Under a Kikuyu government, therefore, in a country in which ethnic 
favouritism is not only prevalent, but also expected, and is certainly visible at the higher 
echelons of government, the anti-Kikuyu discourse is prominent. However, many 
interviewees suggest that ‘in Moi’s time the Kalenjin started to dominate’ (SM, Interview, 
Makina, Kibera 2 January 2010) and were similarly resented as they were perceived to have 
far better opportunities and assistance than others: ‘Like in Moi’s time the Kalenjin had many 
jobs in the country and big lands and many opportunities’ (YD, Interview, Pondamali, 
Nakuru, 24 June 2010). Furthermore, a number of interviewees suggested that should Raila 
be elected President, it will not be long until other communities come to resent the Luo. Thus, 
as a resident of Kibera surmises: 
The Luos // they had the idea that “it’s our turn to eat”, that they would’ve gone on 
and had a Luo cabinet. Then we would all be against the Luo. Why do people resent 
the Kikuyu? That is one reason. At one time people resented the Kalenjin. In 2002 
they sacked all the Kalenjin ministers, including the head of the civil service. So the 
cycle would repeat and people would’ve resented the Luo (AB, Interview, Karanja, 
Kibera, 13 December 2009).  
 
Moreover, narratives of ethnic favouritism, dominance and superiority are affected by the 
identity of local MPs, councillors and chiefs and consequently there is a spatial dimension to 
the perception of ethnic inequality. In Kibera, for example, there is a prominent 
understanding that the Luo community have benefitted the most from local development 
projects, and many non-Luo residents express resentment at the ‘superior’ and ‘arrogant’ 
attitude displayed by members of that community in the area. For example, a Luhya resident 
of Kianda states: 
Even to date the Luos… these are people… it is their behaviour, someone’s behaviour 
can make someone hate you and the Luos, the way they behave... So no one can say 
these are good to me. Most people in Kibera don’t want that tribe because they are so 
many. There’s nothing we can do though, we must just go on with life (DC, 




 A Nubian police officer who lives in Makina articulates a similar sentiment when he states 
‘up there [in Gatuikera] they believe they are more superior because their man is the Prime 
Minister. So they think they can do anything. // They believe they are more superior than 
other people. The Kikuyu, they are humble’ (PC, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 13 November 
2009). And another resident claims, ‘If you are not a Luo then you can’t get a job’ (BG, 
Interview, Makina, Kibera, 21 December 2009), countering the macro-narrative of Kikuyu 
dominance in employment opportunities. Similarly, many residents of Kawangware explain 
that in neighbouring Kangemi the MP, Fred Gumo, assists his Luhya community at the 
expense of others with regards to investments, loans and bursaries. Unequal distributions of 
resources certainly operate in the arena of local politics, and perceptions of domination and 
subordination exist at the level of intra-urban relations. Thus, prejudices and resentments of 
other communities are, to an extent, locally contextualised and they can serve as a counter-
narrative to the wider anti-Kikuyu sentiment within Kenyan society. This illustrates the 
multi-vocality of ethnicity which is produced through lived experience. 
 
Cultural Violence and the Discourse of Autochthony
29
 
 Macro-level tensions related to socio-economic and political superiority are further 
accentuated, magnified, and sometimes complexified by the territorialised identity narratives 
which pervade Kenyan society, and the inherent ‘cultural violence’ that is attached to them. 
Galtung (1990: 291) identifies ‘cultural violence’ as something that ‘makes direct and 
structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong.’ Drawing upon discourses of 
autochthony, local level actors in ethnicised spaces construct and reproduce 
conceptualisations of ethnic citizenship, imposing a ‘subordinate social status’ (Shipton 1992: 
362) and reduced civic rights upon ‘immigrants’ and minorities within ‘their’ areas, in a clear 
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 This section draws heavily upon arguments set out in Jenkins (2012).  
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example of cultural violence. That is to say, that ‘immigrants’ are understood to be ‘guests’ 
and visitors who have been invited, and are allowed to stay, in an area on the condition that 
they abide by the host’s rules of hospitality. Consequently, the perception that ‘guests’ are 
abusing the hospitality of their hosts in some way can engender deep resentments and 
feelings of animosity, and in certain circumstances can provoke violent punishment. A 
Nubian resident of Kibera states: 
You’ve been welcomed by the Nubians here, keep in mind people, it will cost you to 
go to someone else’s land. I cannot just go to Kakamega. I’ll not claim that it is mine, 
it belongs to someone (JK, Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 2 December 2009).  
 
The ‘rules’ of hospitality are remarkably consistent across space, and relate almost 
exclusively to issues of power and control over resources, and the feelings of superiority such 
dominance produces. It is a widely-held perception that the ‘owners’ of a particular space 
should not only control it politically, but should also be the ones to benefit from the resources 
associated with it. Autochthons expect, and in many ways demand, that they be favoured in 
the distribution of land, business, employment opportunities, development projects, school 
bursaries, loans and other such forms of aid and assistance. Autochthony, then, justifies 
discrimination. This discrimination of ‘guests’ undoubtedly produces frustrations and 
resentments amongst minority communities. For example, in a Luo dominated 
neighbourhood in Kawangware, members of the Kikuyu community claim that they are 
regularly denied access to water from a local tap, and one of my interviewees laments, ‘Not 
many Kikuyu can get water here, they’re abused and discriminated’ (MG, Interview, Kobiro, 
Kawangware, 1 March 2010). However, it is in the challenge immigrant communities pose to 
native dominance that the most acute grievances and fears seem to reside.  
Territorialised identity narratives have constructed deep-rooted beliefs that the 
economic resources associated with particular spaces ‘belong’ to the native or majority 
community, and consequently, when it is perceived that ethnic minorities are seeking to 
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appropriate and exploit these resources, to dominate in an area which does not belong to 
them, resentments can become explosive. One interviewee vehemently exclaims: 
That’s what happens with the Kikuyu. Many of them live outside Central, they’re 
there for business and they go to the rural areas and they take the wealth from there 
and then they start oppressing people there, stealing their resources. // They exhaust 
the area // so we need things to devolve and companies and infrastructure to be set up 
in different parts of the country so people can benefit (BPNU, Interview, Gatina, 
Kawangware, 24 March 2010).  
 
The issue of land and the historical injustices associated with its redistribution and allocation 
following the colonial period is perhaps the most obvious example of a tangible resource 
perceived to rightfully belong to a particular community, but which has been ‘stolen’ by other 
groups. This is most acutely felt in the Rift Valley context given the settlement schemes 
which litter the province, but it is also apparent elsewhere, particularly in Kibera.
30
 One 
Nubian resident, for example, states, ‘We welcomed the Luos but now there is a problem 
with title deeds. They don’t want the Nubians to get the title deeds and we are the ones who 
invited them here!’ (BD, Interview, Ayany, Kibera, 17 November 2009). It is regarded as 
unjust that other communities should own land and possess title deeds when members of the 
host community do not. However, as alluded to in the quote above, notions of ‘ownership’ 
extend far beyond such highly visible resources. Geographically-contingent economic 
activities, for example, such as fishing in Nyanza and Coastal Province, and the growth of 
sugar cane in Kakamega, and of miraa in Meru, are frequently understood as ‘belonging’ to 
the native community and the perception that other ethnic groups dominate the employment 
opportunities associated with them is resented. A significant number of my interviewees 
suggested that the location of particular ministries in Nairobi, for example, has engendered an 
unacceptable Kikuyu bias in sectors which rightfully belong to other groups: 
                                                 
30
 Former Sudanese soldiers were allocated the land of Kibera by the colonial regime. However, these historical 
claims to the land made by the Nubian community have been subverted not only by the numerical dominance of 
the Luo community, but also by the failure of the Kenyan government to recognise their legitimacy. 
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You know Central doesn’t plant tea. In Western... the fish are from Western, but the 
head office is in Nairobi. Why not put the head office in Nyanza? The sugar office in 
Kakamega? Why do they all come to Nairobi? You travel to Nairobi for something in 
Western, but you want all the resources to yourself (SIL, Woodley Market, 22 
November 2009). 
 
Moreover, in the urban neighbourhoods of the micro-level arena, the dominance of housing 
or businesses in territories which are ‘owned’ by another community engenders grievances 
and resentments. In many of the slums in Nairobi, for example, my interviewees were 
frustrated by the fact that most of the landlords in ‘their’ areas were Kikuyu. By extracting 
rent from their tenants, these Kikuyu landlords are seen to be taking money away from the 
majority community, and benefitting at the expense of the host group. Indeed, perceptions of 
such disproportionate advantage are particularly objectionable when it is understood that 
immigrants and minorities have their own rural homes or urban territories in which they are 
able to dominate. As a Nubian resident of Kibera states, ‘Tribes like the Luo want to eat with 
us on the table, but that is not fair. You have your home’ (YB, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 17 
December 2009). 
Intimately related to this issue of economic dominance is the belief that the native 
community should have more political say in their territory
31
 and that minority groups should 
not oppose the leanings of their hosts. That is to say, ‘guests’ are expected to acquiesce to the 
political wishes of the majority: ‘When you go to Rome you do what Romans do... if you are 
going to stay here you must do what the people here want’ (ADW, Interview, Langas, 
Eldoret, 15 January 2010). If guests are perceived to be in political opposition to the native 
group, ‘their conceptualisation can be transformed from accepted guest to unwelcome 
occupier’ and their (violent) eviction can be legitimised and justified (Jenkins 2012: 10). As 
one interviewee states, ‘If you don’t vote for our people you can’t live here, you must vote 
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 The conflation of political and economic control of space is the product of neo-patrimonial style rule and the 
‘our turn to eat’ mentality of society. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.  
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for our people’(R, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 18 March 2010). A Kikuyu resident of 
Eldoret similarly related the following revealing anecdote from the 2007 campaigns in his 
interview: 
A friend told me “my friend, if you come to me and you see me eating meat, then you 
must also eat meat, the way that I am eating meat. You don’t eat greens because I am 
eating meat.” Without knowing that maybe if I eat meat, that meat can bring a 
problem to my stomach and maybe I can get sick. But he was telling me that “you 
must do what you get me doing.” It was because I am not one of them, so the meaning 
is that here in Eldoret we are like visitors and we must do what the owners do. If it is 
to vote for Ruto, then we must vote for Ruto and not to vote for someone else (JMW, 
Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 3 February 2010). 
 
Thus, during the 2007 campaigns this narrative was explicitly expressed and overtly 
articulated as minorities were harassed, intimidated, beaten up, and sometimes even killed for 
voicing their support of the ‘wrong’ party. Given this pervasive understanding of political 
‘rights’ and the often violent punishment for any infringements, many ‘guests’ choose to 
work within the constraints of its framework. For example, a Kikuyu candidate who ran on an 
ODM ticket in Kibera in the 2007 elections states: 
I’m in a volatile area, the Luo are the majority, whatever the outcome I better lose or 
win on their side // Supporting Raila, I feel safe. My people are in the minority, it 
would be foolish to go against the Luo in Kibera (SINJ, Interview, Kibera, 1 January 
2010). 
 
Several scholars who explore these issues of autochthony, and who have identified the theme 
of immigrant ‘rapacity’ and ‘ungratefulness’ (Marshall-Fratani 2006: 19; also Socpa 2006), 
suggest that democratisation processes in such contexts ignited questions over who could or 
could not run for office and where; that is, who ‘could or could not participate in a project 
new-style’  (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005: 389; see also Geschiere and Jackson 2006: 4; 
Konings 2008: 203; Lynch 2011: 211). However, in Kenya at least, the language of 
hospitality has more nuanced implications than this; it is not the involvement of immigrants 
in politics per se which is at issue, but it is their involvement in opposition to the host 
community that is a source of tension. In fact, members of other groups are welcome to run 
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for office, to vote, and to participate actively in the political arena of a territory, so long as 
they do so according to the rules laid out by their hosts.
32
  
 The host-guest narrative then, ‘has serious consequences for the distribution of power’ 
as hosts have the right to ‘decide on the rules of the visit and accordingly to “put their foot 
down” when the guest does not conform’ (Gullestad 2002: 54). Punishment for perceived 
infringements of these rules are justified and legitimised by the language of autochthony and 
belonging. The 2007-2008 post-election violence can be understood, at least in part, as native 
groups ‘putting their foot down’ after persistent abuses of hospitality by the Kikuyu, 
including the progressive ‘theft’ of resources and the attempt to gain political control of areas 
which do not belong to them by voting against the wishes of their hosts. The way in which 
this cultural violence fed into the dynamics of the 2007-2008 crisis is explored at length in 
Chapter Seven. 
   
The Normalisation of Violence  
 In addition to, and indeed intricately connected with, these less visible – though no 
less significant – structural and cultural dimensions of violence, is a more noticeable ubiquity 
of directly violent action within Kenyan society. During the ten months I was in Kenya I 
witnessed a number of violent acts ranging from domestic disputes to interpersonal brawls, 
gang violence, mob justice, state-citizen confrontations (between police and urban youth), 
and larger-scale inter-community clashes. In this section I examine this ‘culture of violence’
33
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 See Jenkins (2012) for a more comprehensive articulation of this nuance.  
33
 Pécaut (1999: 142) raises an objection to the use of this term suggesting that the invocation of culture as an 
explanatory framework can reflect a ‘lazy attitude’ and assume a tautological aspect. While I accept the 
potential dangers of its use, I think that they originate from a misunderstanding of its basis. It is not that culture 
explains violence per se, but rather that violence has become an integral part of culture; that is, it has become 
normalised, routinised and accepted as a legitimate response to certain situations. Thus, in my understanding, 
Pécaut’s (1999: 162) notion of a ‘banalization of violence’ (original emphasis), can be equated with ‘culture of 
violence’ and consequently I use such terms interchangeably.  
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(Simpson, Mokwena and Segal 1992; cf. Hamber 1999: 114; Steenkamp 2005: 254), arguing 
that violent action has become normalised and, in some sectors of society, it is perceived to 
be a legitimate response to certain situations. As Branch (2009: 1) states, ‘put simply, 
Kenyans have become accustomed to endemic social and political violence’ and as such, it is 
largely accepted and tolerated as a solution to everyday challenges and social conflicts 
(Steenkamp 2005: 254; cf. Harris 2003). I focus here on four key interconnected elements of 
this ubiquitous violence in Kenya: crime, mob justice, vigilantism, and revenge. 
  Kenya experiences high crime rates, particularly in the capital, which has earned the 
nickname ‘Nairobbery’ and is often spoken of in the same context as the notoriously violent 
cities of Johannesburg, Lagos and Cairo (Gimode 2001: 300). While debates are ongoing 
regarding the exact nature of the relationship, it is nevertheless widely accepted that poverty, 
inequality, unemployment and lack of opportunity are significant determinants of crime and 
violence (Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Vanderschuren 1996; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 
2002; Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga 2002; Winton 2004). Many of my interviewees, echoing 
this scholarship, suggest that the high crime rates in their neighbourhoods are intimately 
connected to the poor living conditions, unequal life chances, and the large contingent of ‘idle 
youth’, which characterise the urban scene. One member of a gang in Kibera, for example 
states, ‘We are not employed. We have to get each and everything on the table. We have no 
choice.  If I have to gun somebody down, I’ll do it. It is our daily bread.’ (D, Group Interview 
with ROCP youth group, Makina, Kibera 17 November 2009). Similarly, a friend with whom 
I worked in Kibera often told stories of his days as a drug dealer and during an interview with 
his friend, he recalled: 
F: During that time I used to live on three hundred dollars a day. During that time I 
used to sell heroin // 
S: What made you stop if you were getting paid so much? 
F: Ah, you know the job is risk. You have to be much more security. You need 
something for protection [he makes a gun gesture with his hand]. Your life is in 
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danger all the time from policemen. But young people are jobless // If you want your 
child to eat, you must pay for shelter. If you don’t have any money – you go outside. 
  (F. in Interview with WAW, Bombolulu, Kibera, 11 November 2009)  
 
Moser and Holland (1997: 23; cf. Moser and McIlwaine 2004:  95), similarly draw attention 
to the widespread perception amongst urban communities in Jamaica that unemployment is a 
direct cause of poverty and that this, in turn, relates to levels of economic violence. Criminal 
activity in Kenyan society is wide-ranging and is certainly not necessarily of a violent nature. 
Pick-pocketing, cons, and petty theft for example, are common acts in which direct 
confrontation is largely, and indeed ideally, avoided. Nevertheless, violent crime is pervasive; 
Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003: 593), for example, note that ‘the almost daily media reports 
of incidents of violent robbery, recovery of guns by the police, car-jackings, and other more 
or less violent crimes provide a glimpse of the crime situation in the country.’ These high 
crime rates contribute significantly to creating a climate of fear and insecurity in which 
people must learn to navigate their surroundings. Many of my interviewees, for example, 
claim that they do not enter particular territories unless they are with someone who lives 
there, expressing sentiments such as ‘down there is very dangerous’ (HASS, Interview, 
Makina, Kibera, 15 December 2009). Similarly, a large number of residents, particularly 
women, ensure that they are home before it gets too late, or arrange for an escort of youths to 
walk them to their door after dark. These practices are routinized and largely adopted 
unconsciously, but they are indicative of an acute climate of insecurity. Indeed, such an 
environment constructs and maintains a ubiquity of fear, and even petty acts of criminality 
can escalate into violence at any given moment. As one interviewee states in his description 
of the manner in which gangs operate: ‘They get you like this [he demonstrates by placing his 
arm around his neck] and within one second everything is out from your pockets – first your 
phone then your wallet. If you refuse they can kill you’ (AB, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 11 
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November 2009). Moreover, criminal activity can provoke violent reactions through mob 
justice and retaliation.   
Informal or ‘mob’ justice is, perhaps, the most visible and the most widely accepted 
and tolerated form of violence in Kenyan society. In Chapter Two I recounted a particularly 
extreme incident of ‘necklacing’
34
 which took place in Kibera, but other less drastic forms of 
mob justice are more common, and were witnessed regularly throughout the course of my 
research. The roots of this normalisation of violent punishment are to be found partly in the 
institutional violence of a corrupt and inefficient police force and judiciary system, and 
frustrations with the relative impunity of criminal activity. Following the necklacing of the 
thief in Gatuikera, I sought to make sense of people’s reactions, or indeed lack thereof, 
questioning them on why the thief had been killed rather than handed over to the police. The 
answer was almost uniform: had they left the police to deal with him, he would have been 
able to buy his freedom with kitu kidogo and would have been back in the village, stealing 
from them again the very next day. Furthermore, the distrust and resentment for the police 
stems from the apparently extensive practice of extortion in which officers are seen to 
engage. One interviewee jokes with his friends that a certain member of the police has 
‘turned me into his customer. Every day he arrests me and wants something. And sometimes 
I don’t have something’ (D, Group Interview with ROCP youth group, Makina, Kibera, 17 
November 2009).
35
 Consequently informal justice has, in many instances, become the 
‘preferred alternative to the criminal justice system’ which is viewed with ‘suspicion and 
scepticism’ (Hamber 1999: 119).
36
 Mob justice is frequently associated with vigilante groups, 
and while the necklacing of the thief in Gatuikera was one such case of vigilante-led justice, 
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 The practice of placing a tyre, sometimes filled with petrol, over the victim’s head and setting it on fire. 
35
 Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003: 603) identify a similar dynamic in Kangemi, and suggest that the reluctance 
to call the police in to assist in situations has blurred the lines between community policing and vigilantism. 
36
 This lack of faith in the system is paralleled in the refusal to use the courts to appeal the results of the 2007 
elections. This issue is discussed in Chapter Six. 
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there are countless other examples where the ‘punishers’ are simply those who witnessed the 
crime. Thus vigilantism appears to operate ‘together with somewhat sporadic group 
lynchings’ (Winton 2004: 172) in the enactment of informal justice. I witnessed three 
significant
37
 instances of mob justice, only one of which was carried out by an established 
vigilante group, indicating that the practice is normalised and legitimised outside of these 
groups. This legitimisation of mob justice, of localised punishments for crimes and 
misdemeanours, underscored some of my interviewees’ framings of their participation in the 
post-election violence, and they suggested that they were ‘punishing’ the Kikuyu ‘thieves’ for 
‘stealing the votes.’ Indeed, it could be argued that elements of the post-election crisis were a 
large-scale enactment of mob justice, a legitimised punishment for a perceived crime. The 
employment of the practice of necklacing during the crisis can be seen as symbolic of this: 
the Kikuyu were ‘thieves’ and as such were subjected to the typical punishment for this 
crime.  
  The rise of vigilantism is often regarded as a response to the ‘widespread 
disillusionment with the inability of the state to provide security’ (Meagher 2007: 90) and ‘a 
perception of the incapacity of the police to tackle criminality effectively’ (Anderson 2002: 
542).
38
 Certainly in my own research members of such groups tended to characterise 
themselves in this way, suggesting that they had ‘taken on the role of the police in this area’ 
(B, Interview, Gatuikera, Kibera, 15 November 2009). Schönteich (1999) argues that 
vigilantism is intimately connected to the rise of private security firms in affluent areas, 
                                                 
37
 By significant I mean that they were carried out by large numbers of people, and the victim was either very 
badly injured or killed. There were a few other cases of what could be described as informal or mob justice, but 
in these incidents threats and warnings were issued without physical violence, or they were not prolonged or 
large-scale.   
38
 The rise of vigilantism in the African context is far more complex than is suggested here. A comprehensive 
analysis remains outside the scope of this research. However, Meagher (2007: 90-91) has identified two broad 
schools of thought within the growing literature on vigilantism: the first emphasises cultural elements and the 
reversion to ‘traditional institutions for the maintenance of law and order’, while the second sees vigilantism as 
related to ‘opportunism’ within a ‘context of social disorder.’ For studies of vigilante groups in the Kenyan 
context see in particular Anderson (2002) and Kagwanja (2003, 2006).  
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suggesting that it is ‘the poor man’s version of private security’ and certainly their self-
characterisation would correspond with this view. However, while vigilante groups 
characterise themselves in such a way, their assumption that the silence of local residents 
equates with a tacit approval of their tactics is often misguided. Indeed, while a few of my 
interviewees spoke of them favourably, as providing an element of security, others 
characterised them as petty and violent criminals extorting money from the local community. 
Vigilantism not only further entrenches a normalised violence within society through its 
spearheading of informal justice and through the often threatening manner in which they 
extort ‘payment’ for their services, but it often also has the effect of heightening underlying 
fears and insecurity, rather than reducing them. 
The harassment is... like the Mungiki there right now are very small youth and they’re 
not understanding, they know very well that this guy is a boda boda driver and he 
meets with him in Pondamali he’ll say, “Hey you! Give me fifty shillings!” What can 
you do? If you refuse it will be a problem, if you beat him then they’ll come many, 
because now they are the majority, so to cool the issue you just have to give it to him 
to avoid what will happen (HR, Interview, Pondamali Nakuru, 26 June 2010). 
 
 Finally and relatedly, in many of the urban arenas in which my research was 
conducted, ‘revenge and retribution have become commonplace’ (Simpson, Mokwena and 
Segal 1992). This culture of revenge not only justifies and perpetuates violence, but it can 
also escalate relatively banal incidents into more widespread violent inter-group 
confrontation.  A resident of 4B in Mathare describes the potential for verbal abuse, for 
example, to escalate into larger scale violence through this mentality of revenge: 
Like for example, maybe there is a highlight
39
 somewhere and maybe she is a Kikuyu, 
and she is passing this area. When she passes and we here are a group of Luo we will 
greet her. If she refuses we will abuse her. Then she goes back to her area and tells the 
boyfriend that “I passed there and they abused me”, then the boyfriend will be angry 
and he will come here and the war will start there. If he beats me then I will go and 
take my comrades and we go to fight them, and he will go and get his comrades, so 
this is the way the Luo and Kikuyu have a grudge in this area (EP, Interview, 4B, 
Mathare, 30 April 2010). 
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This quote not only illustrates the potential for teasing, verbal abuse and insult to escalate into 
a more serious incident of direct violence but it also recalls earlier arguments regarding the 
ease with which incidents can become ethnicised in such a territorialised and ethnically-
sensitive society.
40
 Similarly, the potential for small, interpersonal disputes to escalate into 
larger communal clashes is evident in an incident which took place in Kibera in October 
2009. The situation arose over a disputed piece of land in the Luhya-dominated Mashimoni 
neighbourhood. The violence reportedly began when a group of Nubian youth demolished 
kiosks that had been erected by some Luhya traders outside of a church. There was some 
evidence to suggest that the owner of the land had, in fact, hired them to do so. Members of 
the Luhya community subsequently retaliated by burning the church to the ground, killing a 
Nubian boy in the process. The situation quickly escalated as the Nubian community 
mobilised their youth. One interviewee, speaking two weeks later recalls: 
You know two weeks ago there were some clashes? A Nubian boy was killed. So we 
met at Makina Mosque, we prayed first for the boy, then we went and buried the 
body, and after burying the body is when the boys went to fight. Because the one who 
had killed the boy had already killed three Nubian boys. So we went to fight to teach 
them a lesson, so they didn’t do it again (BB, Interview, Makina, Kibera, November 
18 2009). 
 
In the following two days several houses were destroyed, three people were confirmed dead 
and several others were seriously injured as the communities fought (Wabalwa 2009). The 
escalation of seemingly minor, small scale interpersonal or group confrontations parallels the 
ways in which the post-election violence was triggered in the local context. Many of my 
                                                 
40
 Several interviewees indicate that this ethnicisation of minor events is even more pronounced since the post-
election violence, and they suggest that inter-ethnic incidents are now dealt with far more severely than in-group 
situations. For example, several residents of Langas explained that Kikuyu matatu drivers no longer drive 
through Kisumu Ndogo, and Luo drivers no longer enter Corner Mbaya because if they should accidently hit a 
pedestrian in these areas it could start an episode of serious retaliatory violence. One interviewee explains, 
‘Let’s say if now a matatu driver is going through Kisumu Ndogo, if you hit someone and you’re a Kikuyu, they 
won’t leave you. And if you’re a Luo and you come to Corner and there’s an accident they’ll not leave you’ 
(CMY, Interview, Langas, Eldoret, 16 January 2010).  
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interviewees explained that arguments and interpersonal conflicts within their areas sparked 
the violence which then grew exponentially. This is further explored in Chapter Six.  
 Episodes of large-scale and intense violence do not occur in a vacuum; their logic can 
be located within the contours of everyday life. This section has very briefly drawn attention 
to the ubiquity and normalisation of violence in Kenyan society, and has alluded to the 
parallel relationship between the practices and rationale of these everyday activities and the 
post-election crisis. In a climate of insecurity and fear, of impunity and ineffective policing, 
informal justice, revenge and retribution are, to a degree, legitimised. This sense of 
justification for the employment of violence to resolve social conflict undoubtedly 
underscored the violent response to the flawed elections of 2007.  
 
Conclusion 
 Violence in its direct, structural and cultural forms is experienced, lived and enacted 
by ordinary people in periods of relative calm, and the ubiquity of these violent structures and 
processes, to a certain extent, negates the use of the term ‘peace.’ Thus, large-scale violence 
along identity lines cannot be understood in isolation from its social context, but rather 
should be recognised as part of a continuum of ethnically conflictual behaviours. Ethnic 
prejudices and resentments do not sit dormant, awaiting their ignition by ambitious elites, but 
rather flow through the contours of everyday life. They are produced, reproduced and 
transformed through daily interactions and experiences and a fine-grained analysis of these 
processes can be instructive for the student of ethnic violence. Negative ethnicity is circulated 
more explicitly, more intensively, and more vehemently in in-group settings and ethnicised 
spaces in Kenya. Resentments and frustrations pertaining to ethnic dominance and inequality 
are reinforced through everyday conversations and interactions in these spaces, significantly 
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influencing and shaping localised perceptions of, and relations with, ethnic others. 
Conversely, in more mixed environments inter-ethnic tensions are negotiated and deflected 
through social cuing, and negative rhetoric is seldom articulated in an overt and conflictual 
manner. Furthermore, while horizontal inequalities underpin ‘persisting’ macro-level 
grievances, ‘active’ resentments are both temporally and spatially contingent. In a winner-
takes-all environment, communities that currently enjoy political dominance are 
predominantly the target of resentment, and consequently contemporary political alliances 
and circumstances can easily shift the boundaries of prejudice and animosity from one group 
to another. With regards to spatial contextuality, autochthonous discourses of belonging and 
exclusion can both reinforce the macro-narrative, and problematise it. Minorities in specific 
territories can come to harbour significant grievances towards the dominant group as they 
seek to impose an inferior citizenship status upon them in a performance of cultural violence, 
whilst dominant communities resent threats to their economic, political and cultural 
hegemony in their own territory. Thus, there is a multi-vocality to ethnicised resentment 
which persists beneath the level of the ‘ethnic group.’ Finally, this chapter has demonstrated 
that the logic which underscores the employment of violence in everyday settings extends 
into episodes of more widespread and large-scale conflicts; there is a distinct continuity 
between the violent practices of the everyday and those of the post-election crisis. Cultures of 
informal justice, revenge, criminality, and insecurity render violence a legitimate means of 
resolving social conflicts and, as such, go some way to explaining its use as a response to the 
flawed 2007 elections. Thus, violence is ubiquitous in Kenyan society and an understanding 
of its normalisation and its everyday workings is crucial to understanding the nature and 
dynamics of the post-election crisis. As Steenkamp (2005: 255) states: 
This framework does not map the causes of violence but aims to provide an analytical 
mapping of the factors that create a context for violence where the use of violence is 
allowed and even encouraged. The question is not why are people violent, but rather 
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how are the norms of violence created and entrenched in society? Few or many 













 The previous two chapters have situated the 2007 elections in the context of a society 
characterised by a salient ethnic consciousness and a normalisation of violence. This chapter 
explores the ways in which both ethnicity and conflict define and influence the relationship 
between political elites and local level actors, and examines the role they play in Kenyan 
politics in general. As has already been noted in Chapter One, there is a heavy emphasis on 
elite mobilisation and the significance of ethnicised patronage networks in analyses of 
African politics, where it is assumed that ‘aspiring politicians must gain the support of their 
ethnic community’ and ‘bring valued resources back home’ (Steeves 2006: 214). Analyses of 
ethnic violence tend to emphasise this predominantly instrumental elite-mass relationship, 
arguing that the distribution of resources along ethnic lines and the zero sum nature of 
politics facilitate elite manipulations of identity and the organisation of violence. This chapter 
does not seek wholly to challenge this position, and it certainly does not preclude the 
mobilisation of ethnicity by elites. However, it does seek to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of this interaction between leaders and local level actors, and to offer a more 
subtle account of the rationale behind, and the complexities of, (violent) ethnic politics at the 
local level. Top-down processes of political mobilisation and incitement to violence interact 
with these bottom-up dynamics, and a failure to pay sufficient attention to localised pressures 
and agency results in a limited and partial understanding of the violent ethnic politics which 
mars Kenyan society.  
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The chapter begins by drawing attention to the value of the existing paradigm and 
highlighting the significance of its insights into the political culture in Kenya, confirming the 
importance of ethnic leaders, patronage networks and symbolic capital. However, it goes on 
to argue that elites are far from omnipotent figures in the mobilisation of ethnic actors, 
suggesting rather that they are themselves constrained by micro-level expectations and 
pressures. Moreover, the role of patronage in solidifying the ties between elites and local 
level actors is more nuanced than the direct exchange of benefit for political support, and is 
as much associated with localised hopes and fears for the future as it is with existing 
patronage flows. The chapter goes on to explore the local politics of voting behaviour, 
suggesting that socio-spatial structures and the local level actors within them, often operating  
independently of political leaders, can significantly constrain political debates and 
contestations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the use of violent ‘ethnic militias’ 
and ‘vigilantes’ in political campaigns, suggesting that they are neither as homogeneous nor 
as centralised as they might initially appear, nor are they necessarily ‘ethnic’ in any 
meaningful sense. 
 
The Personalisation of Kenyan Politics 
 Many, if not most, studies of African politics have drawn attention to the personalised 
and informal nature of the African state. In this neo-patrimonial model
1
 it is understood that 
political elites largely attain and retain loyalty and support, ward off opposition and silence 
critics through a privatised and informal distribution of wealth and benefits in the form of 
                                                 
1
 The term is derived from Weber’s (1947) concept of patrimonial authority and is commonly attributed to 
Médard (1982). It has become something of a catch-all concept which obscures the nuances of the numerous 
and varied understandings of the phenomenon. Moreover, some scholars, while ascribing to the fundamental 
elements of a neo-patrimonial model, do not explicitly use the term. A detailed exploration of the concept and 
its uses lies outside the scope of this thesis, but for an excellent and thorough analysis see Erdmann and Engel 
(2007).   
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jobs, promotions, development projects, loans, bursaries and other such favours (Abrahamsen 
2001: 84). Some scholars go as far as to suggest that ‘the system is “structured” so to speak, 
not by institutions, but by the politicians themselves’ (Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 19). While 
the personalisation of politics is acute and is central to the discussion in this chapter, it should 
be stressed here that the legal-rational institutions which exist alongside these informal and 
privatised networks of distribution are not simply a façade (Erdmann and Engel, 2007: 104); 
indeed it is the existence of both forms of legitimacy which distinguishes the modern neo-
patrimonial African state from the Weberian model of patrimonial authority. Nevertheless, 
despite the fierce debates over its nature and operation, as well as the conceptual confusion 
that has emerged within the extensive body of literature, the prevalence of neo-
patrimonialism as the defining characteristic of African politics is largely undisputed.
2
 
Undoubtedly there are subtle and important differences between Roth’s (1968) ‘personal 
rulership’, Lemarchand and Legg’s (1972) ‘clientelism’, Bayart’s (1993) ‘politics of the 
belly’, Van de Walle’s (2003) ‘presidentialism’, Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) ‘informal 
politics’ and the ‘neo-patrimonialism’ coined by Médard (1982) and adopted by countless 
others, nevertheless they each emphasise the personalisation of politics and resource 
distribution on the continent
. 
 Moreover, the clientelistic networks of patronage which 
characterise these regimes are assumed to operate predominantly along ethnic lines and the 
legitimacy of politicians is said to ‘rest on their ability to provide for their own (mostly 
ethnic) constituents’ (Chabal, 2005: 4). Consequently, politics becomes a zero-sum game, 
elections are ‘a struggle among ethnic communities to put one of their own into a position of 
political power’ (Posner 2007: 1305), and ethnic leaders or ‘kings’ (Adar 1998) are central to 
                                                 
2
 However, scholars have recently begun to question whether neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and patronage are 
sufficient for understanding African politics and voting behaviour, and they call for further in-depth research in 
this area. See for example Hansen (2003); Gyimah-Boadi (2007); Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler (2007); and 
Lindberg and Morrison (2008). This chapter seeks to build upon this literature. While not dismissing the 
importance of the existing model, its overly materialist emphasis on the ethnically-structured exchange of goods 
and services for political support fails to explain some of the nuances and complexities of Kenyan politics. 
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political competition. While this chapter as a whole seeks to offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of ethnicity and the relationship between elites and local level 
actors, existing analyses do offer important insights into Kenyan politics. My own research 
confirms that, at the macro-level at least, party organisation and electoral competition are 
centred around powerful ethnic spokesmen who demand and, to a large extent receive, 
substantial loyalty and political support from their respective communities on the 
understanding that they, in turn, will receive certain benefits and gains from their leader’s 
position of power.  
While Kenyan elections certainly ‘cannot simply be understood as an ethnic census’ 
(Cheeseman 2008: 172), voting patterns nevertheless indicate that presidential candidates 
have historically enjoyed overwhelming support from their own communities. Given the 
regional concentration of ethnic groups, these patterns are, to an extent, visible in provincial 
election results. In the 1992 elections the two leading Kikuyu candidates, Kibaki and Matiba 
garnered an overwhelming 95 percent of the votes from Kikuyu-dominated Central Province, 
whilst Raila Odinga similarly overshadowed opposition in Nyanza, winning 75 percent of the 
votes, and Moi obtained 68 percent in his home region of Rift Valley (Throup and Hornsby 
1998: 435). These patterns were repeated in the 1997 elections where Kibaki, now 
unchallenged by another Kikuyu candidate, took 90 percent of Central Province, and both 
Raila and Moi again enjoyed majority support in their respective regions – the former 
winning 75 percent of his province’s votes, and the latter 72 per cent (Cowen and Kanyinga 
2002: 142). In 2002, leading politicians from the Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kikuyu 
communities, having suffered the consequences, and learned the lessons, of a divided 
opposition in 1992 and 1997, formed an alliance under Kibaki’s National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC), and thus pooling the support of each community, NARC defeated Uhuru Kenyatta 
and succeeded in ousting KANU from power. I strongly disagree, then, with Kagwanja’s 
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(2006: 51) suggestion that ‘NARC’s victory [in 2002] signified the triumph of ethnic 
pluralism and national rejuvenation’; rather, the election once again highlighted the 
prevalence of ethnicised voting patterns, as each ethnic region demonstrated overwhelming 
support for the party with which their leading politician was affiliated. NARC was victorious 
in the Luo, Luhya, and Kamba provinces, as well as in Kibaki’s Nyeri district, whilst KANU 
dominated Rift Valley and Uhuru Kenyatta’s Kiambu region.
3
 Given this precedent, it is 
unsurprising that the 2007 elections similarly demonstrated ethnicised voting patterns at the 
presidential level, with Kibaki’s PNU party dominating in Central Province with 96 percent 
of the vote, and Raila’s ODM party, which included leading Kalenjin, Luhya and Coastal 
community politicians, enjoying substantial support in the respective regions of Nyanza (81.7 
percent), Rift Valley, (61.7 percent), Western (66.6 percent) and Coast (58.8 percent) as can 












                                                 
3
 For a detailed breakdown of the results see the final report by the European Union Election Observation 
Commission (European Union 2003: 72ff.). 
4
The understanding of politics as largely ethnicised generated high expectations that PNU simply could not 
defeat ODM, as the latter carried the numbers of the Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya, and Coastal communities combined. 
This contributed to the certainty that the elections had been rigged. However, the depth of division within the 
Luhya community, as well the significant support for PNU in Eastern Province is often overlooked by local 


































































































































































Source: International Crisis Group (2008) 
 
These statistics and party alignments draw attention to the individualism inherent in 
the Kenyan political system, highlighting its influence on the nature of political parties and 
pointing to the tactics employed by politicians in their pursuit of positions of power. The 
major political actors in contemporary Kenyan politics ‘make extensive use of “ethnic 
arithmetic”’ (Elischer 2010: 204), forging coalitions and alliances in an effort to mobilise a 
support base from as many different groups as possible, or in an effort to split the opposition. 





 and the parties which constitute them weak, little more than vessels through which 
elites can pursue their political ambitions. Figure 3 humorously depicts one such alliance 
which was dominating the political scene in Kenya from late 2009 into 2010.  
 
Figure 3: Daily Nation, 26 November 2009 
The cartoon shows the leading Kamba, Kalenjin and Kikuyu politicians Kalonzo, Ruto and 
Uhuru in bed together, forming the KKK (Kamba-Kalenjin-Kikuyu) alliance in preparation 
for the 2012 elections,
6
 barely concealing the deadly tribalism that lurks beneath. Notably, 
these politicians were each prominent members of the three main opposing parties in 2007, 
with Kalonzo leading ODM-Kenya, Uhuru backing PNU, and Ruto a key member of ODM’s 
pentagon.
7
 Thus, the KKK alliance is arguably a coalition of convenience, and as the cartoon 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, an article that appeared in The Standard newspaper in 2007 joked that ‘It’s coalition season and tribal 
chiefs are the rave’ (Tanui 2007).  
6
 The elections have since been rescheduled for March 2013. However, at the time the newspaper went to print 
they were expected to take place in December 2012. 
7
 The pentagon refers to the five most prominent members of ODM: Raila Odinga, William Ruto, Musalia 
Mudavadi, Charity Ngilu and Joseph Nyagah 
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depicts, it is designed to get ‘the numbers’ from these three communities in the forthcoming 
election. 
Thus, many key players in Kenya are guilty of political nomadism, shifting from one 
party to another, from government to opposition, according to which position offers them the 
greatest potential for political advancement at any given moment. Raila Odinga, for example, 
joined the FORD-Kenya party in 1992, together with Luhya politicians Paul Muite and 
Kijana Wamalwa, in opposition to KANU. Following Oginga Odinga’s death in 1994, 
Wamalwa and Raila tussled over the leadership of FORD-Kenya, and eventually the latter 
resigned to form his own NDP party in time for the 1997 elections. He later merged NDP 
with the KANU government and served in Moi’s cabinet between 2001 and 2002. However, 
again following leadership disputes, Raila left KANU to form the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) just before the elections in 2002, joining forces with the NARC coalition under 
Kibaki’s leadership. Following NARC’s triumph relations soon degenerated between Kibaki 
and Raila and in 2004 the latter split off from the alliance to create the Orange Democratic 
Movement for the purposes of opposing the draft constitution in the 2005 referendum. The 
movement included, among others, William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, against whom Raila 
had campaigned in the 2002 elections.
8
 More recently, Raila has again found himself in 
opposition to Uhuru and Ruto as he remains the leader of ODM, while they have combined to 
form another party in the lead-up to the next elections. Thus in the last two decades Raila has 
repeatedly shifted from government to opposition, from one party and one allegiance to 
another, very often finding himself allied with those whom he had previously opposed. 
Through all of this manoeuvring his Luo supporters have, for the most part, remained loyal. 
Similarly, less influential politicians competing for parliamentary or district seats, having 
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failed to secure a nomination with one party, often have no qualms about seeking a ticket 
with another, and nor, apparently, do their supporters. Thus, as Tanui, a journalist with The 
Standard newspaper, points out, in Kenya ‘political parties are weak and stand for nothing 
and all you need is an amalgamation of tribal kings’ (Tanui 2007). It is clear then that the 
centrality of individual politicians as ethnic leaders, kings or chiefs is crucial to an 
understanding of Kenyan politics. A Kalenjin youth summarises this political culture 
concisely when he states: 
In Kenya, communities have given hopes to one leader, they choose a key leader, so if 
someone of your community has a strong political will, then whatever he says you 
will take it from him. People have invested much faith in their leader, so it is difficult 
to go against them. So for the Luo it is Raila, for the Kikuyu it is Kibaki, for the 
Kamba it is Kalonzo, for the Kalenjin, Ruto (NFF, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 6 June 
2010). 
 
While there are clear material and rational concerns underscoring this relationship 
between local level actors and political elites, there is also a non-rational, affective dimension 
which Kanyinga (1994: 67) has suggested is akin to an ‘uncritical admiration’ of and ‘quasi-
religious faith’ in the ethnic spokesperson.
9
 This sentiment is echoed in one interviewee’s 
exclamation that, ‘I don’t know why they listen to Raila. Is Raila God, or what?!’ (ABW, 
Interview, Ayany, Kibera, 14 November 2009).
10 
 A Taita youth similarly states that, ‘Politics 
is like a religion. It has this strong feeling inside you. // I don’t know how. It’s a religion. For 
the people, they can do anything for [their] leader’ (CHOC, Interview, Waithaka, 8 March 
2010).  
                                                 
9
 Kanyinga is referring specifically to Jarimogi Oginga Odinga’s popularity amongst his Luo community in the 
1980s, but it can be translated, to some degree, to other elite-mass relationships in contemporary Kenya.  
10
 While the understanding that the loyalty of ethnic communities to their leaders relates to all communities, my 
interview material suggests that this devotion is, or is perceived to be, particularly pronounced amongst the Luo 
community. The term ‘Odingaism’ has been utilised not only by scholars and journalists, but also by Kenyans 
themselves. It could be suggested that the absence of any other strong Luo politicians who can realistically 
challenge Raila’s supremacy offers a partial explanation.  However, the question remains as to whether there is 
something unique to Luo political history and identity construction which has contributed to this situation. A 
number of friends speculated that the poverty of Nyanza province has ‘brought them together’, for example.  
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However, despite the apparent loyalty of the spokesperson’s supporters, the emphasis 
on the top-down mobilisation of ethnicity has a tendency to overstate the manipulative ability 
of elite actors and neglects the constraints placed upon them by local level agency and 
expectation. Support for an ethnic spokesperson is far from unquestioning. Indeed, there is a 
clear duality to the relationship between elites and local level actors in which both work to 
shape and influence each other. When asked how a community decides upon a leader, one 
interviewee explains that it is ‘the person who they think has political will and he is in the 
government at that time’ (NFF, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 6 June 2010). Thus, the ethnic 
‘king’ or ‘tribal chief’ must not only be seen as having the capacity to deliver benefits to his 
community, but he must also be regarded as willing to do so. Leaders who, for whatever 
reason, are perceived to have betrayed the community, or who fail to live up to the 
expectations of providing for and defending the ethnic group, run the risk of losing their 
support base to another rising star. De Smedt’s (2009: 597) conclusion that ‘Raila is not able 
to exert complete control over his support base and... key constituents in Kibera do not 
automatically accept his authority’ is applicable to other ethnic leaders in Kenyan politics. 
Indeed, it can be said that political elites are subject to ‘ethnic entrapment’ in that they must 
often tailor their actions to meet, or at least be seen to meet, the ethnic expectations of their 
followers (Goldsworthy, 1982: 109-110). A Luhya youth identifies this problem faced by 
elites when he states that: 
I think that the Kalenjin have rubbished the KK thing,
11
 and they are not into that. 
They even threatened Ruto and said that they’ll not vote for him if he associates with 
the KK, so Ruto’s future will be very narrow if he does that (LSM, Interview, Gatina, 
Kawangware, 10 April 2010). 
 
                                                 
11
 He refers to the KKK alliance discussed above. His abbreviation to KK should be understood as a reference to 
the Kikuyu-Kalenjin dimension of the coalition, the implicit suggestion being that it is this aspect of the 
relationship which is particularly problematic. This is perhaps due to the fact that the Kikuyu and Kalenjin are 
largely understood to have an enduring animosity as result of historical injustices over land distribution in the 
Rift Valley Province, as well as a legacy of vicious ethnic clashes throughout the 1990s.   
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 Similarly, WIL, speaking in 2010 when Ruto’s position was being challenged on a number 
of fronts,
12
 indicates the potential for Ruto’s loss of supremacy in the approaching 
referendum: 
So this referendum, if Ruto manages... The politicians ally themselves... Like in 2007 
Ruto delivered a bloc of votes to Raila. After that it was Kosgey or Ruto, people 
weren’t sure. Now Kosgey is on the yes side and Ruto is on the no, so now we will 
know who is the spokesman of the Kalenjin. Ruto will weigh himself, if Ruto gets the 
Kalenjin bloc votes or not (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010). 
 
This dispels the myth that ‘the lines of command are unidirectional’ and that ‘formal avenues 
for “democratic” critique of those in power by their subordinate clients... are non-existent’ 
(Ovesen 2005: 34). Politicians are themselves constrained by ethnicity and by the 
expectations of their own community.
13
 Lynch (2008: 556) draws attention to this duality in 
her study of Kalenjin politics, stating that local level actors can ‘apply pressure on, and 
remove support for leaders, just as the latter realize they can gain easy mileage by supporting 
popular positions.’ The relationship is, then, a reciprocal one (Goldsworthy 1982: 111), in 
which leaders must justify their status as spokespersons through their actions and their 
performance on the political stage. Indeed, their role is often to respond to popular sentiments 
(Lynch 2011: 8) rather than to direct them. It should be noted, in addition, that the constraints 
of bottom-up expectations are applicable to all levels of political contest, and are perhaps 
most visible in local level demands for handouts and gifts during political campaigns.
14
 Thus, 
                                                 
12
 Ruto’s failure to prevent evictions from Mau Forest in late 2009, his alleged involvement in a corruption 
scandal which led to his temporary suspension from office in February 2010, his subsequent demotion from 
Agriculture Minister to Minister of Higher Education in April 2010, and his name repeatedly appearing in 
connection with ICC investigations throughout the year raised some questions over whether he still had the 
political weight, and the will, to protect his group’s interests. 
13
 This does not preclude the possibility of ethnic mobilisation, however. Indeed, a charismatic leader may be 
able to persuade enough of his community that a particular action is in their best interests, or to effectively 
deflect blame for unpopular policies. Still, this does not detract from the fact that local level actors have 
significant agency and ability to affect the political actions of their leaders. 
14
 This is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. However, it is interesting to note that a councillor in the 
Nairobi area suggested that the frequent involvement of politicians in corruption scandals is related to this 
expectation from their constituents. He states ‘Corruption won’t end. People must use money in the campaigns, 
where will I get the money? I must get the money to go and give to my constituents… If you don’t meet them 
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the leader’s status as ‘king’ is not entirely stable; he can be usurped by another influential 
leader of the same community.  
Neither is the spokesman’s position wholly uncontested. In the extract from NFF’s 
interview quoted above, he states that the ethnic spokesman is determined by whomever they 
think has the political will. But who is this ‘they’? While undoubtedly the ‘ethnic group’ is 
inferred, the ‘ethnic group’ is far from a homogenous entity and local contexts can drastically 
shape perceptions of, and relations to, political leaders. An interesting example of this is in 
the case of Kosovo, Mathare. A significant contingent within the Kikuyu dominated area, 
particularly amongst the youth, pointed to the heavy handed and brutal crackdown by the 
police on Mungiki in June and July 2007. The targeting of a large majority of youths on 
suspicion that they were members of Mungiki was seen as being the responsibility of Kibaki, 
and was commonly cited as evidence of his inability and unwillingness to protect his own 
community. Several interviewees from the area suggested that it was the memory of this 
brutality under Kibaki’s rule that accounts for the ODM-leanings of a significant contingent 
of the Kikuyu youth in Kosovo.  
The youths of this area… in the leadership of Kibaki, since 2002 Kibaki has harassed 
them. Many Kikuyu youth have died here, calling them Mungiki. The youth were not 
happy with Kibaki, so some of us voted for Raila. // There was a time that this area 
was a Mungiki stronghold, then there was one Thursday in 2006 [sic], you woke up in 
the morning and the GSU were here just targeting boys, saying that all the boys here 
are Mungiki, so they killed many youth here, so the youth were tired of Kibaki (B, 
Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 12 April 2010).  
 
Kagwanja (2009: 372) similarly argues that the ‘high-handed application of the “shoot-to-
kill” directive against the youth risked pushing young voters into the arms of the opposition.’ 
Thus, ethnicity is the reverse of ‘unthinking conformity’ (Lonsdale 1992: 268) and 
debates about who best represents the group’s interests, and even what constitutes those 
                                                                                                                                                        
you won’t get back in the seat. When you meet them you must buy them soda and you must bring them lunch’ 
(LEO, Interview, 18 March 2010). The location of this interview has been omitted to protect anonymity.  
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interests, are fierce and persistent. The local contours of Kenyan politics are explored in 
further detail later on in the chapter, but at the macro-level, at the level of the ethnic 
spokesperson, intra-ethnic divisions and debates are most visible when there are two or more 
powerful and influential politicians from the same ethnic community vying for the top seat, 
or where there is no presidential candidate but any number of influential leaders who are well 
positioned to secure a high-level post in government. The Luhya community, for example, 
has historically been ‘the most fragmented politically and socially of Kenya’s major 
communities, with big differences in attitudes and allegiances between the relatively 
independent sub-groups and no Presidential candidate of their own’ (Throup and Hornsby 
1998: 439).
15
 Indeed, one interviewee expresses his incredulity at the divisions within the 
Luhya community and their continued lack of a clearly defined leader: 
You know, the Luhya, they don’t have a standing, they don’t know who to support, 
they’re always mixed up. Their reasoning is low, they’re mixed up. You ask them, 
“Who are you voting for?” and they don’t know! (TY, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 1 
June 2010). 
 
I would suggest that in 2007 the Luhya presidential vote was divided between ODM and 
PNU, with Mudavadi the champion of Luhya interests in the former, and Awori in the 
latter.
16
 Similarly, the Kikuyu vote was very clearly split between their two presidential 
candidates both in 1992 with Kibaki and Matiba, and again in 2002, with Kibaki and Uhuru, 
demonstrating the internal divisions within the group. Intra-community battles for leadership 
can be fought along a variety of different cleavages, such as region, clan, class, gender, 
religion, or age. For example, in 1992, Matiba’s popularity amongst the landless and 
                                                 
15
 Indeed, this lack of a presidential candidate renders debates over the identity of the ethnic leader particularly 
fierce.  
16
 MacArthur has suggested that the Luhya community do not ‘automatically’ rally behind Luhya candidates 
(2008: 230). While I certainly do not wish to suggest that ethnicised political behaviour is ‘automatic’, I find no 
evidence to suggest that the disposition to vote along ethnic lines has not been as socialised amongst the Luhya 
community as it has amongst other groups in Kenya. Indeed, most of my Luhya interviewees demonstrate the 
same ethnicised understanding of politics. Moreover, ODM’s constant invocation of Masinde’s prophecy that 
the Luhya shall rule only after a Luo has sat in the presidential seat – a point dwelt upon by MacArthur – very 
pointedly speaks to Luhya ambitions to leadership and ethnicised voting behaviours.  
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unemployed imposed a class dimension upon the struggles between himself and Kibaki 
(Kanyinga 1994: 83-85). Sub-regional politics was also an important factor in the 2002 
elections as two Kikuyu presidential candidates competed for the support of their ethnic 
community, and Charity Ngilu’s gender was almost certainly capitalised upon in 2007 in an 
attempt to attract women voters away from fellow Kamba politician, Kalonzo Musyoka.  
By way of conclusion, then, it is clear that there is not an unthinking following of 
ethnic leaders which is the direct result of the latter’s charisma and skills of manipulation and 
mobilisation. Moreover, ethnicity is a powerful force which operates as a bottom-up pressure 
on elite action. Still, the focus on the personalisation and ethnicisation of Kenyan politics is 
not wholly unjustified. The widely understood role of ‘political elites as ethnic spokesmen’ 
(Atieno-Odhiambo 2002: 232) is deeply apparent in the Kenyan context, pervading political 
speeches and rhetoric, newspaper articles, opinion pieces, and everyday attitudes, 
conversations and discourses. Leaders command a great deal of respect, support and trust 
from their respective communities, and their actions and decisions tend to be perceived as 
being in the broad interests of the ethnic group. As one Luo youth from Kibera states: 
There is a joke in Luo Nyanza that if anything happens an old grandmother will ask, 
“What has Raila said?” and whatever he has said, then that’s it. We’ve grown like 
that, even me, even my mum. The other day we were talking about the new 
constitution and she asked “What’s Raila said about it?” I told her, “He said yes”, so 
she said, “Well yes then!” (FOT, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 6 April 2010).  
 
What needs further exploration, however, is how ethnicity operates at the local level of 
political behaviour and competition. This section has alluded to the pressures that localised 
expectations can exert upon elites, and has illustrated that there are clear intra-ethnic 
divisions, contestations and debates, pointing to further complexities and ambiguities. The 
following sections seek to reflect upon these issues, questioning the rationale behind and 




Habitus, Ethnic Voting Patterns, and Social Pressure 
 In Chapter Three, the notion of ethnicity as a component of the habitus was explored 
and it was argued that ethnicised perspectives, behaviours and actions can be understood in 
this context. The rationale behind ethnicised political behaviour is intimately linked to the 
expectation of benefit, the issue of collective security, as well as to notions of self and group 
worth. These issues are explored in the following section, but it is important to note here that 
in this context, ethnicised voting behaviour has become a socialised practice. Ethnicised 
political behaviour has been constructed through history, over an extended period of time, 
and has become, for many, ‘just a feeling people have’ (CG, Interview 4B, Mathare, 29 April 
2010). It is a practice which is inculcated in the earliest years, and which can either be 
reinforced or disrupted by everyday life experiences. As one interviewee states, ‘our parents 
told us, they showed us that our community is the best, it is the one to lead, so the seed was 
planted by our parents’ (SS, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 12 April 2010), and another 
explains that ethnic voting has been an element of Kenyan society for a long time, stating: 
Me, I say that I am twenty-six years old and since before, this thing was there. I was 
born and I got it here. Like a Kisii cannot vote for a Kikuyu for example. This tribal 
war was always there so I just follow it the way it is (MW, Interview, Shabab, 
Nakuru, 5 June 2010). 
 
Thus, a number of interviewees suggest that ethnicised voting patterns in Kenya are 
constructed by an implicit force which exists within subjective consciousness. Nevertheless, 
as has been argued in earlier chapters, ethnic components of the habitus are continually 
reproduced, reaffirmed, and perpetuated through lived experiences and the practices of 
everyday life. As such, the frequent interaction with fellow tribesmen and the everyday 
practice and performance of ethnic identity, both in its banal and demonstrative forms, 
contributes to the continued understanding that voting along ethnic lines is the just and moral 
thing to do:  
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We Kamba must vote for a Kamba. It is not a pride or a benefit, people just vote their 
tribe without knowing. Like me, I voted Kalonzo and if you ask me why I have no reason. 
It is just that when I am in the queue to vote, I was with fellow Kambas, we were talking 
in our language, like one hundred Kambas going to vote. So when I reach there I won’t 
vote another tribe, no, I’ll fear because in that queue I am with all my tribe. They’ll all 
vote my tribe, so why will I vote another? (CS, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 18 May 
2010). 
 
Similarly, a Kikuyu interviewee admitted that he regretted voting for Kibaki, and when I 
asked him what had made him do so, he said, ‘I suppose because I saw others supporting 
their own tribe. At first I wanted the best leader, but in this area all are Kikuyu and my family 
were pressuring me’ (F, Interview, Waithaka, Nairobi, 11 March 2010), highlighting the 
ways in which everyday ethnicity and the interaction with other members of the ethnic group 
can reinforce dispositions to act in a particular way. As can be seen from the last two 
interview quotes, simply being in the presence of co-ethnics who, it is assumed, will almost 
certainly be voting along ethnic lines, can impose a sense of social pressure; and it can 
reaffirm practices driven by the ethnic component of the habitus – voting for a fellow 
tribesman is the accepted and morally correct thing to do.
17
 One resident of Kikuyu-
dominated Waithaka states: ‘There is pressure from other friends and clansmen, they pressure 
you... I feel that these are my people so I have to do what they are doing’ (E, Interview, 
Waithaka, Nairobi, 8 March 2010). Moreover, perceptions of the divergent and competing 
interests of different ethnic groups are emphasised through everyday conversations within 
ethnicised spaces, and the continued vocalisation that people must protect their community 
by voting ethnically is persuasive:
 18
 
It’s like my neighbour starts influencing me saying “She’s not good”, telling them, 
“You should vote for PNU because ODM won’t help us, all the Luo will take our 
                                                 
17
It should be reiterated here that understanding ethnicised behaviour as a social disposition does not suggest a 
lack of agency on the part of individuals. People can, and do, resist this narrative of ethnicised voting, and there 
is a vibrant moral ethnicity which underscores politics at the local level. However, as is discussed later, socio-
spatial structures can be remarkably constraining and can limit and suppress alternative perspectives.  
18
 Thus, as Bratton and Kimenyi’s (2008) study of voting patterns in Kenya has indicated, observations of the 
apparent solidarity of other communities and the assumption that they will vote exclusively for their own 
engenders defensive ethnic voting. 
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houses.” // The landlords are the ones who come and influence us telling us that the 
Luo will come and take our houses, so I am influenced by that, if I am a tenant. So 
there was a lot of pressure to vote for PNU, pressure (MR, Interview, Kosovo, 
Mathare, 19 April 2010).   
 
Thus, there is a strong disposition to vote in a particular manner, which is reinforced through 
everyday interactions and the sense of obligation which they invoke. Deviations from 
ethnicised voting behaviour are met with hostility and punishment by other members of the 
group.  
 
Clientelism, Patronage and Kenyan politics 
 It has already been suggested that there is a neo-patrimonial character to Kenyan 
politics which serves to construct certain expectations amongst local level actors, and which 
facilitates political mobilisation along ethnic lines by elites. This section explores the nature 
and operation of patronage networks in Kenya, and suggests that rather than being a simple 
ethnicised exchange of goods, services and assistance for political support, it is rather the 
expectation and anticipation of benefit, and the fear of marginalisation and exclusion that 
underpins voting behaviour.   
The ‘our turn to eat’ mentality which dominates political discourse in Kenya has 
largely been constructed by the uneven investment, development and allocation of resources 
which characterised the post-independence regimes. Under Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap 
Moi the ‘top jobs and the lion’s share of government spending’ went to their respective 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities (Branch and Cheeseman 2010: 2) and Kibaki’s 
government has been similarly accused of ‘defend[ing] this wealth that they got in the wrong 
way’ (O, Interview, 56, Kawangware, 6 March 2010).  As a result there is a pervasive and 
entrenched understanding that to hold power is to enjoy the spoils of the state: 
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Kenyans are like that. To them, they see like the way Moi ruled, he ruled for twenty-
four years and he gave his people land and opportunities of jobs and many things. So 
the other tribes want someone of their tribe in power so that even them, they can 
benefit (KN, Inteview, Shabab, Nakuru, 11
 
June 2010).  
 
Moreover, given the zero sum nature of Kenyan politics, it is widely understood that to lose 
an election means to be marginalised and excluded from all benefits for the duration of that 
government’s term. As one interviewee says of the 2007 elections, ‘people were divided in 
ethnic blocs and our ethnic bloc must win. It was life and death, where if you don’t win, then 
no one should win’ (CAM, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 19 March 2010). Mueller 
(2008: 201) has drawn attention to this crucial point, adopting the phrase ‘exclusionary 
ethnicity’ to highlight the fact that Kenyan elections are as much about who does not get 
power as they are about who does. However, the exact nature of the benefits of power, as 
well as the extent to which they trickle down to the local level is an issue of much dispute in 
the literature and the importance of clientelism and patronage in voting behaviour is 
increasingly coming under question (for example, Lindberg and Morrison 2005, 2008; 
Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Erdmann 2007). Consequently, my own interviewees’ understanding of 
the potential benefits that are to be gained from power warrants some discussion here.  
 There is a widely accepted distinction between clientelism and patronage within the 
literature  which suggests that the former essentially refers to individualised benefits, such as 
land, office or employment, whilst the latter refers to collective goods, such as roads, schools 
and hospitals (Erdmann and Engel 2007: 107). Many of my own interviewees, however, do 
not make such clear distinctions between clientelistic practices and patronage, and the 
expected benefits frequently straddle the line between the two. Thus, what are essentially 
individualised benefits granted to members of the elite, such as governmental and ministerial 
posts, are expected to translate into collective benefits for the group as a whole, and these are, 
167 
 
in turn, expected to be converted into some form of individual advantage. Lindberg and 
Morrison (2008: 118) have stated that clientelistic practices 
include not only paying school fees, electricity, and water bills, and funeral and 
wedding expenses, distributing cutlasses and other tools for agriculture and “chop” in 
the form of small sums of money; but also personal assistance in dealing with the 
authorities, whether they are the police, courts, headmasters, local government 
officials or ministries.  
 
In Kenya, the direct payment of fees and other forms of tangible face to face benefits are 
mentioned by only a small number of interviewees,
19
 but many perceive that a clientelistic 
form of personal assistance in times of trouble can be expected from a member of the 
community holding a position of political power. For example, a young Luhya woman living 
in Kawangware told me that in 2007 she registered to vote in neighbouring Westlands 
constituency, rather than her own constituency of Dagoretti in order to vote for a fellow 
Luhya.
20
 She explained that if she were to go to the Westlands MP, Fred Gumo, and ‘tell him 
our problems, for example school fees, then he’ll help me. // so I belong to Westlands’ (YBS, 
Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 3
 
April 2010). This sentiment was echoed by a middle aged 
Luhya man from a different area of the slum. He states: 
I voted for an MP in Westlands because he is a Luhya like me. If I vote for him and 
he goes through, I can get some benefits of his rule. Like I have kids going to school 
and the school fees are high. There is a fund for school kids so I tried to apply for it in 
                                                 
19
 Moreover, such face to face benefits seem to be restricted primarily to campaign periods. Politicians use this 
more direct form of clientelism in the campaigns ‘paying school fees, or giving money to start a business’ 
(KAM, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 17 April 2010). Similarly, elites reportedly paid the hospital, or on 
occasion the funeral, fees of members of their campaign teams who were killed or injured during rallies. 
However, during an interview with BK – a member of the Siafu vigilante group in Gatuikera who regularly act 
as ‘security’ for Raila on his visits to Kibera – he drew my attention to a fundraising event which was going on 
in a nearby field. He told me, ‘You know my colleague has died there, so Raila must bring the coffin and must 
fund the funeral. // He gives us something small because he is in power’ (BK, Interview, Gatuikera, Kibera, 15 
November 2009). This clearly demonstrates a more continuous clientelistic relationship. However, there is 
nothing in my material to suggest that such a relationship is the norm. In fact most interviewees suggest that as 
soon as the campaigns are over, politicians disappear and are no longer accessible to them.  
20
 This appears to be quite a common practice in Nairobi, and several interviewees explained that members of 
the Luo community often vote in Langata constituency, where ‘their man’ is a parliamentary candidate, Luhyas 
register to vote in Westlands, and many Kikuyus living in Kibera took their voting cards in Dagoretti 
constituency. This practice further highlights the territorialisation of ethnic identity which was discussed in the 
previous chapters, and draws attention to the entrenchment of ethnicised voting patterns in Kenyan society. 




Dagoretti and I didn’t get it. It was said that if you’re not a Kikuyu you won’t get it 
because the MP here is a Kikuyu, so I went to Westlands to get my help (SSB, 
Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 15 March 2010).  
 
 Similarly, a chairman of a youth group in Kibera states, ‘If I have a problem there is 
someone to run away to. If I have someone in government I can walk straight away to their 
houses’ (OBY, Interview, Jamhuri, Nairobi, 16 November 2009).  
Moreover, it is largely accepted  that if a member of the ethnic group is in the 
presidential seat he will flood the Cabinet, the Ministries, the parastatals, the army, the police 
and other institutions with members of his own community, and that this will have a 
beneficial impact on the everyday lives and opportunities of local level actors.  
They give out jobs with tribes. For me, I can go to a Ministry, if I say I am a Kikuyu 
they will do things very quickly for me. A Luo knows if a Ministry is run by a Luo 
they will get a job, or another tribe, wherever there is a lot of that tribe (D, Interview, 
Soweto, Kibera, 5 November 2009).   
 
Thus, what might primarily be a clientelistic arrangement between elites is expected to 
translate into a collective (and individualised) advantage for other members of the 
community. Similarly, a Kalenjin youth insists that ‘If I was in Moi’s era and I have a degree, 
I know I could have a very good job. If your tribe is in then I’ll employ your people, it will 
reach down to me’ (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010). These benefits need not 
necessarily be tangible, but they can also relate to more intangible assistance in the form of 
protection and security. In a discussion with a Nubian and a Kikuyu youth, the two agreed 
that if the police are members of their own community than they are less likely to be harassed 
by them: 
F: They [the Luos] want lakeside people to be top. Like at Kilimani police station, 
OB’s a Luo,
21
 he’ll ask “Why have they arrested you?” he will talk to you like you’re 
a human being. If it is a Kikuyu or a Kamba... nothing. He’ll kick you. 
 
                                                 
21
 OB stands for the station’s occurrence book. F here refers to the person in charge of the Occurrence Book on 
any given day. 
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W: Even if you’re arrested when patrolling and he’s a Kikuyu and I’m a Kikuyu, he’ll 
just say, “Go home.” It is the problem with Kenya. 
    (MUS, Group Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 2 January 2010) 
 
Indeed, the hope and expectation that ‘once in power everything will be alright’ (D, 
Interview, Soweto, Kibera, 5 November 2009) is of fundamental importance in understanding 
the violent reaction to the flawed election results in 2007.
22
  
In addition to these anticipated trickle down benefits which justify my earlier use of 
the phrase ‘clientelistic networks of patronage’,
23
 more obviously collective group benefits 
are identified as being important in determining support for and loyalty to an ethnic leader. 
The construction of better roads, the investment in educational establishments, schools and 
hospitals, and the wider provision of electricity and water, for example, are all frequently 
cited as advantages of having one of your own in power. However, a key point is that there 
need not be a strong redistributive effect from this patronage; what is important is the 
perception that someone from your own community is more likely to protect your interests 
than someone of another ethnic group (Erdmann and Engel 2007: 107). Lynch has identified 
this perception amongst the Kalenjin community where the metaphor that ‘although Moi may 
be bad, he is our rat’ was a ‘central plank of their [KANU’s] presidential campaign’ (Lynch 
2008: 552). One of my own interviewees echoes this sentiment, stating ‘It is better the devil 
you know than the angel you don’t’ (C, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 14 December 2009).  
However, while a large number of interviewees insist upon the benefits that 
accompany political power, many, conversely, denied that its effects were felt at the 
                                                 
22
 Moreover, this understanding of elections as matters of life or death is linked to issues of structural violence 
as discussed in the previous chapter. The intense poverty, lack of opportunity, poor healthcare and living 
conditions, and intimidation by police to which many of my interviewees are subjected in their day to day lives 
renders understandable the intensity of their hopes in the ethnic leader to rescue them from their current 
circumstances. Thus, politics in such situations is experienced and fought over perhaps more fiercely than it is 
amongst those in more affluent settings.  
23
 In that the benefit is seldom understood to be the result of a personalised interaction between leader and led, 
but it is understood that patron-client relations at the upper levels are expected to translate into collective and 
individual benefits at the local level. 
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grassroots, thus problematising the overly instrumentalist tone of much of the existing 
literature. One interviewee’s statement that ‘in reality, it doesn’t trickle down’ (K, Interview, 
Olympic, Kibera, 4 December 2009) echoes Williams’ argument that surprisingly little 
reaches the lower echelons of society through patronage networks, but rather it ‘sticks to a 
few hands at the top’ (Williams 1987: 639). Similarly, an alleged ODM document outlining 
campaign strategies for the 2007 elections
24
 cites the ‘potential for linkage to under-
development in Nyanza’ and the fact that ‘Kibera in his Langata constituency is the least 
developed and most volatile area in Nairobi’ as weaknesses of, and threats to, Raila’s 
presidential electability (Anon. 2007), indicating that his political position and power has not 
significantly benefited his community.
25
 Moreover, the fact that large numbers of Kikuyu 
have felt little benefit from Kibaki’s rule further indicates that the expectation of benefits may 
far outweigh their reality. However, it is the anticipation and the expectation that security and 
improved life conditions are firmly located in the hands of the ethnic leader, and that 
marginalisation and lack of opportunity will result from the ‘wrong’ community’s electoral 
triumph that is the crucial point. Lynch (2011: 9) has suggested that it is this exclusionary 
ethnicity in combination with ‘speculative loyalty’ – that is, the anticipation of security and 
assistance – which influences political behaviour. This offers a distinctly different 
understanding of ethnic politics, opening up the space for exploring localised debates and 
                                                 
24
 The document circulated the country via emails and blogs in the final months of the 2007 campaigns, though 
its origins remain much debated. Some speculate that it was fabricated by PNU members, and others attribute 
the tactics laid out in it to the ODM political consultant, Dick Morris (Kagwanja 2009: 376). I am cautious in 
my use of this document, given the questions over its origin. However, the plausibility of its contents to many 
Kenyans, in addition to the fact that much of it is reinforcing of my own data, allows for its tentative use to help 
illustrate the nature and operation of Kenyan politics. While a copy was given to me by an interviewee, it can 
also be accessed at http://www.scribd.com/doc/961835/ODM-Poll-Strategy. Hereafter I refer to this document 
as Anon. (2007).  
25
 It could be argued that this is due to the fact that he had not held a high enough position by 2007 to have made 
a significant impact. However, he has previously held cabinet level positions, as Minister of Energy between 
2001 and 2002, and as Minister of Roads, Public Works and Housing in Kibaki’s administration from 2003-
2005 which do not appear to have enabled him to secure significant development projects for his own 
community. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a large number of non-Luo residents in Kibera lamented the 
fact that Raila takes localised development projects to his own people in the slum.  
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interpretations of social and economic justice that are obscured by the broader neo-
patrimonial model. These local contours of Kenyan politics are explored in further detail later 
in the chapter, but the more affective dimensions Lynch alludes to are of importance here. 
Many interviewees who stressed the lack of any real benefits associated with political power 
suggest that ethnic voting behaviour is rather more related to issues of pride and superiority: 
The way I see, not all Kikuyus are rich, even some are poor. It is just because people 
want to say “We’re in power.” It is a pride, so they can boast that they’re in power. 
There is no benefit (PT, Interview, 4B, Mathare 2 May 2010). 
 
Similarly, in an article appearing in The Sunday Standard, entitled ‘Nyeri envies neighbours’ 
state goodies... but residents still proud of “mean” son’,  residents of Kibaki’s home district 
claim that they were disappointed that they had not enjoyed the benefits they had expected 
from Kibaki’s rule; nevertheless, they would still vote for him in the upcoming election 
(Mathangani and Njagih, 2007). 
You know there is no benefit, it is just pride. They say, “Our person is in power.” In 
many parts of Kikuyuland there are many poor, they have no money, they have no 





Thus, the ethnic leader can be said to be representative of the group’s status, a symbol of 
collective prominence (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 42) which, in turn, has an effect on 
individual feelings of self-worth. 
 Thus, the neo-patrimonial model is of central importance to an understanding of 
Kenyan elections, but the influence of patronage networks lies more in the hopes and fears 
for the future that they evoke than in a direct exchange of benefits for political support. 
Nevertheless, the expectation of improvements to life conditions from a fellow tribesman 
holding a position of political influence, and the feelings of superiority and pride which are 
attached to this power, in addition to the certainty that everyday life will be far harder under 
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the rule of another community, are deeply entrenched within local level understandings of 
Kenyan politics.  
 
Individual agency, Moral Ethnicity and Disruptions to the Habitus 
 Nevertheless, the understanding of ethnicised voting as a socialised disposition, a 
component of the habitus intimately related to assuring future prosperity and security, does 
not preclude its disruption, transformation or resistance by local actors. It is evident that 
many individuals voted against the grain of popular expectation and ethnic meta-narratives, 
and that localised histories and contexts could shift support away from fellow tribesmen to 
another politician for a variety of reasons. It has already been noted, for example, that the 
police action in Mathare in 2007 facilitated the emergence of an anti-Kibaki element within 
the local Kikuyu community. Similarly, at the individual level, a number of interviewees 
from ODM-affiliated communities suggested that they had voted for Kibaki as they felt he 
had improved overall conditions in Kenya since assuming the presidential seat. However, 
while non-ethnicised voting in the presidential election should not be understated, it is 
perhaps in the lower levels of political competition, in the parliamentary and civic contests, 
that it is most acutely observed. A candidate’s willingness and capacity to bestow material 
benefits and assistance upon the local community is often indicated less by his or her ethnic 
affiliation, and more by other factors such as personal status and relationships within the 
community. It is also signalled by other identity affiliations such as age or gender, and their 
capacity to mobilise some form of moral authority amongst local residents. Nevertheless, 
while ethnicity is of diminished importance, the rationale behind political support remains the 
same; speculative loyalty underpins voting behaviour even at this local level and support is 
granted by each individual to the candidate he or she feels will be of greatest assistance in the 
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future. It is the identification of who is most likely to offer some benefit or gain from their 
victory that is the issue at hand. This section discusses a few of these in further detail to 
highlight the wide variety of factors which can be drawn upon, but which each relate to the 
issue of hopes for future opportunity and prosperity. 
 
Identity factors and personal relationships 
In the relative anonymity of macro-level politics and economic development – where 
personal relationships and face-to-face relations between political and business elites and 
local level actors are rare – ethnicity is undoubtedly the overarching factor: 
In Kenya we have a culture that says to help someone who is closer to you, and 
someone of your tribe is closer to you. So if I vote my tribe he’ll develop my rural 
area, bring infrastructure there. If I’m looking for employment it is easier for me if my 
own is at the top (BEAT, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 7 April 2010).
 
 
However, at the micro-level, where politics is infused with personal relationships and 
candidates are understood to have a deeper knowledge of the everyday problems and 
challenges of people on the ground, other issues come to be of equal, if not greater, 
importance. It is no longer an anonymous, largely symbolic, interaction between leader and 
led, but rather a more intimate relationship which is assumed to be, if indeed it is not, based 
upon a mutual knowledge and recognition of each other. As a result, other factors which 
mark a candidate’s proximity to their constituents can be of importance. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
a personal friendship or connection with a particular candidate, which is most common at the 
civic level, can transcend ethnicised voting patterns in this arena. Friends and relations are 
often employed by political aspirants during the campaign period and it is assumed that 
should they be successful they will grant employment opportunities and share their new-
found wealth with those around them. In this context, then, ethnicity is largely unimportant as 
benefits are more likely to be received from someone intimately connected through personal 
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social networks than an anonymous ethnic candidate. Relatedly, those who have managed to 
obtain employment as leading members of campaign teams often give their vote to their 
‘employer’ in the hopes that upon their election they will either continue with their 
clientelistic practices of handouts on a regular, if infrequent, basis, or that they will find a job 
for them somewhere through their position and connections. There are clear hopes of 
continued support from politicians following the elections, even if it is in the form of 
infrequent assistance. A chief campaigner for Bishop Margaret Wanjiru in Starehe 
constituency for example, recalls that following the election the MP would no longer answer 
his calls, despite having promised him a job upon her election. However, upon accidentally 
running into the MP in Muthaiga police station, he expected, and indeed received, her 
assistance in securing the release of some friends who had been arrested (SIM, Interview, 
Kosovo, Mathare, 20 April 2010). Similarly, on one occasion when we were walking around 
Kibera, Nusrah and two of his friends who had been key figures in a civic candidate’s 
campaign team in Kibera came across their councillor. They approached him and he handed 
them two hundred shillings each. When I asked Nusrah about it he told me that the councillor 
owed that to them as they had helped him in his campaigns. Furthermore, when they arranged 
for me to interview the councillor over lunch in a local hoteli they attended the interview and 
very clearly expected, and received, lunch, sodas and miraa at the councillor’s expense. Thus, 
personal relationships, whether formed through pre-existing friendship ties, or through more 
short-term attachments during political campaigns, can disrupt ethnicised political behaviour; 
they are expected to result in greater individual benefits than perhaps would ensue from the 
success of another candidate, be they of the same ethnic community or not.   
Where this direct personal relationship is absent, however, other factors become 
important in identifying commonality, such as age, gender, religion or class, as well as party 
affiliation and proximity to the ethnic spokesperson. For example, Kavulla (2008: 258-259) 
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has suggested that given PNU’s dominance of the municipal level elections in the area, 
Margaret Wanjiru’s success as the ODM candidate for the parliamentary seat in Starehe 
constituency necessitates the conclusion that her status within the Pentecostal church, as well 
as her gender, appealed across ethnic boundaries and party affiliations.
26
 Similarly, in 
Dagoretti constituency, Beth Mugo’s appeal to older women is reflected upon by a number of 
interviewees, while her opponent, John Kiarie, a Kikuyu youth affectionately known as KJ, is 
said to have not only enjoyed the support of a significant contingent of the Luo and Luhya 
communities in the area because ‘the party’s ours’ (JUL, Interview, 56, Kawangware, 4 
March 2010), but also attracted a substantial section of the Kikuyu vote because he was a 
youth, someone who was seen to understand the problems of the large youth population in the 
slum. As one interviewee states, ‘There was not tribalism in the parliamentary seat. You see 
KJ is someone young’ (JU, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 16 March 2010). KJ, then, was 
perceived to be capable not only of providing for the Luo and Luhya communities in Kikuyu-
dominated Dagoretti constituency by virtue of his membership in Raila Odinga’s party, but 
he was also seen to have the interests of the youth, in general, at heart. Another interviewee 
draws attention to the intra-ethnic divisions highlighted in the competition between Mugo and 
KJ, as well as to the supposed youth solidarity across ethnic groups which the latter invoked: 
They realised that reaching KJ is easier than reaching an old lady. He can feel what 
you want and need easier than Mugo. Even if you go there now, to the CDF on a 
Monday morning, there are many old Kikuyu women there. So with a youth on board 
it is easier for them to know our problems (A, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 18 
January 2010).  
 
 Thus, once again it can be argued that this political support and loyalty for both Mugo and 
KJ was speculative; the latter was identified as someone who could provide assistance and 
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Given her affiliation with ODM, Margaret Wanjiru enjoyed the support of much of the Luo community living 
in Mathare. It is interesting to note that she is often referred to by interviewees simply as ‘Bishop’ effectively 
emphasising her religious identity and downplaying her Kikuyu identification, which is explicit in the name 
Wanjiru.   
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benefits in the future and would be able to advance the interests of the youth in the area 
whilst older Kikuyu women felt closer to the former. As Kavulla (2008: 258) states, ‘In an 
election the degree to which one can feel akin to a candidate is, of course, essential.’ 
Nevertheless, and perhaps for obvious reasons, this identification of who constitutes the best 
prospect for future prosperity, assistance or protection is highly contested within the local 
context. While both Bishop Wanjiru and KJ received support from significant contingents of 
their respective Kikuyu communities, at the same time, both they, and their supporters, were 
demonised by other Kikuyu residents as traitors to the community for their departure from 
Kibaki’s PNU party. This issue is returned to later in the chapter, as it is particularly 
interesting to pay attention to the socio-spatial dynamics in which such debates occur, or 
indeed do not. 
 
Individual Qualities, Generosity and Moral Authority  
 In addition to the advantages expected to result from affinities based upon identity 
factors and personal relationship ties, candidates must manipulate other aspects of their 
campaigns in order to manage their individual weaknesses and to translate their individual 
strengths into moral authority. Symbols, markers and indicators of a candidate’s moral 
authority are of fundamental importance in speculative loyalty and while ethnicity is one very 
powerful marker, it is certainly not the only one. Indeed, if the identificatory factors 
discussed above are seen to be indicative of the direction in which benefits and assistance 
will be bestowed, the issues discussed in this section are the signs of the candidate’s 
capability and willingness to take care of his or her constituents. Uncertainty with regards to 
an aspirant’s ability to take care of others, or to his/her generosity in doing so, can be 





 for example, drew attention to their marital status as an important issue in their 
campaigns. In my interviews with them, both suggested that there is a ‘stereotypic 
positioning’ that if a candidate ‘is not married then he can’t lead’ (KT, Interview, 6 
December 2009). The rationale underpinning this perception is that if he is unable to 
demonstrate his ability to take care of a wife and of domestic affairs, there is no guarantee 
that he will be able to look after his community: 
I’m not married and the issue of marriage came up, because you know if you’re not 
married you can’t campaign. So I lied to people, saying that my wife was abroad 
studying and I even had to call my Mum and tell her to confirm that. You see you 
must convince people that you can take care of a family first before you can take care 
of them (SIM, Interview, 18 March 2010). 
 
Thus, marital status acts as a symbol of moral authority.  
However, perhaps the most prominent marker of moral authority, of generosity, good 
nature, and prospects for future assistance, lies in the use of money and other handouts during 
campaigns. Indeed, this practice of gift-giving, which many would class as bribery, is almost 
equally as pervasive an issue in Kenyan politics as the ethnic factor, and it operates in a 
similar manner, both through top-down mobilisation and through bottom-up pressures. One 
interviewee laughed when I asked if she would vote for someone who had good ideas and 
policies, but no money, stating, ‘There’s no way that could happen! How can you come and 
you expect us to give you our votes and there is someone outside pouring money? 
Automatically he takes it’ (ED, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 7 April 2010). While some 
scholars have questioned the effectiveness of simple vote-buying in the context of a secret 
ballot, and Nugent (2007: 254-255) strongly asserts that ‘money cannot literally buy votes 
under conditions of a secret ballot’, I do not think that it should be discounted entirely. The 
prominence of the use of agents stationed outside polling centres to distribute cash, which 
was highlighted by many of my interviewees, points, at the very least, to the belief that direct 
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 The exact area of residence of these interviewees is withheld so as to protect anonymity.  
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bribes are effective. Moreover, a small, but not insignificant, number of interviewees 
suggested that their vote was influenced by this eleventh-hour handout. CHOC, for example, 
states, ‘When I was going [to vote] my mind was set that I’d vote for this person, but when I 
reached there someone bribed me so I changed my mind’ (CHOC, Interview, Waithaka, 
Nairobi, 8 March 2010). Similarly, a Luo youth who enthused about Raila Odinga and ODM 
throughout his interview, conceded that he was persuaded to vote, and indeed to mobilise 
other voters, for a PNU councillor on election-day, stating, ‘I voted for him, we were paid 
1500 each to do this and I brought boys so I got 3000. // I voted him as councillor and then 
the MP and the President for ODM.’ (JAK, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 20 May 2010). It is 
interesting to note here, however, that money appears to have only been a significant factor at 
the civic level, recalling my earlier point that in the anonymity of macro-level politics, 
ethnicity is often seen to be a more accurate indicator of the direction of future benefits. 
When such interviewees were asked why they did not simply take the money and still vote 
for their favoured candidate, many expressed their belief that the secrecy of the ballot could 
not be guaranteed. Others implied a certain moral obligation having already accepted the 
money. I would suggest that this is entangled in the broader culture of kitu kidogo in which 
gifts are usually given in exchange for some favour or service.
28
 This supports Collier and 
Vicente’s (2012: 125) suggestion that vote-buying ‘may nevertheless become effective either 
if the secrecy of the election is doubted, or if the voter attaches moral value to keeping her 
word.’ 
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 This phrase, whilst commonly used to refer to a ‘bribe’ as mentioned in a previous chapter, is also used to 
cover a wide variety of other ‘greyer’ practices in this moral economy of corruption. Indeed, my interviewees’ 
expectation of something in return for speaking with me is indicative of this broader culture and is further 
illustrative of the power and influence of local level expectations. It was impossible for me to effectively 
mobilise interviewees without offering some small gift in appreciation of their participation. Moreover, local 
level assistants would often tell potential interviewees that I was a ‘good person’ and that they would receive 
something small for their time.  
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However, while not wishing to downplay the simplistic notion of vote-buying 
entirely, I am in agreement with Nugent (2007) that, on the whole, the function of money and 
other handouts in political campaigns is primarily a symbolic one which points to the 
candidate’s capability and willingness to distribute wealth and benefits in a direction which is 
seen to be favourable to each individual. Thus, it is perceived as evidence of the potential for 
future gains, a tangible basis for speculative loyalty, rather than as a direct bribe. The nature 
of gifts, handouts and other favours is wide-ranging, including cash, food, drink, clothes, and 
lessos, as well as more clientelistic forms of assistance such as the payment of school fees, 
funeral costs, rent and other such services. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that 
the investment in certain development projects increases in the lead-up to the elections. 
Several interviewees in Mathare, for example, recalled that Maina Kamanda had utilised CDF 
funds to construct public toilets within Kosovo and had planned to hold a grand opening 
ceremony at the height of the campaign.
29
 Nugent (2001: 409) suggests a similar practice was 
at work in the Ghanaian elections of 2000, where ‘the provision of roads and electric poles at 
election time was calculated to persuade the voters that the NDC was genuinely committed to 
“development” and had their best interests at heart.’  Thus the line between clientelism and 
vote-buying is quite indistinct and this blurring is related to the fact that all such practices 
form the basis of speculative loyalties rather than a direct patrimonial exchange. Indeed, ‘it is 
an institutionalized behaviour signifying the willingness to take care of “your people”, 
namely the constituents’ (Lindberg 2003: 124).
30
 This symbolic capital which is attached to 
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 However, one of my interviewees who had been an active campaigner for the ODM candidate explained that 
the ceremony was postponed because he, and other members of his campaign team had, under the cover of 
darkness, pasted ODM posters all over the walls of the toilets. So, ‘when the MP came to open the toilet, he saw 
them surrounded with posters so he postponed opening the toilet’ (SIM, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 15 April 
2010). 
30
 However, while in Ghana Nugent demonstrates that the distribution of cash and handouts is construed in 
‘overtly moral terms’ this does not appear to be the case in Kenya. It is an interesting contradiction and 
ambiguity that, at the same time as eschewing the corruption of the use of money and handouts both amongst 
the leaders and amongst the led, the practice is prevalent and expected, in fact it is demanded.  
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gifts in campaigns is what is of importance, and not the monetary value of the gifts. It is not, 
then, that ‘bribery may become more costly because allegiance based on identity may 
increase the “price” of inducing a change of vote’ as Collier and Vicente (2012: 121) 
postulate, but rather the simple fact that there is a gift of some sort. The following exchange 
between myself and a Luhya interviewee from Kawangware is indicative of this point: 
BEAT: If a politician gave us good money then we voted for him and for those with 
nothing, they lost. // 
S: So let’s say you, you are a Luhya, say Fred Gumo came here and he gives you 100 
to vote for him and then the next day Beth Mugo comes and gives you 1000, would 
you vote for her? 
BEAT: [She laughs] You can’t. Mostly people vote their tribe, even if you could get 
money from a politician of another tribe, you’ll vote for your tribesman. 
    (BEAT, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 7 April 2010) 
 
Thus, in this scenario, Gumo has demonstrated his generosity by giving kitu kidogo, and a 
larger amount of money from another candidate is not sufficient to alter the voter’s allegiance 
to her tribesman. Candidates must translate their particular qualities into moral authority, they 
must be able to demonstrate their generosity and good nature and their capacity to assist and 
benefit their constituents in order to be successful on election-day.  
This section has argued that factors other than ethnicity can come to be of importance 
to individual voters, all of which predominantly revolve around this notion of expected gains 
and benefits. Localised contestations, intra-community divisions and cross-ethnic solidarities 
could be pointed to as indicative of a vibrant moral ethnicity at work in Kenyan politics. 
Indeed, some scholars have suggested that these local divisions and debates over who 
constitutes the best chance at securing individual and collective benefits can offer a ‘more 
inclusive civic and national consciousness’ (Klopp 2002: 270) and have ‘distinct 





 (Klopp 2002). However, the following section takes a less 
optimistic view of the contours of local politics, and suggests that rather than operating in 
opposition to political tribalism, moral ethnicity has actually become conflated with it 
through the discourse of ethnic territoriality.  There is a ‘“dark side” of moral ethnicity’ 
(Cheeseman 2009: 100), where socio-spatial dynamics and ethnicised expectations reinforce 
the discourses of political tribalism. Thus, the top-down and bottom-up nature of politics do 
not necessarily act in opposition to each other, with the latter offering a clear route out of 
violent ethnic politics, but rather they contain a certain duality which has significant 
implications for the future of Kenyan democracy.  
 
Socio-spatial dynamics, Ethnic Territoriality and the Local Politics of Kenyan elections   
So far it has been argued that while at the macro level of largely anonymous 
interaction between leaders and led, ethnicity is often perceived to be the most effective way 
of securing future benefits and assistance. This is further complicated at the lower levels of 
political competition where localised contexts and individual relationships and experiences 
can disrupt ethnicised understandings of speculative loyalty. However, individual agency and 
the internal debates and contestations which operate at the local level are constrained not only 
by the meta-narrative of ethnic identification, but also, and perhaps more powerfully, by 
socio-spatial dynamics and the territorialised identities that they produce. Ethnic territoriality 
has the effect of creating a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between moral ethnicity and political 
tribalism (Cheeseman 2009: 100), and social pressures, both implicitly felt and explicitly 
exerted, can make it difficult, if not inherently risky, for individual actors to resist the ethnic 
and territorialised expectations inherent in Kenyan politics at the grass roots. This section 
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 The phrase ‘political tribalism’ is employed by Lonsdale as the counter to his notion of ‘moral ethnicity.’ He 
uses the term to refer to the politicisation of ethnicity by elites.  
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explores how ethnicised spaces became visibly politicised during the 2007 campaigns and 
how this served as a constraint upon, and a suppression of, individual agency and intra-ethnic 
political debates. The persistence of ethnic territoriality in Kenyan society, both in the rural 
arena, as well as within the various urban centres across the country, has already been 
discussed at some length. It has been argued that discourses of territorial ownership engender 
a native/immigrant, host/guest dichotomy in which minority groups are subject to a reduced 
citizenship status and are expected to conform to the political wishes of the majority or native 
community. However, this expectation of conformity is simultaneously felt by, and imposed 
upon, individuals within the host community who might consider, vocalise or display their 
preference for another candidate or party, and it is this intra-community policing and the 
localised suppression of internal debate which is explored here.  
In moments of transition or tension, ethnicised spaces become highly politicised, the 
borders between ‘our’ area and ‘their’ area become increasingly distinct and reified, and the 
boundaries of political acceptability are visibly enacted. In the lead-up to the 2007 elections, 
a number of interviewees recall that the words ODM and PNU were scrawled onto the walls 
and inscribed on the iron sheet houses of their settlements, particularly on the structures near 
to the imagined borders of the territory. One interviewee, for example, recalls that after 
fighting broke out between PNU and ODM supporters during a rally in the Ronda area of 
Nakuru, it was decided by local residents that PNU should no longer be allowed to campaign 
within the territory: 
So then we said that as from today, no PNU truck can pass there, they’ll just do their 
campaign in their own territory and we will do our campaign in our area. That is when 
we wrote “ODM zone” in our area, all over, and they wrote “PNU zone” on their 
territories. // We were writing it with paint on the walls, on the markets, the kiosks, on 





Moreover, the extensive use of campaign posters erected in these neighbourhoods, and the 
refusal to allow opposition posters to be put up had the similar effect of visibly demonstrating 
the political identity of the territory and ownership of the space: 
Mostly, say in Pondamali, you’ll get ODM posters everywhere and maybe they give 
you PNU posters to put in the area, there is nowhere you can put it. Maybe just in 
your house, because on the highway, on the electricity poles from top to bottom it is 
ODM, ODM, so there is nowhere to put your PNU posters (HIB, Interview, 
Pondamali, Nakuru, 23 June 2010). 
 
The political leanings of ethnicised spaces were also vocally articulated, as opposition 
campaigners were prevented, often violently, from holding rallies in these territories and local 
residents were expected to voice their support for the accepted party only. As one interviewee 
states, referring to the ODM zone of 4B, Mathare, ‘It was difficult for PNU to talk about 
PNU, the people living in the area wouldn’t allow that’ (DO, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 11 May 
2010). This suffocating political environment, with its expectations of absolute conformity, 
effectively suppressed open political debate within the area and engendered a strong notion 
that ‘you have to go with the chorus of the area’ (GB, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 20 
June 2010) amongst both host and guest communities alike. While this visible and vocal 
politicisation of space can be markedly coercive in and of itself, it is the active policing of 
these boundaries and the disciplining of deviant behaviour, both within and between 
communities, which is perhaps the most powerful constraint upon individual agency.   
It has already been noted that during the 2007 campaigns the reduced citizenship 
status imposed upon minorities was violently enforced as they were harassed, intimidated, 
attacked, and sometimes even killed for expressing their support of opposition parties.
32
 The 
disciplining of political behaviour, however, also operates to constrain individual choice, 
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 See Jenkins (2012: 13-14) for examples of the ways in which minorities were violently disciplined during the 
campaigns. While in this section I remain focused upon how socio-spatial dynamics influence intra-ethnic 
politics, it should be noted that verbal abuse and vicious attacks upon ethnic minorities are very important 
factors in the creation of an intimidating and repressive intra-communal political atmosphere and the 
containment of alternative political preferences within the ethnic community.  
184 
 
freedom and agency within the local ethnic community. In a society in which the ethnic 
spokesperson is understood to be the primary protector and defender of collective benefits 
and security, to vote against him is perceived as disloyalty and a betrayal of the entire ethnic 
group: ‘If you vote for another tribe it’s like you’re selling your tribe’ (NJ, Interview, 
Kosovo, Mathare, 12 April 2010). Members of the community who are vocal in their support 
of other candidates are labelled as traitors and are subjected to insults and abuse by their 
fellow tribesmen. These intimidating behaviours thus reinforce the sense of obligation and 
pressure to vote the ‘right’ way, effectively reducing the space for contestation and debate. In 
ethnicised spaces the abuse of known opposition supporters became an everyday occurrence 
and they were subjected to insults and verbal attacks whenever they walked through the 
neighbourhood. They ‘would be teased and booed’ (SS, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 12 
April 2010) and ‘there was that hate, like if an ODM person passed near they’d hurl insults at 
them and abuse them’ (BTS, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 14 April 2010). One interviewee 
explains that he received such continued and extensive threats, warnings and abuse from the 
elders in his neighbourhood that ‘it reached a time I couldn’t even pass where they are’ (J, 
Interview, 4B, Mathare, 2 May 2010). Moreover, the potential repercussions of vocal support 
of an unfavourable candidate or party were not limited to verbal attack. Interviewees also 
reported being ostracised by other members of their community: 
If you were ODM but you were campaigning for PNU, when they see you with ODM 
you’ll be in shit. If you came here, they won’t sit with you and they’ll get mad with 
you (EL, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 4 May 2010).  
 
Similarly the businesses of opposition supporter were often shunned by the community. One 
interviewee recalls that ‘a friend here lost his business because he was vocal that he was 
supporting ODM, so people didn’t take that well and they stopped buying from him.’ (J, 
Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 19 April 2010). In some cases prominent opposition supporters 
from within the ethnic community were threatened with, if not actually subjected to, violent 
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disciplining of their perceived transgressions. A number of interviewees in Kosovo, Mathare 
told the story of a young Kikuyu woman by the name Njeri, who was a prominent supporter 
of Margaret Wanjiru’s ODM campaign in Starehe constituency. Interviewees recalled that her 
vocal support of ODM attracted much negative attention in the area and that one day during 
the campaigns some local youths went to her house with the intention of burning it to the 
ground.
33
 Similarly, a Luo youth in Pondamali explains the potential for violent reprisals for 
the support of the wrong candidate or party: 
But the people on the ground, in their mind and hearts they’ll call me a traitor, it will 
reach an extent that as I go to campaign some will maybe break my house, some may 
mug me and even they can chase me from the plot, or I can be beaten (HR, Interview, 
Pondamali, Nakuru, 26 June 2010).  
 
In a similar way individuals who were minorities within a particular territory and had 
conformed to the political expectations of their area, were consequently subject to external 
abuse from their own community. One Kikuyu youth, who had been resident in Luo-
dominated Gatuikera for his entire life and who was an avid supporter of ODM states: 
That made my fellow tribesmen to hate me. They had that grudge, they abused me 
telling me that I am not thinking. But I stood and told them that according to me I 
wanted the change that ODM were promising. //Most of them were insulting me, 
telling me my head is... maybe I’ve gone mad, gone crazy. Some were telling me I 
was thinking in a negative way, other Kikuyu. Since that day most of them hate me 
(KM, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 5 December 2009).   
 
KM indicates that he was able to ignore the accusations, insults and abuse he received from 
members of his own community and continued with his support of ODM throughout the 
campaigns. However, I would suggest that KM’s ability to remain vocal in his opposition to 
ethnic expectations is related to his residency in an ODM zone where there are few other 
members of his ethnic group with whom he must interact in everyday life. For those who live 
in areas dominated by their own group the frequency, intensity, and indeed violent potential, 
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 The reasons why they did not succeed in burning her house are disputed amongst interviewees. Some suggest 
that the women and mothers in the area appealed to the youths to desist, while others suggest it was the elders or 
other male youths.  
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of abuse was remarkably effective at suppressing their support, or at very least their open and 
vocal support, of opposition candidates. Thus, as a Kikuyu youth from Kibera exclaimed in 
frustration, ‘In a democracy you vote for who you want, but that is not what is happening 
here’ (D, Interview, Soweto, Kibera, 5 November 2009).  
While this policing of behaviour certainly had an impact on a significant number of 
individuals who indicated that ‘I’m voting this tribe // but it is not my choice of candidate’ (J, 
Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 1 March 2010), it did not necessarily prevent individuals 
voting however they wished, even in ethnicised spaces. Many interviewees suggested that 
while these socio-spatial dynamics often silenced their outward expression of political 
support, they had still voted their conscience, keeping their support of the opposition a secret 
from their friends, relatives and neighbours for fear of reprisal.
34
  
Me, personally, according to all the presidents that we have had in Kenya, Kibaki has 
done something in our nation, he has achieved something which everyone can see. 
He’s a good guy, but the advisers leading him are bad. I can’t say that where the Luo 
are though, I can be killed or beaten because people are after their tribe, it is stronger 
than everything else (HR, Interview, Pondamali, Nakuru, 26 June 2010). 
 
Thus, whilst for many people the local politics of Kenyan elections served to constrain their 
individual agency and choice of candidate, it was arguably most effective in its suppression 
of open political debate, which was virtually non-existent in ethnicised spaces:  
When it reached campaigning it is difficult to find another tribe in this area, there is 
no freedom in this area. They want that it is a Luo, let him be the councillor, they 
won’t allow another tribe’ (NO, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 12 December 2009).  
 
Conversely, in ethnically mixed spaces these dynamics do not appear to have been 
nearly as predominant. The territory is not seen as belonging to any particular group, and as 
such there is little risk of marginalisation and exclusion on ethnic grounds from local leaders. 
Debate within these areas is open and voting is largely down to individual choice: 
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 Indeed, this overestimation of ethnic conformity further fuelled the absolute certainty that the elections had 
been rigged in many places.  
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There were ODM and PNU supporters, the rallies were held here, but there was no 
hatred, you have a right to campaign here, or to campaign anywhere. // The groups 
from 4A were ODM supporters and Kosovo is PNU, but here we’re neutral, you can 
just vote for who you want, no group would come and force you to vote for them (SS, 
Interview, Nigeria, Mathare 18 May 2010). 
 
This is not to say that political debate was entirely non-conflictual at this level, nor that 
ethnicity becomes irrelevant in these areas. Indeed, it was not uncommon for political debates 
to result in arguments, and occasionally fights. However, the environment is not so tightly 
controlled by local residents, stake holders, and gangs.
35
 It is perhaps in these de-
territorialised areas that the emancipatory potential of moral ethnicity resides. The absence of 
ethnic territoriality ensures that there is limited conflation of moral ethnicity and political 
tribalism and there is a greater freedom of political debate and choice. 
 
Violent Politics and Kenyan Campaigns 
 This final section moves away slightly from the issues directly related to ethnicised 
and non-ethnicised voting patterns, and the sometimes-violent localised suppression of intra-
community debate, in order to explore the role of ethnic militias and vigilante groups and the 
top-down employment of violent tactics in Kenyan politics. As has been pointed out in 
Chapter One, there is a substantial body of literature which demonstrates that the pre-
electoral instrumentalisation of disorder by Kenyan elites through the use of ethnic vigilante 
groups has been a prominent feature of elections since the transition to multiparty politics in 
1992. From as early as October 1991 incidents of ethnic violence erupted across the country, 
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 The leaders of intra-community policing vary quite significantly from place to place. Some suggested that 
local youths who were employed as campaigners were the key perpetrators, while others suggested that it was 
village elders, and others simply pointed to residents of the area in general. Others drew attention to what I have 
termed ‘stakeholders’ – by this I refer largely to local businessmen and landlords who have more to lose from an 
unfavourable candidate’s election. For example, in Kawangware, where the majority of landlords are Kikuyu, 
several candidates’ promises of reducing or eradicating rent in the slum would have drastically affected their 
individual security and wealth. It appears that they took on an active role in persuading and coercing local 
residents to toe the ethnic line. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that they employed members of 
Mungiki in the area to coerce local residents and to intimidate, and even evict, ethnic minorities from the area.  
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beginning with clashes over land at Meteitei farm in Nandi district and soon spreading across 
Rift Valley, Western and other parts of Kenya.
36
 In the Rift Valley these attacks were 
orchestrated and funded by prominent politicians and carried out by trained militias of 
Kalenjin warriors in ‘a strategy adopted to intimidate and terrorise the ethnic groups that 
seem to be in support of multiparty democracy’ (NCCK 1992: 3). Indeed, the Parliamentary 
Select Committee report into the clashes – commonly referred to as the Kiliku report – 
documents that members of these militias were paid between 1,000 and 2,000 Kenyan 
shillings for killing a person and 10,000 shillings for burning a permanent house (Republic of 
Kenya 1992: 75). Similarly a document released by the National Council of Churches of 
Kenya points to elite involvement by identifying the vehicles involved in transporting these 
Kalenjin warriors as belonging to prominent MPs (NCCK 1992: 17). The 1997 elections, and 
to a lesser extent the 2002 campaigns, similarly indicate that candidate militias under names 
such as Jeshi la Mzee, Jeshi la Embakasi, Jeshi la King’ole, Baghdad Boys and Chinkororo, 
were utilised by politicians to intimidate opponents and to disrupt campaign rallies.
37
 
Violence has certainly become an integral part of Kenyan politics, and many scholars have 
pointed out that it has become ‘commonplace for politicians to have their own (violent) gangs 
of supporters, generally of the same ethnic group’ (de Smedt 2009: 595). A number of 
analyses of the 2007-2008 crisis allude to the continued prominence of these ethnically based 
political goon squads and imply that they play a similar role to those of the early 1990s. 
Kamungi (2009: 352), for example, writes: 
Ethnic militias such as the Kalenjin Boys and the 12 Disciples still exist, retained 
through monetary and employment incentives to perpetrate violence or mobilise 
support for party positions on national issues such as the constitution. 
 
                                                 
36
 For a detailed chronology of the spread of violence, see NCCK (1992) and for more comprehensive accounts 
and analysis, see Human Rights Watch (1993), Republic of Kenya (1992),  Throup and Hornsby (1998)  and 
Klopp (2001). 
37
 See Anderson (2002: 547-552) for an account of the various vigilante groups which emerged in the 1990s. 
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This section explores these so-called ‘ethnic militias’ in the context of the 2007 campaigns 
and suggests that while politicians certainly made use of hired youths to disrupt the electoral 
process and to intimidate opponents, these groups were often far less cohesive, bounded and 
organised than their predecessors, and their characterisation as predominantly mono-ethnic 
does not appear to be entirely accurate in the 2007 context. While in the 1990s large-scale 
violence primarily took place in the pre-electoral environment and was designed to 
intimidate, displace and otherwise prevent opposition supporters from voting, in 2007 the 
most significant violence took place after the election, and consequently was markedly 
different in nature. Indeed, the various collections of youths who had participated heavily in 
the campaign activities of a particular candidate, who were effectively their ‘militias’, did not 
necessarily participate on the same side during the post-election violence. One Kikuyu 
interviewee, for example, explains that he was one of ‘Ruto’s boys’ during the campaigns, 
part of a group of youths from all different communities who would meet, armed with 
rungus, and be transported to opposition rallies in order to create chaos. However, once the 
violence started, ‘I came back here, because I am a Kikuyu. I put the party aside now, I come 
as a Kikuyu’ (AV, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 4 February 2010).  It is helpful, then, to make 
a clear distinction between the groups of youths attached to politicians during the 
campaigning period, and the mobilisation of more organised ethnicised elements – such as 
Kalenjin warriors and Mungiki – in the post-election environment. Thus, this section focuses 
solely upon the relationship between, and the activities of, political leaders and their 
associated youth
38
 in the campaigning period of the 2007 elections. 
Candidates for office, whether at the civic, parliamentary or presidential level, all 
employ groups of youth to assist them in their campaigns and in 2007, while some politicians 
                                                 
38
 While this term is used throughout the thesis to refer to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, it should 
not be inferred that women are excluded from these campaign teams.  
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apparently made use of established and semi-cohesive groups, such as Mungiki, Siafu and 
perhaps Jeshi la Mzee,
39
 this was not the norm, at least not at the level of local politics. Many 
interviewees who took an active part in the campaign period and who were, for all intents and 
purposes, on the payroll of various politicians, indicate a more organic and fluid recruitment 
and participation process, suggesting that these groups were rarely pre-established, organised 
vigilante gangs. Rather, they were amorphous and unstructured assortments of youth, largely 
emerging out of the various street-corner organisations and friendship groups of urban micro-
territories. Some of these groups were approached by politicians, and others actively sought 
out candidates to whom they could offer themselves as campaigners. SIM, for example 
explains that the politicians ‘came to our base where we youth used to gather and we talked 
and we decided to work with them’ (SIM, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 15 April 2010). 
Similarly, AR recalls that ‘when the campaigns started, we formed groups and the guys vying 
for the seats looked for groups like us and we were paid to campaign for a certain candidate’ 
(AR, Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 1 March 2010).  
While these groups were certainly engaged in violent activities during the campaigns, 
this was only one aspect of their involvement, and their role has metamorphosed quite 
significantly from the primarily violent intimidatory tactics of the 1990s militias. Indeed, the 
responsibilities and activities of youth groups in the 2007 campaigns were many and varied. 
At times they assumed the role of enthusiastic, yet largely benevolent cheerleaders; at other 
times they adopted more ‘traditionally’ malevolent and violent tactics and were used to instil 
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 There is strong evidence to suggest that elements of Mungiki were involved in Dagoretti MP Beth Mugo’s 
campaign, and that Raila drew assistance from the Siafu vigilante group in Kibera, and there is some limited 
indication that Fred Gumo reactivated the Luhya group called Jeshi la Mzee. However, even with these 
contingents, which could perhaps be understood as ‘ethnic militias’, other people who are not members of these 
groups also played an active part in the campaign teams. Indeed, FZ, a Nubian youth from Kibera told me that 
the councillor for whom he and three of his friends – each from different ethnic communities – were 
campaigning ‘took us up to the MP, to Beth Mugo, and we became her soldiers’ (FZ, Interview, Makina, 
Kibera, 3 August 2010). Thus, even those candidates who may have utilised more established vigilante groups 
akin to the political ‘armies’ of the 1990s,  did not turn to them exclusively.  
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fear and to intimidate political opponents and their supporters. Youths were often employed 
to follow candidates around as they campaigned, to attend their rallies, singing and cheering 
their names. Indeed, one civic candidate indicates that he employed some youth solely for the 
purpose of ‘composing songs, because people must sing’ (LEO, Interview, 18 March 2010) 
and another interviewee describes his involvement in the campaigns as being ‘just like 
celebrating with the councillors, shouting with them’ (EL, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 4 May 
2010).
40
 I observed the verve, excitement and enthusiasm with which this role is enacted 
during a ‘YES vote’ campaign rally for the constitutional referendum which took place in 
Nairobi on 1 August 2010. As I crossed Uhuru Park, I heard lots of screaming and shouting, 
and the distinctive noise of numerous plastic vuvuzelas. When I reached Uhuru highway and 
was about to cross over heading towards Nairobi’s Central business district I saw two trucks 
packed full of campaigners donning the green t-shirts and hats of the Yes campaign, and 
others who had painted their bodies and faces green and were waving small green flags 
pronouncing “YES.” They were standing in the back of an open truck, hanging off the sides 
and perched on top of the roof. Dozens of others were running and dancing alongside as the 
vehicles slowly made their way towards the entrance of Uhuru Park ready for the rally. 
Everyone was singing, chanting and shouting. The pomp and spectacle of the campaign 
certainly generated a sense of hype and excitement as I and other passers-by stopped to 
watch. Gachigua (2008: 12) suggests that such hype and glitz was typical during the 2007 
campaigns and was designed to attract crowds and media attention and Haugerud (1995: 1) 
has similarly argued that ‘exuberant showmanship is one enduring face of Kenyan political 
life.’ It is this creation of spectacle that forms an important role of these youth groups. These 
campaign teams also often take on the task of distributing handouts, such as cash, t-shirts, 
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 EL notes however, that this group was also simultaneously acting as their candidate’s security detail, and were 
expected to protect him should they be attacked by an opposing group.  
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lessos and food, on behalf of the politicians. SIM, for example, a key campaigner for 
Margaret Wanjiru recalls that ‘one day the Bishop called us and told us that there is some 
flour to be distributed to people, so we went to Huruma to distribute it’ (SIM, Interview, 
Kosovo, Mathare, 15 April 2010). They are also paid to put up posters of their candidate and 
to generally praise their name to all who will listen. Thus, these are not simply criminalistic 
and violent goon squads used to intimidate people and to whip up tension; they are employed 
to create the pomp and spectacle of a successful campaign. 
However, it would be misleading to suggest that intimidation and violence does not 
constitute an important dimension of their activities. At times violent clashes are 
unintentional, such as when residents of an ethnicised space, or another candidate’s 
supporters, catch a group removing the ‘preferred’ or ‘acceptable’ candidate’s posters from 
an area. Nevertheless, deliberate and strategic violence is also an integral part of each group’s 
modus operandi and they are funded to attend and disrupt the rallies of their opponents, to 
prevent opposition candidates campaigning in their strongholds, and generally to disturb the 
campaign and electoral process. One young woman who was involved in the campaigns in 
Dagoretti states, ‘We were taken to rallies of our opponents to spoil them. It was fun’ (BB, 
Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 3 March 2010), and a youth campaigning for Stanley 
Livondo – the PNU parliamentary candidate in Kibera – describes a day in which they tried 
to campaign in Luo-dominated Sarangombe Ward. He states: 
They
41
 saw us heading to Sarangombe, immediately, in a personal car in Kamkunji, 
they were dishing out 500 shillings saying “Livondo’s people are coming, kill them! 
The constitution, they felt that we were a threat because Raila had to win the MP 
seat.
42
 So they dished out money. The intention was to kill (AT, Interview, Makina, 
Kibera, 21 December 2009).  
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 He seems unclear as to who constitutes this ‘they.’ He initially suggests that it was ‘400 hired hooligans’, but 
later he suggests that it was members of the Siafu alone – most likely it was a mixture of both. 
42




It is not uncommon for members of these campaign groups to be at the centre of suppressing 
political debate within ethnicised territories, but it should not be assumed that all disciplining 
of deviant political behaviour is carried out by paid youths, nor indeed that all intimidation 
and abuse of opposition supporters is directed from above. These groups often act 
independently of elite provocation in policing borders, and they frequently operate alongside 
more organic forms of intimidation and abuse by local residents who are not active 
campaigners, as described in the previous section. Thus, top-down mobilisation and bottom-
up practices are often mutually reinforcing and should be explored together. 
At the most extreme end of the scale of violent tactics undertaken by these group are 
premeditated and specifically targeted attacks upon opposition candidates or their supporters. 
Some interviewees indicated that they had been directly recruited to destroy property or to 
kill opposing candidates. One interviewee recalls, ‘I was approached by someone sent by 
Raila to organise some boys to burn the CitiHoppa buses because they are owned by Kikuyu. 
// We were told, “We’ll give you 5,000 now and 5,000 after the job is done”’ (JUL, 
Interview, 56, Kawangware, 4 March 2010). Similarly FZ remembers an exchange between 
himself, two of his friends, and a councillor for whom they were working at the time: 
Our councillor told us // that in your plot, if there are some dirty things like this mud 
here, you must remove it so that here is clean. It won’t bring a good picture to your 
compound. I asked him, “What do you mean?” and he said, “In our compound there 
are dirty leaves and we must remove them and throw it away,” I didn’t understand 
what was that dirty leaf, without knowing that he meant his opponent who was very 
strong... to remove him. There is when we knew that he meant V, to remove him is to 
kill him. // He gave us money and we planned (FZ, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 3 
August 2010). 
 
FZ goes on to explain that he and his friends saw an opportunity here to extort money from 
both councillors, and having been paid for the job by the first,  they decided, ‘we go to V and 
we tell him, “they’ve sent us to come and kill you with this money. We’ll do what our boss 
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has sent us to do” so that V could worry and he could give us more money.’ Having done 
this, they arranged with V to make it seem as if he had been attacked: 
We arranged a deal for the next day, the group of three of us and V. “The day you are 
supposed to kill me you just come” and we came and we broke his windscreen and we 
broke his car and we put dents in his car, and he had some bruises // and that incident 
was in the media, that the councillor was going to be killed by a group of gangsters. 
We told [our] councillor “We tried but there were some Flying Squad in the area and 
they interrupted us” so Councillor thought we had done the mission. 
 
This story raises attention to the ways in which youths use politicians during the campaigns. 
Often the emphasis is placed upon the manipulation of unemployed youths by political elites, 
and while I certainly do not wish to downplay the importance of this dimension, it should 
also be noted that these youths also use and manipulate politicians. In fact, many interviewees 
who were involved in the campaigns suggested that they were not attached to one candidate 
alone, but joined in with other groups in an effort to capitalise upon the financial rewards, and 
many explained that the campaigns were ‘like a job.’ A Kalenjin youth living in Kaptembwa 
in Nakuru, for example, explains that he initially campaigned for ODM, but after speaking 
with his PNU friends he discovered that they were being paid 200 shillings more, ‘So that 
tempts you to cross the border to campaign with them. We campaigned in their area and they 
came to our area too’ (KV, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 16 June 2010). Thus, the ethnic 
component of the 1990s militias is complicated by these fluid and unbounded groups and 
often members of supposedly ‘rival’ ethnic communities campaigned together. Even Kikuyu 
youths in the Rift Valley joined in with campaigns for William Ruto: 
That time we were Ruto’s boys in the area, working for him in the campaigns. // We 
follow where there is money and here no one has money like Ruto. So we used to go 
where there is money, but we know where we belong (AV, Interview, Huruma, 
Eldoret, 4 February 2010). 
 
Moreover, members of opposing campaign groups could be persuaded to work together 
temporarily in a recognised opportunism. FZ, given the difficult task of putting up PNU 
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posters in the Luo stronghold of Gatuikera, approached three ‘kingpins’
43
 in the area and told 
them, ‘We’re not after politics, we are after our stomachs, and if our stomachs cry hunger 
then we can do anything. We want to put up these posters with you and we will give you 
5000 each’ (FZ, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 3 August 2010).  
 Given the intolerance for transgressions from the expected ethnicised support, 
however, youths campaigning for ‘unacceptable’ candidates had to negotiate and manage 
their situation very carefully. While some did this by convincing their fellow tribesmen that 
they were simply following the money and that their heart – and more importantly their vote 
– lay with the community, most only participated in campaigns for the ‘wrong’ community 
outside of their own neighbourhoods, keeping their involvement with the opposition a secret. 
One Luo interviewee who was campaigning for a PNU civic candidate in a neighbouring 
ward explained that his Luo friends in 4B, Mathare, ‘didn’t know that I was campaigning for 
PNU, if they’d have known then it would have been bad’ (JAK, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 
20 May 2010) and another interviewee echoes this sentiment stating that if members of his 
community had known that he was campaigning for PNU, ‘I wouldn’t have been safe’ (JG, 
Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 3 June 2010). 
 Thus, to understand these groups as predominantly mono-ethnic militias is deeply 
misleading and it masks the opportunistic, trans-ethnic cooperation which often takes place at 
the local level. Nevertheless while there is perhaps more inter-ethnic cooperation amongst 
youths in their pursuit of financial gain during political campaigns it remains an inherently 
risky and dangerous activity in the context of ethnic territoriality and the expectation of 
political conformity. 
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  Existing analyses of African politics, with their emphasis on the centrality of 
ethnically structured patronage networks and influential ethnic leaders, have much to offer to 
an understanding of the 2007 elections in Kenya and their violent aftermath. While the 
literature has a tendency to overstate the materiality of ethnic politics, it is abundantly clear 
that Kenyans expect better opportunities and life chances from a member of their own 
community being in power – or at the very least allied with those in power – and that they 
anticipate almost certain marginalisation and subordination at the hands of others. Thus 
speculative loyalty and exclusionary politics, that is hopes and fears for the future, are central 
to determining the direction of political support and raising the stakes of elections. In the 
relative anonymity of macro-level national political competition, ethnicity is consistently 
perceived to be the safest means through which to safeguard future prosperity, and any 
deviation from this is regarded as potentially dangerous. As one Kalenjin interviewee states, 
‘People attach Ruto to saving the community, but if I knew that I would be protected by 
another person of another tribe then I’ll not vote my tribe’ (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 
2 June 2010). However, the view from below depicts a far messier and more complex 
scenario. 
While at the higher levels of political competition ethnic leaders enjoy considerable 
degrees of loyalty, it is not an unthinking, unwavering and unquestioning support, and their 
continued predominance is far from guaranteed. Ethnic ‘kings’ are not immune from shifting 
loyalties and challenges to their position, and they must carefully manage perceptions of their 
value to the community as a whole, especially if there are other influential and powerful 
politicians from the same community lurking in the shadows. Such intra-ethnic competition 
at the highest echelons can easily divide the ethnic community along another cleavage line, 
such as regional or clan affiliation. Nevertheless, it is largely assumed and expected that 
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political support will remain ethnically directed at the level of high politics, and this 
disposition to vote along ethnic lines is embedded in the habitus. However, at the lower levels 
of political competition ethnicity can become far less important and fierce intra-community 
debates can emerge amongst local level actors over which candidate is best able to improve 
their everyday circumstances. Local histories, personal relationships, and other identificatory 
factors such as age, gender, class, clan, party affiliation and religion come into play. 
Politicians at this level must work extremely hard in order to translate their peculiar attributes 
into moral authority, that is to say, they must convince local communities that they are both 
more willing and better able to protect and provide for them than the other candidates. Thus 
local level political discussions, conversations, and debates continuously produce, reproduce, 
challenge and transform perceptions of where speculative loyalty is best invested, and the 
ethnic dimension can become more or less important depending upon the immediate context.  
However, while such discussions may thrive in ethnically mixed territories – or when 
there are two candidates from the same community – and people are relatively free to 
vocalise their support for whomever they wish, there is far less space for debate in ethnicised 
neighbourhoods. Fears of losing control of, and supremacy in, the area underscore the 
insistence that residents support candidates from their own community, and the multi-vocality 
of ethnic identity and political debate is silenced. Deviations from the expected ethnicised 
political behaviours are policed and disciplined, often violently, and in these areas the line 
between political tribalism and moral ethnicity becomes increasingly blurred. Thus, violent 
ethnic politics is not wholly, or even primarily, directed and instigated by elites and organised 
vigilante groups in the political campaigns of contemporary Kenya. Rather, the diffusion of 
violence has extended into the very contours of localised relations and interactions, as 
embedded notions of ethnic territoriality serve to stifle political debate and constrain 





From Banality to Bloodshed: 
Triggers and Transitions 
 
Introduction 
On 14 October 2002, at a large opposition rally in Uhuru Park, Nairobi, Raila Odinga 
famously declared ‘Kibaki Tosha!’
1
 marking the beginning of Kibaki’s ascendency to the 
presidency as the leader of the NARC coalition. The raucous crowd burst into song, dancing 
along to the refrain ‘Yote yawezekana bila Moi.’
2
 However, within a few years, stark political 
divisions were beginning to emerge and by the time the constitution was put to a referendum 
in 2005 the Kikuyu were widely perceived to be isolated, standing alone on the ‘wrong’ side 
of the political divide. This polarisation only continued and intensified leading into the 
election year as the rhetoric of ‘forty-one-against-one’ pervaded the country and framed the 
political setting. This chapter offers an account of the transformation from the seemingly 
unified environment of 2002 to the deep polarisation of 2007, and explores the transition 
from the banal ethnicity and everyday conflict which characterise Kenyan society to the 
widespread bloodshed of the post-election violence. I begin by examining the increasing 
polarisation which marked Kibaki’s first term, suggesting that ethnicised discourses of 
betrayal were constructed and drawn upon, both by elites and local level actors, to solidify 
new and emerging political alliances. I go on to offer a detailed exploration of the campaign 
period, illustrating how hate speech, negative ethnicity, and incitement were perpetuated at 
                                                 
1
 ‘Kibaki is enough’, meaning that Kibaki is the chosen presidential candidate for the NARC coalition, and he is 
enough to oust Moi from power. Raila’s endorsement of Kibaki is widely credited as being crucial to mobilising 
and uniting the people behind the NARC coalition. It is also interesting to note that at the end of 2011, key 
figures in government were purportedly pressuring Kibaki to make a similar endorsement of Raila for the 
upcoming election and to declare “Raila Tosha.” (Otieno, 2012).  
2
 Everything is possible without Moi. 
199 
 
all levels of social agency, and should be understood, in part, as an intensification of the 
everyday prejudice which pervades society. The campaigns triggered a movement along the 
continuum of ethnic conflict and previously unnoticed, banal, or policed expressions of 
prejudice and resentment became increasingly visible, sinister, and unconstrained. I suggest 
that where the distinctions between bottom-up everyday animosity, and top-down incendiary 
hate speech are blurred and indistinguishable, the receptivity of incitement to ethnic violence 
finds its logic. The chapter concludes by examining the specificities of the 2007 elections, the 
counting process and the announcement, drawing attention to how the particular sequence of 
events served to heighten feelings of hope and excitement, and intensified the subsequent 
disappointment, anger and sense of injustice with the flawed elections. The high stakes and 
deep emotions attached to the 2007 elections, and the pervasive belief that the democratic 





Yote yawezekana bila Moi? High hopes and deep disappointments of the Kibaki regime 
 The intense disaffection with the authoritarian, corrupt and tribalistic KANU regime 
was palpable by 2002 and ‘NARC’s campaign tapped directly into most Kenyans’ deep 
desire for change’ (Wolf et al. 2004: 4). The coalition’s electoral victory marked the apex of 
Kenyan optimism and ‘heralded expectations that a new political era of democracy had 
dawned in Kenya’ (Nasong’o and Murunga, 2007: 9). However, these expectations were soon 
met with disillusionment and disappointment. Whilst in 2003, 79 per cent of Kenyans 
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 While I suggest that the elections acted as a trigger, and that the violence on 30 December can be largely 
understood as a spontaneous eruption of protest, this does not describe or explain the violence dynamic as a 
whole. There is strong evidence to suggest that some of the violence was pre-planned and highly organised, and 




expressed satisfaction with ‘the way democracy works in Kenya’, this figure plummeted to 
just 53 per cent over the next two years (Logan, Wolf and Sentamu, 2007: iv) as the Kibaki 
administration failed to deliver on many of its campaign promises, and was perceived to be 
returning to the corruption and tribalism of the past. An article in the Daily Nation in 
February 2005 is indicative of this growing disillusionment: 
In 2002, I thought I had President Mwai Kibaki figured out. He was the ideal 
candidate, the man who would play Moses to our Israelites and lead us to Canaan 
after decades of distorted politics in which the leader invariably morphed into a small 
god... How can he and his team have managed to throw it all away in just two years? 
(Lucy Oriang, Daily Nation, 11 February 2005, cited in Murunga and Nasong’o  
2006: 1) 
 
 The Kikuyu, in their continued loyalty to Kibaki,
4
 increasingly came to be regarded as 
arrogant and selfish, unwilling to support or accommodate other communities in the political 
arena and as betraying the country as a whole in their self-interested pursuit of power and 
wealth.  
 Kibaki’s presidency got off to a faltering start when tensions quickly emerged 
between the LDP and NAK factions over his failure to honour a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed prior to the election. The agreement laid down plans for the 
sharing of power, stipulating that a Prime Minister position would be created and allocated to 
the LDP leader, Raila Odinga, and that cabinet positions and other key governmental posts 
would be distributed evenly across the parties following consultations between the two major 
factions.
5
 However, after fifteen of the twenty-five ministerial positions were unilaterally 
given to NAK members, and only eight went to LDP, the rest being assigned to smaller 
                                                 
4
 This perception of continued Kikuyu loyalty was affirmed, for many, by the overwhelming support Kibaki was 
able to garner in Central Province during the 2005 referendum. 
5
 While most interviewees framed the MoU as a single agreement between Raila and Kibaki which would install 
the former in a newly created Prime Minister post, the deal was arguably far more vague and generalised than 
this. Indeed, there were apparently two different agreements which were signed, with slight variations. Each 
stipulated that the cabinet positions would be divided evenly between LDP and NAK members and that both 
factions would meet following the inauguration to discuss other ministerial appointments. For an interesting 
insider account of the MoU and the events surrounding its collapse see Khamisi (2011: 88-91).  
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parties, members of LDP issued a statement accusing Kibaki of dishonesty and betrayal 
(Khamisi 2011: 90). Whilst at the time the issue did not dampen the post-election euphoria 
and optimism for the future, and ‘grumblings by LDP over positions backfired as Kenyans 
accused it of greed and ungratefulness’ (Khamisi 2011: 91),
6
 the failure to honour the MoU 
would come back to haunt Kibaki. Indeed, one journalist affirms in an article in the Daily 
Nation, that ‘yes, the dishonoured MoU was our eventual undoing’ (Munene 2009: 9). In 
light of subsequent events and political manoeuvres, the reneging on the MoU would come to 
be reinterpreted as ‘yet another example’ of Kibaki’s betrayal of Kenya and the selfish and 
arrogant nature of the Kikuyu community: 
In 2002 there was a Memorandum of Understanding, like a gentlemen’s agreement 
between Kibaki and Raila to create the Prime Minister’s office and decentralise 
power, but Kibaki went back on his promise. He lied and it was the genesis of the 
problems, they started portraying Kikuyu people as dishonest. “This is what happens, 




The numerous unfulfilled promises and perceived failures of the Kibaki 
administration as his term progressed facilitated this retrospective reading of the failed MoU. 
The administration’s commitment to anti-corruption was called into question by the exposure 
of the Anglo-leasing scandal
8
 and the subsequent, related resignation of John Githongo, the 
then-head of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) in 2005. This scandal was 
devastating to Kibaki’s government because it suggested continuity with the grand scale 
corruption of the Moi era, confirming the growing belief that ‘whichever way you look at it, 
the Narc Government is the same old Kanu Government, minus Moi’ (Barrack Muluka, The 
                                                 
6
 An article appearing in the Daily Nation similarly states that the reneging on the fifty-fifty position-sharing 
deal was not the source of immediate tension amongst the populace, stating that ‘Mr Kibaki was still recovering 
from an accident that had sent him onto [sic] a wheelchair in the sunset days of the campaign, and public 
sympathy rested with the recuperating old man, rather than the complaints from the Rainbow wing of the 
government’ (Munene 2009: 9).    
7
 Moreover, this perception of Kikuyu dishonesty and mistrustfulness is further reinforced by pervasive 
stereotypes of the community as thieves and conmen.  
8
 Anglo-leasing was a shadow company, supposedly from the UK, which was issued with a government contract 
to procure passport issuing equipment. The scandal implicated key figures in Kibaki’s administration. For more 
detailed accounts of this scandal see Githongo (2005) and Otieno (2005). Michela Wrong’s (2009) book 
detailing John Githongo’s experiences as head of the KACC and his subsequent exile is also of interest.    
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Standard 12 February 2005, cited in Murunga and Nasong’o 2006: 1). Furthermore, it 
became increasingly evident that there was a distinct ‘Kikuyuization’ of ministerial positions, 
senior civil servant posts and other ‘plum’ jobs. Murunga and Nasong’o (2006: 10) argue that 
the ‘re-emergence of political tribalism... became evident when Kibaki appointed his cabinet 
and top officials in the civil service and parastatal sector’, and they detail the Kikuyu 
dominance of the clique of politicians and businessmen with whom Kibaki surrounded 
himself.
9
 Thus, in November 2005, when Kibaki sacked members of the government who had 
supported ODM in the referendum, further entrenching the Kikuyu dominance of top level 
jobs, it served as a clear indication that the administration had reverted back to the tribalism 
of the past, and fuelled the perception that the Kikuyu were fully intent on dominating the 
political, and indeed, the economic, scene to the exclusion of others. 
The other partner [of NARC],
10
 the majority were Kikuyus, the leaders, the bigwigs. 
The Kibaki administration promoted tribalism because the appointments and the 
positions were biased to one tribe. The major ministries were given to the Kikuyu, the 
plum jobs were given to the Kikuyu, so the other tribes felt that they were being 
sidelined, that they weren’t sharing the cake (M, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 4 June 
2010).  
 
However, it was the contentious draft constitution and the subsequent referendum 
which consolidated the perception of the Kikuyu as selfish, arrogant and isolationist. The 
ambitious promise of enacting a new constitution within 100 days of assuming power became 
almost impossible to fulfil as factions emerged within the NARC coalition over the ‘people-
driven’ Bomas draft prepared by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC).  
                                                 
9
 While this analysis is not unjustified, it perhaps should be noted that, at least initially, the political tribalism of 
Kibaki’s administration was less pronounced than is suggested by Murunga and Nasong'o’s emphasis on 
continuity. Frances Stewart (2010: 139-140), for example, has indicated that there was, at first, a relatively 
equitable ethnic distribution of cabinet positions, though the Kalenjin were significantly underrepresented. 
While this is qualified by a diminished representation in assistant minister positions, and while senior civil 
servant positions were marked by an ethnic imbalance, it is important to recognise the ethnic diversity of the 
cabinet in the early days of the regime; it perhaps partially explains the continued optimism for Kibaki’s 
administration throughout 2003, despite its failure to honour the MoU and to enact a new constitution within 
100 days.  
10
 Here the interviewee refers to the NAK faction of the NARC coalition 
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Chitere et al. (2006: 3-4) point out that whilst there was a prior understanding that the bill 
would be based upon the recommendations laid out in this proposal, a dominant faction of the 
NARC coalition seemed reluctant to accept the draft without significant amendments. The 
key issues of contention revolved around curtailment of the presidential powers, the 
establishment of a parliamentary system, and the devolution of power through a federal 
system of government.
11
 Thus, when the Proposed New Constitution of Kenya (the Wako 
draft) was subjected to a referendum in 2005 it was a greatly watered down version of the 
earlier Bomas draft. It maintained a unitary system of government and a powerful presidency 
and, as one interviewee recalls, there was a sentiment that ‘the Bomas draft was raped.’ 
(SINJ, Interview, Kibera, 1 January 2010). The proposed constitution was widely regarded as 
a betrayal of Kenyan democracy, an ‘anti-Wanjiku’
12
 document which served the interests of 
hardliners within the government who were unwilling to compromise and give up their grasp 
on power (Chitere et al. 2006: 50). It was defeated by a significant margin, with 57 percent of 
the country voting against it. However, the Kikuyu community’s continued loyalty to Kibaki 
in this referendum highlighted their isolation from others. As a Kikuyu politician in the ODM 
party explains: 
My people, my community, the Kikuyu voted banana
13
 almost to the last person, 
defending one of their own. The outcome isolated the Kikuyu from Kenyans, it 
became a campaign between the Kikuyu and the rest of Kenya. That mistrust 
continued up to the General Election. Other tribes saw the Kikuyu as selfish and 
always wanting to retain power by all means (SINJ, Interview, Kibera, 1 January 
2010). 
 
Many interviewees stress that in 2002 other communities did not selfishly pursue power for 
themselves, but rather put tribalism aside and united to support a Kikuyu candidate for the 
                                                 
11
 For a comprehensive examination of the three constitutions under debate during this period and the issues of 
contention raised by various factions, see Chitere et al. (2006).  
12
 Wanjiku is a common Kikuyu name which came to refer to the ordinary Kenyan citizen after Moi dismissed 
attempts to construct a ‘people-driven’ constitution in the 1990s, exclaiming, ‘What does Wanjiku know about 
the constitution?’ (KHRC 2010: 11).  
13
 A banana was the symbol for the yes campaign, and an Orange the symbol for the no campaign in 2005. 
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good of the country. They lament the fact that, on the other hand, ‘the Kikuyu just vote for 
Kikuyu and they’re selfish // They were just born like that’ (MM, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 11 
May 2010). 
The Luos have voted for the Kikuyu and the Nandis have voted for the Kikuyu, this 
2007, those people don’t want to vote Raila. So the people for Raila say, “Why won’t 
they vote for a Luo? (B, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 2 May 2010). 
 
Indeed, this discourse was only further affirmed by Uhuru Kenyatta’s KANU party pulling 
out of the ODM alliance in July 2007 and returning to Kibaki’s PNU umbrella. One Luo 
youth explains: 
The elders told us, “Those Kikuyu are not good people, they’re not one of us, they’re 
not with us. As you see in 2002 we supported them and we joined them in 
brotherhood and we fought for them. Now it is our time, they must help us, but as you 
see, Uhuru has gone back home to them, they’re not with us anymore” (AMC, 
Interview, 4B, Mathare, 8 May 2010).  
 
Thus, by the 2007 campaigns there was a strong discourse of Kikuyu selfishness and 
unwillingness to support other communities. Amidst this perception, the rigging of the 
elections was seen to be yet another tactic employed by the dishonest Kikuyu to maintain 
power at the expense of Kenyan democracy, a tactic that would not be tolerated.  
However, whilst there was a strong sense that Kibaki betrayed the country as a whole 
and squandered the opportunity for a united and democratic Kenya, more ethnicised 
interpretations of events were frequently adopted by my interviewees, as is evident in the two 
previous quotes. The tendency to frame social and political events in ethnic terms has been 
discussed at length in Chapter Three, and it has been illustrated that quarrels and 
disagreements between individual politicians, as well as particular policies and actions, are 
often taken as evidence that an entire ethnic community is being targeted. Thus, Kibaki’s 
failure to honour the MoU and to appoint Raila Odinga as Prime Minister was perceived as a 
betrayal of the Luo community. His opposition to Raila’s presidency in the 2007 elections 
was regarded as evidence that ‘those Kikuyu don’t want Luo to be in power’ (DO, Interview, 
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4B, Mathare, 4 May 2010) and that, ‘now it is our time to rule and the Kikuyu don’t want to 
give us our time to rule’ (JW, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 16 May 2010).  Many interviewees 
incorporated the increasingly tense relations between Raila and Kibaki in the 2002-2007 
period within a narrative of a continuous Kikuyu-Luo animosity which has persisted since 
independence, and an ever-present determination on the part of the former to exclude the Luo 
from political power. Indeed, many interviewees connected the disagreements between 
Kenyatta and Odinga in the early 1960s with those of Kibaki and Raila, some forty years 
later. Raila’s support of Kibaki in 2002, and his subsequent dismissal from the government in 
2005, is equated with the situation between Kenyatta and Odinga in the 1960s when the 
emergence of bitter divisions within KANU ‘culminated in Odinga’s demotion from his 
position as party Vice-President’ and his subsequent resignation from the Cabinet to launch 
the Kenya People’s Union in 1966 (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 13). Thus, just as ‘Kenyatta 
kicked the Luo out of government’ (SD, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 16 March 2010), 
so too did Kibaki:  
The Luos remembered that Kenyatta had betrayed Jarimogi and Kibaki had betrayed 
Raila, so the Kikuyu were the greatest enemy, so they came to hate each other (JUL, 
Interview, 56, Kawangware, 4 March 2010).  
 
Moreover, the assassinations of prominent Luo politicians in the postcolonial period are 
similarly incorporated within these local discourses of a deep-rooted enmity which has 
persisted ‘since 1963 up until 2007’ (SD, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 16 March 2010). 
One interviewee, for example, suggests, ‘Kenyatta was accused of killing Tom Mboya so that 
hatred grew because it was like the Kikuyu have killed our man. Odinga was sacked and 
Kenyatta incited people and they started hating the Luo’ (BTS, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 
14 April 2010). The construction of such narratives not only requires highlighting certain 
events and moments in time, but also suppressing and ‘forgetting’ others. The list of political 
figures who were assassinated in the early years of Independence, for example, includes, 
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among others, Pio Gama Pinto, a Kenyan Indian in 1965, Ronald Ngala, a Giriama in 1972, 
and J.M. Kariuki, a Kikuyu in 1975. Furthermore, the murder of the Luo foreign Minister 
Robert Ouko – one of the most high profile cases of political assassination in the country – 
occurred under Moi’s rule. Thus, the construction of a narrative of Kikuyu hostility towards 
the Luo as evidenced by the assassinations of Luo politicians necessitates a forgetting of the 
countless other politically-motivated killings which took place under both the Kenyatta and 
Moi regimes. In this way, then, drawing selectively upon a rich supply of past events, themes 
and relationships, the political animosities of the 2007 elections were not only justified, but 
also heightened and intensified by their incorporation within a discourse of permanent enmity 
and repeated betrayal and oppression of the Luo at the hands of the Kikuyu.  
 In a similar fashion, the perception that the ‘Kibaki administration and the House of 
Mumbi
14
 has systematically marginalised the Kalenjin community’ (Anon. 2008)
15
 was 
pervasive in the lead up to the 2007 elections and, just as in the case of the narratives of Luo 
exclusion, ‘this strongly ethnicized discourse of current “persecution” and “bias” was 
interwoven with those of past and potential “injustice”’ (Lynch 2008: 544). Signs of a 
perceived Kikuyu mistreatment of the Kalenjin community emerged early in Kibaki’s 
presidency when, addressing the overrepresentation of Kalenjin in top level positions which 
had developed throughout the Moi era, he sacked high profile members of the community, 
including Sally Kosgey, the head of the civil service, Zakayo Cheruiyot, the former 
permanent secretary for internal security, as well as the Kalenjin heads of the Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID),
 
GSU and Presidential Escort. Furthermore, the reshuffling 
of the military further entrenched the hegemony of the Kikuyu and other GEMA 
                                                 
14
 Mumbi is the matriarch of the community in Kikuyu mythology and as such the House of Mumbi refers to the 
Kikuyu group as a whole.   
15
 This citation refers to a piece of propaganda that was circulating via email and weblogs in early 2008. Whilst 
a copy was given to me by an interviewee in Langas, Eldoret, a version of the text can also be found at 
http://www.amref.it/doc_din/Volantino_dell%27odio.pdf [Accessed 16 September 2012].  
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communities, largely at the expense of the Kalenjin, and there was a prevailing sentiment that 
members of the community were increasingly being excluded from employment 
opportunities.
16
 A newspaper article from The Sunday Standard states: 
Earlier Biwott had complained that most professionals from the community had been 
sacked or retrenched from government. He said the Government had sidelined 
members of the community while making key appointments. “For instance, our 
youths have been locked out of police and army recruitments for more than four years 
now. We want the trend to change” (Batoo and Lucheli, 2007). 
 
Thus, as a Kalenjin elder living in the Kikuyu village of Huruma states, when the government 
sacked these Kalenjin officials, ‘it brought a grudge, and the Head of State was a Kikuyu so it 
was seen as harassing’ (MZ, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 25 January 2010). Furthermore a 
few interviewees suggest that the way in which Moi was treated when he handed over power 
to Kibaki in 2002 was similarly indicative of Kikuyu abuse of, and disrespect towards, the 
Kalenjin community: 
When Moi was thrown out he was not shown respect, mud was thrown at him and he 
is an old man. So there is a Kalenjin saying that when Moi got home he hung up his 
coat and for every drop of mud that dropped down from that coat, a Kikuyu will drop. 
How can they do that to an old person? So they had that grudge (WIL, Interview, 
Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010).  
 
In addition to these early signs of Kalenjin mistreatment under Kibaki, large-scale evictions 
of settlers in the Mau Forest, and heightened tensions in Likia following recommendations of 
the Ndung’u commission,
17
 provided fertile material to enrich the narrative of Kalenjin 
marginalisation.
18
 As Lynch (2008: 555) notes, these events were incorporated within ‘local 
discursive repertoires’ which highlight Kalenjin persecution at the hands of the Kibaki 
administration and were evident in inflammatory propaganda material circulated during the 
                                                 
16
 For a detailed account of the rise of the ‘Mt Kenya Mafia’ during Kibaki’s rule, see Hornsby (2012: 711-713).  
17
 The Ndung’u commission is the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land in 
Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2004). The findings constitute a damning report on the misallocation of land in the 
country. 
18
 Interestingly, Raila Odinga’s central role in the Mau Forest evictions in 2009 and 2010 has been subject to 
similar ethnicised readings and has increased tensions between the Kalenjin and the Luo communities. This 
illustrates the flexibility of the friend/enemy divide and the ways in which contemporary and historical events 
and narratives are employed and moulded to justify the current cleavage.  
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post-election violence: ‘They evicted our people in Mau, Likia and other areas. Bretheren, 
arise; this has come to an end.’ (Anon. 2008).  Furthermore, this leaflet highlights the ways in 
which these narratives of contemporary marginalisation are interwoven not only with those of 
past injustices and contemporary marginalisation, but also with fears for the future: 
Kwani, what is so special about this breed of people for them to own so much? They 
have greed and arrogance of catastrophic proportions. // They stole our votes and 
decided to maintain the status quo. Imagine what they will do in the next five years if 
you consider this will be their last term (Anon. 2008). 
 
Similarly, a newspaper article in December 2007 reads: 
On top of the anger over ways in which Kibaki’s government had gone against the 
community during his first term was the worry about what he might do should he get 
a second term...“There was a certain level of anger at what happened after Moi left. 
People needed to be told what Kibaki was going to do in the second term. The 
question was: ‘is he going to finish us?’” one former civil servant wondered (The 
Sunday Standard, 30 December 2007).  
  
While narratives of past injustice and present perceptions of marginalisation are central to the 
transformation of the Kikuyu into ‘the enemy’, fears of future exclusion from power and 
resources are of far greater importance and played an important role in raising the stakes of 
the 2007 elections.  
 Thus, the impossibly high hopes and expectations which accompanied the NARC 
victory in 2002 were met with deep disappointments and disillusionment shortly thereafter. 
Repeated broken promises were regarded as a betrayal, and were incorporated within 
ethnicised narratives of marginalisation, persecution and exclusion. Anti-Kikuyu sentiment 
was high by the time of the 2007 election campaigns, and not only provided a rich material 
which ODM politicians could draw upon to mobilise supporters, but was also produced and 




Hate Speech and Incitement in the 2007 Campaigns 
 Analyses which have explored the outbreaks of ethnic violence surrounding elections 
in Kenya since 1992 have pointed to the role of elites in manipulating ethnic grievances and 
tensions, provoking hatreds and animosities, and triggering and inciting violence (for 
example, Oyugi 1997; Klopp 2001; Ajulu 2002; Oucho 2002; Brown 2003; Boone 2011).
19
 
Some of the scholarship emerging about the 2008 violence similarly highlights the 
importance of this dimension. Klopp (2008), for example asserts that the post-election 
violence was ‘fuelled by strong men... exploiting ethnic identity’, Rambaud (2009: 88) states 
that ethnic tension was ‘revived by politicians’, and Chege (2008: 133) argues that 
‘politicians stoked ethnic tensions... pitting the Kikuyu against Kenya’s other African ethnic 
groups.’ Moreover, evidence submitted to the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) indicates that ‘inciteful utterances were made by politicians and their 
cronies on all sides of the political divide’ (CIPEV 2008: 41) and evidence from other 
commissions and organisations similarly indicate that the ‘use of covert hate speech, 
defamatory and unsavoury language continues unabated’ both in the 2005 referendum 
campaigns and again in the 2007 electioneering period (KNCHR 2006, 2007). My own 
research certainly confirms that politicians on both sides are culpable of heightening tensions, 
making use of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech to mobilise their supporters against the 
opposition, and in some instances inciting people to violence. Indeed, they played an 
important role in the gradual transition from banality to bloodshed by encouraging the 
intensification of hate speech, and by instigating and provoking campaign-related violence. 
However, the focus on elite manipulation only tells one part of the story and an overemphasis 
                                                 
19
 Wamwere (2003, particularly Chapter 9) seems at times to acknowledge the profusion of negative ethnicity at 
the local level, suggesting that parents, teachers, local party leaders and shop owners are important conduits for 
the spread of hatred – though he also, somewhat confusingly, makes a distinction between these ‘local opinion 
shapers’ and ‘the masses.’ However, he maintains that negative ethnicity is ‘manufactured’ in the ‘ideological 
factories of elites’ (2003: 95), and does not appear to allow for its construction at the grassroots.  
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on this dimension can be misleading; local level actors are not simply passive recipients of 
this rhetoric, but rather are active agents in its production and circulation. As Maupeu (2009: 
201) states, ‘This ethnic nationalism of exclusion is not only a matter of manipulation by the 
elite. It is an ideology that now involves a lot of people.’ Hate speech is produced and 
reproduced at all levels of social agency and should not be understood simply as a 
phenomenon isolated to political campaigns, solely a tactic used by elites to mobilise 
supporters for a specific purpose; it is also something which is deeply embedded in everyday 
life and society. The rhetoric utilised by both politicians and local level actors during the 
2007 campaigns can be understood as an intensification of the prejudice and hate speech 
which characterises Kenyan society. Similarly, while more direct incitements to violence 
were a feature of some politicians’ campaign speeches, they were also evident in interactions 
between local level actors as they policed politicised territories. This section argues, then, that 
animosity and hatred was cultivated and circulated at various levels of social agency
20
 in 
2007, and suggests that the difference between the hate speech of the political campaigns and 
the everyday negative ethnicity already discussed might lie primarily in its proliferation, 
intensity and interpretation rather than in its content. Furthermore, it suggests that incitement 
to violence operated both at the elite and the local level and that it legitimised and normalised 
increasingly violent politics, acting as a transition from the low-level violence of everyday 
life into the more widespread and acute form it took following the triggering events 
surrounding the presidential announcement. 
 The events of the 2002-2007 period, and the increasing resentment towards Kibaki, 
and by extension his Kikuyu community, were capitalised upon by ODM politicians to 
                                                 
20
 I focus predominantly upon the aspect of ‘speaking prejudice’, that is on political speeches and on everyday 
conversations and interactions here. However, it should be noted that the use of SMS, email, web-based 
discussions and other such mediums were also crucial in the dissemination and circulation of hate speech and 
incitement during the campaign period. 
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mobilise their supporters and raise the stakes of the elections. An alleged ODM strategy 
paper recommends that ‘regional pointmen’ should be utilised to ‘galvanise their respective 
communities around the anti-Kikuyu initiative’, given the strategy’s success in the 2005 
campaigns (Anon. 2007).
21
 PNU politicians similarly adopted a distinct anti-Raila/anti-Luo 
rhetoric, and sought to cultivate local fears concerning future marginalisation under ODM 
rule. These tactics were hugely successful and many interviewees emphasise their importance 
in polarising the country and influencing inter-ethnic relations at the grassroots. A Nubian 
youth, for example, recalls: 
There was lots of anti-Kikuyu sentiment // The country was polarised because of bad 
politics. The politicians put these hate speeches, tribalism, people became so 
tribalistic, you could hear it. When the violence erupted it was not shocking, because 
it was anticipated. // The propaganda was something brutal to the Kikuyus (AB, 
Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 13 December 2009).  
 
However, there were various dimensions to this construction of animosity, some of which 
were more direct, overt and sinister in nature than others. Indeed, given the intense 
ethnicisation of politics in Kenya, expressions which might in other contexts constitute 
normal campaign strategies, and be considered a relatively benign aspect of competitive 
politics, are often interpreted as ethnic abuse and hate. Several interviewees, for example, 
suggest that the ways in which leaders highlighted the failings and inadequacies of various 
politicians, parties and policies in their campaign speeches constituted a form of incitement 
and hatred. One interviewee states, ‘The way of campaigning, the method was hate. ODM 
were saying that Kibaki had failed to deliver promises, but we will’ (G, Interview, Makina, 
Kibera, 2 January 2010). Similarly, a Luo youth from Gatina explains: 
There was some pushing and shoving among the aspirants because they’d come to 
these areas and in the rallies they incited the people. A politician came and on the 
podium he would say, “Don’t vote for so and so, he has done nothing good for the 
people and I am the best person” (CG, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware 8 April 2010).  
                                                 
21
 For a detailed account of the use of hate speech, derogatory terms and incitement to violence in the 




As has already been discussed in Chapters Three and Four, in a highly ethnicised society, 
criticisms of individual politicians can easily be interpreted in ethnic terms, even when it is 
not overtly the case. Similarly, certain policies and proposals emphasised in political 
campaigns can be recognised as an attempt ‘to finish off’, to marginalise or to disenfranchise 
a particular community. For example, a key plank of the ODM manifesto concerned securing 
affordable housing in slum areas, and was interpreted by many as a call for a reduction, if not 
an eradication of rent for the urban poor. Given the fact that the landlords in many of these 
areas are predominantly members of the Kikuyu community, this policy had substantial 
ethnic overtones: 
Like me, I’m a Kikuyu and this place, most of the landlords are Kikuyu. The other 
tribal leaders were saying that “If we win I’ll force those people to reduce the rent”, 
so I’m forced to vote with them to maintain that place because if our candidate won’t 
win then “I’ll throw you out” (J, Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 1 March 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that overt negative campaigning was a prominent feature of the 2007 
elections and that, ‘the politicians were too personal, destroying each other’s names’ (KAM, 
Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 17 April 2010). At the PNU launch rally in Nyayo Stadium, for 
example, politicians openly referred to Raila Odinga as ‘One Dangerous Man’ in a play on 
the ODM acronym. Moreover, negative stereotypes and derogatory comments of Raila’s Luo 
identity were pervasive in the campaign, and undoubtedly heightened tensions: 
Luos have darker skin, and when a politician says, “That man, black as the devil”, the 
message it sends to Kikuyu...// the Luos believe in Raila so much and the Kikuyu are 
saying that he’s the devil. Then it becomes cultural, like, “the Luo and the Nilots, they 
don’t circumcise, so how can he lead you?” // So you use my culture against your 
culture; what is repugnant to you, I vote for it. If you start saying that my culture is 
inferior to yours it’s very sensitive. If you want to cause a war with someone, belittle 
their culture. // So this propaganda was inciting. There was a meeting at Uhuru Park, 
they said “One Dangerous Man” or “One Demon something” (H, Interview, Satellite, 
Kawangware, 17 March 2010).  
 
While negative campaigning is not an uncommon feature of politics across the world, the 
frequently ethnicised and cultural discourses which frame such dirty politics in Kenya has far 
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wider implications than simply tainting the name of the opposing candidate; it is often 
interpreted as, even if it is not directly, an insult to the community as a whole and feeds into 
feelings of superiority and inferiority, pride and humiliation. These sentiments were further 
triggered as politicians mocked entire communities in campaign speeches, drawing upon 
pervasive negative stereotypes to disparage opposing groups:   
The problem is when a politician comes in, they use phrases that are common with 
people on the ground. They mock the tribes. Like one politician said, “If I come with 
half a loaf of bread and a soda and I give it to a Luhya, they’ll vote for me” because 
the Luhya are perceived to be impoverished and in need of food. So it is denoting 
[sic] for a politician to talk in public like that, it is inciting people and it brings hatred 
from the people he’s referring to, so the war will be there because wars start with 
words (UGA, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 7 April 2010).  
 
It is interesting to note here that UGA stresses that these sentiments are ‘common with people 
on the ground.’ He highlights the fact that this tendency to demean ethnic communities and to 
play upon disparaging characteristics finds resonance with local level actors as it reflects the 
prejudices and negative ethnicity which inflect everyday conversation, discourse and 
interaction. Similarly, as Onyango (2008: 11) points out, ‘the circumcision trivia... is 
common rhetoric among the male circumcising groups of Kenya when referring to the Luo in 
negative terms.’ Similarly, PNU politicians frequently referred to Raila and other ODM 
politicians as ‘beasts’ or ‘animals’ from the West’ (Somerville 2011: 91), drawing on a 
common phraseology of Kenyan folklore which depicts the Luo community as ‘monsters’ 
and ogres (Wa-Mungai, 2007: 343). Thus, while undoubtedly more visible and pervasive 
through its employment by elite actors, this use of negative rhetoric is a part of the negative 
ethnicity, cultural violence and everyday prejudice which underscores Kenyan society, rather 
than simply a tactic unique to political mobilisation. The distinction between the hate speech 
and negative ethnicity which characterises everyday life and the incitement of animosity and 
hatred in periods of political transition is, at times, blurred and difficult to distinguish. Indeed, 
it this very continuity which enables elite rhetoric to resonate so powerfully at the grassroots. 
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 In addition to the prevalent use of ethnicised insult and abuse, elites very clearly 
stirred ethnic tensions by scapegoating communities and overtly depicting them as the source, 
or the potential source, of poverty and oppression. ODM politicians for example played upon 
existing sentiments and resentments over Kikuyu dominance in the political and economic 
spheres. 
In 4A and 4B the campaigners used to incite those Luo telling them that “You people 
are like underdogs living on less than on a dollar a day, why is everything for the 
Kikuyus?” So the politicians used to incite them here (B, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare 
12 April 2010).  
 
GNM, a Kisii youth living in Huruma, Eldoret, draws stark attention to the ways in which 
politicians modify this rhetoric to resonate with people in different localities. He suggests that 
politicians seeking a seat in Mumias, for example, where there is a large sugar cane farm, will 
emphasise the fact that that while the sugar cane is grown in Mumias, the profits go to 
Central. He implies a similar dynamic at work in areas where land injustices are a particularly 
sensitive issue, suggesting that in these areas politicians state ‘Kenyatta took it and gave it to 
the Kikuyu.’ He concludes that, ‘because he’s poor and you’ve told him that there is someone 
behind his problems, he’ll become furious’ (GNM, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 29 January 
2010). Similarly, PNU candidates emphasised the potential threat to Kikuyu livelihood and 
prosperity should ODM take power, and often reminded the community of their 
marginalisation and exclusion under Moi. As such, they sought to raise the stakes of the 
election, whipping up fears that an ODM victory would be devastating to the Kikuyu 
community and calling for the group to unite to ensure that power did not leave the hands of 
the House of Mumbi. A Nubian youth who was an active campaigner for PNU candidates, 
both at the civic and the parliamentary levels, illustrates how candidates would play upon 
these fears in campaign meetings and rallies: 
They used to talk in Kikuyu which I couldn’t hear well, but my friend would tell me 
what they said later on. And they used to say, “We have to protect our country, our 
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nation from the bad people, the Luos. They’re going to take this nation if we play, so 
we must preach to our boys to know that this Kenya won’t be the same Kenya, they 
must fight for the nation so that the seat cannot move from our hands” (FZ, Interview, 
Makina, Kibera, 3 August 2010).  
 
Another interviewee recalls the ways in which candidates would situate this rhetoric in 
localised contexts, explaining that politicians would come to their area and spark tensions by 
warning them that ‘If Raila won the presidential seat, the Luos will take over Kosovo’ (B, 
Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 12 April 2010). According to Wa-Mungai (2007: 343), these 
fears of Luo rule are similarly commonly-heard expressions in Kenyan society and there is a 
pervasive sentiment that ‘if you elect a Luo for president you will have it rough.’ Thus, these 
narratives are not entirely the product of elite machination; they pervade everyday life, and 
they are as much a bottom-up project of ethnic narrative construction and production as they 
are top-down. 
In addition to the prominence of ethnic hate speech in political campaigns in Kenya, 
more direct incitement to violence is also evident. A KNCHR (2006) report, for example, 
highlights the prevalence of this tactic by citing numerous examples of elite incitement 
during the 2005 referendum campaigns. For example, it quotes the Coastal province 
politician Najib Balala as saying, ‘Those are people who have adopted the Banana stand,
22
 we 
do not want them, and if they come you are at liberty to beat them up’ (2006: 32); similarly, 
the then-Assistant Minister for Energy is quoted as saying, ‘People should prepare for war if 
NO wins’
23
 (2006: 31); and a Central Province politician is cited as encouraging people to 
‘physically resist encroachment by the Orange team into Nyandarua’ (2006: 30). Many, if not 
most, of these ‘inciteful utterances’ are designed to intimidate and ‘to discourage voter 
participation in hostile areas’ (Anon. 2007), however, and are not necessarily intended to 
                                                 
22
 Here he refers to the Muslim Youth of Kenya group who had allied with the YES campaign, whilst Coastal 
Province communities were predominantly perceived to be allied with ODM in opposition to the draft 
constitution.   
23
 It is interesting to note, however, that there was no violence following the NO campaign’s success in 2005. 
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spark large-scale violence. Similar statements are evident in the 2007 campaigns as 
politicians sought to intimidate rival candidates and their supporters in particular areas, 
preventing them from conducting their campaigns or from demonstrating their support in 
particular areas through disruptive and often violent tactics. However, as has already been 
highlighted in Chapter Five, this tactic was also vigorously employed at the local level as a 
means of policing the boundaries of political behaviour within an area, both at the intra- and 
the inter-community level, and is tied in with grassroots debates over speculative loyalty, 
citizenship, and hopes and fears for the future. One interviewee told me, for example, that 
there were local level inciters who would say, “Don’t talk to that Luo!” (M, Interview, 
Kosovo, Mathare, 13 April 2010), and a Kikuyu youth in Kibera explained, ‘My neighbour is 
a Luo and he is incited by other Luos who don’t want to see certain tribes here.’ (CW, 
Interview, 42, Kibera, 16 November 2009). Thus, local level actors, particularly those with 
direct interests in a particular political outcome, such as landlords, incited ethnic fears in 
order to police the community and to mobilise them to vote on election-day.  
In addition, repeated and very public warnings issued by ODM politicians affirming 
that they would not accept the results of a rigged election arguably served as a more covert 
rallying call encouraging violence in the event of a Kibaki victory. The alleged ODM strategy 
document suggests that this was part of a deliberate tactic designed to ‘prepare the ground for 
rejection of unfavourable results’ (Anon. 2007). Indeed, PNU politicians evidently 
recognised this, and on the eve of the election The Standard newspaper reported: 
The two [Kalonzo and Raila] have declared that they would not accept results of a 
rigged poll… but PNU has, however, said their opponents had sensed defeat and were 




Whilst the encouragement of the use of violence to contest the results was largely not overt in 
these statements made at the higher echelons of Kenyan politics,
24
 vague references to a 
‘rejection’ of unfavourable results were taken up by many local elites and ordinary people 
who reproduced them with more overtly sinister and threatening overtones. A Human Rights 
Watch report suggests that ‘around Eldoret local ODM mobilizers and other prominent 
individuals called meetings during the election campaign to urge violence in the event of a 
Kibaki victory’ stating that the reaction to a rigged election ‘should be “war” against local 
Kikuyu residents’ (Human Rights Watch 2008: 4). Similarly, a middle-aged Kikuyu man who 
ran for civic office in Huruma recalls that when he went to campaign in an area dominated by 
ODM supporters, ‘we heard people say “If there is an outcome that we won’t accept, be 
prepared to vacate”’ (GC, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 28 January 2010). Indeed, this violent 
interpretation of not accepting the results of a rigged election arguably relates to the 
normalisation and legitimisation of violence as a means of resolving social problems 
discussed in Chapter Four. The endemic corruption and inefficiency of the judiciary has 
devastated Kenyans’ confidence in an impartial and prompt response to electoral disputes. 
Indeed, a number of petitions following the 1992 elections took over a year, and some took 
up to three years to resolve (Abuya 2010: 159). In the case of Kones vs. Republic and 
Electoral Commission of Kenya ex parte Kimani wa Nyoike [2006] eKLR, the court states, 
‘That the courts take such a long time to hear and determine election petitions is a serious 
blot upon the judicial system’ (Kenya Law Reports 2006). Thus, the interpretation of the call 
to reject unfavourable results in a violent manner is intimately linked to the identification of a 
weak and inefficient judiciary.  
                                                 
24
 Ruto’s campaigns in the Rift Valley can arguably be said to be a clearer illustration of direct incitement, and it 
is certainly the case that politicians at the lower levels of competition, as well as other local elites such as 
businessmen, chiefs and village elders, engaged in this encouragement of violence in the event of unfavourable 
results. However, for the most part, incitement to violence was employed in more subtle and vague terms and 
was highly dependent upon its interpretation as such by local level actors.     
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Perhaps the most prominent, and arguably the most sinister issue which heightened 
inter-ethnic hostility, and which, in some cases, served as a vehicle for more direct incitement 
to violence, was the sensitive question of majimbo,
25
 and the deep hopes and intense fears 
which were attached to it. The majimbo debate has been a particularly divisive and highly 
emotive issue in Kenyan politics since its inception in the 1960s and its revitalisation in the 
early 1990s.
26
 The issue was resurrected in the 2007 campaigns as ODM, addressing many 
Kenyans’ deep desire for constitutional reform, promised a federalist system of government 
upon election. Given the association of ethnic groups with particular regions, for some 
communities majimbo offers the potential for greater power and inclusion in the political and 
economic spheres and an assurance of protection against marginalisation; indeed it resounds 
with grievances related to the unequal regional, and consequently ethnic, distribution of 
resources which has already been discussed. For others, however, the notion is tied to a more 
sinister proposal which calls for the ethnic homogenisation of ancestral homelands, and the 
‘repatriation’ of ‘foreigners’, often through violent means. This latter understanding is largely 
a remnant of the negative connotations attached to majimbo by KANU politicians in the early 
1990s, supporting Toft’s (2003: 9) argument that elite constructions can ‘become embedded 
in history, perception and interpretation’, but it is also related to the territorialised identity 
narratives which are intrinsic to Kenyan society and consciousness. Thus, ODM leaders took 
an ‘ostensibly pro-majimbo stance’ and whilst they did not overtly advocate for the expulsion 
of foreigners, there was a deliberate vagueness to their elucidation of what the term meant 
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 The term means regionalism and it advocates for the devolution and decentralisation of power to the 
provinces.   
26
 At independence majimbo was promoted by the smaller ethnic communities as a means of protecting 
themselves from the dominance of the larger groups. However, with calls for the reintroduction of multi-party 
politics in the early 1990s the majimbo debate was revived by key figures within KANU whose interests lay in 
the maintenance of the one party system. Majimboism came to be increasingly associated with a rhetoric of 
violence and intimidation against ‘foreigners’ and ‘immigrants’ who were living in the Rift Valley and 
clamouring for democratisation. Politicians played on fears of KAMATUSA marginalisation at the hands of 
larger communities, as well as on struggles over land, calling for outsiders to return to their homes and for the 




(Anderson 2010: 50), facilitating its negative interpretation. A significant number of 
interviewees identify this ambiguous use of majimbo and the effects it had at the local level. 
One interviewee states: 
Because when Raila and Ruto were asked about majimbo, Kalonzo had finished 
explaining his understanding, and when they were asked they said, “What Kalonzo 
was thinking”, but they didn’t give their views in their own language and maybe they 
had a different understanding. You must explain it in your own language because the 
way you understand it might not be the same (MZ, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 25 
January 2010).  
 
Similarly, a report on the post-election violence by the International Crisis Group asserts: 
The Orange movement tried to dissociate itself from the violent and ethnic chauvinist 
stigma attached to the majimbo debate but also knew the confusion would rally 
maximum support among the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu... 
communities of the Rift Valley, as well as coastal populations (International Crisis 
Group 2008: 5). 
 
Thus, a large number of interviewees pointed out that ‘it was understood badly’ (LF, 
Interview, Pondamali/Mwariki, Nakuru, 22 June 2010), that communities, particularly the 
Kalenjin, ‘understand it as all tribes should go back to their area’ (YW, Interview, Langas, 
Eldoret, 14 January 2010), or that ‘they are understanding majimbo as the Kikuyu to go back 
to Central so they can get their land’ (GR, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret 19 January 2010). 
Thus, the ambiguity attached to majimboism interacted with embedded narratives of 
belonging to and ownership over space, facilitating its interpretation in autochthonous terms. 
Furthermore it fed into long-standing grievances over past injustices in the allocation of land 
and other resources and kindled hopes for future political power and prosperity. Thus, this 
elite ambiguity and the subsequent interpretation at the local level illustrate the ways in which 
top-down mobilisation interacts with bottom-up discourses and understandings of politics and 
society.  
However, in addition to this lack of a clear definition of majimbo, a number of 
politicians reportedly employed rhetoric in their campaign speeches which more directly 
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encouraged its violent interpretation. References to ‘foreigners’ as madoadoa
27
 and the need 
to remove these stains from the land were made in campaign speeches in the Rift Valley. A 
significant number of interviewees in Eldoret noted that in one particular campaign speech 
Ruto had declared that, following the election, all the Kikuyu would be carried back to 
Othaya in one pick-up truck. Similarly, a Kikuyu youth who claims to have delivered bread 
to Ruto during the campaigns, told me that on one occasion there was a campaign meeting 
taking place and that Ruto ‘was saying in his language “Masangara”, which means to be 
removed. Masangara is like when you are picking weeds from the garden’ (DAB, Interview, 
Huruma, Eldoret, 25 January 2010). These claims by my interviewees in Eldoret are further 
supported by evidence submitted to the Waki commission (the CIPEV), and clearly indicate 
high levels of elite incitement and the stirring up of anti-Kikuyu sentiment
28
 in the Rift 
Valley region. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out throughout the above discussion, hate 
speech, inflammatory statements, and even more direct incitement to violence ‘was being 
spoken in all circles’ (AB, Interview, Karanja, Kibera, December 2009). Indeed, two 
KNCHR reports highlight the prominence of hate speech amongst local level actors and raise 
the important point that its utilisation by elites was both acceptable and welcome: 
Unfortunately, Kenyans have come to cheer hate speech and have themselves become 
active agents of proliferation of hate campaign against politicians and fellow Kenyans 
(KNCHR 2007: 8). 
 
We believe that politicians have used this type of uncouth and dangerous language in 
mobilising because there is a demand for it. Is this a general pointer of decadence in 
our society that this kind of language is acceptable in public? (KNCHR 2006: 107).  
 
While the act of ‘speaking prejudice’ is evident in daily life, the campaigns acted as a period 
of transition, shifting the boundaries of acceptability and engendering a more prolific, overt 
                                                 
27
 Spots or stains. Interestingly, it has been suggested that references to madoadoa were not restricted to political 
campaigns but were part of ‘normal discourse’ in Uasin Gishu, Rift Valley (CIPEV 2008: 41), further 
reaffirming the suggestion that the distinctions between everyday negative ethnicity, and the incendiary 
language of political campaigns are blurred.  
28
 In some regions animosities towards the Kisii were similarly stirred up as Simon Nyachae, arguably the most 
prominent Kisii politician, was a key figure in PNU.  
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and confrontational element to its use. Indeed, it is interesting to note that a resident of 
Shabab recalls, ‘In the campaigns you could see it coming out clearly, despite the politicians 
not mentioning it in the local village, then you’d hear people talk, the minor tribes didn’t 
want another Kikuyu rule’ (M, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 4 June 2010). As the election-day 
approached the use of abusive language and insults, for example, which in times of relative 
peace would be largely confined to in-group settings, became much more overt, pervasive 
and intense. A Luo youth who was living in a Kikuyu-dominated area during the campaigns 
states: ‘In those days I was there [in Kosovo] and there were some threats. They used to call 
us Luos baboons from Kisumu, you can’t rule because we’re not circumcised’ (JW, 
Interview, 4B, Mathare, 16 May 2010). Similarly, while the expression of prejudices and 
grievances against particular groups is usually policed and curtailed by social cuing in 
ethnically mixed situations, during periods of political tension negative ethnicity is not as 
frequently negotiated or deflected so as to avoid confrontation.  A resident of Soweto in 
Kibera, for example, remembers that ‘even the neighbours from that tribe, they were saying 
“you people have ruled for a long time”’ (D, Interview, Soweto, Kibera, 30 November 2009). 
Similarly, a Kikuyu youth from Nakuru states: 
We were throwing words at each other and the Luos said “Our person will win and if 
he wins he’ll take all your houses, they’ll be ours.” And we told them, “We’ve 
sweated for it! How can you just come and take houses?” But we were just joking 
around. It started to get more serious and we told our Luo friends “If our person wins 
you’ll get out of this place and all of you will go.” We were just arguing and they 
said, “Hey if our person wins you Kikuyu will leave and if you live in this place, 
you’ll be wearing shorts because we’ll be ruling.” // We told them, “We’ll wear shorts 
but we’ll go and rearrange ourselves and we’ll come back and while you may be 
wearing trousers we’ll all be men because you are not circumcised.” We told them, 
“You don’t own businesses, you are our workers, so if you take us from there saying 
that we’ll wear shorts, then we will marry your girls because you will have nothing” 
(ND, Interview, Ronda, Nakuru, 9
 
June 2010).  
 
In this anecdote, arguments about the presidential candidates not only degenerate into 
ethnicised verbal abuse and insults, playing upon issues of superiority and inferiority, but 
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they also draw attention to key political issues at the root of ethnicised fears for the future. 
The Luo contingent in this situation highlight the threat to the Kikuyu community should 
ODM win the election by emphasising the assertion that tenants would no longer have to pay 
rent to their Kikuyu landlords under an ODM government. Moreover, issues of power, pride 
and superiority, are embedded within these arguments. The Luo’s threat that following 
Raila’s ascension to the presidency the Kikuyu will have to vacate the area alludes to 
majimboist discourses and territorialised identity narratives. Furthermore the notion that 
should they be allowed to remain in the area they will be ‘wearing shorts’ is suggestive of an 
inferior status
29
 that will be brought about by Luo power and superiority. The Kikuyu retorts 
are similarly suggestive of perceptions of ethnic superiority, emphasising Kikuyu dominance 
in business and using cultural practices to point to Luo inferiority. Thus, in the same way that 
political elites make use of negative ethnic stereotypes, insults and verbal attacks, they are 
equally as prolific in everyday conversations and arguments between local level actors. 
Furthermore, the recognition of these exchanges as straddling the line between joking and 
seriousness points to the continuity between everyday prejudice and the negative ethnicity of 
the campaigns. A significant number of interviewees explained that they did not take insults, 
abuses, threats and warnings seriously at the time, dismissing them as ‘normal’ jokes, or as 
something typical to Kenyan politics: ‘We just took it as campaigning, that it was not serious’ 
(B, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 25 January 2010). The distinction between the hate speech 
and negativity which pervades everyday life and the incitement of animosity and hatred in 
periods of political transition is, at times, blurred and murky; it is not entirely recognisable 
even to those who perpetrate it, and who are subjected to it. 
 A final point worth reiterating and expanding upon here is the relationship between 
socio-spatial dynamics and the act of ‘speaking prejudice’ which was identified in Chapter 
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 In that it is understood that young boys wear shorts. 
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Four. Ethnicised spaces facilitate the circulation of hate speech, prejudice and ethnically 
skewed interpretations of the political setting, and they witness more frequent instances of 
violence during the campaigns as residents police the political behaviour of the community. 
The emotive elements of hopes, expectations, fears and animosities that surrounded the 2007 
elections are heightened and intensified by their frequent expression in these areas and 
everyday conversation and interaction can solidify ethnicised interpretations of events. On the 
other hand, in ethnically mixed areas the intensity of ethnic hatred is constrained, as it is not 
as frequently reproduced or circulated by local level actors. Indeed, while a number of 
interviewees in these areas report a few arguments during the campaigns they stress that such 
disagreements did not engender any deeply felt animosity; rather ‘it was just jokes, it brought 
no hatred’ (CS, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 18 May 2010). Similarly, another interviewee 
states: 
People were just joking around, like both parties were saying “We’ll win” and others 
were saying, “we’ll see”, but it was just joking, there was no fighting, it was just in 
that friendship way (K, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 19 May 2010). 
 
As is indicated in this interview, ethnically mixed areas witnessed far fewer incidents of 
violence during the campaigns since they were not subject to the same policing of political 
behaviour as are highly ethnicised, and therefore highly politicised, spaces.   
Thus, while the focus on elite incitement and manipulation which persists in the 
literature is not unjustified, attention to the grassroots dynamics illustrates not only why it 
resonates, and where it does so, but also demonstrates that the high stakes nature of Kenyan 
elections and the intense emotions they evoke, can engender intense local level hate speech 




The 2007 Elections: Transitions, triggers and the importance of emotion 
The high stakes nature of the 2007 elections engendered intense feelings of hope, fear, 
suspicion, disappointment, frustration, resentment and anger in the lead-up to polling day, 
during the counting process and in the aftermath of the announcement of the results, 
particularly the result of the presidential election. While the ‘rationality’ of violence is often 
emphasised in the literature on ethnic conflict, the importance of emotions in triggering and 
feeding into violence is being increasingly explored in scholarship (Kaufman 2001; Petersen 
2002; Suny 2004). In the Kenyan context Lynch (2008: 567) has alluded to this dimension, 
stating that ‘to understand the election’s aftermath... one must understand the intense emotion 
and hope associated with this high stakes election’ as well as the events ‘which helped 
transform expectation and hope into popular frustration and anger.’ Githinji and Holmquist 
(2008: 348) similarly emphasise the significance of emotions, stating that ‘the popular 
disappointment was crushing and the anger extreme.’ In addition, investigations into the post-
election violence draw attention to the fact that anger and a deep sense of injustice over the 
flawed elections were important drivers of the conflict (CIPEV 2008; KNCHR 2008). This 
section explores the ways in which these emotions developed and intensified over the course 
of the elections and the counting period, arguing that the specific sequence of events further 
intensified feelings of hope, disappointment, anger, injustice, and resentment amongst 
political elites and local level actors alike, sparking incidents of violence on the ground. 
 In many ways, the 2007 elections echoed the political environment of 2002. In the 
context of significant disillusionment with the Kibaki administration, for many Kenyans 
ODM was regarded as a bastion of democracy amidst endemic corruption. Campaigning on a 
platform of change and reform, just as NARC had done before it, ODM generated the same 
sense of euphoria that had been witnessed in 2002. Indeed, there was a strong sense that 
‘Kenyans felt that they were cheated’ (M, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 4 June 2010) by 
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Kibaki’s administration, and that ODM offered a second opportunity for the change that the 
country had been yearning for since the Moi regime. Many interviewees highlight this intense 
desire for change in 2007 and suggest that there was a pervasive sentiment that ‘the hopes of 
all Kenyans were in Raila’ (B, Interview, Langas, Eldoret, 15 January 2010). Indeed, the vast 
and unprecedented voter turnout across the country and the fact that large numbers of people 
woke in the early hours of the morning to join the queues at the polling stations and make 
sure their vote was counted is, in part, explained by this excitement.
30
 
We woke up very early, at 4am, to vote for our fellow candidates. // there was a very 
big queue. At 4am I thought I would be the first, but I was not. There were like 1000 
people there in the twilight hours. (T, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 28
 
January 2010).  
 
Given the multi-ethnic nature of ODM’s pentagon members, and the fact that the party was 
seen as an alliance of forty-one tribes setting themselves against one, many Kenyans firmly 
believed that ODM could not be defeated if the elections were free and fair. While it was 
widely perceived that Central Province would remain loyal to their man,
31
 and parts of 
Eastern would vote for Kalonzo Musyoka, ODM was believed to enjoy considerable support 
in Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, North Eastern and Coastal provinces. According to this 
‘ethnic arithmetic’ then, Raila was expected to win; indeed, ‘there was a sense that he’d 
already won because of the support he had from all regions’(MN, Interview, Kosovo, 
Mathare, 19 April 2010) and ‘the rest was just a formality’ (K, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 4 
December 2009). Many interviewees suggest that these expectations were further 
strengthened by the wealth of pre-election polling information, which ‘showed that ODM 
were leading, so we were 100% sure that ODM would win’ (SSB, Interview, Satellite, 
Kawangware, 15 March 2010). Despite this sense of an almost certain ODM victory amongst 
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 Intense fears for the future on the part of PNU-affiliated communities also contributed to this high voter 
turnout. Indeed, as an article in The Standard highlights, ‘Central Kenya...will overwhelmingly vote for Kibaki, 
saying, “We will not breathe if ‘those people’ come to power”’(Malanda, 2007).  
31
 While some interviewees conceded that Kibaki was also popular in Eastern Province the overwhelming 
understanding of the political situation in 2007 was that PNU had the support of only one community, and only 
one province.  
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its supporters, however, the presidential race was in fact the tightest contest the country had 
ever witnessed. While pre-election opinion polls tended to put Raila ahead, this was by a far 
narrower margin than many of my ODM-affiliated interviewees suggest, particularly in the 
final stages of the campaign.
32
 However, as Cheeseman (2008: 168-169) points out, while the 
Steadman Group and Consumer Insight indicated that the election was ‘too close to call’, 
misleading polls by Strategic Research and Infotrak Harris consistently put Raila ahead by a 
sizeable margin and contributed to the disappointment and outrage at Kibaki’s victory. 
Consequently, a significant number of Kenyans remained convinced that an ODM defeat at 
the polls was all but impossible, as long as the democratic process was honoured by the 
incumbent.  
However, election fraud and malpractice has been a characteristic of Kenyan elections 
since independence and people are acutely aware of this fact. During many informal 
discussions with friends and assistants they would often emphasise that the incumbent is 
always at an advantage and is difficult to oust from power. One interviewee laments, ‘it is 
obvious that we’ll never beat a government in power in Africa, the opposition will never beat 
the government, they’ll use public resources and securities to retain the seat’ (NM, Interview, 
Shabab, Nakuru, 1 June 2010).  Under the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, ‘the executive has 
always found the means for “fixing” the electoral machine to the benefit of the preferred 
candidates’ (KNCHR 2008: 21) and ‘virtually all elections in the multi-party era in Kenya 
have been manipulated’ (Njogu 2011: xiii). Nevertheless, the 2002 elections were, at the 
time, widely regarded as a turning point in Kenyan electoral politics, passing by with far 
fewer incidents of violence than ever before and seeing the removal of the long-standing 
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 Indeed, Kibaki did not officially announce his candidacy until 16 September 2007. After this, opinion polls 
pointed to a steadily narrowing gap between Kibaki and Raila. The final Steadman Group poll released on 18 
December placed, Kibaki at 43 percent with Raila at 45 percent and Kalonzo Musyoka trailing with just 10 
percent (The Standard 19 December 2007).  
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incumbent KANU party. However, the subsequent and ever-increasing sense of 
disillusionment with this new era of Kenyan democracy reached its apex in the last elections 
and ‘for many Kenyans the rigging of the 2007 presidential election was the final betrayal on 
the agenda for change’ (Human Rights Watch 2008: 3).  
Rumours of a government plot to rig the upcoming elections began to emerge in the 
early stages of the campaign period. They were produced and reproduced in everyday gossip 
and conversation, as newspaper reports, op-ed pieces, radio shows, campaign rallies, emails, 
text messages, and weblogs alluding to rigging plots were circulated and were widely 
discussed. In early December, for example, there were newspaper reports of parallel ballot 
papers being printed in Belgium (Rambaud 2009: 66), and throughout the campaigns there 
were rumours of various plots to rig Raila out of his Langata seat and therefore to disqualify 
him from the Presidential race (Osborn 2008: 318).
33
 Moreover, fears that Kibaki would rig 
the election were further inflamed by local level actors who would attest that ‘hook or crook 
we have to stay”’ (PAD, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 15 December 2009). One Luhya 
interviewee recalls that in September 2007 as he was travelling back to Nairobi in a matatu, 
he and a fellow Luhya got into a discussion about the upcoming elections and were 
expressing their certainty that Raila would win. He states:  
We were just talking peacefully, but everyone in the matatu joined in and it was a 
very big argument. They said that no other community will lead and they’ll use their 
economic might. The matatus, they are owned by the Kikuyus. They parked the 
matatu and forced us to alight and take another vehicle (SSB, Interview, Satellite, 
Kawangware, 15 March 2010).  
 
This anecdote not only indicates that local discourse equally alluded to the potential for 
Kibaki to rig the elections through the use of his economic power, but it is also further 
indicative of a Kikuyu sense of political superiority and right to rule which underscores many 
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 This perception was further fuelled on the election-day itself when Raila’s name was one of those missing 
from the electoral register.  
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tensions in Kenya. Thus, by early December newspapers were reporting that ‘ominously a 
recent opinion poll shows that 51 per cent of those polled believe the General Election will be 
rigged’ (The Saturday Standard, 8 December 2007).  
On the eve of the election, rumours of marked ballot papers being transported to 
various constituencies sparked some localised incidents of violence across the country. In 
Eldoret, for example, a group of youths burned a vehicle that had been used by ECK officials 
carrying election materials to a polling centre in Keiyo constituency; in Mombasa, youths 
were stoning matatus they suspected were carrying fake ballot papers; a ‘new wave of 
violence racked western region’ and Nyanza over rigging allegations; and in Kisii riots broke 
out as mobs chased people they believed to be administration police officers involved in a 
plot to rig the elections (Daily Nation, 27 December 2007). One interviewee from Eldoret 
recalls: 
When the campaign was over and we had just two days to the election, some rumours 
broke that some campaign materials were seen and that there was a plot to rig, so 
there was lots of tension. I don’t know if they were rumours or if it was true. But a 
bus was seen and the owner of the bus, he was PNU, and it was with election 
materials. But the police calmed the situation and we relaxed (GC, Interview, 
Huruma, Eldoret, 28 January 2010) 
 
Rumours sowed the seeds of suspicion that Kenyans might be cheated out of their democratic 
rights by the government. Nothing short of a flawless management of the electoral process by 
the ECK, it appeared, would be satisfactory to the Kenyan people, particularly if the results 
were to be counter to expectation. 
Despite a few isolated problems on the polling day itself which generated tensions 
over potential election fraud taking place – such as ‘the names starting with O, the Luo 





 and widespread accusations of politicians buying votes outside the polling 
centres – the elections themselves went relatively smoothly.
35
 However, it was the delays, 
irregularities and confusions during the tallying process which confirmed, for many, that the 
government was rigging the election. While this discussion focuses predominantly on the 
presidential vote, it should be noted here that accusations of malpractice in civic and 
parliamentary elections were rife and many local counting centres experienced violence and 
intimidation as candidates and their supporters disagreed over the results. For example, 
interviewees who had been heavily involved in the campaigns in Dagoretti constituency 
report that violence broke out at Kenya Science, a teaching college where the tallying was 
taking place, as rumours that candidates were rigging the election abounded. One 
interviewee, who had been campaigning for the ODM candidate, KJ, recalls that when he 
arrived at the centre ‘we saw some boxes, they were not sealed, so we sensed irregularities 
there’ and he indicates that the youths with whom he was campaigning tried to prevent the 
returning officer from leaving Kenya Science to report the results at KICC’ (JU, Interview, 
Satellite, Kawangware, 16 March 2010). Another interviewee, campaigning for the PNU 
candidate Beth Mugo states: 
Like here in Dagoretti, a boy [KJ] passed for MP but then the other MP [Beth Mugo], 
she rigged the election. In Dagoretti the voting was done in two locations, but the 
counting was at Kenya Science. I was a chief campaigner so we went to Kenya 
Science to see the results. When we entered there, there was a big fracas because of 
KJ and Beth Mugo rigging. They started fighting.// I was one of them fighting 






Similarly, the Daily Nation reported clashes breaking out in Kamkunji constituency as 
candidates accused each other of rigging, and the ODM candidate Ibrahim Ahmed ‘said he 
                                                 
34
 This problem affected Langata constituency specifically and was well-reported in the Kenyan and 
international media.   
35
 Though, again, there were some isolated incidents of violence following rumours of rigging, including a riot 
in Mumias town which killed three, as youths attacked a building believed to be storing ballot papers (Daily 
Nation, 28 December 2007: 2).  
36
 CHOC here seems to suggest that both candidates were involved in rigging tactics.  
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would not accept the results, claiming they were interfered with’ (Daily Nation, Saturday 29 
December 2007); and The Standard described the interruption of counting in both Garsen 
constituency (Mbaji 2007) and Mukurweini constituency (Ngigi 2007) as youths destroyed 
ballot boxes and burned papers amidst rigging claims.
37
 It is important to note, therefore, that 
allegations of rigging in local level contests, both by ODM and by PNU candidates, fed into 
rumours of fraud on a grander scale in the presidential election and, moreover, set the 
precedent for the use of violent tactics to challenge the results.  
Nevertheless, it was the presidential count and the increasing tensions at KICC which 
served to provoke fear, frustration and anger amongst the general population. In the early 
stages of the counting process, Raila took a commanding lead, and by the end of the day on 
the Friday, Kibaki was trailing him by almost a million votes. This further consolidated the 
sense of an assured victory for Raila and ODM which had marked the campaign period. 
Indeed, some interviewees suggest that ODM supporters during this phase of the counting 
were already celebrating their perceived victory: 
In a PNU zone, like here, there was a group of Luo, like six, and I saw that they were 
busy listening to the radio and whenever they heard that ODM had won in a particular 
place, they were celebrating. Imagine! They were celebrating in an area which does 
not belong to them. So incidents started and they chased them (MW, Interview, 




However, as Throup (2008: 293) points out, ‘the first seventy results... came 
disproportionately from ODM strongholds’ and these ‘were geographically more compact 
and had fewer voters than Kibaki’s strongholds.’ As the results from Central began to be 
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 Garsen is in Coastal Province, and Mukurweini is in Nyeri, Central Province.  
38
 MW’s outrage at the audacity of ethnic minorities celebrating in another community’s space highlights the 
sense of territorialised identity and expectations of political acquiescence which underscores Kenyan politics 
and inter-ethnic relations, and further illustrates the increasing use of violence during this period.  
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announced, the gap between Raila and Kibaki narrowed significantly.
39
 One interviewee 
states: 
The media house, KTN, were saying that there was no way that Raila can be reached. 
How can this man be reached? So the ODM followers, the Kalenjin and the Luo, they 
knew that they had won. // The blunder they made was that they started counting with 
the strongholds of Raila, but they had not touched Central Province (MW, Interview, 
Kiambaa, Eldoret, 20 January 2010).  
 
Kibaki’s numbers increased significantly over the Friday night and into Saturday morning. 
The fact that this happened in the dead of night appears to have contributed to suspicions that 
there was something untoward going on at KICC, and many interviewees emphasise the fact 
that they had gone to sleep secure in ODM’s impending victory, but had awoken the next day 
to find Raila’s lead had vanished.  Throughout the day on Saturday, Kibaki continued to gain 
ground on Raila and by 2.30pm ‘only 38,000 votes separated the two leading presidential 
candidates’ (Throup 2008: 294). At the elite level this announcement prompted fierce 
arguments and disagreements between various politicians and the ECK chairman, Samuel 
Kivuitu, and ‘created pandemonium at KICC.’ (Throup 2008: 294). Many interviewees recall 
these arguments in detail, particularly the altercations between Ruto, Martha Karua, James 
Orengo and Kivuitu,
40
 and suggest that ‘as they argued, back on the ground things became 
harder’ (MS, Interview, Ronda, Nakuru, 10 June 2010). At the local level, tensions were 
steadily rising, ‘people started to become hysterical, confused, anger was building, anger was 
building inside’ (ELIM, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 20 November 2009). In a number of my 
field sites this increasing frustration provoked arguments and confrontations, sometimes 
violent ones, through the course of Saturday. For example, a Kikuyu youth from Shabab 
recalls: 
                                                 
39
 It should be noted that Kalonzo Musyoka’s numbers consistently trailed the other two candidates by a 
substantial margin.  
40
 Ruto was disputing the results from certain constituencies, telling Kivuitu ‘you cannot continue reading 
results which are not real’, James Orengo was calling for a recount, and Martha Karua was protesting that ODM 
should seek to settle any disputes in court following the election (The Standard, 31 December 2007). 
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The chaos started especially in the pub and people were arguing to the extent that they 
were throwing bottles at each other. In that time in the pub the chaos started like, 
“Yesterday all through the day and night we were winning, and then this morning we 
are overtaken?!” They started to say that it was rigging, that’s when they got angry 
throwing bottles to each other // and the president hadn’t yet been announced (AZ, 
Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 6 June 2010).  
 
Thus, incidents of violent confrontation increased during this period marking a movement 
along the continuum towards more intense and widespread violence.  
Kivuitu’s own confusion and suspicion regarding irregularities in the results inflamed 
this growing sense of unease surrounding the tallying process. He raised questions over the 
delays to the arrival of ballot boxes from areas in Central and Eastern province;
41
 he was 
confused by his inability to communicate with several returning officers who had apparently 
turned off their phones; and he was growing suspicious by ballot boxes arriving without Form 
16A
42
 attached, without it signed, or with amendments made to the results. Kivuitu openly 
and publicly voiced his concern that these indicated a possibility that the results were being 
‘cooked.’ 
Thus, serious questions were being raised as to the neutrality and impartiality of the 
ECK, not only by politicians and Kenyan citizens, but by the chairman himself. Moreover, its 
credibility had already been questioned during the campaign period as Kibaki, without 
consulting other party leaders, had unilaterally appointed five commissioners to the ECK in 
January 2007, and had waited until the last minute to renew Kivuitu’s contract which expired 
on 2 December. Even before the problems of the counting process, then, the independence of 
the commission had been a point of heated debate. This, in conjunction with the increasing 
confusions as to the validity of incoming results and the delayed arrival of others, entrenched 
the belief that the elections were being rigged and that components within the ECK were 
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 Kivuitu pointed out that these constituencies are served by good roads and so he could not understand why 
there were such significant delays in receiving the results (Throup 2008: 295).  
42





 As one interviewee exclaims, ‘It was obvious that rigging was taking place. You 
could see on TV that there was confusion at KICC’ (SSB, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 
15 March 2010).  
The announcement was further delayed as Kivuitu, the ECK team, and representatives 
from ODM and PNU scrutinised ballot papers and sought to resolve the discrepancies in 
some of the results through the night of Saturday 29 December, and for the better part of the 
following day (Throup 2008: 296). However, by late afternoon on Sunday, under increasing 
pressure to declare the winner, Kivuitu attempted to read the results. After continued 
interruptions and disputes from ODM politicians the ECK chairman was whisked away under 
police escort and, in a sealed room, accompanied by a select media presence, of which the 
state-controlled KBC was the only Kenyan media company represented, announced Kibaki as 
the winner. The power was cut to the main conference hall as ODM held a live press 
conference, and within the hour Kibaki was sworn in as President at State House in a private 
ceremony. The events surrounding the announcement featured prominently in my 
interviewees’ narratives, and there is a strong sense that the fact that Kivuitu had been taken 
to another room to announce, the fact that there was a blackout, and the fact that the state-
controlled KBC was the only vehicle for the announcement,
44
 confirmed that ‘something 
fishy was going on’ (PET, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 24 March 2010), that the results 
had been manipulated, and that Kibaki had ‘stolen’ the election. The haste and secrecy with 
                                                 
43
 Interestingly, in December 2011, four years after the bungled elections, Kivuitu publicly expressed his 
opinion that the ECK appointments had eroded public confidence in the impartiality of the ECK even before the 
elections were underway (Daily Nation, 29 December 2011). 
44
 Many interviewees state that they do not trust KBC as they believe that it has always been manipulated by the 
government. One interviewee vehemently exclaims, ‘Only KBC beamed the results. Like me, I grew up in 
Kenya, and I hated KBC, it was a mouthpiece for the government. So the other TV channels were blackout, so 
we turned to KBC. // they announced Kibaki had won and we didn’t want to know the margin, it was a clear and 
open lie’ (K, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 4 December 2009). 
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They announced Kibaki in the evening, he was sworn in at night and in our life we’ve 
never seen a President sworn in at night. It is supposed to be done in the day with 
many witnesses and dignitaries from other countries. Even looking back to Moi, when 
he stepped down and he handed over power to Kibaki, it was in public. So these 
things should be done in a clear manner, at night it is very suspicious and it made us 
think that the election was stolen (M, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 8 April 2010).  
 
Given the high expectations of an ODM victory, the deep disappointment of the 
announcement was markedly visible, and as Raila’s substantial lead disappeared the 
atmosphere ‘changed from celebration to humiliated defeat’ (GC, Interview, Huruma, 
Eldoret, 28 January 2010). Following the announcement, Raila was seen to be wiping tears 
from his eyes as he addressed the nation and several interviewees highlight how this 
resonated deeply with the feelings of local level actors. One interviewee states, ‘when we saw 
on TV that Kibaki won, we saw that Raila and Ruto and all the ODM MPs, they were in 
tears. It’s when the chaos erupted. They saw the tears of their leaders’ (MED, Interview, 
Eldoret Town, 19 January 2010). Another suggests that people ‘feel the pain he is 
undergoing. They feel that their person is being harassed’ (JUL, Interview, 56, Kawangware, 
4 March 2010). A similarly deep disappointment was expressed or witnessed by a number of 
my interviewees who suggest that ‘election rigging hurt Kenyans and through that hurt they 
got angry’ (HP, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 15 June 2010), and ‘I saw people crying 
physically’ (K, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 4 December 2009). Recalling the moments 
immediately following the announcement of Kibaki, a Kikuyu resident of Kibera states: 
At the announcement me and my wife were sitting at home. // At that time I was the 
only Kikuyu living here, all the others were Luo. My TV was not on, I was fearing. // 
I slept with my panga like this [he demonstrates by placing the blade of his panga 
                                                 
45
 For an extremely detailed analysis of this process, see the Kriegler report, in particular Annex 4A (Republic 
of Kenya 2008). In this annex, the analysis concludes that while the tallying process demonstrates the 
incompetence of the ECK, ‘it does not come close to prove wrongdoings, fraud and deception’ (Republic of 
Kenya 2008: 8). 
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underneath the cushion of his sofa]. I was shaking. // Then I heard my neighbour 
crying – an old man... I heard the neighbour crying and sharpening his panga. He was 
crying ‘Kikuyu ameiba’ which means the Kikuyu have stolen (WAW, Interview, 
Bombolulu, Kibera, 11 November 2009).   
 
Thus, this transformation of high hopes and expectations into deep disappointments fuelled 
the rioting and violent protests of the immediate aftermath of the announcement. Moreover, 
people were furious with the apparent rigging of the election and felt that their rights had 
been violated once again by the selfish and arrogant Kikuyu. One interviewee recalls ‘people 
were very, very angry. How can he [Kibaki] win with only one province? This is what made 
people mad, they felt he had cheated’ (NDG, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 13 November 
2009).  Further inflaming this anger, and sparking the violence in many of my field sites, 
however, was the celebratory reactions of members of the Kikuyu community. As one 
interviewee states, ‘Those who were very happy, they didn’t sleep, they celebrated through 
the night. // The ODM supporters there weren’t happy with the way the PNU supporters had 
behaved, so they decided to retaliate’ (SSW, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 6
 
April 2010).  
Many interviewees state that initial acts of violence were targeted at groups of Kikuyu who 
were openly celebrating the announcement, particularly if they were doing so in an area 
which does not ‘belong’ to them. As a resident of Kaptembwa recalls: 
I saw some three Kikuyus in that area of Checkpoint, they were not in their territory. 
They were celebrating the winning of their president, while we were still confused. // 
people started throwing stones at those three Kikuyu (JF, Interview, Kaptembwa, 
Nakuru, 17 June 2010). 
 
The importance of the way in which communities are seen to be reacting to events which are 
regarded as harmful to another group is further highlighted by a Kalenjin youth.  I asked him 
about how the Kalenjin community might react if Ruto were to be named as a suspect by the 
ICC. He said, ‘The Kalenjin will go crazy. It depends, the best thing to see, how do your 
neighbours react? If Kikuyu clap and celebrate then there is trouble, but if they say, “we’re 
against this, we support you...”’ (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010). Thus, the 
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Kikuyu’s celebration of Kibaki’s victory was regarded as tacit acceptance of his thievery and 
betrayal of Kenyans: 
If you support a thief to steal, you also become a thief. For us, we believe they are 
also thieves. They should tell him [Kibaki], “No. You’ve been voted out.” But no; 
they ended up celebrating after the announcement (X, Interview, Lindi, Kibera, 
December 2009).  
 
Finally, while clearly the immediate violent response to the apparent rigging of the 
elections was highly ethnicised and reflected resentments of Kikuyu dominance, superiority 
and selfishness, it was equally the result of a lack of an alternative vehicle through which to 
express this sense of injustice and frustration. As one interviewee explains ‘some of the 
results were not expected. I was angry. // When the election was stolen I had no other way to 
express my anger and disappointment’ (WL, Interview, Langas, Eldoret, 15 January 2010).  
This draws attention to the relationship of the post-election violence to weak democratic 
institutions, to the corrupt and ineffective judicial system, and to the normalisation of 
violence in Kenyan society as a means of resolving social problems. Throughout the crisis the 
refrain which was chanted in the streets was ‘haki yetu, haki yetu’’ and ‘tunaenda haki 
yetu!’
46
 Many interviewees regard their participation as ‘asking for justice’ (BEAT, 
Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 7 April 2010) and suggest that ‘I went to the streets to ask 
for my rights to vote’ (MUS, Interview, 4B, Mathare 29 April 2010). The lack of alternative 
mechanisms of pursuing justice plays a significant role in the normalisation of violence as a 
means of protest, effecting change, and resolving social conflict.
47
 Several interviewees 
allude to this sense of powerlessness and their inability to affect the government or to seek 
justice through democratic institutions and processes. A Luo youth who had been a candidate 
                                                 
46
 ‘Our rights, our rights’ and ‘we are going for our rights’ 
47
 For a discussion of this in the context of Nepal see Pfaff-Czarnecka (2004). He identifies similar expectations 
and disappointments in democratic transitions in Nepal, and a subsequent increased readiness to consider 
alternative political options, including the violent Maoist movement. However, Pfaff-Czarnecka suggests that 
protest is limited in Nepal due to ‘the lack of such a tradition in many parts [of the country]’ (2004: 183).  As 
has already been discussed in Chapter Four, this is not the case in many parts of Kenya, and indeed, violence has 
become normalised and is seen as a legitimate means of resolving conflict and effecting justice.  
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for a civic seat in Kibera explains that ‘people were venting their anger on their friend 
because they could not reach the system’ (KOT, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 6 December 
2009) and similarly a member of a youth group Kianda states: 
It was a fight between the people and the government. The government stole the vote, 
so people are fighting for their rights. People were frustrated and you don’t have the 
capability of fighting the government, so you vent your anger against your neighbours 
(HA, Group Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 15 November 2009).  
 
Thus, while some of the violence indicates high degrees of organisation, a dimension that is 
explored further in Chapter Seven, the immediate outbreak of violence was triggered by the 
intense emotions surrounding the rigged elections, and is more akin to Horowitz’s (2001) 
‘deadly ethnic riot’, that is ‘an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, 
lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic 
group’(2001: 1), than to the more prolonged and complex dimensions it later assumed.  
 
Conclusion 
Rogers Brubaker et al. have powerfully argued for the ‘shift in angle of vision’ (2006: 
167) stating that a focus on the ‘incendiary rhetoric’ of the political elite ‘without attending to 
the question of resonance or receptivity’ might be misleading (2006: 358). Similarly, this 
chapter has sought to shift the emphasis from a focus upon the elite level alone to a more 
balanced analysis of how this dimension interacts with local level dynamics. Situating the 
discussion within the context of Kenyan society explored in the first half of this thesis, I have 
argued that the political events since the 2002 elections were of crucial importance in shifting 
the boundaries between friend and stranger, enemy and ally, and served as an important 
transition period in the gradual movement towards and entrenchment of Kikuyu alienation 
and isolation by 2007. While the political events of this period provided elites with a wealth 
of material upon which to draw, ethnicised discourses of betrayal and animosity were already 
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circulating at the local level, and are a result of the highly ethnicised nature of society and the 
tendency to interpret events through an ethnic lens. Furthermore, hate speech and incitement, 
usually assigned to the realm of the political elites, were produced, reproduced and circulated 
at all levels of social agency and cannot be understood in isolation from the social context of 
everyday ethnic conflict from which they emerge. In fact, often the gradual intensification of 
hate speech and the incitement to violence goes unnoticed and unchecked at the local level, 
being mistaken for the typical use of negative ethnicity in day to day life. Moreover, a closer 
examination of local level dynamics illustrates that hate speech and incitement was far more 
prolific and intense in ethnicised spaces, where prejudice and bias circulate more profusely in 
everyday situations; conversely in ethnically mixed spaces, where outspoken ethnic 
prejudices are less acceptable in day to day interactions, political disagreements remained 
largely congenial and, more often than not, the use of stereotypes continued to be a source of 
humour rather than tension. Nevertheless, the interaction of top-down and bottom-up 
incitement and animosity during the campaign period marked a movement along the 
continuum of conflict, as incidents of violence increased and intensified.  Finally, the chapter 
has suggested that the specific sequence of events served to heighten, intensify and transform 
feelings of hope and expectation to deep disappointment, anger and frustration, and served as 
a trigger for the violence which immediately followed the presidential announcement. 
Chapter Seven examines the local level dynamics of the violence and argues that it very 
quickly transforms from this form of violent protest and rioting, to a more complex 





The Post-Election Crisis: 
A Local-Level Perspective of Ethnic Violence 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapters of this thesis have highlighted the social and political context 
of ethnicity and violence in Kenya, explored the political transitions towards the polarisation 
of 2007, and examined the ways in which the flawed elections acted as a trigger for violence, 
continually emphasising the importance of social structures and agency at the local level.  In 
this chapter I focus more closely on the patterns and practices of violence, exploring the ways 
in which they relate to ethnicity and examining how violence was experienced and enacted 
during the post-election crisis. The ethnic conflict literature can often overstate the 
manipulative capacity of political elites at the expense of local agency, and there is a strong 
tendency in the broader literature on civil conflict to ‘look for the causes of violence at the 
regional and national levels, and not in the realm of the local’ (Autesserre 2010: 42). 
However, in recent years there has been increasing attention paid to more micro-level, sub-
national research which addresses questions related to the locality, intensity and duration of 
violence, to the motivations and behaviours of individual participants in the action, and to the 
routines and patterns which emerge during conflict (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009: 335-336; see 
for example, Nordstrom 1997; Kalyvas 2003, 2006; Richards 2005; Wood 2003; Hinton 
2002; Lubkemann 2005; Straus 2006;  Bakonyi and De Guevara 2009). Such analyses are 
important, as Richards (2005: 11) points out: 
War may be deeply unpleasant and dangerous, but only by stepping up close will the 
complex intertwining of multiple motivations become tractable to analysis. Reading a 
balance sheet from afar is simply no substitute for well-grounded attempts to grasp 




In the Kenyan context, in addition to the detailed governmental reports and human rights 
documents relating to the post-election crisis, a number of scholarly works are emerging that 
highlight the importance of disaggregation and emphasise the local dimensions of, and 
variations in, the violence. Anderson and Lochery (2008), for example, document the 
geographical patterns of violence in the Rift Valley by analysing satellite imagery signalling 
the outbreak of fires in January 2008;
1
 Murunga (2011) explores the variations in the forms 
of violence in different regions of the country, focusing on questions concerning the 
spontaneous, planned, or organised nature of conflict; Osborn (2008) and de Smedt (2009) 
address the dynamics of politics and violence in Kibera; Médard (2009) highlights the role of 
autochthonous discourses in conflicts over land; Calas (2009) offers a spatially sensitive 
mapping of the elections and the post-election crisis; and Lynch’s (2011) in-depth study of 
the Kalenjin emphasises the importance of local discourses in shaping political action and 
behaviour.    
Yet despite this increased attention to the grassroots dynamics of violence, there are 
few attempts to engage directly with questions of ethnicity in these local level processes, 
practices and violent acts.
2
 This chapter, then, contributes to this literature by exploring the 
complex and ambiguous role ethnicity played in the kaleidoscope of violent action during the 
post-election crisis, examining not only when and where violence took place, but what forms 
                                                 
1
 The value of this analysis lies more in its efforts to disaggregate the patterns of violence and to draw attention 
to the geographical variations in its timing and intensity. While the authors draw some tentative conclusions 
from these images, inferring that a significant dimension of the violence was planned and orchestrated, and that 
historical injustices over land allocation drove much of the violence in the Rift Valley, they quite rightly point 
out the limitations of mapping fires in analysing the conflict. They emphasise the need to ‘triangulate the 
evidence provided by the maps with other kinds of information’ (2008: 333), and my own research, which 
problematises and complexifies some of their conclusions, further highlights this need.  
2
 There are some notable exceptions including Malkki (1995) Straus (2006), and Fujii (2009a). Also worthy of 
note is Tronvoll’s (2005) study of localised Tigrean identity formation in the Eritrean-Ethiopian war of 1998-
2000, which shifts the focus from the collective to the individual, and highlights the ambiguity of ethnicity in 
violence. Similarly a recent article by Kalyvas (2008) offers a locally grounded account of ethnic identification 
processes in violence. The article is important as it addresses the tension between constructivist insights in the 
analysis of ethnicity and the concurrent tendency to cast ethnic groups as unitary actors in analyses of conflict. 
Furthermore it empirically maps the involvement of individuals in ethnic conflict in an effort to incorporate 
constructivist insights into the analysis of violence.  
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it took, who participated in it, in what ways and why. It argues that the conceptualisation of 
ethnic violence afforded by the dominant macro-level perspective – that it is largely 
organised and directed from above, and that it is fought along clearly identifiable cleavage 
lines between (temporarily) reified groups – is deeply misleading and obscures the processes 
of mobilisation on the ground, the complexity and ambiguity of participation, and the multi-
vocality of ethnic identity in times of violent conflict.  
 The chapter begins by examining the interaction of planned, organised and 
spontaneous dimensions of violence, drawing attention to the ways in which bottom-up 
processes interacted with, infused, and operated independently from, top-down orchestration. 
It then explores the spatial variations in violence, demonstrating that discourses of ethnic 
territoriality, the embeddedness of ethnic components of the habitus, and the dynamics of 
local interaction significantly influence the contours of violence. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of the flexibility of the friend/enemy dichotomy at the local level, revealing the 
logic behind its negotiation and reconceptualisation by local level actors. Thus, the chapter 
seeks not only to elucidate, but also to offer some explanation of the ‘messiness’ of ethnic 
conflict in the context of the 2007-2008 crisis.  
 
Spontaneous, Planned and Organised Violence 
 Common representations of ethnic violence as the product of strategic planning, and 
direction by political elites for electoral purposes are echoed by some analysts of the Kenyan 
situation. It is explicitly stated by Klopp (2008) who argues that elites on both sides of the 
political divide were deliberately ‘pitting one community against another as a means to gain 
power,’ and implicitly noted by Branch and Cheeseman (2009: 21) who suggest that the 
reintroduction of multi-party politics has created ‘incentives for leaders to adopt increasingly 
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antagonistic strategies.’ Moreover, a KNCHR report asserts that ‘the violence was largely 
instigated by politicians’ (2008: 8), and the ICC has accused key political figures of being 
heavily involved in directing the violence, suggesting that William Ruto and Henry Kosgey 
planned the chaos in the Rift Valley up to a year in advance ‘to create a Kalenjin and pro-
Kalenjin voting block that would serve their interests in any election’ (ICC, 2011: 8). 
However, despite this inclination to blame elites for initiating, orchestrating, funding and 
directing violence, a significant number of analyses have noted that at least some of the 
violence was more spontaneous in nature, and that its eruption and spread provoked more 
impromptu processes of organisation at the local level (Lynch 2008: 565, 2011: 206-208; 
Ashforth 2008: 14; Calas 2009: 177; Rutten and Owuor 2009, 321; Kagwanja 2009: 378; 
Murunga 2011). Thus, there is an emerging consensus that the 2007-2008 crisis was a 
combination of planned, organised and spontaneous dimensions,
3
 with each constituent part 
being more or less important across time and space. The CIPEV (2008: viii) report concludes 
that: 
The post election violence was spontaneous in some geographic areas and a result of 
planning and organization in other areas, often with the involvement of politicians and 
business leaders. Some areas witnessed a combination of the two forms of violence, 
where what started as a spontaneous violent reaction to the perceived rigging of 
elections later evolved into well organized and coordinated attacks. 
 
This section explores the different dimensions, arguing that while there were significant 
elements of elite organisation, funding and direction, this provides only a partial explanation 
of violence in some areas, and at times it can be misleading. I suggest that while premeditated 
elements of violence – that is violence planned by powerful leaders in advance of the 
elections – was largely limited to the Rift Valley region, elite organisation and instigation 
                                                 
3
 Many accounts also identify state-sanctioned violence carried out by police and other state agents as an 
additional dimension (see for example Murunga 2011; Kagwanja 2009; CIPEV 2008; Human Rights Watch  
2008). While I do not disagree that this constituted a distinct and important element, given this thesis’ focus 
upon the involvement of non-state, local level actors in conflict I do not address it here.   
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became increasingly widespread and prominent as the situation proceeded. However, this 
top-down picture is complicated by bottom-up processes of spontaneity and locally-organised 
responses that operated alongside it throughout the duration of the crisis. Indeed, a close-
grained look at how some attacks came about, who was involved in their planning, and in 
what ways, points to the increasingly blurred lines between organisation and spontaneity at 
the grassroots.   
While in Chapter Six I argued that much of the violence immediately following the 
presidential announcement was predominantly a spontaneous reaction to the ‘rigged’ 
elections, this does not preclude elements of elite mobilisation and planning. My research 
certainly supports the assertion that some incidents of violence in some areas might have 
been planned in advance of the elections. The speed, scale, nature and coordination of some 
of the attacks that occurred in Rift Valley within the first few days of the presidential 
announcement, for example, all point to premeditation and organisation. The large numbers 
of Kalenjin warriors reported to have descended upon Kiambaa
4
 on the morning of 1 January, 
less than forty-eight hours after Kibaki’s announcement, is in itself suggestive of advanced 
preparation. Furthermore, the fact that the attackers were well-armed with kerosene and 
petroleum is also a ‘useful indicator of planning or premeditation’ (Murunga 2011: 35); as 
one resident of Kiambaa exclaims, ‘they know what they are going to do, otherwise where 
would they get the petroleum?’ (JG, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret, 16 January 2010). 
Similarly, on the other side of Eldoret town, the attack against Huruma began on, or just after, 
1 January (ICC, 2011: 21). Large numbers of perpetrators were transported to the area in 
trucks, surrounding the village from all sides, indicating a coordinated and systematic attack 
                                                 
4
 My interviewees consistently put the number at around 3000-4000. While this number is most likely inflated, 
the CIPEV report and other human rights documents suggest the figures reached into the hundreds at least.  
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on a predetermined target.
5
 Many of the attackers were also found with large amounts of 




I saw people coming for war with a lot of weapons because in Nyathiru
7
 up there we 
were defending the area. And we used to see six trucks from the hill up there, and 
when the truck turns you see many people coming, without fear. // In night hours 
some used to come from the other direction, very many of them. // But those people 
were being paid, because the way they look, they are not boys we know from the area. 
We know on that hill there are not as many Nandis as that. So we are wondering 
where they’ve come from. Some of them, we caught them and we asked them, “Are 
you coming from that hill?” They said no, that they were brought in a truck. Some of 
them came from Turbo, from interior areas. We got them with money. They were 
being paid 400 shillings and they used to be in a group. It was like a down payment. 
Once they’ve already done the violence, when they go back, they’d get more money 
(AV, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 4 February 2010).  
 
In addition to these signs of pre-planning and premeditation in the Rift Valley, elite 
orchestration became increasingly prominent in other areas of the country as the violence 
continued, and well-organised, well-funded retaliatory attacks were almost certainly arranged 
and directed from above. Key politicians on the PNU side, for example, have been accused of 
mobilising members of the Mungiki sect, providing them with weapons and payment, and 
transporting them across the country to carry out systematic revenge attacks upon ODM-
affiliated communities.
8
 The vast majority of my interviewees confirm the mobilisation both 
of the Mungiki and of Kalenjin warriors as the violence continued. One Kikuyu interviewee 
from Kawangware in Nairobi, who was identified as a member of Mungiki by many residents 
                                                 
5
 Interviewee descriptions of the attack on Munyaka are virtually identical. The uniformity and seeming co-
ordination of these large-scale attacks is suggestive of levels of advanced planning and elite direction. 
6
 This supports the charges made by the ICC against William Ruto and Henry Kosgey that in addition to 
providing fuel to the perpetrators and coordinating transportation, telephones were also distributed as logistical 
support (ICC, 2011: 16).  
7
 Nyathiru is a motel which is situated at the edge of Huruma village, near to the main road. Its location at the 
border of the slum meant that the area became a prominent battleground.  
8
 The ICC has named Uhuru Kenyatta and Francis Muthaura as the principal perpetrators in the organisation of 





 explains that after the ‘massacres’ which took place upcountry, the group was 
mobilised to retaliate: 
A group called Mungiki called a meeting and they told us to go and rescue our people 
in the Rift Valley. Since the group has so much money, they hired vehicles. It took 
around 500 people to Naivasha. When we reached in Naivasha, we put a very big 
roadblock in there. // We declared that any bus passing the area was to be searched, if 
there was a Luo on the bus he must remain in Naivasha and the bus would continue 
on. We cut many and we circumcised many (RH, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 
14 March 2010).  
 
Similarly, in Nakuru, residents report that Mungiki members were transported to the town in 
lorries and were well-armed: ‘the Kikuyu’s weapons, they were not emergency weapons, so it 
was planned for them to have those weapons. // All of them had bottles of petrol’ (HR, 
Interview, Pondamali, Nakuru, 26 June 2010). Furthermore, letters were purportedly dropped 
by the group in ODM territories issuing warnings that ‘today we’re coming for you’ (GB, 
Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 20 June 2010), which, as Horowitz (2001: 228) points out, is 
a clear sign of forethought and organisation. Similarly, a significant number of interviewees 
in Eldoret and Nakuru believe that the Marakwet and Pokot communities were transported 
from the North to support the Kalenjin attacks. A Kikuyu woman from Munyaka, for 
example, explains that when the first Kalenjin group were unable to defeat the Kikuyu in the 
village, they sent for reinforcements from the Marakwet because ‘they’re still a Kalenjin clan. 
// as we were in the church, we saw a truck with a lot of people. It was full and they were 
Marakwets. They had arrows’ (BD, Interview, Munyaka, Eldoret, 17 February 2010). 
Similarly, a Kalenjin youth in Kaptembwa explains that when rumours began to circulate that 
the Mungiki were being mobilised to launch counter-attacks in the Nakuru area, the Pokot 
                                                 
9
 RH is, unsurprisingly, more ambiguous about his status as a member of the sect. While he appears at times to 
disassociate himself from membership of the group, the fact that he was among those transported upcountry is 
suggestive of his involvement, and at the end of the interview he states, ‘if the police will kill us because they 
think that we’re Mungiki, let them, because we’re all Kikuyu and we’re all Mungiki.’ 
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were called in to support the local Kalenjin community (KV, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 
16 June 2010). 
In addition to these acts of large-scale, country-wide coordination there is strong 
evidence to suggest that politicians also became involved at a more local level, funding and 
offering incentives to the more amorphous youth groups and gangs, encouraging them to 
continue fighting. In Mathare, for example, one interviewee recalls that ‘some councillors // 
came walking around here giving out money to the youth, telling them to continue with the 
war and some were buying the machetes for the youths’ (SGH, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 
13 April 2010); a large number of interviewees in Kawangware reported that Beth Mugo, the 
incumbent MP, was heavily involved in a meeting which took place in the Ndarura school 
grounds, claiming that she gave the youths money and weapons to engage in retaliatory 
attacks on the Luo and Luhya communities; and residents of Kibera reported that ‘we saw a 
big politician come and give money to the boys blocking the road’ (JHG, Interview, Kianda, 
Kibera, 15 November 2009). Indeed, some participants in the violence admitted that ‘at that 
time we got money very easily’ (ED in GWH, Group Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 20 
November 2009). However, these elements of later-stage organisation, funding and direction 
appear to be the result of politicians responding to, and capitalising upon, the violence that 
had already erupted. They were not necessarily, or indeed primarily, the ‘instigators’ of the 
clashes in most areas, but they certainly contributed to its transformation into a more 
organised, directed and coordinated affair, and perpetuated it through the provision of 
incentives and rewards. However, while it is tempting to infer a certain linearity in the 
temporal patterns of violence from these observations – that there was a general shift from 
spontaneity to organisation – this oversimplifies the more complex infusion  and interaction 
of top-down organisation and bottom-up dynamics of the conflict.  
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Thus, while it is important not to understate the involvement of political elites in 
orchestrating some dimensions of the post-election crisis in some places, other more localised 
processes of organisation were equally prevalent, if not more so. These operated at various 
different levels of the local community, and to varying degrees, ranging from mid-level 
coordination of the youth by local ‘big-men,’ to more amorphous, impromptu plans for small-
scale attacks on the part of groups and gangs in the area. In the case of the former, village 
elders, chiefs, businessmen, councillors and landlords played a significant role in mobilising 
the local youth, initiating meetings and leading discussions over responses to the ongoing 
crisis. Lynch (2008: 565) similarly identifies the importance of this dimension of 
organisation, stating:  
In many areas an initially spontaneous reaction against a ‘rigged election’ also 
initiated community discussions on how to respond and more ad hoc processes of 
incitement and organization by local actors, including elders and local ODM 
councillor and campaign organizers.  
 
For example, a Luo interviewee from 4B suggests that an elder in the village was the ‘chief 
organiser’ of the youth, arranging them into groups to carry out attacks (PT, Interview 4B, 
Mathare, 2 May 2010). Similarly, in Kaptembwa a large number of interviewees recall that 
there were a number of meetings organised by the Kalenjin village elders in which they ‘told 
us how we will fight our enemy and protect ourselves’ (KV, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 
16 June 2010). One Kalenjin youth states that: 
With the Kipsigis, the Kalenjin down here, you can’t just start a war without it being 
organised by the old men, to give that blessing. So a Kalenjin was killed in Catholic 
church
10
 on the way home from his job, so then the old men called the young men. I 
was in that meeting, as a young man you must go there // There is a river down there 
where we meet and the old men talk, “how should we react?” We were told that 
someone of our tribe was killed so we can’t just sit there watching, our community 
must do something (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010).   
 
                                                 
10
 The interviewee is referring to an area of the road between Shabab and Kaptembwa where there is a Catholic 
church.  He does not mean that the Kalenjin was killed in the church itself.   
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Furthermore, many interviewees explain that following the outbreak of violence, property 
owners, landlords and ‘the rich people with businesses’ (S, Interview, Langas, Eldoret, 14 
January 2010), were also involved in inciting, mobilising and organising the youth to fight in 
order to defend and protect their assets. In Kawangware, for example, Kikuyu landlords are 
reported to have been heavily involved in initiating a meeting, mobilising the strong Mungiki 
presence in the area, and funding the youth to fight ODM-affiliated communities who were 
rioting and destroying Kikuyu properties.
11
 A youth from the area recalls that it was the 
destruction of Kikuyu properties in the 56, Muslim and Stage 2 areas of Kawangware that 
prompted this local level organisation: 
After this, it fuelled the war and the landlords and Kikuyu decided to reinforce, and 
they called for backup from Kikuyu [a town on the outskirts of Nairobi] and Ndonyo 
and Waithaka, from where most of the youths there are Mungiki. So they had a 
meeting at the grounds there called Ndarura’ (B, Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 1 
March 2010).  
 
At this meeting ‘money was raised by the businessmen and the landlords, and we bought 
pangas, rungus, guns // so we were to go to Congo to rescue the fellow Kikuyu, the landlords 
in that area’ (B, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 5 March 2010). The involvement of the 
more wealthy sectors of the community in financing the conflict is noted in areas across the 
country. Interviewees in Mathare, for example, suggested that ‘those rich Luos // bribed the 
youth with money so the youth went to war’ (SGH, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 13 April 
2010), and in Eldoret some suggested that ‘The business people used to pay the warriors. 
They were paid to go and watch their places’ (KNB, Group Interview with Kisumu Ndogo 
youths, Langas, Eldoret, 17 January 2010). One interviewee in Kawangware suggests that, 
‘An Indian, he paid the youths to attack the other businesses that gave him competition, so 
                                                 
11
 This is the same meeting mentioned above in which Beth Mugo allegedly played a prominent role. There is 
some debate amongst interviewees as to who initiated the meeting, the landlords or the MP, but a significant 




they attacked all those businesses.’ In Huruma, some interviewees believe that a former land 
owner in the area funded some of the Kalenjin attackers in the hopes of benefitting 
financially: 
Those who we caught, we got information [from them] that the hill up there belongs 
to one Nandi man. That is the garden of one man. And he sold it to mostly Kikuyu 
and Kisiis. We heard that that man went to the bank to take loans towards 800,000, 
900,000 and he was told “use money to get money.” So he took the loan and he came 
and gave it to the youth to chase those Kikuyu and Kisii from that hill so that he can 
sell the land again. Because the people who bought the land before bought it at 40,000 
to 60,000 per plot so they want to chase them to sell the land again (AV, Interview, 




 The involvement of local businessmen in mobilising, inciting and funding the youth is not 
only indicative of bottom-up elements of organisation, but it also highlights the importance of 
individual and local agendas in perpetuating the violence.  
In addition to these structured processes of organisation, a large number of 
interviewees described more organic discussions and plans to carry out acts of violence that 
seem to straddle the line between spontaneity and some degree of organisation. A Luo youth 
from Mathare, for example, states, ‘I found a group of youth planning how they will raid the 
Kikuyu who are still here. I joined them and we went, we took their goats and ducks and we 
raided their shops around’ (FO, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 8 May 2010). In Nakuru a Luhya 
interviewee recalls, ‘I saw a group of Kalenjin youth saying, “Tomorrow we’ll go in 
Pondamali, there is where many Luos have been killed”’ (FS, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 
June 2010). Similarly, Kikuyu residents of Kosovo in Mathare explain that they coordinated 
with youths in neighbouring areas in order to prevent the Luo from passing along Juja road 
on their way to Uhuru Park: 
                                                 
12
 The veracity of this story is highly questionable given my inability to triangulate it with data collected from 
the Kalenjin youth in the area. However, this interviewee’s belief in its credibility, as well as that of others in 
Huruma, in conjunction with other stories illustrating the involvement of businessmen, land owners, and 
property owners in pursuing their own agendas during the violence, are all indicative of the involvement of such 
individuals as organisers and financiers.  
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That next day Raila called for a mass demonstration at Uhuru Park, they were 
supposed to go there, so that day we saw them in large numbers going to Uhuru Park 
using Juja road // So the Kikuyus organised a gang and we communicated with the 
youth from Mlango Kubwa. // we hijacked them here. // Those who escaped along the 
road, while they were escaping they came across the boys from Mlango and they 
attacked them there. So they realised that Juja road is a Kikuyu zone (B, Interview, 




Similarly, in Huruma, Eldoret, a Kikuyu youth recalls the plans to launch a counter-attack 
upon the neighbouring Kalenjin village: 
We as the youth sat down and we said, “No, they cannot go like that with our things.” 
Because they had looted all our things, anything nice from the houses. So we sit, a 
group of boys, to discuss the issue. At that time, we say we can’t wait for them as they 
go with properties // so we went up there and all the things they had stolen, they had 
put it in one place there. We start removing the things from the house. It took us like 




These discussions took place at common youth ‘hangouts,’ such as on street corners, at 
newspaper stands, in pubs, youth bases and at other such meeting points. For example, in 
Kawangware residents met outside a supermarket in 56 and from there they ‘planned how to 
do what we were going to do // [because] that is where the newspapers are sold. So people 
went to look at the newspapers, so the Luos, the Luhyas, it is their meeting point’ (CM, 
Interview, 56, Kawangware, 7 March 2010). The fact that these discussions of how to 
respond to ongoing events took place in a largely organic fashion, in common hangout spots 
and bases, further illustrates that highly organised and centralised ethnic militias attached to 
politicians were not necessarily the key perpetrators of the violence, as might have been the 
case in previous clashes in the country. Rather, violent acts were more often carried out by 
amorphous groups of youth, lacking a distinct and stable leadership element. Thus, violent 
                                                 
13
 Note the reference to ethnically territorialised and bordered space: that Juja road is part of the ‘Kikuyu zone.’ 
The politico-ethnic homogenisation of space and the subsequent patrolling of boundaries was a key 
characteristic of the violence across the country.  
14
 This incident was related to me by a number of interviewees in Huruma. Over thirty members of the group 
were arrested when they were caught by the GSU and the incident was reported in The Standard (9 February 
2008). The article states that over fifty youths were involved in the attack, and characterises it as a ‘revenge 
mission’ in which the youth were not only looting livestock and property, but were also harassing women and 
children, burning houses and searching for particular individuals, presumably those known to have been 
involved in attacks upon Huruma estate.  
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acts of the post-election crisis were often haphazardly planned and extemporaneously carried 
out by groups of friends and neighbours meeting, reacting to, and taking advantage of the 
situation, supporting Horowitz’s (2001: 225) suggestion that often ethnic violence is, in part, 
‘organised by ephemeral leadership that springs up to respond to events as they happen.’  
Amidst these various levels and degrees of organisation, both macro- and micro-level 
events continued to trigger renewed waves of spontaneous protest and rioting throughout the 
crisis. Kibaki’s announcement of a partial Cabinet on 8 January, for example, unexpected as 
it was in the absence of a negotiated settlement, sparked fresh waves of violence across the 
country (Daily Nation, 9 January 2008; The Standard, 10 January 2008) and interviewees in 
Mathare recalled that ‘at that time when things were cooling, we heard that Kalonzo was 
made the Vice President, and now the war was between the Kambas and the Luos’ (CS, 
Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 18 May 2010).
15
  Similarly, the killing of an MP, Mellitus 
Mugabe Were, in Woodley Estate in the early hours of 29 January sparked renewed chaos in 
Nairobi (KNCHR 2008: 42; The Standard, 30 January 2008) and the death of an Eldoret MP, 
David Kimutai Too, less than two days later, triggered further violent protests in Rift Valley 
and Western Kenya (The Standard, 1 February 2008; CIPEV 2008: 144). Moreover, 
throughout the crisis reports of attacks upon co-ethnics sparked violent reprisals across the 
country and provoked more active and intense participation amongst local level actors. As 
one interviewee states: 
We heard that the Luo and Luhya in Central, Naivasha, Limuru were evicted and 
beaten up, some houses were burned. When we got the message that our people were 
evicted from Kikuyu areas we were furious and I was very angry. I called my people 
in Western and I told them “Evict any Kikuyu in our area!” // and now I got mad and I 
was like an animal. I had my panga twenty-four-seven, walking around the plot (SSB, 
Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 15 March 2010).   
                                                 
15
 CS implies that prior to this incident, Kambas in the area had not been targeted. This not only points to the 
speed with which ethnic alliances and animosities can shift, and their inherent instability, but it also draws 





Thus, the instability of the political situation, and the violent events that were spreading 
across the country, fed into localised dynamics of violence. These responses illustrate the 
importance of local level agency, drawing attention to the continued prevalence of mass-led 
elements of violence throughout the crisis. Bottom-up, largely spontaneous reactions to 
ongoing events continued for the duration of the conflict and, as Horowitz (2001: 225) points 
out, ‘there remains room, even in the most organized riots, for spontaneous action.’  
  Thus, there was a certain duality to the Kenyan violence, where bottom-up processes 
of violence and organisation both interacted with, and operated independently from, more 
top-down direction and coordination in a continually transforming infusion. As such we 
should caution against focusing solely, or indeed even primarily, upon the level of the 
political elite. As one interview states, ‘People like blaming the leaders, but we must give 
credit where it is due’ (K, Interview, Olympic, Kibera, 4 December 2009), and sometimes 
this lies in the realm of the local arena. The remainder of the chapter explores the practices of 
violence which characterised this web of planned, organised and spontaneous conflict, 
suggesting that socio-spatial structures and local agency arguably have more of an impact in 
shaping the contours of violence than the involvement of elite actors.   
 
Ethnicity and the Socio-Spatial Dynamics of Violence 
In Eldoret, the people who suffered there were the Kikuyu and the Kamba and the 
Kisii, because the Kalenjin are the majority, and others are the minority. And in 
Kisumu, the Luo are the majority and the Kikuyu are very few, so something like that 
can easily happen there. So the places where the tribes are the majority and others are 
the minority is where there was war. // that is where things are hard, in places like that 
(JF, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 17 June 2010).  
 
In this interview, JF highlights the socio-spatial variations which characterised the 
post-election violence, and his suggestion that it is the majority/minority dynamics which are 
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responsible for shaping these variations, whilst somewhat simplified, is not wholly 
inaccurate. Spaces dominated by a particular group, that is spaces which are ostensibly 
ethnicised, did experience more immediate and more intense violence than ethnically mixed 
territories. The latter on the whole, either remained relatively calm for the duration of the 
crisis, or only descended into violence after a significant delay. The first waves of violence 
erupted in core ODM zones across the country, as the few PNU-affiliated residents were 
targeted and the spaces subjected to violent politico-ethnic homogenisation. The violence 
quickly spread outwards from these territories as attacks were launched against neighbouring 
areas, frontier zones and nearby ethnic enclaves, and fighting became concentrated at the 
increasingly reified borderlines and boundaries. This pattern is apparent in both the peri-
urban arena, where villages are spread out and have relatively clearly defined borders, as well 
as in the more geographically-concentrated, and often less distinctly-bounded 
neighbourhoods of urban slums. In Eldoret, for example, residents of the villages of 
Kiambaa, Huruma and Munyaka recall that when the violence began they saw smoke coming 
from the ‘interior’ rural Kalenjin areas
16
 and that Kikuyu residents were fleeing these villages 
as attackers burned their homes to the ground. Shortly after this, large-scale attacks were 
launched upon their own estates. An account given by a Kikuyu man, DAB, who was resident 
in a small Kalenjin-dominated village on the outskirts of Eldoret in 2007 clearly illustrates 
this pattern. He recalls that on 29 December, as the presidential announcement was delayed 
amidst suspicions of rigging, he heard his neighbours grouping together and organising 
themselves to come and attack his home; as one of the few Kikuyu living in the village, he 
was the first to be targeted. He fled to the neighbouring Kikuyu enclave of Huruma, where 
the residents were celebrating, unaware that violence was erupting elsewhere, until they saw 
                                                 
16
 Interestingly, a large number of interviewees referred to the rural areas of Rift Valley as ‘interior Kalenjin 
zones’, highlighting this sense of core areas which are indisputably dominated by one community.  
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smoke billowing from the rural areas. The next day, Huruma was attacked in a highly 
organised, systematic and coordinated manner.
17
 Similarly, residents of Mathare explain that 
the Kikuyu living in the centre of Luo-dominated 4B were the first to be attacked, and the 
violence quickly spread to Gitathuru, a frontier zone which borders with Kosovo and which 
has a significant Kikuyu minority, as ‘the Luo were coming from Muradi towards this area // 
saying that they’ll come from their village to stay in Kosovo and chase the Kikuyu from here’ 
(MSO, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 14 April 2010). In Kibera, residents of Kianda recall that 
the violence began in the Luo stronghold of Gatuikera, and spread as the youths ‘were 
coming from Gatuikera and coming to 42,
18
 burning something and going back. The group 
was large and when they came here some of the boys joined them’ (CM, Interview, Kianda, 
Kibera, 21 November 2009). After this, inter-communal violence was largely concentrated 
along the border of Kikuyu-dominated Laini Saba.
19
 Thus, violence spread outwards from 
core ODM  areas, through more peripheral frontier zones, as ethnicised neighbourhoods and 
villages were ‘cleansed’ of PNU minorities, and enclaves were subsequently attacked in an 
effort to claim, or in some cases to ‘reclaim,’ space.  
                                                 
17
DAB suggests that violence erupted in his village prior to the presidential announcement. While Anderson and 
Lochery (2008: 333) suggest that such incidents are signs of advanced planning, and illustrate that violence 
would likely have occurred regardless of the result, DAB’s description of the violence on this particular day 
gives little indication of prior organisation and coordination; the way in which he was attacked appears to be a 
reaction to the flawed counting process by local people who knew both his name, and where he lived. His 
account of the violence that took place the next day, after he had run away to his family in Huruma, however, 
does indicate signs of planning and organisation. It is also possible that DAB is mistaken over the date in which 
violence erupted. He suggests that when he reached Huruma, the residents there were celebrating by 
slaughtering a sheep, drinking and eating chapatti. It seems unlikely that the Kikuyu would have been 
celebrating so exuberantly if Kibaki had not yet been announced. It is possible that they were celebrating the 
fact that Kibaki had taken the lead but given the narrow margin of his lead on 29 December and the ongoing 
disputes over the counting process, I am not wholly convinced by this and think it more likely that violence 
began in DAB’s village on 30 December. This would also correspond with the ICC’s supposition that the attack 
on Huruma began on 1 January, or shortly thereafter, rather than on 30 December, as DAB suggests.    
18
 42 is a matatu stage in Kianda, but it is often used to refer to the neighbourhood as a whole.  
19
 However, fighting between the youth and the police continued in various areas of the slum, as did the looting 
of shops and businesses. One interviewee suggests that with the exception of Laini Saba, ‘from there in Kibera 
there were no Kikuyu, it was just ODM. From there I came back home just to protect the area. There were 
rumours of Mungiki coming but the killings stopped in Kibera on the third [of January]. People were just 
fighting the police from there’ (FZ, Interview, Makina, 3 August 2010).  
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On the other hand, in contrast to the intense violence which characterised ethnicised 
spaces, ethnically mixed territories remained relatively calm or experienced a significant 
delay in the eruption of violence; this is evident both in the micro-territories of urban slums, 
as well as at a larger scale in the case of Nakuru town. In the former, residents of Nigeria in 
Mathare and Kobiro in Kawangware, for example, reported that their areas remained peaceful 
throughout the crisis, ‘because it is mixed up ethnically’ (J, Interview, Kobiro, Kawangware, 
3 March 2010), stating that, ‘there was no saga here because we live many tribes, not just one 
tribe. We were surrounded by war, but it was cool here’ (K, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 19 
May 2010).  Similarly, residents of Kenya Service in Eldoret explained that ‘there was no 
tension at all between the tribes in Kenya Service’ (CK, Interview, Kenya Service, Eldoret, 
13 February 2010), despite the intense violence which consumed neighbouring Munyaka. 
Interviewees told me that they united during the violence, cooperating with members of 
‘rival’ groups to protect and defend the area:
20
 
They have been our neighbours living here a very long time. Here our elders in this 
community called everyone and told us, ‘You are not a Luo, or a Nandi or a Kikuyu 
anymore. We are Kenyans. We must come together to take care of our community (C, 
Interview, Kenya Service, Eldoret, 12 February 2010). 
 
On a larger scale, Nakuru town,
21
 while experiencing some isolated rioting and violent 
protest on the night of the presidential announcement, quickly cooled to a relative, if uneasy, 




 It is the ethnic heterogeneity of the area and the 
                                                 
20
 The complexification of the macro-ethnic cleavage and the circumstances under which it occurs is further 
explored in the following section.  
21
The shifting demographics of Nakuru have been highlighted in Chapter Three, and while the Kikuyu are now 
believed to constitute the majority, they are by no means dominant in the area. As one interviewee states, 
‘Nakuru is a cosmopolitan town, with many tribes. You can’t say that a particular party has an advantage over 
another. It is not like in Western where it is the Luhyas who are allied to a party’ (FG, Interview, Shabab, 
Nakuru, 1 June 2010). 
22
 Nevertheless, while there were few incidents of violence in Nakuru during this time, tensions were certainly 
enveloping the town as the country descended further into violence. The influx of IDPs and the persistent 
rumours of the imminent arrival of Kalenjin warriors and Mungiki further heightened inter-ethnic tensions in the 
town (CIPEV 2008: 98).  A number of interviewees noted that these tensions erupted into widespread chaos 




prevalence of long-standing cross-cutting ties that many interviewees point to as the reason 
for the significant delay in the outbreak of intense and extensive violence in the town. This 
section, then, explores these socio-spatial variations in violence dynamics, arguing that they 
are, in part, shaped by the culturally embedded discourses of ethnic territoriality which 
underpin Kenyan politics and society, as well as by the ethnic components of the habitus, and 
by the constraining nature of relations within ethnically homogenised spaces.  
 The autochthonous discourses and exclusionary citizenship narratives that 
characterise Kenyan society, both at the macro-regional level, and in the urban micro-
territorial arena, have been highlighted throughout this thesis. The designation of ethnic 
others as guests, and the subordinate citizenship status to which they are subjected, became 
increasingly overt and tense during the 2007 campaigns as dominant communities policed 
their areas. Here I argue that much of the violence which marred the country after the 
elections can be understood as a performance of this ‘deep cultural grammar’ (Johnston 2008: 
322), and a violent expression of the immigrant-guest narrative (Jenkins 2012);
23
 as such it is 
perhaps unsurprising that ethnically mixed spaces, where a sense of ethnic territoriality and 
ownership is conspicuously absent, did not encounter the same levels of intensity or the same 
characteristics of violence.  
The discourse that minorities should either conform to the political wishes of the host 
community or return to their own territories, not only dominated the campaigns, but persisted 
throughout the crisis. Acts of violence were punctuated by territorialised identity narratives as 
spaces were homogenised, borderlines were marked, patrolled and policed, and residents 
became acutely aware that ‘you have to watch which territory you are in’ (SIL, Interview, 
Woodley, Nairobi, 22 November 2009). Indeed, the post-election crisis was more about 
asserting or reasserting dominance and control over space, and punishing opposing 
                                                 
23
 The following paragraphs draw heavily upon the arguments laid out in Jenkins (2012).   
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communities for their perceived transgressions and persistent abuses of hospitality, than it 
was about killing or eliminating them. Consequently, the violence was characterised largely 
by the burning of minorities’ houses, businesses and other properties, and while the killings 
and deaths were numerous, they remain relatively low in comparison to the numbers of 
displaced persons.
24
 Revealingly, in some cases minorities were even given time to vacate the 
area before they were violently evicted. For example, one interviewee who was living in 
Gatuikera, Kibera states that, ‘they told me if I want to live, leave your things and go’ (KN, 
Interview, Makina, Kibera, 22 December 2009) and another recalls that, ‘seven people came 
in the morning and told my mother that by 4pm she should not be here, she should leave and 
go if she wanted to save her life’ (JHG, Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 15 November 2009). In 
Coastal Province leaflets were reportedly distributed by the Kaya Revolution Council stating: 
We are giving you 72 hours to leave. Get your vehicles out of here before this time 
runs out. Or your blood and ashes of your property will be poured (KNCHR 2008: 
106).  
 
Similarly, when violence erupted in Nakuru there were intra-community debates regarding 
the expulsion of minorities from the various neighbourhoods, with some residents suggesting, 
‘“Give them till morning, if they won’t go then, we will chase them.” We gave them until 
morning. Some of them with land and plots were still around so we started to go to them’ 
(ENG, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 16 June 2010). Thus, the violence was not framed by 
a widespread desire to kill, but rather by the intention to remove unwelcome occupiers from 
the area, to push them back to their own territories, and to bring about the balkanisation of the 
country, underscored by the sentiment that ‘we must remain here alone in our home.’ (DK, 
Interview, Kenya Service, Eldoret, 13 February 2010). One interviewee surmises, then, that 
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 While there is a great deal of dispute over the statistics, it is widely accepted that over 1000 people lost their 
lives in the postelection violence, and somewhere between 350,000 and 650,000 were displaced. 
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violent acts were ‘not to kill people, but to harass people, to burn their houses so that they can 
go and not come back again’ (ND, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret, 16 January 2010).  
Furthermore, as has already been illustrated in Chapter Four, there is a strong sense 
that economic resources associated with particular territories ‘belong’ to the dominant 
community, and that immigrants have unfairly appropriated these resources. Thus, by 
extension, the violent homogenisation of territory which marked the post-election crisis was 
not only an attempt to punish and evict politically unsupportive minorities, but it was also an 
attempt to claim or reclaim ownership of the economic resources and activities of the area. 
Consequently, businesses were targeted in addition to residential structures. In Kibera, for 
example, the long row of Kikuyu businesses in Olympic were set alight on the night of the 
announcement, Citihoppa buses which entered the slum were burned, and Toi Market, a 
haven for Kikuyu vendors, was razed to the ground. Similarly, in Kisumu, hotels, markets, 
and kiosks, as well as large businesses such as the Ndugu Transport Company Ltd were 
targeted for their ‘association with people from non-Luo communities’
25
 (KNCHR 2008: 96), 
and in Nakuru, Kikomba market was looted and burned because ‘that market belonged to a 
Kikuyu who built it in an ODM zone since before’ (FS, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 
2010). Whilst many structures were destroyed in a dual process of punishment and eviction, 
in others they were appropriated by the ‘host’ community as a resource that ‘rightfully’ 
belongs to them. In the slums of Nairobi, for example, many Luo and Luhya moved into and 
took over Kikuyu houses and now ‘most Kikuyu houses have gone. The Luo have taken them 
and now they stay there and they don’t pay for them’ (J, Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 28 
October 2009); it was unacceptable that a minority community should have such economic 
dominance in the area. As one resident of Kibera surmises: 
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 While the company was owned by members of the Asian community, the manager was believed to be a Meru, 
and the company reportedly employed a significant number of non-Luo communities.   
259 
 
When they  [the Luo] see that they are the majority, they think that they can rule.// 
There are so many here but they don’t have houses here.// In Kibera, in Gatuikera, 
those people there are Luos, as before it was their area, they captured it. But the 
houses are not for them, they are Kikuyu and Nubian. They were captured by force 
(FR, Interview, Bombolulu, Kibera, 16 December 2009).   
 
Similarly, a group of youths who were actively involved in the violence conceded that, ‘We 
thought “let us beat up the Kikuyu for them to run away to leave for us their businesses”’ (M 
in GWH, Group Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 20 November 2009). Many Kalenjin were 
accused of participating in the violence in order to secure land in the Province, because they 
‘say that this land was theirs and we took their land // they used to call us black whites, 
Wazungu weuse, holding land which doesn’t belong to us’ (JG, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret, 
16 January 2010). Thus, many incidents and acts were overt expressions of the cultural 
violence that underscores ethnicised spaces, and the strong resentments that minorities own 
and control the resources that ‘belong’ to the dominant community. Indeed, a number of 
interviewees suggested that violence against the Kikuyu was particularly intense ‘because the 
Kikuyu are the owners here, and the other tribes are renting’ (YTS, Interview, Huruma, 
Eldoret, 25 January 2010), and because other communities ‘they just come here to work, but 
the Kikuyu come here to live here forever, to migrate’ (BWT, Interview, Munyaka, Eldoret, 
15 February 2010).  
These fears concerning the permanency of occupation are not only related to material 
and instrumental claims over territory, but they are also linked to the threat immigrant 
communities pose to the more affective, cultural and symbolic attachments to space. Indeed, 
the targeting of certain churches associated with particular communities can be understood as 
a cleansing of culturally-alien institutions within the space. One interviewee in Kibera 
suggests, for example, that the AIC church on Kibera Drive was burned ‘because it has a 
board saying that there were Kikuyu services’ (AB, Interview, Karanja, Kibera, 13 December 
2009). Moreover, the fear that guests will alter the cultural identity of the land and challenge 
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native claims is apparent in framings of the selective nature of violent acts. For example, one 
interviewee states that the Kisii were targeted because: 
The Kisii are starting to dominate in a Kalenjin area and the Kalenjin are focusing that 
in a short time the Kisii will be the majority here, so they took the advantage. Then 
they believe that the Kisii are in witchcraft, so later on they will bring their witchcraft 
in the area, when they are the majority (JO, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 14 June 
2010).   
 
This understanding of the rationale underscoring the violence is also visible in the invectives 
that accompanied some of the attacks. Residents in Munyaka and Kiambaa in Eldoret claim 
that Kalenjin warriors were declaring that they would not only raze the villages to the ground 
and re-appropriate the space, but they also emphasised that they would rename it with an 
appropriate Kalenjin name, exclaiming ‘Why have you come from Central to bring Central 
names here?’ as they attacked (JKM, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret, 20 January 2010). 
We heard war cries, they came from all corners and they said they wanted to clear 
Munyaka to be a wheat farm, and they wanted to name it after the athletics runner 
Sang,
26
 to rename the Munyaka name (F, Interview, Munyaka, Eldoret, 15 February 
2010). 
 
Furthermore, anger and resentments over the perceived superiority displayed by immigrants 
in areas that do not belong to them was evident in various acts of violence. One Kikuyu 
interviewee living in Nakuru recalls, ‘I was lying on the ground and a soldier stood over me, 
“These people think that they can run the province, we’ll show them they’re nothing. They 
are just toilets”’ (DM, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 14 June 2010); similarly a resident of 
Satellite in Kawangware suggests that violence erupted when Kikuyu businessmen ‘went to a 
group of locals started bragging, “We’ll always lead you.’ So when these people started 
telling the natives of the land, “We’re still in government and we’ll always lead you,” that’s 
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 Sang was a successful Kenyan athlete who was killed during the post-election violence. Many residents in 
Munyaka claim that he played a key role in leading and financing the attack on their village.  
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when they started breaking shops’ (D, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 20 March 2010).
27
 
Thus, through the post-election violence majority communities sought to assert and to 
reassert their dominance over space, both materially and symbolically, and to punish minority 
communities for failing to respect the rules of hospitality which are perceived to govern the 
territory. In ethnically mixed territories  on the other hand, there are no obvious claims of 
entitlement to the economic activity, or the cultural identity of the space, and as such there 
are no ‘secondary citizens’; members of all communities are recognised as having an equal 
right to conduct business in the area, and expectations of political conformity are markedly 
absent. The punishment of ethnic others for persistent abuses of hospitality, which culminated 
in the support of an unfavourable candidate in the 2007 elections, was not a feature of the 
post-election environment in these spaces. Thus, in identifying the immigrant-guest narrative 
as the overarching framework for violence across the country, the pockets of calm in the 
midst of chaos become more explicable.
28
 
 The importance of socio-spatial dynamics in inculcating and reinforcing ethnic 
components of the habitus, in shaping particular perspectives, responses and behaviours, and 
in facilitating the spread and perpetuation of ethnic tensions has been stressed throughout this 
thesis, and these processes certainly influenced local violence dynamics. Interactions with, 
and indeed observations of, co-ethnics and their responses to the crisis served not only to 
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 It is interesting to note here that D refers to the Luhya as the ‘natives’ of Satellite. This further demonstrates 
the extension of autochthonous discourses into the urban arena, and supports the argument made in Chapter 
Three that numerical dominance over space should be added to Lonsdale’s (2008: 306) three idioms of 
understanding, controlling and working land, when conceptualising how claims to land entitlement and land are 
expressed in Kenya.  
28
 Though Nakuru complexifies this due to its ambiguous and contested status with regards to ethnic dominance 
and territoriality. While there are territories in which certain communities dominate in the town, most also 
accommodate significant numbers of other communities.  Moreover, the dominance of the Kikuyu in the town 
as a whole, while marginal, still challenges Kalenjin claims that Nakuru is part of their ancestral homeland. 
Thus, a clear sense of entitlement to, and belonging in, the space is not as evident as it is elsewhere. This, at 
least in part, might explain the delay in the onset of violence. When widespread violence did erupt, it was 
marked by narratives that illustrate the ambiguous and contested status of the town. Kalenjin attackers were 
claiming, ‘Naivasha, that is where the last Kikuyu should stand’ (NFF, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 6 June 
2010), whilst the Kikuyu were claiming that ‘all Kalenjin would have to go back to Kericho, that we must 
vacate Nakuru’ (DM, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 14 June 2010).   
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reinforce ethnicised perspectives of the situation and feelings of anger, hatred and fear, but 
also to legitimise violent action. One Luo interviewee, for example, states that, ‘I thought it 
was just me who was angry, but I came outside and I saw that it was all Kenyans who were 
angry’ (EO, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 15 May 2010), and another recalls, ‘I got very angry. 
My fellow people in the village were chasing the Kikuyu and if they see a Kikuyu they would 
beat them, so I joined them and we started to fight them’ (FO, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 8 May 
2010). Both interviewees here indicate, then, that their own frustrations with the flawed 
election were affirmed by the reactions of other residents in the area, and they subsequently 
joined in the protests and rioting. Indeed, some suggest that upon seeing a large crowd 
protesting and walking around the area, they themselves felt inclined to participate: ‘I joined 
the crowd and then it was like “Haki yetu!” // I don’t know where they are going, I joined 
them not knowing where we were going’ (FZ, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 3 August 2010); 
similarly, ‘You know there was that heat there, you know young boys like us, you see that 
fight and you want to experience it’ (AF, Interview, Munyaka, Eldoret, 18 February 2010). 
The visibility of mass action by co-ethnics served to heighten the sense of ethnic 
commonality and invoked a sense of obligation to defend the rights of the community and to 
respond to the emerging crisis. Just as demonstrative practices of ethnicity can serve to 
strengthen and maintain the salience of ethnicity in times of relative calm – as has been 
illustrated in Chapter Three – the visibility of ethnicised responses to the flawed elections and 
the ongoing violence tapped into people’s predisposed sense of ethnic pride, duty and 
solidarity. A resident of Kikuyu-dominated Langalanga for example, states: 
As we talked a group of Kikuyu youth passed our place, singing and holding bows 
and arrows, pangas, rungus, with shields, singing war songs like, “Today we want to 
know whether Kenya belongs to the Kalenjin or the Luo or to the Kikuyu.” // So those 
people passing were singing saying that // “You, you are putting boundaries, but we 
say that the whole of Kenya belongs to the Kikuyu.” And every Kikuyu in the area 
was told to rise up and defend their country, their rights, their land, their farms and 
their family, what our forefathers left, because there is no way that it can be taken 
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from us, it is for us to defend it. // We passed through bodies of dead people. I myself 
with my head tied with a bandage // I wanted to see what was going on, and I was 
going to defend my people. I couldn’t stay in the house because I’m the child of 
heroes
29
 (JK, Interview, Langalanga, Nakuru, 7 June 2010).  
  
Thus, the activities and discourses enacted by large numbers of the community within 
ethnicised spaces resonated with other residents who similarly felt the desire to express their 
discontent with the situation and to support the community. As a resident of Mathare states, 
‘People just walk out and, “Let us do this,” you can feel in your body, “I am supposed to do 
this.” It was for everybody’ (B, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 2 May 2010).  
Furthermore, as events were discussed and stories relating the suffering of co-ethnics 
at the hands of other communities circulated, feelings of anger and hatred intensified. Indeed, 
the fact that the majority of IDPs fled to areas where their own community constituted the 
majority only accentuated this process. A Kikuyu youth living in Pondamali recalls that as 
the violence raged across the country, both he, and other residents of his area noted that, ‘this 
is serious, our people can’t be tortured there while we stay with them here’ (LF, Interview, 
Pondamali, Nakuru, 22 June 2010). Similarly, a Kikuyu youth who fled his home in Eldoret 
and managed to reach Kayole, where ‘things were good’, recalls:
30
 
They asked how things were there in Eldoret. I told them how the Kalenjin and the 
Luo were killing Kikuyu there and I didn’t know that they were getting angry with the 
story. So my uncle used to meet in a liquor place and he talked with Kikuyu there. 
When it reached night I saw them coming with a box of knives and I wondered what 
they were for. I heard them say that “This knife, we must use it to circumcise the Luo 
here’ (BH, Interview, Kenya Service, Eldoret, 12 February 2010).  
 
And a resident of Shabab in Nakuru states: 
 
People started coming from Eldoret, Molo, Eldama Ravine, so we were the ones who 
welcomed them here in Nakuru. // We saw children with arrows, women with bad 
injuries telling us, “I was spared but my son was killed.” So the thing came into our 
                                                 
29
 JK here refers to the Kikuyu heroes of the Mau Mau rebellion.  
30
 While BH emphasises that in his area of Kenya Service things remained relatively cool, and that the different 
communities living there united to defend their area, rumours that the Kalenjin were ‘going to poison the water’ 
or that ‘they were coming at midnight’ led him to flee to his family in Kayole.  
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hearts, “Why are these people doing this?” (ND, Interview, Ronda, Nakuru, 9 June 
2010).  
 
Thus, intra-ethnic interaction and the visibility of suffering heightens the salience of ethnicity 
and strengthens the inclination to react to the injustices committed against the community; as 
a result, violence and the impetus to participate in it, spreads more rapidly in ethnicised areas.  
Nevertheless, whilst for some individuals participation in violence was prompted by a 
sense of solidarity with, and duty to the community, intra-community policing and the 
disciplining of behaviour was crucial to constraining resistance in ethnicised spaces, 
accounting for some levels of participation in the violence. The nature of this policing closely 
resembles that of the campaigns (see Chapter Five), as coercive mobilisation operated in 
varying degrees with some pressures being invoked by light admonishments and subtle 
appeals to ethnic identity, and others by more explicit threats of punishment for non-
conformity and non-participation. In the case of the former, for example, one interviewee 
recalls: 
There is a mother, I think she must have been in her mid-thirties, she said to the boys, 
“You are just sitting down and your people are being beaten on the other side, and 
you are staying here, but the work there is continuing!” So she provoked them, “When 
the job continues there, to us here, let the job start” (BTS, Interview, Kosovo, 




Similarly, a Kikuyu interviewee from Waithaka states that ‘someone spoke in Kikuyu to me 
saying, “The country is divided and you are just standing here?!” I was given a stick and we 
walked to Kawangware. // we fought many people and we tried to chase them’ (HE, 
Interview, Waithaka, 15 March 2010). A number of interviewees also suggest that they pre-
empted such reproofs and questioning over their lack of involvement because ‘people in our 
own community not wanting to fight, they would be seen as a traitor’ (WL, Interview, 
                                                 
31
 The mother here is playing upon the PNU campaign slogan, Kazi Iendelee, ‘let the work continue.’ During the 
violence, perpetrators across the country taunted members of the Kikuyu community by distorting and repeating 
phrases along these lines. Many interviewees in Eldoret and Nakuru, for example, recall that when they sought 
assistance from the police they were told, ‘you said kazi iendelee, so kazi iendelee’, carrying the implicit 
meaning, ‘let the violence [the work] continue.’  
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Langas, Eldoret, 15 January 2010). Indeed, some suggested that questions over their loyalty 
to the community prompted them to participate more actively in an effort to dispel any 
doubts. Significant reservations and uncertainties were raised amongst the Luo community in 
4B over JAK, for example, a Luo youth who was not only married to a Kikuyu, but who also 
spent a significant portion of his time playing football and socialising with members of the 
Kikuyu community in a neighbouring enclave. In the early stages of the chaos, JAK watched 
as the youths looted his father-in-law’s home and continued ‘doing many wicked things. // It 
came a time when they asked me, “Why aren’t you joining us? Have you been sent with 
Mungiki so they can know our plans?”’
32
 He states, ‘They see me here [with the Kikuyu] 
every day, and so they thought “this guy is planning something for us.” So I decided to join 
them. I had a panga and I was with them. I was with one group and we were going door to 
door, looting and breaking.’ He continues on to suggest that he ended up taking a leading role 
in the action: 
By that time, they were listening to me, I was like their commander, I was in charge. 
// Then we went to that base down there and boys were drinking, and even me, I was 
drinking. We were giving ourselves that morale and I didn’t want them to know that I 
wasn’t with them (JAK, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 20 May 2010).  
 
Thus, JAK’s participation in violence was largely prompted by a concern that his loyalty to 
the community was in doubt, and he consequently sought to negate this perception through 
concrete and incontrovertibly ethnicised behaviour. However, in addition to these rebukes, 
implicit threats, and deep-seated fears of reprisal for non-conformity, more explicit and 
violent disciplining of the community was employed in order to ensure participation in 
                                                 
32
 Indeed, the suspicion that people were spies for the opposing community was a significant source of tension 
during the crisis. It contributed to the intra-ethnic policing and to the prevention of inter-ethnic communication 
and co-operation. An interviewee in Huruma, who wanted to check on the safety of his Luo and Luhya 
neighbours who had fled to the neighbouring Kalenjin village, recalls that fellow residents told him, ‘No. You 
are not supposed to do that. You are a spy taking information from here to there. Go back or we will kill you’ 
(BS, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 30 January 2010). This anecdote also highlights the fact that pre-existing 




violence and curtail any resistance. Many residents explain that ‘you had to join because they 
were coming house to house’ (MS, Interview, Waithaka, 8 March 2010) and, ‘if you refuse 
they will say that you are not a man, and they will beat you, sometimes to death’ (SO, 
Interview, Ronda, Nakuru, 10 June 2010). As one interviewee exclaimed, ‘If anyone refused 
to join us then he is not one of us because we were fighting for our rights, so if you don’t join 
us, then we will mug you’ (FO, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 8 May 2010).  Fears of violent 
reprisals were certainly not unfounded and the use of coercion in mobilising the local 
community accounts for some participation.  
 Thus, ethnicised spaces experienced more immediate and more intense violence for 
three key reasons: the strong discourses of territorial ownership and belonging which 
underscore residency in the area; the deeply embedded components of the ethnic habitus and 
the visibility of ethnicised action; and the violent intra-community policing which took place. 
Conversely, ethnically mixed zones are not underpinned by the same dynamics and 
discourses; longstanding social ties, sentiments of common interest and mutual belonging in 
the area engendered a more united environment where inter-ethnic co-operation was 
predominant. That is not to say that residents of ethnically mixed areas did not involve 
themselves in the violence; indeed, many did. Groups of friends from these areas, for 
example, would form gangs in order to loot, rob, steal and generally take advantage of the 
chaos. As a Nubian youth from Makina states: 
In this area the boys formed a group, we formed a group and then you would give 
your group a name. Like here, our group was called ‘Pentagon’, there was also ‘Al 
Qaeda’, ‘Gaza’, so you would organise a group and walk together. Here people don’t 
have money so it was a chance for the youths. We as ‘pentagon’, we used to move 
around, “Today, let’s walk around Makina” and anyone you found you would take 
their money and their phone, loot shops. Youths from this area, we know each other, 
so we united going up to places like Ngong Road and then coming back to the slum, 
we used to run up to areas around Kenyatta hospital, stealing, and then the police 
would chase us back. // The youths of this area we formed a group, the pentagon 
members, if you touched one of us then we would go for revenge, but mainly we were 
looting. We were all mixed up, here we were mixed up tribes, like our group up there, 
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the moment we know you stayed together we wouldn’t turn on you (HASS, Interview, 
Makina, Kibera, 15 December 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, violent incidents within these territories, and between the ethnically diverse 
residents, were extremely rare.  
 
The Flexibility of Animosity and Transcending the Macro-Ethnic Divide 
 The macro-level perspectives of ethnic conflict that dominate the literature have a 
tendency to focus upon the hardening of ethnic boundaries during violence and upon the 
increasing salience of ethnicity at the expense of other cross-cutting identities. Amartya Sen 
has suggested that ‘the art of constructing hatred’ lies in the ability to invoke ‘the magical 
power of some allegedly predominant identity that drowns other affiliations’ (2006: xv), and 
that ‘violence is fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible 
people’ (2006: 2). Whilst extreme in its phraseology, this reflects a sentiment underpinning a 
significant stream of the literature. However, as Fujii (2009a: 187) has pointed out, we should 
caution against ‘assumptions that state-sponsored forms of ethnicity automatically overtake 
or deactivate all other forms of identity.’ Moreover, the often implicit treatment of ethnic 
groups as unitary actors in conflict fails to appreciate the significant variations in inter-ethnic 
relations across space; animosity is far more flexible and susceptible to local dynamics than is 
allowed for by the macro-level perspective. Indeed, a close examination of conflict dynamics 
at the local level indicates that the nature of inter-ethnic relations varies across the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of violence. There is significant resistance to the macro-ethnic cleavage 
and a continuous reframing of the friend/enemy dichotomy, as individuals transcend the 
politico-ethnic divide by protecting, assisting, cooperating, collaborating and enacting 
violence with members of ‘rival’ communities. This section not only explores the moments 
268 
 
when, but also the ways in which, the macro-ethnic cleavage is moulded, resisted and 
transcended by local level actors.  
 In addition to the spatial variations in the levels and intensity of violence already 
discussed, there are marked differences in the location of the boundaries of animosity at the 
local level. That is to say that the conceptualisation of communities as welcome or, at the 
very least, accepted guests in ethnicised spaces, was not uniform and the macro-cleavage of 
‘forty-one-against-one’ was subject to significant realignments and reconfigurations 
following the outbreak of violence. Whilst residents of one Kikuyu-dominated village might 
be unwilling to allow members of the Luhya community to remain in their area, for example, 
unquestionably identifying them as rivals and enemies, residents of another neighbourhood 
might perceive them to be allies and potential recruits in the battle against a more dangerous, 
common external enemy. Similarly, whilst the Kisii might be cast as bad guests by ODM-
affiliated communities in one area, as immigrants who ‘have come to affect the haven, the 
stillness of our land’ (IS, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 2 February 2010) and who 
consequently must be evicted, in another area they are identified as part of a brotherhood of 
Western communities, partners in the fight against the arrogant Kikuyu. In this way, different 
levels of identity affiliation can be emphasised or de-emphasised to rationalise the 
relationship. So, in the latter case for example, the boundary of ‘Kisii’ can be downplayed in 
favour of ‘Western communities’; in another example, the supra-ethnic affiliation of ‘Nilots’ 
was frequently invoked in 2007-2008 to solidify the Luo-Kalenjin alliance. However, while 
some scholars would point to this as evidence of shifting identity boundaries, I do not 
understand it in this way. Even when recognised as our ‘Western brothers’, the Kisii continue 
to be identified as ‘Kisii’; the boundary does not change, and the awareness that they are in 
some way ‘not the same as us’ persists. Similarly, the boundary between the Luo and the 
Kalenjin remains significant even when subsumed under the ‘Nilot’ label. For example, one 
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interviewee points to the continued awareness of ethnic difference between the Luo and the 
Kalenjin during the post-election crisis, explaining that there were disagreements between the 
communities as they launched attacks against the Kikuyu, ‘because our cultures are 
different’
33
 (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010). Ethnic boundaries are not 
infinitely flexible and mutable, and people do not ‘switch’ identities; rather ethnicities are 
nested within other identity boundaries. Claire Médard’s (2009: 368) analogy of Russian 
dolls is particularly helpful here. Each doll – each identity – is unique and clearly identifiable 
and each maintains its own boundedness, even when nested within others. This stickiness of 
ethnic identity is, in fact, what facilitates the ease and speed with which communities can be 
included within, or excluded from, ‘in-group’ status, and enables the flexibility of the 
friend/enemy dichotomy.
 
During the post-election violence in Kawangware, for example, the 
Luhya were unequivocally associated with the Luo and with ODM, and as such were an 
unproblematic target of Kikuyu attack; in Langas, Eldoret, on the other hand, they were 




Me, I was living in a Kikuyu house, the plot belonged to a Kikuyu. When the Kikuyu 
came they found us, and those boys don’t have any problem with us. But they say, “If 
you’re a Luo or a Luhya stand to the side. If they find that you are a Luo they will 
circumcise you. So we said that we better unite with them, we’re Luhya, so we went 
with the Kikuyu. So when things go like that they said that we must walk with them at 
night. At night, if they found a Luo they would circumcise them and kill them. We see 
that it is not good because us, we’re Luhya and they could turn on us at any second 
because we are not of their tribe. We’re Luhyas. So we snuck away.  In that group 
with the Kikuyus, there were three of us. One of us was a Luo, but he knows how to 
speak Luhya, so we hid him with us. When we went back to our area we met a group 
of Kikuyus – they asked us what tribe we were. We said that we were Luhyas. They 
said “Prove for us that you are Luhya, Remove your trousers” and then when we did 
that they saw that two of us were Luhyas, because we were circumcised, but one, they 
                                                 
33
 The disagreements arose over the issue of looting. WIL suggests, and several other interviewees and friends 
agreed, that ‘in Kalenjin [culture] it is taboo.’ Thus, WIL claims that while the Luo were engaging in looting 
activities, the Kalenjin were primarily burning houses and chasing the Kikuyu.  
34
 The Bukusu sub-group were largely perceived to be PNU supporters, whilst other communities in the Luhya 
grouping were perceived to be affiliated with ODM. This ambiguity facilitated their acceptance on both sides 
during the violence.  
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found was a Luo. So they took the Luo and they removed his head (KNB, Interview 
with group of youths, Langas, Eldoret, 17 January 2010).  
 
Similarly, whilst the violence in Kibera was dominated by Luo-Kikuyu animosity, in Huruma 
members of these two communities united to protect their properties and defend the village. 
Interviewees state that, ‘at the time of problem you must fight those coming to attack, so they 
[the youth of the area] put politics aside’ (P, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 28 January 2010). 
Residents of Huruma, then, identifying a common external enemy in the Kalenjin, shifted the 
boundaries of animosity, and communities elsewhere defined as enemies were perceived as 
allies in the local struggle for survival. However, it is interesting to note that in both of these 
examples, there is an underlying sentiment of ‘more acceptable’ or peripheral communities, 
and ‘less acceptable’ groups. Notice in the case of Langas, for example, that while the Luhya 
are tolerated by the Kikuyu community, they are, to an extent, still regarded with some 
suspicion; they are separated from the Kikuyu and asked to ‘stand to one side’ with the Luo, 
in recognition of their similar political affiliations; they are situated on the peripheries of the 
boundary of animosity. Indeed, the interviewee expresses his acute awareness of his 
precarious position when he admits that he was afraid that the Kikuyu could turn on him at 
any moment. Similarly, in the case of Huruma a few interviewees insisted that ‘the Luo // 
were not here at all. We realised that we can’t put a Luo here because he can easily fight us’ 
(JMW, Interview, Huruma, Eldoret, 3 February 2010). Here then, the Luo, identified as loyal 
ODM supporters, were the subject of fierce intra-community debate, tolerated by some 
residents, but certainly not so readily accepted as other communities in the area, such as the 
Kisii and the Kamba.  Indeed, an interviewee from Nakuru draws stark attention to this 
uncertainty surrounding the status of relations between some communities when he states: 
Here, like the Luos, we chased them and some of them we killed them. The Luhya 
were the lucky ones in that time because if a Kikuyu and a Luhya met then it was 
50/50, they can kill you or let you go, the same if a Kalenjin found a Luhya, but the 
tribe that we had no mercy for was the Luo. The war was between three tribes the 
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Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, so the Kikuyu living in Kalenjin areas had trouble. The 
Luos used to hide themselves if they were in Kikuyu territory, they had a problem in 
that time (SBS, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 5 June 2010).  
 
Inter-ethnic animosity can also fluctuate over time, and ongoing events can very 
quickly shift the boundary, leaving previously acceptable or peripheral communities, 
indisputably on the other side of the divide. For example, interviewees in Langas suggest that 
the Kisii were initially on the side of the ODM-affiliated communities in the area, stating that 
after the announcement, ‘the Luos, the Luhyas, the Kalenjin, and the Kisiis, they’re in 
Kisumu Ndogo, they were crying // so the people in Kisumu Ndogo decided to throw stones’ 
(P, Interview, Langas, Eldoret, 12 January 2010). However, following the death of a Kalenjin 
MP, David Too, at the hands of a Kisii policeman, ‘It affected the estate, so it brought a 
problem to the Kisii. The Nandi’s were saying “you have to move”’ (S, Interview, Langas, 
Eldoret, 14 January 2010). Similarly, as reports of violent attacks across the country spread, 
previously accepted communities could quickly become legitimate targets: 
The chaos was everywhere, you would hear that your tribe has been chased away 
from places and they are being beaten by this and this tribe, so then you get angry and 
you don’t want to see that tribe that is fighting your tribe. If you see one of them, you 
just start with them. Someone in that area that you are, if he doesn’t belong to your 
tribe and they’re the ones fighting you, never mind whether it is daytime or night-
time, you will cut him with a machete (AZ, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 6 June 2010).  
 
In addition, the cooperation of ‘rival’ communities in some cases is only a momentary 
alliance to achieve a particular goal. For example, a Kikuyu interviewee from Kenya service 
recalls that at the height of the crisis the youth of his village saw a group from neighbouring 
Munyaka launch an attack on the home of a Kalenjin councillor. The youth of Kenya service 
went on a rescue mission: 
BH: We fought those people to chase them because we know the next place will be 
this area. We got a support of Kalenjin to help us chase the Kikuyu, they had arrows 
and from there we managed it. The Kalenjin of this area told those others that “The 
Kikuyu here, we have no hatred with them and they’ve helped us a lot, so they have to 




S: And has it caused tensions between you and the other Kikuyu up there in Munyaka 
for joining the Nandis? 
BH: They didn’t know that we were Kikuyu  
(BH, Interview, Kenya Service, Eldoret, 12 February 2010) 
 
Indeed, this quote distinctly highlights the ways in which a macro-level perspective of 
violence can mask the extent of inter-ethnic cooperation on the ground, and the localised 
negotiations of ethnic relations. Ethnic hatred is not simply constructed from above, certain to 
resonate consistently across time and space, but rather it is tempered, moulded, and 
influenced by localised dynamics. Thus, the clear politico-ethnic divide which dominates the 
macro-perspective is challenged by local level actors as they seek to protect themselves and 
their livelihoods. 
In addition to these localised processes that shape the construction and negotiation of 
the boundaries of animosity and the conceptualisation of friends and enemies, individual 
actors often resist ethnic cleavages, transcending ethnic identifications in order to protect 
friends and neighbours. While mutual interest, such as the protection of homes and properties 
can facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation, it is longstanding social ties which appear to be the 
most influential in engendering resistance to the ethnic divide. The vast majority of my 
interviewees expressed the notion that, ‘I can’t hurt my friend’ (B, Interview, Kobiro, 
Kawangware, 1 March 2010), that ‘We can’t beat them because we grew up with them and 
we work with them’ (MW, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 5 June 2010), that ‘Most of us have 
grown together and we were born here and we’ve helped each other since then, it’s turned to 
be a brotherhood’ (P, Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 22 March 2010) and that, ‘they’re 
good friends so nothing can happen here’ (K, Interview, Nigeria, Mathare, 19 May 2010). 
Consequently, neighbours in ethnically mixed residential plots often united to defend their 




It was a plot of thirty houses and all of the neighbours came together and they said 
that “there is no day that we have crossed with each other, so we will protect 
ourselves in all ways. If the Kikuyu come to the plot looking for the Luo then the 
Kikuyu living here will go out and talk to them and if it is ODM then the Luos will go 
out and talk to them to save the Kikuyu living there” (LF, Interview, Pondamali, 
Nakuru, 22 June 2010).  
 
Similarly, neighbours of minorities living within ethnicised spaces often assisted their friends 
by hiding them or by helping them to escape the area. A Kikuyu lady living in Waithaka told 
me that, ‘I rescued my Luo neighbour and I hid her in my house. They came to my door and I 
told them, “We’re all Kikuyu here, you can come in and see” (MIN, Interview, Waithaka, 9 
March 2010). Similarly, a Kikuyu youth in Kaptembwa explained that his Kalenjin friend hid 
him in his house when the violence erupted: 
That man used to own a plot near Kwa Chief and I was just inside the house, so he 
said, “Stay inside” while he would go out and look for food, even if there was a war 
he would say “You relax” and then he would go outside the gate watching (HP, 
Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 15 June 2010). 
 
Indeed, even the most enthusiastic and active participants in the violence engaged in some 
acts that transcended the ethnic divide.
35
 People were not blinded to their pre-existing social 
ties and relationships, and throughout the violence individuals sought to assist their friends, 
relatives and neighbours by whatever means possible.  However, whilst in ethnically mixed 
areas this resistance to the macro-ethnic divide is transparent and openly acknowledged, in 
ethnicised spaces, where helping or collaborating with other communities could be severely 
and brutally punished, residents had to employ more covert, subtle and concealed strategies 
to transcend the ethnic divide and assist their friends and neighbours.  
 In Chapter Three I drew attention to the various markers and social cues that inform 
the process of ethnic categorisation in Kenya. These same cues informed the targeting of 
victims during the violence and as Horowitz (2001: 126) points out ‘in doubtful cases, the 
                                                 
35
 There are, of course, exceptions to this and some interviewees suggest that ‘when the violence started there 
were no friendships now. You’re fighting for your tribe, and me, I’m fighting because I have to have my life’ 
(B, Interview, Satellite, Kawangware, 5 March 2010). However, these seem to constitute a minority.  
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crowd is often given extraordinary opportunities to interrogate, disrobe, and otherwise force 
the identifying cues from potential victims.’ Groups of youth used appearance, language, 
accent, names, and other such criteria to identify their targets.  However, at the same time, 
local level actors manipulated these cues in their efforts to protect friends and neighbours 
consequently minimising the risks of doing so. For example, in Shabab, Kikuyu interviewees 
explained that two of their close friends who work with them in the matatu industry, one a 
Luo, the other a Kalenjin, remained with them throughout the violence, even when the 
Mungiki presence increased in the town. In an effort to hide their ethnic identity, they 
assigned them Kikuyu names; one interviewee states ‘we were friends from before, // so we 
gave them Kikuyu names’ (MW, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 5 June 2010) and his Kalenjin 
friend confirms that, ‘In that time my friends instead of calling me K. which is a Nandi word, 
they called me Bobo because the Mungiki were here, so they called me that so that they 
wouldn’t know that I was a Nandi’ (KP, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 4 June 2010). Similarly, 
a Kikuyu youth in Mathare – who states that during the violence, ‘I was safer on the Luo side 
because I’m dark skinned’
36
 – recalls that one afternoon he was walking around the area with 
some friends when they were approached by a group of youths, one of whom he knew from 
school: 
Before we left school me and that boy, we had a fight, so we were somehow enemies, 
so when he saw me he called my name, and my name is purely Kikuyu, if you hear it 
you just know that I am a Kikuyu, so all the attention turned towards me. There were 
four boys and they were tall, but with muscles, and they came to me and asked me, 
“Are you a Kikuyu” and they asked me in Luo. So I stammered, because I don’t know 
Luo. So the ones we were with, one of them was a Luo, and he spoke to them in Luo 
and he said, “No. We live here and we are all Luo, but he has lived in the city and he 
does not know Luo very well. N., that is a nickname we have for him because of his 




                                                 
36
 BTS does not speak any Kikuyu, and as such was afraid that given his appearance he would be unable to 
convince any Kikuyu in the area who did not know him of his ethnic identity. 
37
 This story also points to the presence of personal score settling in the violence.  
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Thus, while BTS indicates that his dark skin initially identified him as a Luo to the group, 
upon hearing a Kikuyu name directed towards him, they sought to confirm their assumption. 
BTS’s friends convinced their attackers that his Kikuyu name was a joking reference to his 
involvement with a Kikuyu lady and that his inability to speak jaluo was the result of an 
urban upbringing. In a similar way ethnically mixed defence groups in frontier zones and at 
borderlines used linguistic signals and signs which deliberately masked the diversity of their 
ethnic composition. For example, a resident of Gatina explains that: 
We shouted “Muliho” and if you shouted “Tuliho” we know you’re one of us, or 
you’re a defence group that is working with us. If not, then you’re an enemy. That is a 
Luhya phrase and everyone knows that we Luhya here are the majority, so the Kikuyu 
in our group used the same phrase so everyone just knew, “He’s a Luhya” (P, 
Interview, Gatina, Kawangware, 22 March 2010).  
 
Horowitz (1985: 48) has identified similar practices in contexts as diverse as Nigeria, 
Cambodia, and India. Thus, local level actors exploited the process of telling which underpins 
social relations in Kenyan society in an effort to miscue potential attackers and to protect 
their friends and neighbours. 
Nevertheless, often this was not a feasible tactic. As Fearon (1999) has pointed out, 
‘common markers of ethnicity... can be difficult or impossible for an individual to 
misrepresent’ and other tactics had to be employed in these cases. JAK, for example, states 
that ‘they will just know from my accent that I am not a Kikuyu’ (JAK, Interview, Nigeria, 
Mathare, 20 May 2010). Thus, more often local level actors hid their friends and neighbours 
from rival ethnic groups. A Kikuyu youth living in Weigh Bridge near Maili Nne recalls that 
Kalenjin warriors attacked his village on the day of the announcement. He states: 
They had residential people here telling them this place belongs to so and so, here is a 
Kikuyu, there is a Kikuyu. Not all of them are burned, because some Kalenjins used 
to stay with us on our plot and they helped me. In that plot there is one Luo, me and a 
Nandi. They told me that just because of my face, even if I tried to hide my identity, 
they’ll know from my face that I am a Kikuyu. They put me in their house. The first 
group passed here. The second group came, and they said “We know that this plot is 




The potential dangers of hiding friends from other communities were extremely high; as 
such, protection in these areas had to be covert. As one interviewee states, ‘We used to be 
with them, but secretly, so the outsiders won’t know them, because if they find out that 
they’re Kikuyu they will kill all of us’ (GB, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 20 June 2010).  
Indeed, even in frontier zones there were concerns that not only could they be caught by 
'outsiders,’ by the various groups patrolling the area, but also that, ‘maybe there was a traitor 
among us’ (DC, Interview, Bombolulu, Kibera, 10 December 2009). Thus, while some took 
great risks to hide their neighbours and friends, many others assisted them in other less risky 
ways. For example, Kikuyu residents of Waithaka claim that they told their Luo neighbours 
to leave the area, but ‘we took their things and we kept them in our houses and we agreed that 
they would go to Kibera so that these guys don’t come and kill them. I felt for them. Imagine 
you have to leave your house!’ (W, Interview, Waithaka, 11 March 2010). Similarly, in 
Kibera members of the Luo community moved into the properties of their Kikuyu neighbours 
in order to prevent their co-ethnics from burning, looting or appropriating them. As one 
interviewee states it was, ‘so that when others in their community come, they see their fellow 
tribesman. That is how our houses were saved’ (SI, Interview, Kianda, Kibera, 12 December 
2009). A young Luo man, who is the manager of a local football team in Kibera, states: 
My players were protecting other Kikuyu players’ houses. Me, I knew this older guy 
and when he was leaving, he left us the houses, saying “I trust you, despite that you 
are of the other tribe”, so when they [the Luo attackers] came here I told them that I 
was the landlord of this house (E, Interview, Soweto, Kibera, 14 December 2009). 
 
The protection of ethnic others in defiance of the macro-ethnic divide has been identified in 
other contexts, with the case of Rwanda offering perhaps the most poignant example. 
However, these analyses often identify such protectors as consistently ‘non-participants’ and 
they draw a sharp distinction between them and those who willingly carried out acts of 
violence. As Fujii (2009a: 8) states, ‘analysts generally rely on the categories “perpetrator,” 
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“victim,” “bystander,” and “rescuer.” Membership in these categories is assumed to be 
exclusive and stable.’ However, just as in Fujii’s study, my own research indicates that this is 
seldom the case; local level actors can be enthusiastic and active participants in ethnicised 
forms of violence, whilst simultaneously crossing the ethnic divide by protecting or assisting 
friends. One Kikuyu interviewee in Mathare, for example, explains that his Luo friend 
allowed him to hide in his home whilst he went out looting and participating in chaos (CR, 
Interview, 4B, Mathare, 29 April 2010). Similarly, a Kalenjin youth who took a leading role 
in a large scale attack in Nakuru still displayed concern for his friend who was caught inside 
one of the buildings: 
There is a friend of mine, who was one who brought the Kalenjin to White Rock
38
 and 
he told them to burn it. At the time he called out to me, “ND, get out of there we are 
going to burn it!” I didn’t know who it was because they had painted their faces, but 
my friends told me, “It seems they know you, go and talk to them” but I said that I 
couldn’t because I don’t know who that person is. After the war the guy came and we 
met and he said, “Do you remember that day I told you to come out of there, that you 
would be killed?” So I knew that it was him (ND, Interview, Ronda, Nakuru, 9 June 
2010). 
 
The fact that ND’s friends suggested that he go outside and speak to the Kalenjin when they 
thought that he might know them is further illustrative of the general expectation that friends 
would not attack each other. Another Kalenjin youth from Kaptembwa, who openly admits to 
brutally punishing members of his own community for not participating in violence against 
the Kikuyu,
39
 still made concessions for those whom he knew, at one point pleading with the 
crowd, ‘Please don’t kill them. I schooled with them.’ He claims that because he is well 
known in the area, ‘those Kikuyu were let go’ (GB, Interview, Kaptembwa, Nakuru, 20 June 
                                                 
38
 White Rock is the name of a butchery, but the name appears to be used as a general reference to the area, 
which houses a number of Kikuyu businesses.  
39
 He claims that he was part of the group which patrolled the area forcing people to come out and fight, and 
states that when they found men who were avoiding the battle, ‘we tortured them so that they couldn’t move. 
We would tie their hands underneath their legs and they would remain like that until morning and we gave them 





 Even in the midst of the attack on Kiambaa, one of the most vicious and brutal 
incidents of the post-election violence, there is evidence to suggest that attackers were not 
blinded to pre-existing social ties. One interviewee explains that a Kalenjin youth with whom 
he had attended school was among the assailants. While he was an active participant in the 
attack, he reacted somewhat differently when he came face to face with his former school 
mate’s mother: 
I left Kiambaa because of what they did to my mother. They burned her in the church 
and they took everything she had.
41
 // They beat her in the leg and the person that was 
doing all this was my deskmate. How can he do it when he was my classmate? He 
took her mobile phone and her title deed, her money, her ID and he told her to go and 
not to turn back. After about ten metres, she heard someone call her and when she 
looked back he was calling her to come. She was half dead, so she told him, “I’ve 
known you for many years.’ The man told her that they would take the phone and the 
money, but they would give her the title deeds and her ID, “because we know you”’ 
(MW, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret, 20 January 2010). 
 
Thus, participation in such acts of intimate violence, that is where the attackers have 
significant social ties with their victims, is difficult, and many interviewees expressed their 
hesitation in hurting people they knew well. As one youth in Kawangware states, ‘We didn’t 
confront each other, we avoided each other because I can’t hurt my friend’ (B, Interview, 
Kobiro, Kawangware, 1 March 2010).  Furthermore, friends from neighbouring enclaves, 
who found themselves on opposing sides of the local battlefields transcended the ethnic 
divide by secretly communicating and warning each other of impending attacks. A Kikuyu 
resident of Munyaka, for example, explains that ‘some Kalenjin are very good, who have 
friends here. They’d call and say, “Be alert, my people are coming” they even told us the day 
that the Kalenjin would come’ (AF, Interview, Munyaka, Eldoret, 18 February 2010); and in 
Nakuru a Kalenjin youth states: 
                                                 
40
 Though given his methods of disciplining fellow tribesmen for not participating in the violence, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that no one in the crowd challenged him on this! 
41
 Of the estimated thirty-five people who were trapped in the church, seventeen were killed. Most of these 
people died in the fire, but some who managed to escape through the doors of the church were hacked to death 
by the Kalenjin waiting outside. Others were more fortunate and managed to escape and flee from the village. 
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You know that first time in the meeting
42
 you are told to cut communication because 
this isn’t friendship now, this is about community. But you can’t sit there knowing 
your friend is there, so you have to call him. Like there was a time, we were going to 
come, so I called him and told him, “We’re coming in like five minutes”, it got 
cancelled though. I was calling him saying “Not yet, not yet.” He thought I was 
playing with him! (WIL, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 2 June 2010).  
 
Indeed, some interviewees suggest that even in the most highly organised revenge attacks led 
by Mungiki, the warning of friends was pervasive, and to a degree, accepted:  
When the Mungiki came we grouped ourselves, some of us went to Mwariki, some to 
Githima and others were with us here in Weavers. They told us, “If you have any Luo 
friends who are not bad, then tell them to leave this place because we will leave 
nothing.” In the night we entered every house where the Luo lived and told them 
“Gather your things and gather your family and we will take you to a safe place, 
because the Mungiki have already arrived and in the morning things will be very bad 
here in Ronda, and we don’t want you to say after the violence that we caused you the 
problems, that we set you up. So we will take you to Kaptembwa” (ND, Interview, 




 While pre-existing friendly and affable relationships can encourage people to 
transcend the macro-ethnic divide, personal grudges and antagonistic relations conversely 
prompt people to take advantage of the narrative of ‘enmity’ to settle personal scores. 
Kalyvas (2003: 475) has argued that ‘actions “on the ground” often seem more related to 
local or private issues’, and there was certainly a substantial element of this in the Kenyan 
post-election violence. A Nubian youth, for example, explains, ‘If I have a mere grudge with 
you // I would come and find you’ (HASS, Interview, Makina, Kibera, 15 December 2009), a 
resident of 4B confirms that ‘maybe if someone has a grudge with you, he’ll take advantage 
in that time,’ and in Eldoret, a Kikuyu youth states that ‘if you had a grudge with the friend, 
the friend would show the house to those who came to attack. If you don’t have a grudge, 
                                                 
42
 He is referring to one of the meetings organised by the Kalenjin elders in Kaptembwa. 
43
 This tolerance of the Luo community is related to the flexibility of animosity in inter-ethnic relations across 
space, and the notion of ‘more acceptable’ and ‘less acceptable’ communities. Issuing similar warnings to 
members of the Kalenjin community was not acceptable. Indeed, MK, the friend with whom WIL was 
communicating during the violence, affirms that had the Mungiki caught him telling WIL the community’s 
plans he would have been in serious trouble (MK, Interview, Shabab, Nakuru, 3 June 2010).  
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they’ll protect the house’ (BD, Interview, Munyaka, Eldoret, 17 February 2010). Indeed, an 
exchange between a group of youths in Kibera is particularly illustrative of this dynamic: 
T (Luo): But it really depends on how you stayed with someone in Kibera.  
Everyone nods their head in agreement 
M (Luhya): Yes, you know there was a man here. He had a very bad heart with 
people here. He was a Kikuyu, and he was having a water tap. He refused to give 
water to others. // It depends on how you are living with... [he directs a question to 
W.] W, that Kikuyu, he was an uncle?… was he an uncle? 
W (Kikuyu): A cousin 
M: He was a cousin to W. He was not a role model to the community, when he is 
having a shop, and another one on the road! He had a tap there. If you had lunch in 
the house and you took water from his tap he’ll beat you up. So people remembered 
what he was like. And when the violence came it was, “Let’s go and attack him.” 
T: His shop was the first to be looted.  
M: The main targets were the ones who had not been living well with us. He was a 
PNU supporter. But you know, when I was circumcised W was like my father. He 
was looking after me. So I couldn’t carry a panga for him.  
T: And you know, nobody chased W away. He left. 
W: Yeah. They didn’t chase me. But some people from outside could come and get 
me. These people… 
M: It is like the lady of that man. 
S [Interviewer]: Which man? The one with the tap? 
M: Yeah that man. The lady of that man was a good woman. She would help people 
with unga and things. So when the people from Gatuikera came to burn the houses, 
we, under risk, we helped her. We did not help him. But we helped her against the 
people of Gatuikera. 
  (GWH, Group Interview, Kianda, Kibera 20 November 2009) 
 
This exchange is illustrative of both the prominence of personal grudges in fuelling actions 
on the ground, as well as of the fact that resistance to the macro-ethnic divide is highly 
selective and dependent upon friendship and good neighbourliness. 
Thus, throughout the violence local level actors, in certain circumstances and contexts 
resisted the macro-ethnic divide, even if only momentarily, to assist friends and neighbours. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which this was possible, and even the ways in which it could be 
done, were shaped and informed by socio-spatial dynamics. Whereas in ethnically mixed 
territories and micro-spaces it was open and transparent, in ethnicised spaces it was more 
often subtle and covert, because if ‘they [other members of the community] found out, then 
your life will be in problem because you’ll be a traitor’ (ENG, Interview, Kaptembwa, 
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Nakuru, 16 June 2010). Indeed, individual agency is significantly constrained by ethnicised 
socio-spatial dynamics and many interviewees perceived resistance to the macro-ethnic 
divide to be impossible in such a severely polarised environment. One interviewee, for 
example states that, ‘There were those who did not want me to be chased, but they were few. 
They were saying not to burn my house. But those who wanted to chase me were many, so 
they could not keep me there’ (RC, Interview, Kosovo, Mathare, 17 April 2010). Similarly, a 
resident of Kiambaa reflects, ‘Our neighbours could not help us. They couldn’t manage 
because those people were many. Even if they wanted to help us they couldn’t because our 
neighbours here are few’ (M, Interview, Kiambaa, Eldoret, 18 January 2010). Often, in these 
circumstances, all that could be done was to tell minorities ‘to go and be safe’ because, ‘we 
don’t want to see you die and we might not be able to defend you’ (DC, Interview, 
Bombolulu, Kibera, 10 December 2009). As one interviewee recalls: 
I am a Kikuyu and my wife is a Luo, she told me, “you are a Kikuyu and according to 
the neighbours it seems things will be bad and they won’t choose who will get the 
penalty. You have to go” (BS, Interview, 4B, Mathare, 30 April 2010). 
 
Thus, what appears at first glance to be a violent displacement of minority communities, 




 This chapter has provided a detailed exploration and view of violence from below, 
elucidating and explicating the processes of mobilisation and the dynamics of participation at 
the local level, highlighting the inherent ‘messiness’ of ethnic conflict on the ground. My 
research supports the emerging consensus amongst Kenyanist scholars that while 
undoubtedly some of the violence was planned, orchestrated, directed and funded from 
above, this offers only a partial explanation of the conflict, and at times can be misleading. 
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Spontaneous and more localised forms of mobilisation were also prominent features of the 
crisis. The chapter has examined how these bottom-up processes of organisation operated, 
arguing that local stakeholders and key figures in the community often played a leading role 
in formulating localised responses to the crisis and in directing and financing the violence. 
Simultaneously, the more impromptu, ad hoc plans that were made on street corners and in 
local youth bases blur the lines between spontaneity and organisation. As the violence took 
hold of the country social ties and networks became key conduits for mobilisation and 
incitement, often operating independently of elite direction. A Kikuyu market vendor in Laini 
Saba, Kibera, for example, recalls: 
When the fight started, my cousin in Kiambu called and asked, “Can we come and 
help you?” When they hear that I had lost my job they got angry and they were 
thinking of joining in (PK, Interview, Laini Saba, Kibera, 4 January 2010).  
 
Thus, elite-centric analyses that persist in the literature often fail to appreciate these micro-
level processes and the agency of local level actors in mobilising and organising violence on 
the ground; consequently, they miss an important element of conflict. The 2007-2008 post-
election violence was a complex infusion of ever-transforming dimensions of organised, 
planned and spontaneous acts, and as such both bottom-up and top-down aspects should be 
appreciated and explored.  
 The local-level perspective also reveals narratives that illuminate the logic of violent 
acts during conflict. In the Kenyan context, autochthonous discourses of belonging and 
exclusion and the immigrant-guest metaphor that underscores inter-ethnic relations in the 
country, significantly influenced the nature and dynamics of the violence. Rather than being 
fuelled by a widespread and pervasive desire to exterminate or kill particular communities, 
the Kenyan post-election crisis was framed by intentions of balkanisation, segregation and 
the politico-ethnic homogenisation of space. As such, the burning of minorities’ houses, the 
destruction of their businesses, and the appropriation of their properties and lands were 
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designed to prevent their return and to claim, or reclaim, dominance of ‘our area’ and the 
resources attached to it. The borders and boundaries of territories became increasingly reified 
and were actively policed, becoming the key battlegrounds of violence. Nevertheless, beneath 
this overarching framework of the conflict exits a multiplicity of more personalised concerns 
and private motivations fuelling participation and involvement that have been alluded to in 
this chapter. People are not singularly motivated, and while the aim of cleansing spaces of 
unwanted ‘guests’ certainly fuelled participation, so too did desires for revenge, personal 
score-settling, economic gain,  pride, and in some cases, for a simple pleasure found in chaos. 
A youth in Munyaka claims, for example, that, ‘At that time people would say “I wish it 
would come again”, it was something people were proud of’ (AF, Interview, Munyaka, 
Eldoret, 18 February 2010). Moreover, local level actors are not blinded to pre-existing social 
ties by the climate of ethnic conflict and enmity, and their actions during episodes of violence 
are equally influenced by the need to protect their spouses, family members, friends and 
neighbours. Individual involvement in ethnic violence is complex, ambiguous, and at times, 
contradictory. 
 Finally, this bottom-up perspective of the post-election violence has drawn attention 
to the flexibility and fluidity of the boundaries of animosity at the grassroots, demonstrating 
that they are neither stable nor coherent. The division between acceptable and unacceptable, 
friend and enemy, ally and rival, varies significantly across both time and space. Somewhat 
paradoxically, this volatility of inter-ethnic enmity and intolerance is made possible by the 
stability and stickiness of ethnic boundaries themselves. Whilst communities can be 
amalgamated within a broader label of categorisation, the persistent awareness of ethnic 
difference facilitates the ease and speed with which a group can be excluded from an 
allegiance and find themselves on the opposing side of the ethnic divide. Thus, while ethnic 
boundaries remain relatively stable in times of both peace and conflict, the nature of inter-
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ethnic relations are in a continuous process of production and negotiation, and consequently, 






This thesis began by telling two very different stories of the post-election crisis in 
Kenya: one of conflict and one of cooperation; one of division and one of unity; one of 
violence and one of peace. Such stark contrasts in experience and participation are not easily 
explained by the dominant top-down perspectives of ethnic violence. If political elites bear 
the responsibility for conflict through their manipulation of ethnic identities, their rhetoric of 
inter-ethnic hatred and animosity, and their incitement to violence, then we must address the 
question of why they succeed in some places and not in others. If the ethnic group becomes 
increasingly reified during times of acute tension and conflict, with its constituent members 
tending to act in support of the community – expressing its grievances, defending its interests 
and protecting its security in a uniform manner – then how do we explain why some members 
of supposedly rival groups ‘defect’ during conflict (Kalyvas 2008: 1043), and rather than 
engaging each other in battle, they unite and cooperate? Valuable as they are in laying out the 
macro-context of intergroup conflict, and in offering a partial explanation of some 
dimensions of violent action, existing theories leave much unexplained. More than this, they 
obscure the agency of local level actors and they oversimplify the nature of ethnic violence. 
This thesis has offered a view of violence from below, resituating local level actors in 
explanations of ethnic conflict and exploring their complex, ambiguous, and sometimes 
contradictory, involvement. Through a fine-grained, thick descriptive analysis, it has sought 
to reveal some of the patterns of, and to elucidate the logics behind, local level participation 
in the 2007-2008 Kenyan post-election violence. It has illustrated the strengths and the 
limitations of existing approaches, and identified localised processes of ethnic identification, 
mobilisation and participation in violence that could potentially speak to other cases. In this 
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concluding chapter I summarise the key arguments concerning the specificities of the Kenyan 
case, relating them back to the broader literature on ethnic conflict, before reflecting upon the 
potentially wider implications of the findings, and pointing to directions for future research.  
 
The Macro-Level Context of the Kenyan Post-Election crisis 
 The dominant theories of ethnic conflict discussed in Chapter One have much to offer 
to an understanding of the Kenyan situation, and many of their key points have underscored, 
appeared in, and been interwoven throughout my own analysis. This section briefly reflects 
upon the key strands of thought laid out in the literature review, summarising the ways in 
which they help to explain the violent aftermath of the 2007 elections.  
After presenting some of the findings of this research at a small conference in 
Cambridge, I went out to dinner with four Kenyans who had been in attendance. The lively 
conversation had long since moved on to other things when the waitress came over to take 
our order. Going round the table, she reached one of the Kenyans, who ordered a curry, at 
which point his friend loudly declared, ‘Hey, you didn’t see that they have fish? You are a 
Luo, and you’re choosing curry over fish?!’ prompting raucous laughter amongst all present. 
The waitress looked bemused. What this brief anecdote illustrates is the extent to which 
ethnic categorisation and differentiation is embedded within Kenyan consciousness. It is not 
inherently conflictual. It is not necessarily overt. Yet, it is a typical mode of thought that can 
become visible in an instant. The rich literature exploring the ‘invention of tradition’, the 
‘imagination’ of ethnic communities, and the social construction of identities goes a long way 
to explaining the resilience and salience of ethnicity in Kenyan society and consciousness. As 
Lynch (2011: 18) has noted, Kenya’s colonial experience encouraged its citizens to ‘think 
and act ethnically’, and as has been discussed at length in Chapter Three, this tendency 
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persists in contemporary society. The question of ethnic categorisation emerges in everyday 
interactions with others through the process of telling, there is an acute awareness of the 
ethnic affiliations of neighbours, businesses, territories, institutions and other structures in 
society, and there is a strong tendency to interpret social and political events through the lens 
of ethnicity. This stickiness and relative stability of ethnic boundaries helps to explain the 
success of top-down mobilisation by political entrepreneurs. Elites can capitalise upon these 
salient macro-cleavages in a way that would be impossible in a different context where ethnic 
identity is not such a defining feature of society. Moreover, an appreciation of the extent to 
which ethnicity defines everyday life allows for a more balanced model of understanding 
ethnic conflict, where bottom-up processes of identification reinforce top-down mobilisation. 
Bill Berkeley (2001: 35), in a strong articulation of the elite manipulation theory of 
ethnic conflict, writes that ‘all of Africa’s conflicts start at the top and spread downward. 
People hungry for power use violence as a means of achieving it. They use ethnicity to 
mobilize constituencies.’ While this thesis has been predominantly concerned with the local 
level processes of ethnic violence, and as such has not explored the motivations of political 
actors, it certainly supports the suggestion that elite manipulation played a significant role in 
some dimensions of the post-election violence in some places. Chapter Six has illustrated that 
politicians employed negative ethnic rhetoric and used inciting language during the 
campaigns, and Chapter Five has shown that many politicians hired youths, at least partially 
for the purposes of disrupting opposition rallies and intimidating opposition supporters.
1
 
Furthermore, Chapter Seven has pointed to the strong evidence that influential politicians 
planned, organised and directed specific attacks in the Rift Valley region, that others later 
mobilised vigilante groups – particularly Mungiki – in retaliation, and that lower level 
                                                 
1
 Though in 2007 these were often not akin to the ‘ethnic militias’ and centralised vigilante groups used in 
previous elections, but were rather more amorphous groups of youths.  
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political actors directly funded youths to continue causing chaos once the violence had 
erupted. Indeed, an alleged ODM document suggests that the exacerbation of ethnic tensions 
was a key campaign strategy of the party, designed ‘to discourage voter participation in 
hostile areas’, and it indicates that violence was being considered ‘as a last resort’ prior to the 
elections (Anon. 2007). Thus, political elites on both sides of the divide certainly had a 
significant role to play in the 2007-2008 post-election violence and the persistent tendency to 
focus upon their involvement is understandable and not wholly unjustified.  
 The arguments presented in Chapter Four resonate with grievance based explanations 
of ethnic violence, and particularly with the recent explosion of literature pointing to the 
significance of ‘horizontal inequalities.’ Persisting grievances regarding the socio-economic 
dominance of the Kikuyu in Kenya were exacerbated by the community’s simultaneous 
dominance of the political arena in the 2007 context (discussed in Chapters Four and Six), 
supporting arguments in the literature that the potential for violence is higher where groups 
are politically excluded as well as socio-economically disadvantaged. Chapter Six also briefly 
reflected upon the related issue of historical injustices, and while I have not delved into the 
evolution of these, I acknowledge their importance. I have suggested that perceptions of past 
persecution in the political arena, and of previous marginalisation in the distribution of 
resources under Kenyatta and Kibaki, provided fertile ground for the justification of 
contemporary animosities, exacerbated fears for the future, and facilitated the solidification 
of the ODM alliance against the Kikuyu. Moreover, I have argued that grievances are 
accentuated by the autochthonous discourses that pervade Kenyan society. The perception 
that the Kikuyu have been disproportionately advantaged in the allocation of land outside 
their own province, and that they have appropriated businesses, job opportunities and other 
resources that ‘belong’ to other communities, played a significant role in fuelling the 
violence. Undoubtedly, any account that does not appreciate the centrality of ethnic 
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grievances and resentments over issues of domination and subordination, superiority and 
inferiority, advantage and disadvantage – both in their material and socio-psychological 
dimensions – cannot hope to understand the Kenyan 2007-2008 violence.  
 Fear-based explanations of ethnic conflict have entered my analysis predominantly in 
relation to the neo-patrimonial nature of Kenyan politics and the perception of elections as 
winner-takes-all events. As such, in my findings these theories are intricately intertwined 
with the rational actor explanations that emphasise the centrality of ethnically structured 
patronage networks and the consequent economic incentives for following the ethnic leader. 
Chapter Five argued that at the higher levels of political competition, Kenyans expect better 
opportunities and improvements to their standards of living from a member of their own 
community being in power. That is, there is a strong sentiment that if ‘our man’ occupies the 
presidential seat – or at the very least if he is closely allied with whomever does – the 
community will get to eat from the national cake. At the same time, fears of marginalisation, 
discrimination and exclusion at the hands of others are pronounced, and there is a strong 
sense that elections are life and death matters. Thus, as Bratton and Kimenyi (2008: 279) 
have argued, Kenyans tend to vote defensively along ethnic lines, motivated by the ‘fear that 
their opponents will rely on formulae of ethnic exclusivity.’ In Chapter Six, I suggested that 
these hopes for future prosperity and fears of potential exclusion were particularly acute in 
2007. Perceptions that Kibaki had betrayed the other communities of the NARC coalition 
since his election in 2002, and deliberately marginalised particular groups –  notably the Luo 
and the Kalenjin – exacerbated fears of his continued rule. On the part of the Kikuyu, 
memories of marginalisation under Moi fed into fears of losing the seat again. Moreover, the 
pervasive discourses of majimbo that dominated the campaigns, with its negative 
connotations of ‘repatriation’, was seen as a threat to the community’s very existence outside 
of Central Province. Thus, while elections in Kenya are usually a struggle between 
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communities to put one of their own in power, the 2007 elections were marked by intense 
hopes and deep fears for the future. Consequently, when it was perceived that the elections 
had been rigged, these fears were combined with an acute sense of anger at being cheated out 
of ‘our turn to rule,’ triggering a violent reaction. As a young Luhya woman from 
Kawangware revealingly exclaims: 
It made us fight. We fought for something genuine because the elections were stolen. 
It was not just a fight that was incited. It is our livelihood. If someone steals the 
elections, he’s stealing my life, so I have to fight for it (AI, Interview, Gatina, 
Kawangware, 8 April 2010).  
 
Thus, it is clear that these explanations go some way to developing an understanding 
of the Kenyan post-election crisis. However, this thesis has argued that none of them go far 
enough in their analysis, and the situation on the ground is far more complex and nuanced. 
The social construction of identities for example, is an ongoing process which is situated in 
the contours of everyday life; the processes and significance of this rather obvious point are 
seldom explicated or reflected upon sufficiently in reference to situations of ethnic violence. 
That is to say, constructivist insights are not incorporated consistently within explanations of 
conflict. Furthermore, while elites do play upon existing and persisting ethnic grievances and 
fears, and they certainly do use inciting and incendiary rhetoric for strategic political 
purposes, they are often reflecting rather than constructing grassroots discourses that are 
already in circulation. Indeed, this is the very reason that they are successful in some places. 
As Brubaker et al. (2006) have so persuasively demonstrated, elite rhetoric and appeals to 
particular identities can be interpreted very differently at the local level, and can just as easily 
be met with a dismissive roll of the eye and a sentiment of ‘there he goes again’ (2006: 4), as 
they can with widespread acceptance and fervour. Questions of receptivity must always be 
raised and this cannot be done at a high level of aggregation. Additionally, ethnic 
inequalities, discriminations, prejudices, resentments, fears and hatreds are not experienced, 
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enacted, expressed, or felt evenly over time and space, and the salience of those along a 
particular cleavage line is not stable. Temporal and spatial contexts can shift a persisting 
grievance into an acute one, and vice versa; violence itself can modify perceptions of which 
communities are a greater threat and should be more feared than others; and the 
conceptualisations of who constitutes a friend and who a rival, of who is more or less 
‘acceptable’, can shift very quickly. Finally, rationalist perspectives of violence as intimately 
tied in with patronage politics and high stakes political competition presume rather than 
demonstrate or explain support for ethnic elites, masking the complexities of negotiation, 
intra-community debate and policing, and participation in violence on the ground. 
Consequently, a closer exploration of the local level dynamics is required. 
 
The Micro-Level Dynamics of the Kenyan Post-Election Violence 
 There are two broad, overarching, and to an extent overlapping, areas of 
argumentation within the complexities of this thick description that can be identified as 
speaking to the central research question laid out at the start of this thesis. Firstly, while 
acknowledging that violence dynamics are peculiar to their local contexts, I have suggested 
that there was a relatively consistent socio-spatial pattern to the post-election violence in 
Kenya. I have argued that neighbourhoods, villages and territories dominated by one ethnic 
group – what I have termed ‘ethnicised’ spaces – experienced more immediate, more intense 
and more acute violence than ethnically mixed areas. The latter often remained relatively 
peaceful, or experienced a significant delay in the onset of violence, and witnessed far greater 
levels of cooperation between members of supposedly rival communities. Secondly, beneath 
these socio-structural dynamics are further complexities and ambiguities of individual 
agency, participation and involvement, where the macro-ethnic cleavage is debated, 
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negotiated, moulded, transcended and subverted according to local level contexts, individual 
relationships and immediate circumstance. This section draws out the key ideas related to 
each of these points that have been interwoven throughout the chapters of the thesis.  
 
Socio-spatial variations 
 The reasons underscoring the socio-spatial variations in the post-election violence are 
multiple, overlapping, and complex, but there are four key elements that can be identified as 
significantly influencing the emergence of these dynamics. Firstly, as was discussed in 
Chapter Three, while ethnic categorisation and differentiation is a typical mode of thought in 
wider Kenyan society, and while the tendency to interpret everyday social and political 
events in ethnic terms is predominant, these processes are also coloured by, and produced 
through, lived experience. I have suggested that ethnic components of the habitus are 
embedded, maintained and reinforced through everyday enactments of ethnicity, both in 
banal and performative ways, and that these are more frequent and pervasive in ethnicised 
spaces. That is to say, that the disposition to act in an ethnically ‘acceptable’ way
2
 is 
structured by, and in turn structuring of, everyday practice. Thus, in times of tension, 
transition or conflict, a significant number of residents within ethnicised spaces toe the ethnic 
line, sometimes with little conscious reflection. In Chapter Five, for example, I illustrated this 
point in relation to ethnic voting behaviour, suggesting that for some interviewees supporting 
the ethnic leader was 'just a feeling' they had, and part of the moral duty of being a member 
of the community. Others, while still pointing to the disposition to vote ethnically, expressed 
                                                 
2
Ethnicised interpretations of events and conceptualisations of appropriate behaviour are, themselves, produced 
through the everyday interactions, conversations and debates at the local level. While this thesis has drawn 
attention to the potential for renegotiation of the friend/enemy dichotomy during violence – an issue which is 
returned to below – it has not explored the intra-community debates which serve to determine what constitutes 
the ‘right’ ethnic behaviour. For example, the processes through which a particular political candidate emerges 
as ‘acceptable’ to the community have not been explored in this thesis. This points to a potentially fruitful area 
of future research. An analysis of local level dynamics and contestations during the party nominations process, 
for example, could be revealing. 
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a greater awareness of the implicit pressure to behave in the ‘right’ way within ethnicised 
spaces, often emphasising the visibility of other group members’ actions as a significant 
contributory factor. Similarly, these dimensions can be extended to explain some levels of 
participation in violence in ethnicised spaces, as argued in Chapter Seven. Anger at the 
Kikuyu over the ‘rigged’ elections, and the subsequent fury over the violent actions being 
enacted upon ‘our community’ across the country, were produced, reinforced and legitimised 
through interaction with co-ethnics. The visibility of fellow tribesmen taking action in 
response to the crisis heightened the sense of ethnic commonality and invoked a sense of 
obligation to defend and protect the rights of the community. This disposition is disrupted in 
ethnically mixed territories, and the sense of duty to rise up in defence of the larger ethnic 
community is less well-embedded. It is not reinforced through everyday interactions and 
practices to the same extent in everyday life, and consequently is more easily transcended. 
 The second factor which played a significant role in shaping the spatial variations of 
the post-election crisis relates to the continuum of ethnic conflict identified in Chapter Three, 
and extended in Chapter Six. I have argued that large-scale ethnic violence must be 
understood as part of a continuum; its eruption does not mark a clear break from the social 
norm, but rather is an intensification and transformation of the logic of the everyday. A 
number of scholars have pointed to this in relation to the diffusion of violent activity in 
Kenyan society, and my own research supports this argument, illustrating that the 
normalisation of violence as a means of resolving social disputes and conflicts, to an extent, 
legitimised the widespread violent reaction to the ‘rigged’ elections. However, I have gone 
further than this and suggested that there is a continuum of ethnically conflictual behaviours 
in Kenyan society, in which ethnic prejudices, resentments, animosities and hatreds scatter 
everyday interaction in seemingly banal, but certainly not benign ways. They serve to 
produce and reinforce ethnicised notions of superiority, inferiority and difference, and they 
294 
 
maintain underlying ethnic tensions. However, there is a socio-spatial dimension to the 
expression of prejudice and resentment; while the overt employment of negative ethnicity is 
acceptable in ‘in-group’ settings, it is usually tempered when members of the abused 
community are present. Consequently, ethnicised spaces experience more overt and frequent 
articulations of prejudice, and there is a marked social silence regarding their use. In 
ethnically mixed settings, on the other hand, negative ethnicity, when expressed, is done so 
more subtly and often through the use of humour; when the boundaries of acceptability are 
perceived to have been violated, tensions are most often deflected and diffused through social 
cuing. The 2007 campaigns acted as a trigger for the movement along the continuum of 
ethnic conflict – both through top-down mobilisation, and bottom-up escalation processes – 
and the use of abusive language and insults became increasingly overt, pervasive and intense. 
Yet its employment was still shaped by socio-spatial dynamics. Hate speech and negative 
ethnicity employed by politicians found resonance in ethnicised areas, was frequently 
expressed and circulated by local level actors within these neighbourhoods, and not 
uncommonly led to low-scale incidents of violence. In ethnically mixed territories, however, 
the intensity and articulation of ethnic hatred remained more constrained, and while 
ethnicised jokes and biases were more overtly expressed than usual, and they led to the 
occasional argument, they seldom caused lasting tensions or descended into the use of 
violence. Thus, it is the very continuity between the everyday and the extraordinary that can 
help to explain why some areas experienced more acute levels of violence following the 
elections.  
 Thirdly, as has been alluded to throughout the thesis and discussed at length in 
Chapter Seven, embedded notions of ethnic territoriality and pervasive discourses of 
autochthony, both at the macro-regional level, and in the intra-urban arena, were central to 
the shaping of violence dynamics. The notion that ethnicised spaces belong to, and are owned 
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by, the dominant community, imposes a secondary citizenship status on ethnic others living 
in the area. They are understood to be ‘guests’ who have been allowed to stay on the 
condition that they abide by certain rules of hospitality, the most prominent of which is the 
expectation of acquiescence to the political wishes of the host community. Thus in 2007, the 
macro-political divide helped to cast different communities in the roles of ‘good’ guests and 
‘bad’ guests at the local level and the violence can be understood in part as the retraction of 
of hospitality to the latter. Guests who were perceived to have abused the generosity of their 
hosts, whether in the polls, or through their community's actions in the ensuing chaos, were 
violently evicted and chased to their own areas. Indeed, I have argued that the post-election 
crisis was more about asserting or reasserting dominance and control over space, and 
punishing opposing communities for their perceived transgressions and persistent abuses of 
hospitality, than it was about killing or eliminating them. Given this pervasive framework for 
violent action, it is perhaps unsurprising that ethnically mixed spaces, where this sense of 
ethnic territoriality, of ownership over space and of ethnically-determined citizenship rights is 
markedly absent, did not descend into the same levels or dynamics of chaos.  
 Finally, the socio-spatial patterns of violence can be partially explained by the greater 
capacity for intra-community policing within ethnicised spaces. While social structures can 
engender strong dispositions to act in a particular way, they certainly do not determine 
behaviour. As argued in Chapter Five, and highlighted in Chapter Seven, local level actors 
contest, dispute, negotiate, and seek to subvert expectations on their behaviour. In ethnically 
mixed territories, these debates over morally acceptable action are vibrant and there is 
sufficient space for them to thrive. Thus, during the campaigns, political discussions and 
debates were lively, often heated, but rarely violent. However, in ethnicised neighbourhoods, 
perceived transgressions and non-conformity to ethnic expectations were frequently policed 
and disciplined. Intra- and indeed inter- community political debate was stifled and 
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suppressed, sometimes violently.  Thus the inherent risks in voicing opposition to the 
dominant narrative of the space served to silence alternative voices, and to constrain 
individual agency. ‘Moral ethnicity’ does not necessarily operate as a counter to political 
tribalism; indeed, in ethnicised spaces, it is often reinforcing of it. Moreover, as noted in 
Chapter Seven, violent reprisals for not participating in violence were pervasive in ethnicised 
spaces, and forced involvement accounts for a significant element of the violence in these 
areas. However, while ethnicised socio-spatial structures constrain individual agency, that is 
not to suggest that they obliterate it. While these social structures undoubtedly limit open 
political discussion and the articulation of alternative understandings of the social world, and 
while they certainly restrict the potentially liberating effects of unconstrained moral ethnicity, 
local level actors continue to contest and subvert the macro-ethnic cleavage, even if only 
covertly. It is this point which acts as a bridge between recognising the socio-spatial patterns 
of the post-election violence, and incorporating the complexities and ambiguities of 
individual action which operated beneath them.  
  
The ambiguity and multi-vocality of the post-election violence 
 While the 'forty-one-against-one' rhetoric dominated the national scene of the 2007 
elections, constructing a cleavage between the Kikuyu on the one side and other Kenyan 
communities on the other, the micro-level dynamics of the post-election violence illustrate a 
far messier and more ambiguous picture. Not only was the friend/enemy dichotomy debated 
and renegotiated by local level actors, and moulded to suit particular agendas and 
circumstances, but individuals frequently transcended the locally conceptualised ethnic divide 
to assist and protect friends, neighbours and others with whom they had a significant 
relationship. With regards to the reconfiguration of the friend/enemy dichotomy, Chapter 
Seven argued that local contexts and circumstances can render some communities ‘more 
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acceptable’ or ‘more welcome’ in ‘our area’ than others. For example, when faced with the 
threat of external attack by a large group of Kalenjin warriors, residents of Huruma estate in 
Eldoret renegotiated the Luo-Kikuyu enmity which defined the violence in other areas of the 
country, uniting with Luo residents in order to defend the village. The macro-ethnic cleavage 
was not stable across space, and while providing a loose framework for conceptualising inter-
ethnic relations, it was inherently flexible and mutable. Furthermore, it has also been 
demonstrated that there was a temporal volatility to these localised friend/enemy relations, 
and a particular event, whether local or national, could quickly transform welcome guests to 
unwelcome occupiers and change former allies into fierce enemies. Thus, in Luo dominated 
4B in Mathare, a number of interviewees suggested that in the first few days of the violence 
members of the Kamba community were more or less tolerated by ODM-affiliated groups in 
the area. While they were recognised as standing against Raila’s candidacy,
3
 they had neither 
stood with Kibaki, nor indeed posed a significant threat to ODM. However, when Kalonzo 
Musyoka accepted the vice-presidency from Kibaki before the dispute over the elections had 
been settled, the Kamba were targeted and residents of 4B launched an attack on the nearby 
Kamba enclave of Number 10. Thus, there was an inherent, ever-shifting and transforming 
multi-vocality to the post-election violence, and it was not fought along stable cleavage lines.   
  Secondly, while the dominant perspective of ethnic violence implicitly suggests that 
other identities are largely deactivated during periods of ethnic conflict as identity boundaries 
harden and reify, in Chapter Seven I have demonstrated that this is not the case. Long-
standing, cross-cutting ties and personal friendships across the locally configured ethnic 
divides prompted many of my interviewees to seek ways of protecting and assisting their 
                                                 
3
 The Kamba were perceived to be split between ODM and ODM-Kenya. Charity Ngilu was a member of the 
ODM pentagon and Kalonzo Musyoka defected from the party to form ODM-Kenya. Arguably it is the fact that 
they had an influential politician within Raila's party that facilitated their conceptualisation as more or less 
acceptable by the Luo in 4B.  
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friends and neighbours. Indeed, even those who were otherwise fierce participants in 
ethnicised violence tended to make exceptions and concessions for those whom they knew 
well. While the means available to transcend the ethnic divide were often constrained by 
socio-spatial dynamics and had to be more covert in ethnicised spaces, it is apparent that 
ethnicity did not preclude all other forms of identification and relationships. Thus, individual 
participation in ethnic violence is not stable, and in fact is often contradictory. One Luo 
resident of 4B, Mathare offers an example of this tendency towards paradoxical behaviour.  
MUS's narrative indicates that he was a particularly active participant in the post-election 
violence and he explains that he was motivated by a deep anger towards the Kikuyu and a 
strong desire to punish them for stealing the elections. However, he also states:  
Even me, my fiancé is a Kiuk, and I like her, she is sweet to me, I love this woman 
and that is a private thing of me. But say her brother is my enemy, I’ll not take my 
anger against my wife, but I will take it on her brother. (MUS, Interview, 4B, 
Mathare, 29 April 2010). 
 
Thus, local level dynamics of violence in Kenya following the 2007 elections were complex 
and ambiguous and illustrate a flexibility to macro-ethnic cleavages which is not often 
recognised in the literature.  
Broader Implications and Future Research 
 While thick descriptive analyses are inherently specific to the particular situation they 
set out to elucidate, their findings can have implications which extend beyond the confines of 
that particular case. This project, while pointing to the need for further research which can 
offer a comparative perspective on the localised processes of identity construction and 
mobilisation to violence identified in this particular case, has broader implications concerning 
our understanding of the very nature of ethnic conflict itself. The dominant aerial view of 
ethnic violence, the persistent propensity to explain it as the result of elite mobilisation, and 
the current tendency to focus upon group grievances, fears, resentments, and sentiments of 
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injustice, all generate the illusion of homogenous ethnic groups waging battle against each 
other. By casting groups as unitary actors in conflict, existing theories suggest that violence is 
fought along consistent, fixed, stable and clearly defined cleavage lines. This analysis has 
illustrated the limitations of such an approach, suggesting that it is distorting to the point of 
being misleading.  Ethnic violence at the grassroots is inherently messy; the friend/enemy 
dichotomy is constantly in the process of production and renegotiation, even during violence. 
There is a distinct multi-vocality to ethnic violence on the ground where local level actors 
mould macro-level discourses of enmity to suit their immediate localised contexts, and where 
individuals frequently transcend the ethnic divide to assist their friends and neighbours. There 
is no singularly understood and stable ethnic ‘other’ during violence; only multiple, 
fluctuating and transforming conceptualisations. Thus, ethnic violence is not a single conflict 
between ‘groups’ as unitary and homogeneous actors, but rather it is made up of multiple, 
transforming locally-ethnicised conflicts. As Brubaker (2004: 9-10) has noted: 
Ethnic conflict... need not, and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic 
groups, just as racial or racially framed conflict need not be understood as conflict 
between races, or nationally framed conflict as conflict between nations. 
Indeed, despite their ‘constructivist’ claims, by treating the ethnic group as a fixed entity 
during conflict, existing approaches do not incorporate constructivist insights consistently 
within their explanations of ethnic violence (Kalyvas 2008: 1044). This thesis has sought to 
contribute to the emerging literature which aims to reinvigorate constructivism in scholarly 
thinking about ethnicity and ethnic violence. As Fujii (2009a: 188) notes, ‘generating a 
constructivist theory will require more local-level analyses that can trace the processes of 
violence that unfold in other parts of the world’ and further research in this area is crucial. It 
is hoped that the research conducted for this thesis will make some small contribution to this 
broader project of developing nuanced, comprehensive, and ultimately more representative 
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